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This thesis examines the methods through which the administration of George W. Bush 
utilized the events surrounding the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) to legitimize a 
type of imperial American foreign policy. The central argument of this research is that 
9/11 was used by the Bush administration to present a perceived shift in the danger and 
threat that America faced, thus legitimating a more aggressive foreign policy, which this 
thesis categorizes as ‘informal imperialism’. It argues that an American grand strategy 
of global dominance is not new, but rather constitutes a continuation of policies whose 
ideological roots date back to the 1990s.  
  
This thesis explores this argument through the lens of critical geopolitics (CGP), which 
provides a critical and interdisciplinary framework for unpacking geographical 
assumptions in geopolitics and questions how they function within ideology. CGP 
serves as a framework for understanding the use of language in constructing and 
normalizing imperial policies in the United States after 9/11. Methodologically, this 
thesis used critical discourse analysis (CDA), which provides tools for analyzing 
discourse, and examining how language is the key to understanding how power 
functions.  
 
This thesis deploys a critical analysis and definition of American imperialism and the 
contributions of CGP to the debate of a ‘post 9/11 world’. A CDA of the writings of key 
people in the Bush administration traces their foreign policy and its ideological roots. 
Further, a CDA of post 9/11 discourses focuses on the changing geography of danger, 
fear, threat and the act of Othering as it relates to a post 9/11 world. Finally, a CDA of 
the discourses surrounding the Global War on Terror is conducted, arguing that the 
frames set up in relation to a new and dangerous world paved the way for policies that 
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We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And 
while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, 
creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things 
will sort out. We’re history’s actors, and you, all of you, will be left to just 
study what we do. – Senior advisor to Bush, in a 2002 interview (Suskind 
2004)  
 
This thesis is an analysis of the ways in which the Bush administration tried to 
legitimize American imperialism after September 11, 2001 (9/11) through the use of 
ideology and the perception of a new and dangerous world. This thesis uses critical 
geopolitics (CGP) as a framework for analysis, and combines this with critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) as a methodology to approach the research question. CGP stands at the 
intersection of human geography and international relations, and provides a critical and 
interdisciplinary framework for analysis. In Chapter Two, a CGP framework will 
specify three major themes that will be used to approach the research question. They 
are: the power of ideas, identity and difference, and the critical analysis of territory. 
Complimentary to this is a CDA method. This method argues that language is power, 
and language is intentional. Hence, discourses are socially constructed and act as a way 
to naturalize ideologies. CDA examines the way that power is produced and reproduced 
through discourse. Using a CGP approach with a CDA methodology, this thesis seeks to 
answer the question of how President Bush used the 9/11 attacks as a way to legitimize 
American imperialism. 
 
The opening quote above provides a glimpse of what was happening after 9/11: 
America was acting like an empire. September 11, 2001, and all of the fear and 
propaganda around terrorists, Iraq, and Al Qaeda, were all justifications, and 
legitimizing factors of the reality that American power was changing.  Over a decade 
has now passed since the attacks of September 2001 and it has had profound effects on 
not only American citizens and American government, but the entire international 
system. After 9/11, President George W. Bush introduced the world to his own version 
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of a new world order, which saw the relevance of American imperialism once more. 
 
The perceived ‘sudden emergence’ of global terrorism after 9/11 changed the 
dynamics of international relations after 9/11, as America was under attack on its own 
soil, not during a time of war. Historically, imperial policies have been justified by an 
external, centralized threat (such as the USSR, during the Cold War). However, since 
September 11th, the intrinsic nature of the threat was perceived to have changed and the 
instruments used to legitimate American imperialism have also changed. Because of 
this, danger is now perceived to be everywhere. The reality that ‘terrorism’ is an 
unidentifiable and dispersed enemy resulted in an instant panic within America, which 
made its citizens more susceptible to be manipulated into a constant state of fear 
immediately following the attacks.  
 
The “Bush Doctrine”, which put forward pre-emption and unilateralism as a 
written policy, was solidified after the invasion of Iraq. It was not, however, the first 
time in history that American administrations had used these techniques. The idea that 
America has the right to assert its power and be a global leader is not a new idea and has 
been present since the days of the Munroe Doctrine in 1823 (Nelson 1999: 53).  
America occupies the self-assigned role as ‘global policeman’, meddling and interfering 
economically and militarily in the affairs of other sovereign states. In fact, Stephen 
Kinzer noted this fact in his book Overthrow when he argued that,  
 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was not an isolated episode. It was the 
culmination of a 110-year period during which America overthrew fourteen 
governments that displeased them for various ideological, political, and 
economic reasons (Kinzer 2006: 1).  
 
Kinzer argues that throughout the twentieth, and into the twenty-first century, the 
United States has used its military strength to overthrow governments. Each 
circumstance might have been different; i.e. for humanitarian reasons, to ‘save’ a nation 
from corruption, to spread democracy, or to protect American interests abroad (Ibid). 
Kinzer’s argument is relevant to give some background, and serves as a reminder that 
the overthrowing of governments, as in Iraq, is not new, and the simple act of 
overthrowing Saddam Hussein post 9/11 is not what marked this ‘new world order’. 
	 13	
The significant change, and what can be said to be new, is that post 9/11 the 
geographical conceptions of danger had changed. It presented a clear shift in how we 
perceive danger, how it should be handled, and what its consequences are. This was the 
first time a ‘global’ war as such had been declared. It was also the first time war, with 
intentions to use the full force of the military, had been declared against non-state actors 
(i.e. unlike war on ‘drugs’, or ‘poverty’). The perception that danger is everywhere (in 
the form of global terrorism), does not have a territory, and can strike America on 
American soil represents an important change in how the United States proceeded to 
deal with this new threat. In 2004, George W. Bush said this about how he understood 
9/11 to change the nature of the threat: 
 
See, September the 11th changed the equation. It used to be that oceans 
would protect us, that we saw a threat, we didn’t have to worry about it 
because there was two vast oceans. And we could pick and choose as to 
how we deal with the threat. That changed on September the 11th (Bush 
2004c).  
 
The foreign policies that America had previously implemented were presented as 
outdated for dealing with the new threat at hand.  Originally geographical and physical 
borders could stop attacks, whereas in a globalized world they cannot. This is the 
backdrop against which this thesis will explore the consequences of 9/11 on the 
legitimacy of American imperialism. Legitimacy in this context will be analyzed in 
socio-political terms. Dijk asserts that legitimacy is a social function of ideology; 
therefore, in this context, legitimation techniques can be understood as social and 
political acts in which “the speaker is providing good reasons, grounds or acceptable 
motivations for past or present action that has been or could be criticized by others” 
(Dijk 1998: 255). Dunmire argues that the most important of these techniques is 
‘naturalization’ which legitimates a policy by making it seem a natural response to the 
“given state of the world” (Dunmire 2009: 198). In the context of this research, Smith’s 
three ‘levels’ of justification will be considered. Smith makes an interesting, and 
important distinction for whom these ideas are geared toward, to justify means.  These 
levels coincide with the three levels of critical geopolitics laid out by Dalby and Toal, 
which will be discussed in depth in Chapter Two. The first ‘level’ is the popular level, 
which includes propaganda put forward on a daily basis to convince the general public 
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(Smith 2007: xxv). This coincides with Dalby and Toal’s ‘popular geopolitics’ which 
includes media outlets, cinema, and popular culture (Toal and Dalby 1998). This tactic 
uses simple ideas to create a snowball effect in support of American imperialism. For 
example, Smith argues the idea of opposing terror would mean that one endorses human 
freedoms, which in turn means that in order to secure these freedoms, troops need to be 
deployed (Smith 2007: xxv). The second level, justification for the elites, is through 
policy such as the Bush Doctrine. This level coincides with Dalby and Toal’s practical 
geopolitics, which would include those who make foreign policy, institutions and the 
bureaucracy (Toal and Dalby 1998). This is meant to gather support for a grand strategy 
by targeting the international foreign policy elite such as scholars, journalists, 
professional political activists and government officials. The third level is where the 
core of the ideology lies – within academics and theorists of international relations and 
political science (Smith 2007: xxvi). This final level coincides with the formal form of 
geopolitics identified by Toal and Dalby, which include academics, but also think tanks 
(Toal and Dalby 1998). Within this sphere the terms for the Bush Doctrine emerged, 
and this is where understanding how power is justified in Washington lies (Smith 2007: 
xxvi). 
 
1.2 Existing Research  
At present, there is vast literature on post 9/11 American foreign policy, 
specifically on George W. Bush’s foreign policies during his time in office. As over a 
decade has now passed, the following section is a representational collection of some of 
the broader main arguments put forth by other theorists/theories in their attempts to 
analyze the change in the direction of policy during the Bush years after 9/11. Research 
in this area can be grouped under journalistic, rationalist, realist, liberal, critical, and 
ideational views. 
 
Journalistic views such as James Man, and Bob Woodward’s popular books on 
the Bush administration and the influences behind it are quite simple, and highly 
descriptive, but remain a good source for empirical background information. Mann 
gives an account of a group called the ‘Vulcans’ and consisted of Dick Cheney, Donald 
Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage and Condoleezza Rice 
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(Mann 2004: x). His account goes over in detail their involvement with the Project for 
the New American Century (PNAC), and their previous work experience together both 
in- and outside politics. Woodward’s journalistic account for the foreign policy of the 
George W. Bush administration in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks is very 
descriptive. For example, his book, Bush at War (2002), documents several key 
conversations between important members of the Bush administration without offering 
much interpretation. His account of ‘Bush at war’ neither outlines reasons for going to 
war in terms of any previous agendas, nor does it cover in depth any external reasons 
that are not reactionary to the September 11th attacks. The book itself only accounts for 
the first one hundred days after 9/11, and is more of a personal view by Bush and those 
involved in decision making, emphasizing their personalities versus an in depth attempt 
at foreign policy analysis. The Bush Doctrine, discussed in both in Mann and 
Woodward’s work, does not address why the foreign policy actions were ‘necessary’; 
neither did it explain how Iraq became a central threat and a target in the newly declared 
GWOT. These are not issues discussed in critical ways by those who employ a 
journalistic account of Bush’s policies. These are examples of quickly produced 
journalistic accounts of the Bush administration’s policies that do not offer much in the 
way of critical analysis. They are mainly a good source for empirical information, but 
remain limited, as they are very descriptive.  
 
Analyses that focus on how specific policies are made in terms of decision-
making, and differences in management styles that lead to foreign policy decisions that 
can be grouped together under rationalist accounts. These accounts of post 9/11 analysis 
take a rational and individualist approach to foreign policy. For example, in assessing 
Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, Mitchell and Massoud outline several management 
styles. They categorize Bush as relying on a hierarchical structure, constituting a formal 
management style (Mitchell and Massoud 2009: 268). This model states that policy 
options are created by advisors and ultimately in the end, the President makes a choice 
from those options (Ibid). Such models incorporate leadership, small group dynamics, 
and bureaucratic politics to explain how the Bush administration essentially failed to 
prepare for the Iraq War in specific (Ibid: 267). Others such as Dina Badie for example, 
suggests that group think was the most important aspect of foreign policy analysis in 
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Bush’s decisions to go to war in Iraq. She acknowledges that 9/11 was not only an 
opportunity to implement a pre-existing policy, but in fact argues that the actions of the 
Bush administration regarding Saddam Hussein demonstrated a shift in their views 
towards him. Instead of seeing Iraq as an isolated threat, Saddam and Iraq were 
incorporated into the larger theme of the Global War on Terror (Badie 2010: 293). 
Badie’s view of American foreign policy in Iraq contrasts with the view that it was 
always ‘about Iraq’ and instead Iraq was used as a way to "connect the dots” – 
demonstrating a shift in Bush’s thinking, caused by group think (Badie 2010: 293). In 
this case, the author acknowledges the shifting perceptions of danger, but rejects the 
thesis that 9/11 was just a window of opportunity, and bases the decision to invade Iraq 
on a model of group-think and a series of decisions by those in the administration. In 
essence, both of these are examples of rationalist approaches that assess Bush’s 
decisions and understand them in light of policy processes (in this case, bad policy 
processes), versus a more critical approach such as critical geopolitics, that would argue 
that they were not mistakes, but rather ideologically justified policies. These accounts 
provide a simple analysis of reasons for the War in Iraq, and focus heavily on decision 
makers and making, as opposed to larger conceptual ideas such as American grand 
strategy or imperialism in motivators for war.  
 
Litwak, who does not fall starkly into any one category, for example, has posed 
the question of whether pre-emption in the Bush Doctrine is a new general doctrine for 
US foreign policy, or if it is a traditional instrument of self-defense that has gained more 
relevance in the “transformed post-11 September political context” (Litwak 2002: 59). 
Litwak concludes that because the security context has been indeed transformed after 
9/11, the “new character of the threat” is leading to a new “calculus of pre-emption” 
(Ibid: 71). According to Litwak, pre-emption is becoming more “common-sensical” due 
to the change in the nature of the threat – global terrorism. Motivations for a grand 
strategy or imperial ambitions are not discussed by Litwak, and his analysis is based on 
an assessment of US foreign policy that focuses on the changing nature of threat as an 
excuse, and the failures of the UN to protect global security. The above examples do not 
critically engage with the construction of fear and threat, and further, the necessity of 
war that these perceptions legitimized. 
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Realists and Liberal theories have also engaged with this material over the last 
decade. For example, Andrew Bacevich’s work on American Empire which is often 
cited in post 9/11 analysis is an attempt to explain American statecraft in the 1990s, and 
covers the early days of the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Bacevich argues that 
the United States has had a clear and well-defined grand strategy since the 1990s 
(Bacevich 2002: 3). Following the main principles of realism that states will at 
minimum seek their own preservation, and at maximum seek greater domination, 
Bacevich asserts that American grand strategy is essentially to “preserve and, where 
feasible and conducive to US interest, to expand an American imperium” (Ibid). 
Bacevich claims that U.S. policy did not in fact change after 9/11 in terms of 
commitment to an ‘open world’; on the contrary, it “energized them to press on” (Ibid: 
226). In representing all that is good in the world, ‘America the reluctant superpower’ 
was ‘forced’ to act in carrying on to spread liberalism (Ibid). Quoting Donald Rumsfeld, 
September 11th actually created the “kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to 
refashion the world” (Ibid: 227). The war on terror that Bush called for articulated 
something that had not been present since the collapse of the Soviet Union which was a 
readily identifiable enemy: “a compelling rationale for a sustained and proactive use of 
American power on a global scale justified as a necessary protective measure” (Ibid: 
229). Bacevich’s analysis points to three important ways in which defining the war 
against terror as a war on behalf of freedom served the administration’s purposes. One 
was that it allowed Bush to claim American innocence; second was it allowed Bush to 
link this new war to great wars of the past in which great evils were defeated (i.e. 
fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism); and thirdly, it allowed Bush to remove the 
constrains on the use of force, and “Bush’s war on terror made it possible for policy-
makers to reclaim the freedom of action provided by the Truman Doctrine” (Bacevich 
2002: 230). Above all, September 11th and Bush’s policies “reinforced the post-cold war 
consensus for maintaining unquestioned military superiority” (Ibid: 238). 
 
However, missing from Bacevich’s realist accounts of American foreign policy, 
or even by his books’ title, ‘American Empire’, is an account of the power of ideas and 
the social construction of discourses. Bacevich does not discuss how America was 
‘forced to spread liberalism’, or the ideological basis of a ‘reluctant superpower’. He 
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does not provide a critical analysis of these concepts, which are central to the 
ideological basis of President Bush’s foreign policy. He states that 9/11 provided a 
chance to refashion the world; but how? The ways in which these concepts (ex. America 
is needed to fulfill the role of benevolent hegemon) were presented to the American 
people, and further the international community are not discussed. Bacevich’s realist 
account misses other important dimensions that can provide insight into the way the 
Bush administration framed the important of 9/11 in relation to their foreign policy, 
such as ideational elements.  
 
Grand strategy has featured as a fundamental part of American politics and those 
who study it. After the attacks of 2001, several theories emerged once more about 
American grand strategy, and how the policies that ‘resulted’ from 9/11 fit into the big 
picture. Theorists such as Ikenberry argue that in the past, America has subscribed to 
one of two grand strategies. One was the realist worldview, which was organized 
around containment, deterrence, and the maintenance of the global balance of power 
(Ikenberry 2002: 45).  Stability of the international system was achieved through 
nuclear deterrence until the end of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, 
Ikenberry, along with many other liberals theorized that great powers would “compete 
with each other, and although war is not unthinkable, sober statecraft and the balance of 
power offer the best hope for stability and peace” (Ikenberry 2002: 46). George W. 
Bush ran for the Presidency describing his platform as a “new realism” which aimed to 
shift focus away from “Clinton-era preoccupations with nation building, international 
social work, and the promiscuous use of force, and toward cultivating great-power 
relations and rebuilding the nation’s military” (Ikenberry 2002: 46). The second grand 
strategy has been a liberal one, aimed at a system in where the US uses its political 
weight to create rules that will protect American interests, maintain its power and 
extend its influence (Ikenberry 2002: 47). However the new grand strategy under 
President Bush is outlined in seven main elements by Ikenberry; amongst them 
maintaining a unipolar world, a new assessment of how to handle the ‘new’ threats, an 
offensive foreign policy involving pre-emption and preventive wars and the right to 
rewrite the rules of sovereignty (Ikenberry 2002). Ikenberry’s analysis of Bush’s new 
foreign policy concludes that his version of neo-imperialism cannot be sustained (Ibid: 
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56). His main argument is that this will lead inevitably to imperial overstretch and that it 
will cause the United States more harm than good as allies will turn against it and the 
world will ultimately become less secure, and so will America (Ikenberry 2002). As a 
result, he posits that the old grand strategies will reappear and a realist or a liberal 
strategy will come back into existence (Ibid: 57).  
 
As many liberal critiques of grand strategy, or imperialism, Ikenberry’s account 
addresses the real issues of overstretch, and the unsustainability of such aggressive 
foreign policy. However, in consistence with much of IR literature, it does not address 
the issues this research is seeking to analyze. His account is that of two competing 
theories of grand strategy. Nowhere does it address how these grand strategies gain 
legitimacy on an ideological level, for instance. The preoccupation with whether or not 
Bush’s new imperialism will result in an overstretch or not, takes away from the issues 
at the core that this type of literature misses, that CGP seeks to address. How did the 
neoconservatives create justification for the war in the first place, and naturalize US 
dominance in the world? How did America become the only superpower, and why is it 
that it continues to fill this role? These are questions that are overlooked at the 
ideological level by many liberals, and some schools of IR that this research seeks to 
investigate through a CGP approach.  
 
Alternatively, authors such as Edwards Rhodes have engaged with the notion of 
imperial ambitions. Although he acknowledges the promotion of American hegemony 
in the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2002, and the emotionally charged political 
messages of the Bush administration both in writing and in speech, his analysis does not 
seek to question the assumptions and implications behind the shifting perceptions of 
danger presented in the NSS. His critique of the Bush administration focuses on how 
realistic it is for the Bush administration to implement or ‘spread’ liberalism around the 
world, as a mission. He criticizes Bush’s policies as he states that “strike down one 
tyrant or one terrorist and another will grow in his place” (Rhodes 2003: 141). His 
critique targets the limitations to spreading liberalism around the world; not engaging 
with how the idea of spreading liberalism is an ideology to maintain American 
hegemony. In another example, Rhodes assesses how progress is presented through the 
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eyes of the Bush administration, and how liberalism will result in progress and therefore 
a secure world (Rhodes 2003: 145). He does not critically assess the idea of progress, 
how it is socially constructed, or how the idea of progress itself may be used as 
justification for certain policies. His analysis only focuses on the fact that the Bush 
administration attempts to link progress to liberalism and whether or not that is 
achievable. This only skims the surface of certain aspects of imperial thinking. He 
concludes by saying Bush’s grand strategy of spreading liberalism isn’t attainable as it 
jeopardizes international peace and individual freedom (Rhodes 2003: 147). The 
analysis of the policies touch on some important points, but is not a multidimensional 
approach, and thus does not address the pre-existing ideas constituting the Bush 
Doctrine, or more explicitly the neoconservative agenda for example, that arguably had 
a greater effect on Bush’s policies.  
 
Views more critical or ideational such as Jean-Francois Drolet, take into account 
the neoconservative agenda and its influences on US foreign policy. He takes an 
ideational approach, arguing that neoconservatives’ claims to promote a liberal agenda 
are false, and in fact mask the militaristic approach they have to foreign policy (Drolet 
2010: 92). He argues that neoconservatives promote the spread of democracy as part of 
their foreign policy initiative to counter Islamic-terrorism, not necessarily the 
ideological concept of democracy itself, which prior to the 1980s, Kristol argues, 
Americans didn’t even support vehemently as they had partnerships with dictators (Ibid: 
97). He cites Toby Dodge’s argument that neoconservatives “envisage democracy 
promotion as the establishment by force of a set of institutions and electoral 
mechanisms designed to transform the ‘deficient’ political culture of the targeted states 
and manufacture consent from above for an externally imposed neoliberal political-
economic structure” (Drolet 2010: 97). Drolet sees democracy promotion as a strategy 
of statecraft that is designed to make the international system safe for American 
hegemony (Ibid: 100). Drolet’s analysis is critical of the neoconservatives, and their 
views of foreign policy. He draws attention to some important factors such as ‘true’ 
motives behind the neoconservative agenda – a military dominance of the globe, versus 
a genuine desire to spread liberal democracy. That being acknowledged, an analytical 
framework that allows us to move away from mainstream notions of foreign policy is 
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needed; one that deals with more complex aspects such as ideology. Drolet’s analysis is 
a start, and makes useful contributions to this research. However, CGP in comparison 
offers an interdisciplinary approach, which takes into account ideology as a product of 
hegemonic discourses. Drolet’s view of democracy promotion as a tool of statecraft puts 
the state at the centre of the equation. Alternatively, CGP questions statecraft as 
manmade, questions the state as a taken for granted entity, and the implications of such 
assumptions on foreign policy. 
 
Another ideational perspective presented by Tony Smith hones in on the 
importance of ideas for the justification of American empire after 9/11. Smith argues 
that after the attacks, the decision to go into Afghanistan was supported internationally 
and by the UN as an act of self-defense that required “no special interpretation” (Smith 
2007: xx). However, in the case of the choice to go to war in Iraq, Smith asserts that this 
was justified on “highly ideological terms”, with underlying motivations for American 
foreign policy (Ibid). The Bush Doctrine, which was the most explicit document in 
American history according to Smith, was used to justify actions in Iraq (Ibid). Having 
Iraq under US control via regime change would also create a new order in the “broader 
Middle East” which was part of a larger mission to structure world affairs in America’s 
favour – “a grand design presented by Washington without precedent in American 
history” (Ibid: xxi). Smith’s different levels of justification, mentioned in earlier parts of 
this chapter are most useful in understanding for whom legitimacy and justification are 
created. His emphasis on the power of ideas is most useful in this research, especially 
regarding concepts of legitimacy. This research seeks to use Smith’s framework around 
justification, and incorporate it into the major themes in CGP to address some of the 
gaps in IR literature, presenting an interdisciplinary and critical analysis.  
 
A more critical view involving methodology similar to CDA shows that the 
ideology that “9/11 changed everything” was the starting point for the Bush 
administration to implement a new domestic and foreign policy. The terror from 9/11, 
in the eyes of the administration, represented a shift in danger, threat, fear, and above all 
how to handle their foreign policy. An intertextual analysis of the Bush administration’s 
claims that 9/11 changed everything, by Patricia Dunmire, argues that in fact this 
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discourse was a return to the desire by the United States to maintain global supremacy 
by maintaining military pre-eminence (Dunmire 2009: 196). She provides an interesting 
analysis of how the NSS 2002 was presented as a “natural” response to the 9/11 attacks; 
one that was inevitable (Dunmire 2009: 198). Her analysis is similar to a type of 
discourse analysis, and proves to be useful. However, her end argument that 9/11 is but 
a continuation of policies related to a new world order declared at the end of the Cold 
War misses the importance of the discourses put forward by the Bush administration 
that geographical categories of danger had changed.  
 
Constructivism has also tackled the ideational elements. As Mabee argues, it has 
challenged “conventional approaches to international security by adding normative 
dimension: that ideational factors constitute social relations” (Mabee 2007: 387). 
However, the downfall of some constructivist work as argued by Mabee is that, “while 
important, the study of security norms has ignored the ways in which actors construct 
ideas about what threats are, and what security itself is” (Ibid). However, he argues that 
the Copenhagen school has made significant contributions in looking at the discursive 
constructions of threat. He praises the school for its “rich understanding of agency, 
potentially not just confined to states” (Ibid). The Copenhagen school has indeed looked 
at some elements of language, discourse and the role of ideas, but only so far as it 
relates specifically to securitization. Buzan et al. in their popular book, Security: a new 
framework for analysis, look at ‘language theory’ (which mainly focuses on speech acts 
(Waever 1995: 55)) as it applies to security and securitization, arguing that something 
becomes a security issue not necessarily because there is a real threat, but it is presented 
as such (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). The distinguishing feature of securitization, as Buzan et 
al. explain, is its specific rhetorical structure and how threats are presented, handled, 
and perceived (Ibid: 26), and the outcome is decided by its audience. The ‘bonus’ of 
categorizing something as a security issue gives it the priority of urgency. It also makes 
it a political choice, by labeling it specifically as a national security issue that needs 
intervention by the state (Waever 1995: 65). Critical geopolitics, and critical discourse 
analysis seek to analyze the discourse beyond just the ‘securitization’ issue, to a broader 
range of understanding regarding power, imperialism, grand strategy and legitimacy.  
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Stuart Croft’s work, a part of the field of critical constructivism also addresses 
the importance of discourses in America’s War on Terror. Importantly, he argues that 
discourses have the power to “create and reflect identities” and hence they construct 
who is seen as an enemy, or ally (Croft 2006:1). He also argues that in turn, these 
constructions legitimate actions and stipulate whose actions are tolerable, and whose are 
not (Ibid). One of his central arguments is that these discourses emerge in times of crisis, 
and hence crises are “the engines of radical discursive change” as we have seen with the 
events of 9/11 (Croft 2006: 1). Like many authors of CGP, Croft also argues that 
discourses that take on a sense of credibility in a crisis situation will soon turn into 
common sense, and hence get repeated from the government levels, through the  media, 
and down to public understanding of events. Importantly, Croft’s work recognizes the 
importance of discourses on our everyday lives, as he argues it forms how we behave 
towards ‘ourselves’ and also towards ‘others’ (Croft 2006: 43). As a critical author, he 
also points out that the events of 9/11 were socially constructed thereafter to gives a 
certain meaning, and a key discourse in the War on Terror that the United States was 
attacked ‘out of the blue’, something that this research will discuss in key CDA chapters 
(Croft 2006: 85). He also stresses the importance of the discourses of the War on Terror 
and its appearance in popular culture. He argues that  
 
On a daily basis, it was the organs of popular culture that reproduced the 
‘war on terror’ as common sense, as the way that life had to be lived. In 
novels, popular music, humour, television and film, the ‘war on terror’ was 
marked, and its messages reproduced (Croft 2006: 204) 
 
Crofts work is an important critical view of the discourses of the War on Terror and 
how crisis situations bring about the radical changes in policy through socially 
constructed meanings.  
 
Another critical constructivist work, and the most in depth engagement that 
addresses language and discourse in the Bush administration is Richard Jackson’s book 
Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Political and Counter-terrorism. Published 
in 2005, his work is classified as a critical discourse analysis. As Jackson states in his 
opening chapter, his book is about “the public language of the ‘war on terrorism’ and 
the way in which language has been deployed to justify and normalise a global 
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campaign of counter-terrorism” (Jackson 2005: 1). As this book is a claim to critical 
discourse analysis, and the language of the Bush administration surrounding the GWOT, 
it is important to mark the differences between Jackson’s work and that of this research. 
First, his timeframe of focus is from September 11, 2001 through January 31, 2004 and 
includes speeches, interviews, radio broadcasts and reports to Congress. He does not 
include policy documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review or the National 
Security Strategy, which this thesis takes into account. While this thesis and Jackson’s 
work argue that the War on Terror is an elite based project, he does not make mention 
of the use of critical geopolitics. While his work is a CDA, he does not specify the 
‘tools’ of CDA that are used to analyze the use of language – and why he has 
specifically focused on certain quotes. For example, he does not necessarily say that ‘X 
quote’ is an example of rhetorical devices, or framing. Hence, in regards to CDA, this 
thesis provides a more methodologically rigorous analysis.  
 
Jackson does link Bush administration policies to previous US approaches, 
however unlike this thesis, his focus is on previous uses of variations of the ‘war on 
terrorism’, not necessarily connecting it to the larger concept of American imperialism, 
or American grand strategy. While he argues that the “activity” after 9/11 was not a 
consequence of the events themselves (Jackson 2005: 16), he claims that this is in 
relation specifically to previous counter-terrorism rhetoric in the United States. Related 
to this point, where he refers to the “genealogical origins” of Bush’s language, he only 
specifies five quotes from before 9/11 (Jackson 2005: 155) and again they are in 
reference to terminology about terrorism. No other references are made in any detail to 
previous documents or speeches tracing back the origins of George W. Bush’s foreign 
policy, or showing continuity. At one point, Jackson makes reference to the policy 
agenda of the Bush administration being linked with the neoconservative agenda (2005: 
27), however, he does not provide any evidence or analysis of this claim. Overall, 
Jackson’s CDA of the GWOT is important, but there are gaps in his work and approach 
which this research adds to. Jackson’s analysis does not link his findings to a clear 
continuity in American foreign policy, nor does it mention imperialism or grand 
strategy. This thesis seeks to do both these things, and in the process will trace the 
origins of the Bush administration’s foreign policy to specific documents and influential 
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people dating back to the 1990s. This thesis will also analyze policy documents, where 
Jackson has omitted them. Additionally, this research combines critical geopolitics with 
critical discourse analysis to show continuity in foreign policy that goes beyond 
terrorism and the language surrounding it. 
 
The above represents a variety of approaches on American foreign policy, 
Bush’s agenda, and the policy implications of 9/11. Although there are some arguments 
worth incorporating, they do not engage with how discourses are created and 
perpetuated on ideological terms, with the exception of Jackson’s analysis that comes 
closest in methodology to this research. The implementation of the Bush Doctrine, the 
declaration of a war on terror, the decision to go to war in Iraq as part of a grand 
strategy and justification of American imperialism are not discussed in depth. In the 
next chapter, a framework for the critical geopolitics approach along with a critical 
discourse analysis methodology will be put forward. Together, they provide a critical 
approach to address some of the missing gaps in the literature. Presented above were 
some major types of approaches and their critiques. Journalistic approaches are very 
descriptive, and full of empirical information that lacks critical analysis. The rationalist 
approaches are very focused on decision making, management styles, foreign policy 
processes and they are largely rational and individualistic. Both these approaches miss 
the intention of constructed discourses to shape foreign policy, and instead conclude 
that management styles or poor foreign policy processes shape outcomes. CGP would 
argue that it is an intentional construction of language in discourses that shape 
ideologies that in turn explain foreign policy outcomes and legitimacy.  Other popular 
accounts like Bacevich’s focus on empire actually leave out the crucial part of analysis 
in how imperial states assume their role; in the case of America, the ‘reluctant’ 
superpower. There are no mentions of ideational elements, and instead focuses on 
rational processes. Ikenberry, Rhodes, and some liberal camps whom are critical of 
American imperialism are analyzing it from the approach of the effects of imperial 
overstretch; i.e. the most important criticism in this approach are the limitations to 
empire no necessarily its legitimacy, ideology or maintenance on deeper level. This is 
something CGP seeks to move away from; discussing the limitations of imperialism and 
overstretch have been discussed by many, but what is missing is how they are justified 
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in the first place, on an ideological level. More critical views such as Drolet and 
Dunmire for example, incorporate the importance of language. But in Dunmire’s case, 
she falls short of linking the past and present policies together in American grand 
strategy. While she recognizes the continuum of American foreign policy, she fails to 
incorporate the importance of the discourses that came from the Bush administration 
after 9/11. This thesis seeks to compare and contrast the discourse of the 1990s when 
this imperial style foreign policy began, with Bush’s discourse post 9/11 to understand 
the connection and hence, the ideological basis. Constructivism declares its interest in 
the ideational, and makes this the centre of their approach, but once again falls short as 
their analysis focuses heavily on norms, but fails to analyze how those norms came to 
existence. In an attempt to build on that, the Copenhagen school has tried to further 
incorporate the importance of language, but its focus is generally on the language 
around securitization specifically. CGP and CDA seek to broaden the focus past norms 
and securitization and look at the different ways in which discourse is used to naturalize 
imperial policies ideologically. Just to reiterate, there is a large amount of literature that 
covers ‘post 9/11’ policy in international relations. This selection is only a 
representation of that, and offers an example of the kind of literature this thesis seeks to 
move away from and critique during the course of research.  
 
1.3 Contribution  
The pairing of critical geopolitics with critical discourse analysis offers a unique 
and critical engagement with materials such as government documents, speeches, and 
think tank publications, and provides an in depth analysis and understanding of 
ideology, via its construction by language, which is at the heart of power. The three 
themes that can be extracted from critical geopolitics (and which will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Two) are the power of ideas, identity and difference, and the critical 
analysis of territory. This research seeks to apply these to the gaps in IR concerning 
how we understand power, how imperialism is understood, and how it is socially 
constructed. Critical discourse analysis provides a tool by which to apply the principles 
of CGP to this research methodologically.  
 
In 1993, R.B.J. Walker made a very important point about the limits of 
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international relations theories. He argued that theories of IR are “expressions of a 
historically specific understanding of the character and location of political life in 
general”, and are less important as substantive explanations they offer about political 
conditions in the modern world (Walker 1993: 5). Walker also alludes to taken-for-
granted beliefs by pointing out that political analysis is constrained by categorization 
(ibid). Whether or not the importance of states is growing, or fading; the importance of 
state versus non state actors; or whether states are becoming more interdependent, are 
common questions for international relations theories, and do not necessarily provide an 
in depth view of phenomena (Walker 1993: 7). Walker’s critique of IR theories is 
important here, because he essentially points to one of the gaps in IR that this research 
seeks to address; which is that most IR theories are “taking a modernist framing of all 
spatiotemporal options as an unquestionable given” (Walker 1993: 7). Addressing 
taken-for-granted beliefs is a key part of this research. Therefore, introducing critical 
geopolitics into the field of IR as an alternative and critical view is an aim of this 
research in addressing the gaps in IR dealing with post 9/11 analyses.   
 
Since Walker’s argument in 1993, there have been many developments in 
critical geopolitics, and within departments of geography across the world. However, 
within the discipline of international relations, critical geopolitics is not commonly seen 
as a tool of analysis; neither is it understood as a theory or framework. Foreign policy 
analysis, realism and power politics dominate IR theories of imperialism, American 
grand strategy and foreign policy more generally. Theorists like Keohane, Ikenberry, 
Morgenthau, Nye and Snyder are often cited in regards to American imperialism and its 
theories.  Variations of constructivism take on ideational elements, but still take the 
state as a given entity as much of the core focus is on norms, and how states and actors 
within them behave based on these shared norms. For example, Finnemore and Sikkink 
cite Checkle’s study that researched how international norms influence different actors, 
whom are usually states, differently (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 397). The basis for 
analysis in most cases are states, and the focus of these studies are usually norms. The 
field of international relations at large does not specifically account for the roots of 
power in discourse and language. The ways in which ideologies are normalized through 
common sense beliefs are not something that IR has vast literature on. However, 
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international relations as a field of study can incorporate such practices into its realm. 
At the crossroads of international relations and critical geopolitics, is a way to practice 
IR called “dissident international relations”. Discussed by authors such as Ashley and 
Walker, dissident IR problematizes the “deterritorialization” and then 
“reterritorialization” of global political life (Toal 1996: 171). Following the principles 
of Critical Geopolitics (CGP), these authors seek to question the boundary-producing 
practices of modern discourse that use divisions such as self and other, rationality and 
irrationality, and divide the inside from the outside (Toal 1996: 171). They question 
how the “Other” is created, on a larger global scale and how we come to understand our 
world by creating distinctions, emphasizing the importance of social construction in 
global politics. Modern statecraft, in Ashley’s words, can be seen as “modern mancraft”, 
which is effectively the fact that man constructs his problems, dangers and fears (Toal 
1996: 172).  Dissident IR “explicitly repudiates” itself as a “new” perspective or a 
single philosophical approach, but instead recognizes the act of practicing dissident IR 
as a “critical attitude” (Toal 1996: 172).  This research seeks to incorporate critical 
geopolitics into international relations, using a critical and interdisciplinary approach, 
attempting to present new ways to analyze the prospect of American imperialism in a 
post 9/11 world by combining critical geopolitics with the methods of critical discourse 
analysis in the understanding of power. 
 
Additionally, this research is not only a move away from journalistic accounts of 
the events that followed 9/11, but also to move away from theories of foreign policy 
analysis that only skim the surface of the change in direction of American policy after 
9/11. Accounts like those discussed above rely on descriptive and rational analyses of 
foreign policy. They are decision based, and often not critical. This thesis offers deeper 
level critical analysis that takes into account the importance of key players and previous 
documents and their ties to the ‘post 9/11’ foreign policy the Bush administration 
implemented. This interdisciplinary method draws upon several influential areas and 
theorists in international relations, human geography, political science, and within the 
methodological tools of critical discourse analysis to offer a combined effort at 
answering questions at the level of the ideational. This central focus of this thesis will 
be on the analysis of the ideologies and discourses that justified and attempted to 
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legitimate American imperialism. By incorporating critical geopolitics and critical 
discourse analysis into the field of international relations as a framework, this research 
seeks to address some of the gaps in literature on the importance of social construction 
of ideologies as legitimating discourses. It is a project in the critical analysis of the root 
of policies put forward by the Bush administration during George W. Bush’s eight years 
in office.  
 
This thesis pinpoints specific ideologies that run through the discourse from the 
1990s using critical discourse analysis, and then highlights how the same discourses 
were used after 9/11 as ‘new’ justifications for foreign policy after the attacks. This 
creates a narrative tracing back the ideological roots of George W. Bush’s foreign 
policy by carefully examining the influence of specific people, their writing and 
ideological roots, and extending the narrative to the Bush administration where we saw 
radical changes in foreign policy as a ‘reaction’ to 9/11, which this thesis will prove 
otherwise.  
 
 The issue with theories that attempt to understand risk and threat and its 
implications, such as the risk society thesis, is that it does not analyze in depth how 
dangers and threats become classified as risks (Isin 2004: 218). This is where discourse 
and the power of ideas become very important, and an area that CGP and CDA together 
can contribute. Structurally, this thesis will combine the framework of CGP with the 
methods of CDA to provide a complimentary, critical way to analyze American power, 
by focusing on the role of ideas and discourses and how they constitute perceptions that 
form specific worldviews. This combined framework and method provides a tool to 
analyze international relations and power in a way that is at the intersection of human 
geography, IR, and political science.  
 
This research will proceed with five core chapters. In Chapter Two, the 
framework and methodology of the project will be presented. Here an in-depth look at 
critical geopolitics and its principles, and critical discourse analysis and its tools will be 
explored. In Chapter Three, a critical analysis and definition of imperialism, American 
imperialism, and the contribution of CGP to that discussion in the context of a ‘post 
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9/11 world’. Following this, Chapter Four will be a CDA of the writings of key people 
in the Bush administration will be examined, tracing their foreign policy and ideological 
roots, making it evident that the policies after 9/11 were in fact not a reaction to the 
events themselves, but a continuation in foreign policy largely started in the 1990s. 
Once this agenda has been made clear, Chapter Five will offer a CDA of post 9/11 
discourses and will focus on the changing geography of danger, fear, threat, and also the 
act of Othering as it relates to a post 9/11 world. This is where most of the framing for a 
‘new’ world took place, evoking the original ideas of American imperialism from the 
1990s, while presenting them as a new reaction to the attacks. The final section of this 
thesis, Chapter Six, will be a CDA exploring the discourses surrounding the Global War 
on Terror, arguing that the frames set up in relation to a new and dangerous world paved 






















  Chapter Two 
Framework and Methodology 
 
2.1 Analytical framework 
This research seeks to move away from ‘theory testing’ within international 
relations that seeks to apply general theories to a variety of political phenomenon. As 
such, this thesis will argue that critical geopolitics (CGP) can fill in a part of the gap in 
current methods and theoretical approaches within the field of international relations, by 
focusing on the power of ideas. CGP is unique in that it can be understood as an 
analytical framework, or a lens, rather than a theory. The first part of this chapter will 
discuss the influences and theoretical underpinnings to the CGP approach by briefly 
discussing the relevant contributions of Michel Foucault, Edward Said and Antonio 
Gramsci. Following this, the principles of CGP will be laid out, followed by the three 
themes that this research extracts from CCP (the power of ideas, identity and difference, 
and the critical analysis of territory) and will be used throughout the remainder of this 
thesis. The second part of this chapter will cover methodology: critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). CDA is intertwined and complimentary to CGP and as such, this 
research fuses the two together to analyze how the attempt to legitimize American 
imperialism was presented. The methodology section of this chapter will cover 
definitions of discourse, the principles of CDA, the importance of language, power and 
ideology in CDA, and finally the framework that this research will employ throughout 
the empirical chapters of the thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to argue that 
employing CDA under the analytical framework – or lens- of critical geopolitics creates 







Michel Foucault is very important to the field of discourse analysis, and well 
known and recognized for his contribution to the method. However, he also has 
concepts that are fundamental to the foundations of CGP. Foucault recognized the 
importance of geographers in studying international relations; he talks about this in the 
following passage: 
 
Geography must be made a means of reading the global crisis of 
imperialism, capitalism and centralism in all its forms…space is the place 
where history inscribes itself, and geography should be the analysis of that 
which dwells and is born there….Geographers become that they should be: 
awakeners of consciousness, educators and thereby liberators (Foucault as 
cited in Riou 2007: 35).  
 
Foucault’s key political-geographic arguments are his theories on governmentality, 
which many political geographers have adopted. He advocates a rethinking of power 
relations beyond the state as a centralized apparatus of interest and strategies (Coleman 
and Agnew 2007: 320). Critical geographers such as Dalby and Toal promote ‘thinking 
outside the box’ – i.e. outside the state as a given entity, and argue for a move away 
from thinking of the state as the only unit of interaction in the international system. 
Foucault suggests that the state should not be seen as something developed “above 
individuals”, ignoring their agency and existence, but rather as a “sophisticated structure” 
which individuals are integrated into (Ibid). This is essentially an argument of social 
construction. Agnew and Coleman suggest that Foucault is arguing for what they call a 
“geosociology of political power”, which is understanding the “complex sociological 
contexts of power that are overlapping and discontinuous spatialities of power in the 
plural” (2007: 321). 
 
Another influential concept among political geographers is Foucault’s concept 
of governmentality. According to Rose, the study of governmentality is to analyze the 
emergence of specific “regimes of truth concerning the conduct of conduct, ways of 
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speaking the truth, persons authorized to speak truths, ways of enacting truths and the 
costs of so doing” (Rose as cited in Huxley 2007: 187). Critical geopolitics seeks to 
question how ‘truths’ are created and legitimized; therefore, this concept has been of 
great importance to the field of CGP. Space is a special concern for political 
geographers, and Foucault maintains that “space is fundamental in any form of 
communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power” (Foucault cited in 
Huxley 2007: 190). Legg (2007) claims that Foucault’s writings on governmentality 
have appeal to political geographers for several reasons, one of them being that it 
presents an analytical program for analyzing modern regimes of government, and the 
literature also refers to a mode of power that has gone beyond the power regimes of 
sovereignty looking into how power is used to stabilize and normalize populations 
(Legg, 2007: 278). However, governmentality, as discussed within sociological and 
political frameworks does not adequately give depth to the discussion of space, which is 
where critical geopolitics seeks to expand on Foucault’s ideas and integrate the 
importance of space and place into the discussion of international relations (Huxley 
2007: 190). Still, Foucault’s contributions to political geography and specifically, to the 
field of CGP are worth noting, and have been of great importance in both theory and 
method. 
 
Foucault’s theories on power/knowledge have also had great influence, both 
theoretically for critical geographers, but also methodologically, as much of his work 
regarding power/knowledge is integrated in various types of discourse analysis. The 
types of questions involving power that Foucault seeks to answer are: “if power is 
exercised, what sort of exercise does power involve? And what are its mechanisms?” 
(Foucault 1980: 89). He contends that “one should try to locate power at the extreme 
points of its exercise where it is always less legal in character” (Foucault 1980: 97). The 
powers granted to Bush after 9/11 under a “state of emergency”, which later turned into 
a permanent state of emergency during his eight years, is a prime example for analysis 
and hence the importance of this time period. The puzzle regarding power is not only 
who has power, but a deeper understanding of power that seeks to understand its effects. 
Hence, the importance in critical geopolitics thinking, and discourse analysis 
specifically, are questions surrounding ideology. Foucault asks: “What rules of right are 
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implemented by the relations of power in the production of discourses of truth? What 
type of power is susceptible of producing discourse of truth that in a society such as 
ours are endowed with such potent effects?” (1980: 93). What he is capitalizing on is 
the importance of discourse. Foucault claims that there are manifold relations of power, 
which “permeate, characterise and constitute the social body” and these relations of 
power cannot circulate or be produced without a specific discourse (1980: 93). 
Foucault’s teacher, Althusser, introduced the conception of ideology in a discursive 
light. He lead discussions on how ideology becomes internalized and the role that 
discourse plays (Purvis and Hunt 1993: 483). The importance of discourse is key to 
Foucault, and to the study of critical geopolitics in understanding the ‘how’ question: 
how discourses become prominent, and how ideology is sedimented in society, for 
example. On the relation of power and truth, Foucault concludes that “we are subjected 
to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through 
the production of truth” (Foucault 1980: 93). Since, according to Foucault, truth is what 
makes laws, and produces discourses, which then transmits and extends itself upon the 
effect of power, our mode of living depends on the “true discourses” (1980: 94). This 
connects directly to discourse and the power of ideas – a main theme in critical 
geopolitics. It provides importance to studying discourse in the production of “truth” 
and ideology a priority in the social sciences, and therefore, many social science 




The influential work of Edward Said crosses disciplines. His ideas have been 
debated and incorporated into a number of fields, and the continued importance of his 
ideas, especially in light of the re-emergence of imperialism as a focus of study will be 
discussed here. In Edward Said’s words, his book Orientalism “once again raises the 
question of whether modern imperialism ever ended” (2003: xvi). In his later work, 
Culture and Imperialism, he echoes this point in a quote from Michael Barratt-Brown 
that, 
  
imperialism is still without question a most powerful force in the economic, 
political and military relations by which the less economically developed 
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lands are subjected to the more economically developed. We may still look 
forward to its ending (Said 1994: 341).  
 
The term “empire” or “imperialism”, has been cited by many who are skeptical of using 
the term, and view it as outdated or representative to current affairs. However, Said 
points out that uncertainty about whether the “past really is past”, or whether it 
continues in different forms perhaps, allows us to continue to investigate modern day 
imperialism (1994: 1). 
 
Said’s work on Orientalism, and the Other is an immensely influential concept 
in the field of politics and international relations. The Other is part of what sustains 
imperialism; as such, critical theorists have specifically used his theories to explain 
imperialism and uneven development. A definition of how Said explains his concept of 
Orientalism is below: 
 
[Orientalism is a] distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, 
scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an 
elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made 
up of two halves, Oriental and Occident) but also of a whole series of 
“interests” which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological 
reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological 
description, it not only creates but also maintains it is, rather than expresses, 
a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, 
manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or 
alternative and novel) world it is (Said 2003: 12).  
 
The relationship between us and them - the Occident and the Orient - is 
essentially “a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex 
hegemony” (Said 2003: 5). Said argues that it is used to produce and maintain an 
uneven exchange of various kinds of power, and a way to understand our identity 
against an Other (Ibid: 12). In the context of post 9/11 studies, the other largely refers to 
the Muslim world, primarily those in Arab nations. Said claims that binaries of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ - a very “settled, clear, unassailably self-evident” identity - began with the 
exchange between Europeans and ‘others’ that became systematic over half a 
millennium ago (1994: xxviii). It changes and morphs depending on what is deemed to 
be evil. During the Cold War it was the USSR and communism, today it is global 
terrorism, Al Qaeda, and more generally Islam. The production and sedimentation of 
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these discourses into everyday life is a process CGP thinkers seek to uncover. The 
acceptance of specific discourse into daily life is a way in which policies surrounding 
how to ‘deal’ with the other are legitimated; therefore, understanding the discourse that 
surround them is crucial.  
 
A part of Othering depends upon Said’s work on imaginative geographies, 
which is also hugely important to CGP. He emphasizes that imaginative geographies do 
not necessarily need to be acknowledged by the Other. He argues that it is enough for 
‘us’ to create boundaries in our own minds and hence ‘they’ become ‘they’ accordingly 
and therefore they are territorially and mentally separated from ‘us’ (Said 2003: 54). 
Using the language of Orientalism, argues Said, is just a way to compartmentalize 
things of the Orient into “manageable parts” (Ibid: 72). After all, imagined does not 
mean false, it only means perceived. 
 
Critical theories generally incorporate Said’s work into their foundations, 
especially in exploring imperialism. In order for a nation to be superior and maintain 
power, it needs a strategy that keeps them in a position of authority. One of the ways in 
which this can be accomplished, bearing in mind that governments still seek legitimacy 
from their populations, is to rally their nations against the Other. Political and social 
ways of Othering are an essential part of foreign policy and the manipulation of the 
public.  
 
Said’s stance in short is that imperialism did not in fact end. It did not “suddenly 
become ‘past’, once decolonization had set in motion the dismantling of the classical 
empires” (Said 1994: 341). Imperialism is real, and continues in other ways. 
Emphasizing ideology and discourse, Said’s work forms some of the fundamental issues 
critical geopolitics seeks to address. He argues that imperialism and colonialism are 
driven by ideological formations that promote specific discourses; such as the ‘need’ for 
certain peoples to be dominated by others  (1994: 8). As Said puts it, “the power to 
narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to 
culture and imperialism” and underlines why the study of discourse and ideology is so 




Importantly, both Gramsci and Foucault have a lot to say about power. Like 
Foucault and Said, Gramsci’s work has crossed disciplines, and proved to be 
foundational to some of the concepts of CGP. Specifically, his concepts of consent and 
hegemony will be discussed in some detail. Both Foucault and Gramsci would agree 
that power is not something imposed from above, but that power and its success 
depends on consent from below (Holub 1992: 29). How this consent is created, through 
a careful selection of discourses that create ideological associations is a central point in 
this research, and therefore it is important to recognize the influences of these ideas. 
These two theorists also share the notion that power and domination function in so far 
as there is consent by those dominated (Ibid: 199). Without consent, in their view, 
domination is not possible. Whereas Foucault focuses on how power exists, Gramsci 
asks why it exists (Ibid: 200). In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci pays particular 
attention to ways in which the hegemonic classes produce and maintain “ways of seeing” 
that do not challenge the status quo but create a “spontaneous consent” (Ibid: 136).  
Gramsci’s influence on CGP, therefore, mainly stems from his theories of power and 
hegemony. Many would argue that the United States is in fact a hegemonic power, as 
opposed to an imperial power, and therefore theorists generally use Gramsci’s idea of 
power by consensus to explain America’s ‘superpower’. Gramsci theorized that in order 
for a state to become hegemonic, it would have to present a world order which is 
‘universal’ in its principles, so that one state isn’t seemingly ruling over another, but 
that mutual interests are evident (Cox 1993: 61). The Global War on Terror is an 
example of an attempt at this consensus: in order for the good of the world, and by 
declaring the war on terror as ‘global’, Bush and his administration made attempts to 
present an invasion as necessary to protect ‘global freedoms’. 
 
Augelli and Murphy describe Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as “an ability of a 
social group to exercise a function of political and moral direction in society” (1993: 
130). In this view, a hegemon would be responsive to the interests of its allies. There is 
plenty of literature to support the idea of an American hegemonic superpower in 
contrast to an imperial power; the basis of that debate which will be discussed in chapter 
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two. For now, the importance of Gramsci’s theories on hegemony and its influence to 
the field of critical geopolitics is important to understand. How certain ideologies 
become hegemonic, and therefore become ‘common sense’ is central to CGP, and finds 
its foundations in Gramsci’s theories. As Sharp puts it “the scripting of geopolitics 
cannot be removed from the process of the social reproduction of knowledge” (1993: 
494). Combining Gramsci and Said’s theories, Sharp argues that popular culture 
constructs ‘our’ space against ‘their’ space, and hence maintains hegemony by specific 
representations of geopolitical spaces (Dalby and Toal 1996: 453). Gramsci’s focus on 
how hegemonic ideas become common sense is something critical geopolitics adopts 
and seeks to explore the further repercussions of. Sharp argues that “common sense 
appeals through the obviousness of its claims; it makes the world simple, and 
manageable” (Sharp 1993: 494). Gramsci’s concept of common sense is what critical 
geopolitical theorists analyze as ‘taken for granted beliefs’, and therefore, Gramsci’s 
ideas are foundational in the theoretical basis of CGP.  
 
Additionally, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony forms much of the foundations for 
discourse analysis. According to Laclau, “hegemonic struggles are antagonisms which 
take the form of struggles over the articulation of discursive practices” (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough 1999: 123). Laclau and Mouffe take a post-structural position, and see 
hegemony as many ideas struggling against one another – not a single idea that Gramsci 
proposes in his work (Ibid). The different tensions that arise from his theories provide a 
blueprint for not only theory, but also a methodology which will be discussed in 
subsequent sections. 
 
2.2 Critical Geopolitics  
Critical geopolitics (CGP) goes a level beyond realist assumptions that underlie 
geopolitical theory, and instead provide a way to critique geopolitical theory. It 
incorporates some aspects of constructivism to ground political analysis in the realities 
of the social construction of our world. However, unlike constructivism, it does not take 
the state as a given entity, instead, it moves away from the thinking that implies that 
politics, international relations, or the structures that are present now are ‘out there’, but 
rather focuses on agency and the understanding of how and why these structures are 
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created. Explaining the foundations of critical geopolitics, Dalby and Toal (1998) state 
that  
 
Critical geopolitics has emerged out of the work of a number of scholars in 
the fields of geography and international relations who…have sought to 
investigate geopolitics as a social, cultural, and political practice, rather than 
as a manifest and legible reality of world politics.  
 
Following this, an argument for how critical geopolitics can function as an analytical 
framework is laid out by Dalby: 
 
 Rather than a single analytical or methodological endeavour, critical 
geopolitics encompasses various ways of unpacking the geographical 
assumptions in politics…and challenges common sense and “modern” 
assumptions that national identities and the states that govern populations 
are the necessary starting point for both policy discussion and scholarly 
analysis (2010: 51). 
 
Influenced largely by postmodern critiques that focus on the “epistemological limits of 
the ethnocentric practices” forming the basis of Cold War geopolitics, Dalby and Toal 
outline five main arguments that critical geopolitics seeks to address, which they claim 
have been influenced by a “variety of postmodernisms” (Toal and Dalby, 1998). The 
first argument is that geopolitics is not only a “specific school of statecraft” but can be 
understood in terms of spatial practices, “both material and representational of statecraft 
itself” (Ibid). Therefore, the critical study of geopolitics “must be grounded in the 
particular cultural mythologies of the state” (Ibid). The argument is that the 
specification of a state in itself, which involves the making of a national identity, 
establishing boundaries of inside and outside and transforming diverse places into a 
“unitary internal space” is a geopolitical act in itself and should be recognized as such 
(Ibid).  
 
The second argument is that critical geopolitics pays special attention to the 
“boundary drawing practices and performances that characterize the everyday life of 
states” (Toal and Dalby, 1998). An important part of the second argument, and of CGP 
as a method, is that CGP “is not about ‘the outside’ of the state but about the very 
construction of boundaries of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘domestic’ and 
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the ‘foreign’ (Ibid). Campell argues that the study of foreign policy isn’t only about 
inter-state relations. States are not “prior” to the international system, but are 
continually constituted by their relation to “an outside” against which they define 
themselves (Ibid). Foreign policy is therefore “the making of the foreign” as an identity 
in which the domestic is created against (Ibid). As such, Ashley argues that foreign 
policy is actually a type of “boundary-producing” political act (Toal and Dalby, 1998). 
To expand on the second argument, Dalby and Toal (1998) assert that practicing CGP is 
the act of investigating how specific “conceptual spatializations of identity, nationhood 
and danger manifest themselves across the landscapes of states” and how particular 
political, social and “physical geo-graphies” create and maintain understanding of “self 
and other, security and danger, proximity and distance, indifference and responsibility”.   
 
The third argument put forward by Dalby and Toal (1998) is that CGP is not a 
singularity, but a plurality referring to a collection of representational practices that are 
scattered throughout societies. There is a three-fold typology of geopolitical reasoning 
which constitutes a de-centered set of practices of elitist and popular forms, which are 
practical geopolitics (foreign policy, bureaucracy and political institutions), formal 
geopolitics (strategic institutes, think tanks and academia) and popular geopolitics (mass 
media, cinema, and novels)  (Ibid).  
 
The fourth argument concerning CGP is that the practice of studying geopolitics 
cannot be a politically neutral act. The goal of CGP analysis is to counter the myth that 
objectivity is possible, a common theme in the history of geopolitics, and instead argues 
that CGP is a “situated knowledge” interpretation (Toal and Dalby, 1998). It aims to 
“disturb the ‘god trick’” of geopolitics, which claims to objectively represent 
international politics without interpretation (Ibid). Dalby and Toal argue that classical 
geopolitics is a form of discourse that “seeks to repress its own politics and geography”, 
seeing itself as a sort of objective truth that is beyond judgment (Ibid). CGP responds to 
this by insisting that geopolitical reasoning is situated, contextual, and is not an 
objective form of reasoning (Ibid).  
Typically, geopolitical questions are surrounding states and their societies, and 
technological networks and their relationship to territoriality (Toal and Dalby, 1998). 
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Realizing that classical geopolitics is rooted in questions about the path to national 
greatness for states, or how states can be reformed so that empires can grow, means that 
the literature is inherently catered to answering questions about the control and 
management of territories. Therefore, the fifth and final argument of CGP is that it 
seeks to theorize broader “socio-spatial and techno-territorial” circumstances and use by 
conceptualizing geopolitics as “situated reasoning” (Ibid). 
 
There are three major themes to be taken from CGP that will be used in this 
research. The first theme is ideology and the power of ideas. This includes an analysis 
of the importance of (hegemonic) discourses. The second prominent theme is that of 
identity and difference – where ideas of ‘us’ and ‘them’ originate, and importantly, 
Said’s work on Othering. The third major theme is the critical analysis of territory and 
the meanings given to space. These major themes are what constitute an analytical 
framework whereby to ask questions about the legitimacy of American imperialism in 
the context of this thesis. 
 
The Power of Ideas 
Discourse, Hegemony & Ideology 
The use of postmodernism, postcolonialism, and critical theories allow one to 
examine discourses in terms of how they “legitimate and hence reproduce structures of 
power” (Dalby 1990: 4). Postmodern approaches underlie the principles behind critical 
geopolitics. They have a special concern for the politics of representation, i.e. the way 
in which specific political discourses are used in “world-making” (Ibid: 5). Gerard Toal 
begins his argument against mainstream geopolitics from Foucault’s premise that 
geography as a discourse, is a form of power/knowledge  (1996: 59). Toal, along with 
Agnew, argue that geopolitics  
 
should be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by which 
intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize/ international politics in such away as to 
represent a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of place, peoples and 
dramas….The study of geopolitics is the study of the spatialization of 
international politics by core powers and hegemonic states (Toal 1996: 59). 
The importance of discourses are crucial to this research, as discourses are political 
resources that enable political mobilization, and therefore, they are a part of making the 
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world in terms of how they construct reality through practices and rules, which they in 
turn construct and legitimize (Dalby 1990: 171). The power of ideas can be an enabling, 
or a manipulative force. Many IR theories neglect their significance, but they are key to 
understanding how discourses are used towards a goal and maintained. Agnew and Toal 
discuss the importance of discourse in practical geopolitics by arguing that discourses 
are like a set of capabilities that people have which are made up of socio-cultural 
resources that people use to help them construct meaning about their world (1992: 193). 
Taking apart the construction of these discourses is what will allow us to understand 
how they are in fact socially constructed, and how they have a real affect on policy 
making, and our everyday lives. The things we have come to know as “taken-for-
granted beliefs” are constructed, and are not natural; knowing this can help us change 
our world; “discourses enable” (Ibid). As Agnew and Toal point out, “discourses are 
never static but are constantly mutating and being modified by human practice” (1992: 
193), and thus so should our theories and ways of understanding them. The challenge 
then, is to understand how geographical knowledge is transformed by intellectuals of 
statecraft (Ibid: 195), and critically asses this to understand how they create specific 
discourses that legitimate their actions; a crucial part of this research which will be 
exemplified by CDA.  
 
The specific discourses created by the Bush administration implied that in order 
to be on the side of freedom and all things good, Americans must be willing to do 
anything to defeat the terrorists; including giving up their own rights and supporting 
what was deemed to be an illegal war by the United Nations (UN). The discourses 
created after 9/11 leading to the Iraq war proved to be very successful in mobilizing 
support in the short term. Most of the mainstream media fell into line and the political 
parties followed suit which allowed the Bush administration to “enact repressive 
legislation with scarcely any opposition – most notably the Patriot and Homeland 
Security Acts” (Harvey 2003: 193). Creating fear was central to this operation, and as 
Harvey puts it, “to sustain the momentum and realize their ambitions, the paranoid style 
of American politics had to be put to work” (Ibid: 194). Iraq had in fact been of 
importance to neoconservatives for a long time1, however creating support for a military 																																																								1	See	discussion	in	Chapter	Four	
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intervention would be difficult to create support for without some sort of justification – 
something ‘catastrophic’ (Ibid: 193). Harvey also maintains that 9/11 created the ‘Pearl 
Harbour’ moment they were waiting for to create social solidarity and the patriotism 
that emerged from it was used to provide the basis for an “imperialist endeavor and 
internal control” (Ibid)2. This special moment after 9/11 leading to the declaration of a 
Global War on Terror had the support of even the ‘usual liberals’, who in the past had 
criticized American imperialist policies (Ibid: 193). Accusations of being ‘unpatriotic’ 
were used to suppress critical engagement and meaningful dissent (Ibid). How was 
justification to be created? Harvey answers this by suggesting that the administration, 
  
assiduously cultivated the new-found nationalism that was created after 9/11 
and harnessed it to the imperial project of regime change in Iraq as essential 
for domestic security, at the same time as it used the imperial project to put 
in place ever tighter internal controls (fuelled by terror alerts and other 
security fears on the domestic front) (2003: 196). 
 
Behind all of this, claims Harvey, is a certain geopolitical vision; to ensure 
continued global dominance, which would put America in a position to control the 
whole globe militarily and, through oil, economically as well (2003: 199). As Harvey 
puts it, “the neo-conservatives are, it seems, committed to nothing short of a plan for 
total domination of the globe” (2003: 211). He concludes that in 2003 the United States 
was in fact heading for a “raw militaristic imperialism” lead by neoconservatives. 
Although anti-imperialist/American movement existed, they were struggling against the 
suppression of dissent, especially amongst all the patriotism after 9/11, alongside 
accusations of being ‘unpatriotic’ or siding with the terrorists if one did not support 
American policies (Ibid). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Copenhagen school has attempted to look at the role of 
ideas but only as it pertained to securitization, which omits many elements. 
Constructivists look at social construction, which could include language, however, 
they do not necessarily ask how language creates ideas. There is not a clear approach 																																																								2	This	references	a	statement	by	the	think	tank	The	Project	for	the	New	American	Century,	in	their	key	publication	Rebuilding	America’s	Defences.	“Further,	the	process	of	transformation,	even	if	it	brings	revolutionary	change,	is	likely	to	be	a	long	one,	absent	some	catastrophic	and	catalyzing	event	–	like	a	new	Pearl	Harbor”	(Donnelly	2000:	51).	
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that would indicate that, for example, discourses of fear can perpetuate ideologies that 
are embedded into geopolitics. For example, constructivists rightly criticize liberals and 
realists for the simplicity of their argument: “realism and most liberals do not 
investigate interests; they assume them. Interests are givens in these approaches and 
need to be specified before analysis can begin”  (Finnemore 2002: 3). Finnemore 
continues to state the missing elements in these two theories and poses constructivism 
as an alternative, arguing that it fills in the missing questions: “a constructivist approach 
does not deny that power and interest are important. They are. Rather, it asks a different 
and prior set of questions: it asks what interests are, and it investigates the ends to 
which and the means by which power will be used” (Ibid). While that does add another 
dimension to the analysis, what this thesis would argue is missing in IR is the ‘how’ 
question. So while constructivism adds to the literature, it is still asking ‘what’. CGP 
asks questions such as ‘how’ is power legitimated? It would argue through ideologies 
that are embedded in geopolitics. How can we understand how they are naturalized? 
Through discourse, this thesis would argue. Further, how can we take apart discourse? 
Through methodology such as CDA, which systematically offers a tool to take apart 
language in order to reveal the ways in which power is constructed and legitimized. 
When states justify their actions over a humanitarian intervention for example, they are 
justifying that within the norms of the international state system, and internationally 
accepted standards (Ibid: 4). The question that CGP would ask is, how are these norms 
created in the first place? If it is the United States ‘job’ to intervene because it is 
‘needed’ to help solve a civil war, for example, what kinds of ideologies and discourses 
have created this role for the United States? How has American power been accepted as 
needed? The social construction element of constructivism is interesting, but it is 
focused on norms and again, misses one further element that CGP can add to IR. 
 
The capacity for discourses to enable, but also to be a manipulative force is 
important and noteworthy. The foundation for communication in our society is language, 
and how that language is used is a form of power. Who creates and maintains discourses 
and how they form the ideologies that become naturalized are all intertwined. Hence, 
the importance of the power of ideas – the ideational aspect CGP seeks to bring out in 
this research, and one that is missing from much of IR debates, is key to the study of 
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imperialism and seeking the basis of its legitimacy.  
 
The link between hegemony and ideology is particularly important in this thesis, 
both to CGP as well to the methodology of critical discourse analysis will be introduced 
at the end of this chapter. Hegemonic discourse is full of ideological statements. 
Hegemonic discourses become ‘common sense’ as Gramsci described (1999: 630), and 
it is the ideologies that create these common sense values in society. Behind ideology, is 
discourse. As they are interlinked, looking at the root of how hegemonic discourses 
become naturalized become more important. Given the importance of these concepts, a 
great deal of CGP literature deals with Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Toal asserts 
that the study of geopolitical reasoning should take place within the Gramscian sense of 
hegemony, adding that, “a hegemonic power like the United States is by definition a 
“rule writer” for the world community” (1996: 61).  Themes around the importance of 
ideology in the justification and legitimacy of actions are central to critical geopolitical 
thinking, and will be analyzed in the context of American imperialism. CGP is therefore 
more than a tool for policy makers; its goal is to investigate how “geopolitical reasoning 
is used as an ideological device to maintain social relations domination within 
contemporary global politics” (Dalby 1990: 15). As CGP is an interdisciplinary 
approach at the intersection of politics, geography and international relations, it requires 
critical and creative thinking, as it employs a deeper and holistic approach to the notion 
of imperialism. It also provides a framework for understanding how these boxes were 
constructed in the first place, which is key. Questioning the taken –for- granted beliefs 
that form our ideologies is of central importance to critical geopolitics. CGP is a call to 
look beyond what ‘just is’ to understand how we have come to accept something as 
natural, i.e. what we take for granted. 
 
To construct critical political geographies is to argue that we must not limit 
our attention to a study of the geography of politics within pre-given, taken-
for-granted, commonsense spaces, but investigate the politics of the 
geographical specification of politics. That is to practice critical geopolitics 
(Toal 1996: 62).   
 
Toal views the critical study of geopolitics as ways in which we can question the  
“writing of truth” in geopolitics, where ideological inscriptions assign certain identities 
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as part of its “nature” and relationship to state and society (Ibid: 142).  
 
The interlinking of these concepts will become clearer below, when they are 
introduced through the method of critical discourse analysis. CDA is a method by which 
CGP can have a methodological outlet as it combines the importance of discourse, 
language, ideology and hegemony to study imperialism and uncover the taken for 
granted beliefs that create and sustain modes of imperialism. The reason CGP and CDA 
work so well together, is that the power of ideas which encompasses discourse, 
hegemony and ideology is so central to a CGP framework, while CDA allows it’s 
execution in research.  
 
Identity & difference: Othering  
Shapiro and Said have been important influences in postmodern theory 
concerning the practice of CGP because they stress a concern with questions of power 
and discourse, using linguistics, philosophy and literary theory to critique modernity 
(Dalby 1990: 5). The concept of the Other, used famously by Said in his book 
Orientalism, is central to critical geopolitical analysis. It provides a framework for 
understanding how foreign policy initiatives and justifications for war are created. 
“Political identity is related to these geopolitical specifications of us and them; their 
space and our space” (Ibid: 13). The Other creates guidelines by which political 
activities are acceptable or not, and creates specific types of identities. Said focuses on 
the construction of the discourses of Orientalism, rather than the interaction of the 
Orient with the view that has been constructed by Orientalism. The importance of 
Said’s work is the fact that he is aware that conceptual categories of identity and 
difference should be treated as “contingent productions, not as ontologically given 
categories” (Dalby 1990: 25). The social creation of the Other is a theme that is constant 
in CGP analysis and in turn adds another dimension of how we understand the world, 
our own identity, the identity of others, and how certain policy actions are legitimated 
through relation to the Other.  
 
Derek Gregory also focuses on Othering in relation to how space is constructed 
and used politically. He looks at the constructions of enemies, and other concepts such 
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as danger and our understanding of what is ‘foreign’. He quotes an Iraqi woman’s views 
on the war on terror: 
 
Bush speaks of ‘abroad’ as if it is a vague desert-filled land ... a land of 
inferior people – less deserving of peace, prosperity and even life ... Don’t 
Americans realize that ‘abroad’ is a country full of people – men, women, 
children who are dying hourly? ‘Abroad’ is a home for millions of us. It’s 
the place we were raised and the place we hope to raise our children – your 
field of war and terror (Gregory 2010: 178). 
 
This quote perfectly demonstrates how space is subjective and embodies different 
meanings to different people. In the above quote, America’s  “field of war and terror” is 
actually a “ family home” to a different group. It is then understandable how Iraq came 
to be constructed as a dangerous breeding ground for terrorists, and how Iraqi’s were 
seen as the Other is not a natural process – it is completely socially constructed. 
Ideologies therefore naturalize concepts that are socially constructed.  
 
Gregory also argues that America, especially post 9/11, was not only in a state 
of exception, but also an exceptional state. Drawing on the theories of Georgio 
Agamben, Gregory argues that the double exception of America is important in 
understanding it’s foreign policy actions (Gregory 2006). America ‘the exceptional’ is 
one of the discourses used to justify imperial policies, and has been a long standing 
ideology. This also formed a key part of neoconservative thought in post 9/11 policy 
making.  
 
Others in the field like Matthew Sparke discuss the ideological effects of fear 
mongering in what he calls “false geopolitical fears”.  He focuses on how taken for 
granted beliefs and specific ideologies create false fears, with real consequences. In 
specific, these fears were used to manipulate a public into war in Iraq, which is Sparke’s 
primary example (2007: 340). Othering is especially important in creating an enemy to 
be feared; a sort of ‘evil’ that the public can unite together over defeating. As Bush said, 
the “evil ones” must be stopped so that “our children and grandchildren can know peace 
and security and freedom in the greatest nation on the face of the earth” (Bush cited in 
Nabers 2009: 104). After 9/11, and with no clear state enemy, the Bush administration 
pointed their finger at Saddam Hussein. The “geopolitical fears” were groundless, but 
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for Bush and his administration the “groundless nature of the fears did not matter in 
terms of geopolitical policymaking” (2007: 341). Sparke expands on this point here, 
 
it was specifically fear of this evil other that was most instrumental because 
it made it possible for the President and his administration to connect 
widespread and visceral feelings of insecurity among Americans in the post-
9/11 present to much narrower and calculative concerns with America’s 
strategic future. It was in this way that the futurological fears ironically 
became a retroactive justification for war (2007: 341). 
 
The analysis of the Other and concepts of identity and difference are not looked at in 
much of liberalism and realism. Even in Marxism, identity and difference are based 
largely on where one fits into the capitalist  (class) system. What one’s stance is in 
society is reduced to whether or not one control the means of production. It has little to 
add about this concept on a larger international scale, that is not again, linked with class. 
Constructivism has incorporated the use of language in forming identity and recognizes 
that identity is “understood as emerging from discourse” (Tekin 2010: 9). This thesis 
seeks to build on that and use the tools of CDA to employ a deeper understanding of 
identity and difference through discourse, and its effects on the geopolitical scale.  
 
Othering will prove to be very important in discourse and the legitimacy of 
certain policies, especially that of the decision to go to war in Iraq. Identity and 
difference: how we see ourselves against how we see the Other, is a recurrent theme in 
this research and within the study of CGP.  What we are, is what ‘they’ are not. These 
distinctions are used to create simple binaries and ways of seeing the world that have 
the ability to manipulate rather complex situations into simple ‘black and white’ 
understandings of the world. Good and evil, us and them, right and wrong. Several 
examples of this will be made clear in later empirical chapters where CDA is used to 
demonstrate the use of Othering in geopolitical discourses. 
 
The Critical Analysis of Territory: How Space is Given Meaning 
Dalby argues that while “geopolitics challenges the essential formulation of its 
terms by pointing to the presupposition of absolute space on which the theory is built”, 
it assumes a “pre-given territorial space”, and then fills this “pre-given” space with 
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superpower rivalry; a view in some ways similar to realism (1990: 172). A critical 
geopolitical framework allows us to question power not only as a matter of elite control 
or state rule. As 9/11 so fantastically proved, terror isn’t necessarily the product of state 
elites, but is also a matter of “contested localities where rule is resisted, thwarted and 
subverted by social movements” (Dalby and Toal 1996: 453). This needs to be studied 
in particular contexts, and not by trying to apply general theories of international 
relations to specific contexts. Toal argues that the challenge of critical geopolitics then 
is to “document and deconstruct the institutional, technological, and material forms of 
these new congealments of geo-power”, to question how global space is continually re-
created and rewritten by great powers (1996: 249). 
 
Agnew uses the term hegemony to define US power, instead of imperialism, 
arguing that, because the United States has not simply gained power through territorial 
rule, and is not an empire by the same standards as Rome, for example, that the best 
way to describe the United States is a hegemony (Agnew 2005). While this research 
disagrees with the term hegemony, the importance of Agnew’s work is to draw attention 
to the dangers of taking the state as a given. The state is not “ontologically prior to a set 
of interstate relations”, he says paraphrasing Ashley, and is not the outcome of action at 
a single geographical scale (Ibid: 49). States become powerful as they interact with 
other states, and form certain relationships, both locally and globally, and in turn form a 
socially constructed hierarchy (Ibid). America is not by ‘nature’ a superpower, or the 
state, which can ‘best lead the world’; these are all socially constructed notions that are 
assumed as natural, having great implications for international relations and foreign 
policy.  
 
A CGP analysis of President Bush’s policies must include a critical analysis of 
territory. Stuart Elden discusses the importance of territory, and in fact, he makes an 
argument against the myth of a de-territorialized world. He claims that the importance 
of territory has not faded, and that “terror” has renewed the importance of territory in 
international politics. While many talk about deterritorialization and then 
reterritorialization, Elden draws on Neil Smith’s point that “power is never 
deterritorialized; it is always specific to particular places. Reterritorialization counters 
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deteritorialization at every turn” (Smith 2005: 51). Although the GWOT is presented to 
have no boundaries, the power attached to imperialism is concentrated within a state. 
Hence, although ‘terror’ may be deterritorialized, in that, as the claim goes that it has 
‘no state’ nor ‘territory’, the responses to that terrorism still come from nation states, 
and the legitimacy of that power is through state reactions. It is what defines and 
separates terrorism from war; and terrorists from legitimate leaders, according to 
popular discourse. For example, Al Qaeda, is a ‘global network’ with no state, 
responsible for killing thousands in the 9/11 attacks, and are deemed terrorists; whereas 
the United States, a nation state, responsible for killing thousands of Iraqi’s in war, is 
somehow legitimated, or justified as it is a state action. It is also true that non-state 
actors can control territory that states cannot (Elden 2009: 34). Although territories have 
become “deterritorialized”, they later become “reterritorialized”. For example, the 
Middle East as a region is often associated with terrorism, or as the breeding grounds 
for terrorists.  Related to this argument, Elden claims that territorial integrity is 
especially important in the context of the war on terror, because it isn’t only about 
powerful nations controlling their own territory, but it is also important because states 
that cannot control their own territory are seen as “breeding grounds” for non-state 
power (i.e. terrorists) (2009: 109).  
 
This in turn has bearing on the understanding of sovereignty. If a state does not 
adequately control its own territory and prevent terrorists from fostering within their 
boundaries, does it justify another state taking over control? Elden argues that the states 
that “fail to play by the security rules” that America hold dear like not harboring 
terrorists within state borders, and not seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
require attention, imply that “their sovereignty is no longer absolute but necessarily 
contingent” (2009: 23). This provides insight into the ways in which imperialism can be 
legitimized; by questioning the sovereignty of a state, and by its connections to 
terrorism post 9/11. The specific portrayal of ‘rogue states’, ‘terrorist states’, and the 
‘axis of evil’ amongst others in the context of a global war on terror gives the 
impression that “an omnipresent terrorist threat as evil as it is widespread”; with that, 
the ability for the U.S. to legitimate “any punitive action it might take, anywhere at any 
time” (Elden 2009: 32). Bush has repeatedly and clearly noted the “global scale” of the 
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campaign: “from the mountains of Afghanistan, to the border regions of Pakistan, to the 
Horn of Africa, to the islands of the Philippines, to the plains of North Central Iraq” 
(Ibid). Based on this premise, there is not politically, spatially, and temporally any limit 
to America’s response (Ibid). 
 
The meanings that fill space are socially constructed, and need to be recognized 
as such, as these meanings have the capacity to legitimate policy decisions. Take for 
example Blomley’s assessment of how space matters in terms of legitimizing violence. 
Prisons such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib are perfect examples of how violence is 
legitimized within certain spaces (Blomley 2003: 123). Geography is important in 
considering violence and how it can be legitimized. Instances of torture are now well 
documented, especially in light of some disturbing images that were released of what 
goes in inside the prisons of the GWOT. As Coutin notes, law used to represent order, 
control and rationality; and in the absence of this was violence, which conveys the 
opposite: chaos, irrationality, and lack of control (1995: 518). What happens then, when 
a space, such as the prisons of the GWOT allow violence? It then becomes evident, 
Coutin argues, that law and violence are not necessarily in opposition (1995: 518). 
Gregory (2006) also discusses the meaning of territory for the legitimacy of violence as 
he discusses Guantanamo and how violence within the walls are seen as ‘okay’. Both 
these instances will be elaborated in Chapter Five. 
 
Geography and the meanings associated with space have a significant affect on 
how we understand them. For example, the geographical region of the “Middle East” is 
a contested space, and what it ‘means’ and to who change constantly. At one time, it 
was the cradle of civilization, and now it is generally understood as a ‘dangerous’, 
‘backwards’ place. In most theories of IR, national states are taken as the basic units of 
analysis, and accordingly the state itself is a taken-for-granted entity. This creates the 
assumption that the world is inherently divided this way: into nation states (Agnew 
2007: 141). Assuming that states are the starting point of political analysis, these 
theories are already limited in their ability to conduct critical analysis. Agnew argues 
that, 
 
projecting the assumption that [states] are indeed both ancient and universal 
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produces an image of the world as a mosaic of bounded ‘‘peoples,’’ 
‘‘cultures,’’ and ‘‘societies.’’ It is to and across these entities that the 
cultivation of knowledge is thus often fallaciously ascribed (2007: 141).  
 
From this view emerges debates such as the “clash of civilizations”, where certain 
people are bound to certain areas by theory, and therefore are pitted against each other 
in endless conflict and difference. This creates what Timothy Brennan calls “a religious 
approach to knowledge, that is, the creation of like-thinking communities based on 
transcendental convictions”; those who claim to have the monopoly on “truth” (Ibid). 
The problem with this is that critical methods are abandoned, and international 
phenomena are reduced to fit narrow views created by these theories.  
 
Since geopolitics is the study of geography and politics, then critical analyses of 
space are needed. This is perhaps an area where IR theory has been most weak. More 
than just physical spaces and places, CGP looks at the ways in which the meanings of 
these places change, and how they are understood. Their classification by powers has a 
profound impact on the ways in which they are understood in international relations. IR 
theories have failed to assess critically, the ways in which space is given meaning, 
through discourse and ideologies that become embedded in our everyday understanding 
about certain regions and areas. The implications of the meanings given to space are 
often overlooked, and also get taken for granted. The way that places and spaces can be 
designated as dangerous or safe have policy implications. These impressions of spaces 
become part of our naturalized ideologies (such as the example of the Middle East). 
Identities assigned to places are created through Othering, and that of course is through 
the discourses that are dominant. As such, everything is interlinked. CGP brings these 
important elements together through a framework, or a lens, providing a critical tool for 
analysis.  
 
CGP has it’s own critics from within the discipline as well, which should be 
addressed. There have been variations, and branches to CGP under the headings of 
feminist geopolitics, popular geopolitics, and emotional geopolitics, to name a few. 
Some that research in the field of CGP suggest that CGP is too narrow, and not critical 
enough, thus some of their criticisms will be briefly addressed. 
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Popular geopolitics, a ‘branch’ of critical geopolitics has taken off and become a 
discipline in itself. Pieces like popular geopolitics 2.0 (Dittmer and Gray 2010) discuss 
some of the criticisms CGP has faced in the rise of other branches of geopolitics. Muller 
argues that CGP traditionally focuses too much on elite discourses, and misses the 
‘everyday’ discourses that move away from elite discussions (Dittmer and Gray 2010: 
1665). Popular geopolitics advocates moving away from texts for example, and looking 
at everyday events such as movies, and pop culture; essentially away from elite agents 
(Dittmer and Gray 2010: 1666). There is also the work of ‘feminist geopolitics’ which 
challenges masculinist binaries such as public/private, or public/political, focusing on 
the gendered nature of these divides (Dittmer and Gray 2010: 1666). Emotional 
geopolitics has also gained considerable attention recently and has put emotions on the 
map within critical geopolitics, such as the importance of fear (Pain 2009). All of these 
are important and growing fields of study, and they do have criticisms toward more 
traditional forms of CGP; mainly the focus on elites, and texts.  
 
 Megoran argues that CGP is often criticized for providing a weak normative 
engagement with social institutions and practices of warfare (Megoran 2008: 474). 
Additionally, there is criticism surrounding the lack of incorporation of a broader range 
of values and ethics, or in some arguments, it lacks a real solution to the problems it 
criticizes (Megoran 2008: 475). Then, there is the critical question of war, argues 
Megoran, which every student of international relations grapples with which is “in what 
circumstances, if at all, should a state be considered right in making or joining war?” 
(Megoran 2008: 493). He then faults CGP for not dealing with this question in a 
systematic and consistent way.  However, this thesis doesn’t set out to answer this 
question, although it may be a fair consideration. This is an analysis into the language 
and comparative discourses that signified a looming change in American foreign policy, 
using 9/11 as its foundational justification. Perhaps further research in this field could 
take this information, and then look at this a step beyond to discuss some of these 
criticisms, but this research attempted to answer some questions still left with holes 
from previous analysis of American grand strategy and the 9/11 effect.  
 
Perhaps the most outspoken and cited in this regard is Nigel Thrift’s 2000 piece 
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that problematizes several arenas in which the discursive model of critical geopolitics 
runs into problems. As an example, he cites the arena of the human body, which he says, 
“eludes discursive inscription through special qualities of embodiment which fashion 
semblances and conjure social worlds” (Thrift 2000: 383). He argues these qualities get 
lost in the study of critical geopolitics as there is a lack of attention for embodiment. A 
second example, is the arena of words, in which he argues that “what we do not get 
from critical geopolitics is a clear enough sense of how words function to bring about 
geopolitical change and it is not possible to do so as long as geopolitical forces continue 
to be framed as ‘big’ and ‘commanding’” (Ibid). 
 
In a response to some of this criticism, specifically from Thrift, Dalby has a few 
responses to consider. Thrift’s main criticism that CGP has left out the “little things” 
gives rise to two main arguments, mentioned above which are the focus of CGP on texts, 
and second, the failure of CGP to address matters of the actual functions of people in 
defense departments who actually make foreign and military agencies operate (Dalby 
2010a: 281). In response to this, Dalby argues that in fact, Thrift has misrepresented the 
critique by presenting texts as merely texts, rather than “discourses embedded in the 
practices of security with all their multitudinous representation of places as sources of 
threats requiring military action and practices of security” (Ibid: 282). Dalby adds that 
such criticisms expect CGP to do “all sorts of things” but not engage with the critique of 
the reasoning of the intellectuals of statecraft.  
 
Coming back to the first point then, Thrift argues it is the ‘little things’ that 
matter and cites Bakhtain, in his reference to, ‘verbal sideward glances, reservations, 
hints” that also make a difference in discourse. Thrift cites some anthropological and 
psychological studies that examine this; but, as Dalby argues, CGP cannot do 
everything. As he argues, “perhaps the time has come to recognise that ‘‘critical 
geopolitics’’ is simply too loose a catchall category to be of much use if it incorporates 
all this. Many of these things might now be more usefully done under such other rubrics” 
(Dalby 2010a: 285). Yes, it is interdisciplinary, and promotes interdisciplinary research, 
but the criticism that CGP is missing certain elements, while focusing too much on 
others (ex. text) steers away from what CGP intended to do.  
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 Dalby argues that if we divert attention away from the political purpose of 
critique to practical lived experiences of people in bureaucracies and ‘non 
representational’ parts of text and identity production, then this also brings on a critique 
that this in fact “facilitates the traditional modes of doing geography”, such as field 
work, ethnography, and interviews, however, the engagements with the rationale of 
military power and the legitimacy of violence are then overlooked (Ibid: 284). Thrift’s 
criticism concludes by arguing a parallel agenda for CGP, that focuses on actual 
practices as opposed to representations. While his criticism is useful, advocating for 
parallel practices, does not render current CGP methods irrelevant or outdated. There 
are different ways, and levels, to analyze discourse for example. All of the important 
and useful in some way. All of them leading to different kinds of projects and research. 
This research is a study of discourses at the elite level where violence and power are 
legitimated. As Dalby also points out, the key arguments in CGP are not “taken up 
widely” in international relations, and therefore this research is an opportunity to 
address how CGP literature and framework can contribute to some of the debates in IR, 
especially in how it relates to imperialism, power, grand strategy and the legitimacy of 
military action. 
 
The following section will discuss critical discourse analysis, the methodology 
for this research that is complementary to CGP and with both a critical method and lens, 
it will be clearer the contributions this approach can make.  
 
2.3 Methodology 
This section will be an in-depth look at critical discourse analysis (CDA), a 
complementary method to CGP and the chosen methodology for this research. First, the 
question of what constitutes a discourse will be covered. Following this, the principles 
of CDA will be outlined. Afterwards, the importance of language, power, and ideology 
will be discussed before presenting a framework for conducting CDA in this research. 
As there is no ‘correct’ or agreed way to employ critical discourse analysis, and there 
are a variety of ways to use CDA as a method, the framework this research lays out is 
one created by extracting the most useful, critical, and relevant parts of CDA to the 
study of imperialism.  
	 56	
Critical discourse analysis is defined by van Dijk as “a type of discourse 
analytical research that primarily studies the way social power, abuse, dominance, and 
inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and 
political context” (van Dijk 2001: 354).  CDA, pioneered and practiced in various forms 
by authors such as van Dijk, Fairclough, Wodak, Chouliaraki, Weldes – most notably - 
is an interdisciplinary method and tool in which to understand how language, and 
discourses shape our world, (re-)produce power, and embody ideological assumptions 
that significantly contribute to how we understand everyday life. The theoretical origins 
of CDA have mainly developed within theories of Marxism and postmodernism, and 
the influence of those such as the above mentioned, with roots in Foucault, Althusser, 
Habermas and others who have given ideology and language important in the study of 
power. Van Dijk asserts that the goal of those who choose to use CDA can be separated 
from most social and political scientists as they strive to gain more insight into the 
importance of discourse in the reproduction of dominance and inequality (1993: 253). 
 
What are discourses? 
 How do those who study CDA understand discourse? The answer to that may 
vary depending on the discipline, and study at hand. Because CDA is a relatively ‘new’ 
approach in qualitative studies, especially now that it is being incorporated across 
disciplines outside linguistics, it is also changing quite quickly. Schieble details 
discourse as “‘ways of representing’…macro-level ideas…through everyday language 
use. Discourses are larger themes that represent participants’ multiple (and/or 
competing) ideological stances” (Schieble 2012: 212). The approach to language taken 
by those who use CDA highlight how language use is purposeful and embedded within 
social practice and have active material consequences because on how problems are 
framed (Schieble 2012: 211). Fairclough and Wodak maintain that discourses, language 
use in speech and writing, as a form of social practice, which is socially constitutive 
(1997: 258). According to Fairclough, discourse involves two parts: social conditions of 
production, and social conditions of interpretation (2001: 20). These further correspond 
to another three levels of social organization: the level of the social situation, the level 
of the social institution, which constitutes a wider matrix for the discourse, and the level 
of society as whole (Ibid). CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – 
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as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a 
dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), 
institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-
way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situation, institutions and social 
structure, but it also shapes them (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Discourse is also 
an intentional action; it is controlled and a purposeful human activity (van Dijk 1997: 8). 
Van Dijk argues that the study of discourse is not only about the properties of text and 
talk but about the ‘bigger picture’, which includes the consequences for social, political 
and cultural actions in general (1997: 4). 
 
 That being said, there is a wide literature on the definitions of discourse and 
ways to implement CDA across disciplines. David Manchin argues that discourses are 
not only political speeches and news items, but can also be considered as computer 
games, movies, fashion, toys, music, architecture, and many other ‘everyday life’ 
practices (Manchin 2013: 347). Through this wide variety of discourses, he argues, 
“communicative activity are infused by and shaped by, power relations and ideologies” 
(Ibid). For example, Manchin argues that discourses of war exist not only through 
political speeches but also through everyday outlets such as the games children play on 
computers, war toys, and the central monuments in cities (Manchin 2013: 351). Some of 
his work looks at how these material things can influence our ideologies. For example, 
taking a monument as an object of analysis, or a war game and assessing how attitudes 
toward war are naturalized and legitimized (Manchin 2013: 350). Although these are 
useful and important, this research focuses on text and speech as it is an analysis of the 
way that the ‘elite’ (the Bush administration) used specific discourses in speeches, and 
publications to legitimate a type of American imperialism. This does not go without 
problems, and criticisms have been made about the focus of CDA on texts and speeches 
only. Blommaert and Bulcaen note that CDA is “burdened by a very “linguistic 
outlook, which does not necessarily include nonlinguistic dimensions, such as some of 
those mentioned by Manchin above (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 452). While that 
criticism is taken into account, there are in fact several layers for analysis for discourse 
and their role in ideology. This research focuses on the specific elements of Presidential 
and high-level administration personnel speeches and publications as its point of 
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analysis in order to understand the discourse of the administration at this level. Further 
analysis could taken into consideration elements of ‘everyday life’, including images, 
games, social media and so on; an entirely different project.  
 
The emphasis in CDA is on “the understanding of discourse in relations to social 
problems; to social structural variables such as race, gender, and class; and above all to 
power” (Wood and Kroger 2000: 21). Through CDA, a critical interpretation of text and 
speech in search to expose the discourses that maintain dominant ideologies can be 
conducted. The aim is to deconstruct taken- for- granted beliefs and understand how 
these beliefs and ideologies become naturalized, hence understanding how policies 
come to reflect these discourses, creating justification for past and future actions of 
governments. This methodology is well suited for a critical geopolitics project because 
similar to the principles of CGP, CDA calls for an engagement with the contemporary 
world while recognizing that the current status quo does not “exhaust what is possible” 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 21). It also involves the recognition of discourse as 
“one moment in the dialectics of social practice”, and therefore, changes in discourse 
can open up new possibilities (Ibid). 
 
Principles of critical discourse analysis 
Fairclough and Wodak outline eight main principles to critical discourse 
analysis. (1) First is that CDA addresses social problems. This first point emphasizes 
the interdisciplinary methods of CDA, by highlighting the analysis of language and 
semiotic aspects of social problems (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271). The key claim 
of CDA is that social and political processes have a linguistic-discursive character. Take, 
for example, “Thatcherism”; it is an ideological project for creating a new hegemony 
and can be seen in this light as an attempt to restructure political discourse by 
combining already existing discourse together in a new way (Ibid: 271). (2) Second is 
that power relations are discursive. CDA highlights how power relations are exercised 
and negotiated in discourse (Ibid: 272). (3) The third principle is that discourse 
constitutes society and culture in a dialectical relationship. This also looks at how 
passages constitute identities (Ibid: 275). For example, when a politician uses the term 
‘we’ (‘we’ believe freedom, or ‘we’ are hard workers), this is an assumption that all 
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people think the same thing; and hence it groups a nation of people into one category, in 
this case, ‘we’ (Ibid: 275). This is important because this usage of language attempts to 
unify people together, especially in times of crisis to project the image that an entire 
nation has the same interests. (4) The fourth important principle is that discourse does 
ideological work. As Fairclough and Wodak maintain, ideologies are  “particular ways 
of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, 
relations of domination and exploitation” (Ibid: 275). (5) The fifth principle is that 
discourse is historical. Importantly, discourse cannot be produced without context and 
cannot be understood without taking context into consideration, which means that those 
contexts also have to be uncovered (Ibid: 277). (6) Sixth is that the link between text 
and society is mediated. CDA looks to make connections between social and cultural 
processes and properties of text (Ibid: 278). The authors claim, that not only are these 
relations complex, but they are mediated. (7) The seventh principle is that discourse 
analysis is interpretative and explanatory. This principle states that specific readings of 
text takes place against a background of emotions, attitudes, and knowledge (Ibid: 278). 
As a critical method, this requires the researcher to evaluate their own beliefs as it will 
affect the readings of texts and the meanings assigned to them. (8) The eighth and last 
principle is that discourse is a form of social action (Ibid: 280). 
 
 Now that the basic definition and principles of CDA have been outlined, the 
remainder of this section will look at some of the important aspects of CDA in greater 
detail.  
 
Importance of Language 
As discourse analysis is the study of language, it is then appropriate to explain 
why language is so important in the first place. Neumann explains how people sort and 
combine sensory impressions of our world through categories. He further explains that 
language is a social system with its “own relations logic” and produces “reality for 
humans by mediating these sense data” (Neumann 2008: 61). It is also social and 
political, constituting an “inherently unstable system of signs” that creates meaning 
through the construction of identity and difference, simultaneously (Hansen 2006: 17). 
Language is a political tool that produces and reproduces specific identities while others 
	 60	
are simultaneously excluded (Hansen 2006: 18). Those who employ various forms of 
discourse analysis maintain that these meanings are socially constructed and therefore 
they are “representations”, which in time become institutionalized and ‘normalized’ 
(Neumann 2008: 62). Discourses are important as they maintain regularity, and 
therefore they determine and potentially constrain how we think about the world and 
how it is ordered (Ibid). They are also more than just written treatise on a topic, but are 
also the ways in which people are able to take what they hear or read and construct it in 
a meaningful way (Dalby 1990: 7).  
 
 Manchin and Mayr argue that since language is assumed to be an available set of 
options, authors make the choice to use certain words for their own “motivated reasons” 
(2012: 32). The following is a simple example put forward by Manchin and Mayr: 
‘youths attack local building’, ‘youths attack local addresses’, ‘youths attack local 
family homes’ (2012: 32). All three headlines are describing the same event, but the 
wording creates a distinctly different impact on the audience. The last option, for 
example, presents something more sacred, i.e. a ‘family home’. It represents something 
to be protected, generally creating more sympathy for those ‘attacked’. In this example, 
without overtly presenting it as such, the discourse alludes to certain identities, and 
values, and therefore elicits a different reaction from the audience than the first two 
headlines. For example, in the context of this research, the attack on the twin towers, 
two physical building in New York City, was presented by President Bush and his 
administration as an ‘attack on American freedoms’ or ‘an attack on American way of 
life’. In a speech on Sept 12, 2001, Bush said, “today, our fellow citizens, our way of 
life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist 
acts” (Bush 2001k). Uniting a population around the idea that their freedoms have been 
attacked is far more effective than uniting them over fallen pieces of infrastructure. This 
is a simple example about how the choice of words and language matter. If it is assumed 
that there is no neutral way to represent a person/event/phenomenon, then all choices in 
language are purposefully made to draw attention to specific identities and ideas 
(Manchin and Mayr 2012: 77). 
 
If it is then an assumption of CDA that all language is a choice, the chosen 
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words then become very important. Hansen argues that is it a key aim of any kind of 
discourse analysis to show how our understanding of meanings are “dependent upon a 
particular discursive framing of the issue in question and that this framing has political 
effects” (2006: 22). For example, Iraq’s status as a ‘rogue state’ or Saddam Hussein as a 
‘dangerous’ man justifies political actions to remove him militarily. For example, 
Hansen argues that understanding ‘democracy’ as a foreign policy discourse rather than 
an independent variable calls for an analysis of how it has been articulated in contrast to 
something that is non- or anti-democratic (Hansen 2006: 25). The definition of 
democracy becomes partly contingent on what it is not like (the “Other) and this in turn 
has in the past justified and legitimated specific policies.  
 
In the context of security discourse, Hansen argues that state sovereignty 
“organizes authority, space, time, and identity by separating the domestic sphere on the 
one side from the international realm on the other” (2006: 34). ‘Inside’ (domestic) and 
‘outside’ (international) are seen as each other’s opposites and therefore each other’s 
“other” (Ibid). This kind of discourse is created to defend the national self, from the 
radical other – such as defending America from the international terrorists. Our 
understanding of ‘terrorist’, for example, is understood in relation to a ‘freedom fighter’, 
or ‘state sanctioned solider’ (Ibid: 19). This is why it was so important that Bush used 
discourse that implies to not be on side with America, automatically meant that one was 
with the terrorists. CDA is a method to understand how these categories of difference 
are socially constructed, and it is vital in understanding foreign policy, as foreign policy 
in itself is based on Othering – who is dangerous, and who needs to be 
defended/protected. 
 
Weiss and Wodak maintain that most forms of critical discourse analysis would 
approve of Habermas’s claim that language is a medium of domination and social force, 
legitimizing organized power (2003: 15). However, for CDA, language on its own its 
not powerful; it gains its power by who uses it and to what ends (Weiss and Wodak 
2003: 14). CDA is essentially a linguistic interest in how manipulations of power can be 
understood (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 15). To understand language as political, Hansen 
argues that it needs to be understood as a site for the production and reproduction of 
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particular identities, at the exclusion of others (Hansen 2006: 18). 
 
Power 
CDA is especially useful when studying situations where “power is maintained 
by aid of culture and challenged only to a limited degree”, which is as discussed earlier 
a concept Gramsci (1992) calls hegemony (Neumann 2008: 70). When these taken for 
granted beliefs become naturalized, and become a part of our collective ideology, they 
become ‘common sense’ beliefs. Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall argue that the 
process of denaturalizing these ‘common sense’ beliefs is a part of critical practices, 
exposing these understanding as constructed. (Weldes et al. 1999: 20). Gramsci wrote 
“every social stratum has its own “common sense” which is ultimately the most 
widespread conception of life and morals” (1992: 173). However, how and why some 
ideas become ‘common sense’, while others fade is a part of the hegemonic process in 
which certain ideas become more influential, or powerful than others. Doty argues that 
the “hegemonic dimension of global politics is inextricably linked to representational 
practices” (1996: 8). Therefore, critical discourse analysts are interested in knowing 
what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or 
communicative events contribute to the reproduction of these discourses (van Dijk 
1993: 250). Therefore, power is central to the CDA project. CDA argues that power is 
rooted in privileged access to social resources such as education, wealth and status 
(Manchin and Mayr 2012: 24).  Van Dijk argues that power involves control, usually by 
one group/person over another; not only by limiting their freedoms and actions, but by 
influencing their mind, which is why ideology is so important (1993: 254). Fairclough 
and Wodak argue that critical discourse analysis (CDA) assumes that power relations 
are discursive, and therefore “power is transmitted and practiced through discourse” 
(Manchin and Mayr 2012: 4). Therefore, they advocate a study of how power relations 
can be understood through analyzing discourse.  However, understanding power 
through discourse is not always overt. The crucial point made by van Dijk is that such 
“mind management” is not always overtly manipulative; on the contrary, dominance 
may be made to seem natural and acceptable (1993: 254). Doty would agree, and argue 
that thinking in terms of representational practices that are made to seem natural such as 
‘developed/underdeveloped/, or ‘core/periphery’, ‘first world/third world’, and so on, is 
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socially constructed and there is nothing natural or inevitable about such distinctions 
(1996: 2). However, these accepted binaries become “legitimate ways to categorize 
regions and peoples of the world” (Doty 1996: 2). Thus, CDA needs to pay special 
attention to the discursive strategies that legitimate, control and ‘naturalize’ social order 
(van Dijk 1993: 254). With the exception of various forms of military, police, or 
judicial force, in which the exercise of power is usually thought of, mind management - 
involving the “influence of knowledge, beliefs, understanding, plans, attitudes, 
ideologies, norms and values” - is actually more common (Ibid: 257). The control of 
knowledge is key in shaping how we understand our world. At the core of CDA is a 
detailed description, explanation and critique of how dominant discourses influence 
socially shared knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies (van Dijk 1993: 258). As a method, 
CDA seeks to understand how specific discourse structures facilitate the formation of 
specific social representations (Ibid: 258). Manchin and Mayr argue that the “critical” 
part of CDA is rooted in “denaturalizing” the language in order to uncover taken-for-
granted beliefs in text, consistent with the aims of CGP (2012: 5). This in turn is a step 
towards revealing the kinds of power interests hidden in text. Thus, the aim of CDA is 
to reveal both implicit and explicit social relations of power (Ibid: 24). 
 
Ideology 
Critical discourse analysis seeks to understand and uncover how discourses 
create and maintain ideologies that are key to how we understand the world. In more 
technical terms of how ideology functions, van Dijk offers the following definition: 
 
Ideologies are basic frameworks of social cognition, shared by members of 
social groups, constituted by relevant selections of sociocultural values, and 
organized by an ideological schema that represents the self-definition of a 
group…Ideologies have the cognitive function of organizing the social 
representations (attitudes, knowledge) of the group, and thus indirectly 
monitor the group-related social practices, and hence also the text and talk 
of its members (1995: 248). 
 
For CDA, ideology is a way to create and maintain unequal power relations, and 
therefore, it is a key part of analysis. Weiss and Wodak argue that language mediates 
ideology and it is the job for those who practice CDA to uncover this (2003:14). 
Similarly, Fairclough argues that conventions routinely drawn upon in discourse 
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embody ideological assumptions which come to be understood as ‘common sense’ in 
our everyday lives, and therefore, they aid in sustaining existing power relations (1989: 
77). Fairclough pays special attention to how ideologies are embedded in discourses, 
and how ‘common sense’ in fact services power, and therefore, ideology is most 
effective when its workings are least visible (Fairclough 1989: 85). Following this, if 
one realizes that a particular aspect of common sense is being used to sustain power 
inequality, then it ceases to be common sense, and therefore, to function ideologically 
(Ibid). 
 
A ‘naturalized type’ (ideology) is likely to be perceived not as that of a 
particular group within an institution, but the institution itself (Fairclough 1989: 92). In 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, ideology becomes naturalized. Likewise, in order for 
imperial policies to be ‘accepted’, it needs to appeal to an audience in a way that seems 
it is ‘natural’ to react in a specific way. Take the earlier example in which President 
Bush presented 9/11 as an attack on freedoms and the American way of life. The 
specific discourses that created the view of an ‘attack on freedoms’ and subsequently a 
no-limit reaction to this are what is in question. CDA offers an approach that questions 
power, which then has the potential to reveal how imperialism may be legitimated. The 
meaning system, according to Fairclough, is sustained by power: relevant experts, those 
seen as intelligent (professors, teachers, etc) who are ‘guarantors’ of the ideological 
understandings in standard language (1989: 95). As ideologies function to provide 
legitimacy by naturalizing forms of domination, and present ideas as ‘natural’, ‘benign’ 
or ‘inevitable’ (van Dijk 1997: 25), discourse analysis is especially important in 
uncovering and exposing these ideologies as creations. The important point made by 
van Dijk is that “the criterion of ideological validity is not truth, but social 
effectiveness”, meaning that the importance is on how ideologies function, and what 
their consequences are (1997: 28).  
 
2.4 CDA: A Framework  
 Now that the principles of CDA have been discussed, the following section will 
look at how CDA is applied methodologically. It should be noted that those in the field 
do not necessarily agree on one correct systematic way to apply discourse analysis. It 
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has been argued by many that “‘there is no guiding theoretical viewpoint that is used 
consistently within CDA”, making it very subjective (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 6). 
Which texts are selected for analysis, and what meanings are assigned to them can differ, 
as well as the frameworks in which those who deploy CDA work within. 
 
Fairclough outlines three ‘stages’ of critical discourse analysis which are the 
description of text, the interpretation of it, and the explanation of the text (2001: 21). 
Description involves the formal properties of the text itself, whereas interpretation and 
explanation are more important to the analysis itself. Interpretation refers to the 
relationship between the text as a product of a process of production and as resources in 
the interpretation (Ibid). Explanation is the relationship between interaction and social 
context; the social effects of discourse (Ibid: 22). Explanation is where discourses are 
portrayed as part of a social process as a social practice and show what reproductive 
effects discourses can have on social structures (Ibid: 135). 
 
That being said, all discourse has to somehow fit in with previous experiences of 
the world, and must have pre-existing conditions, what Fairclough calls coherence. To 
expand, coherence is what aspects of the world discourses relate to, or what kind of 
conception of the world it presupposes (Fairclough 2001: 65). Fairclough clarifies 
however, that these are not connections within the texts themselves, but connections we 
make as interpreters as we draw upon our own background and knowledge (2001: 65). 
The term that Fairclough uses to refer to this body of knowledge is ‘member’s 
resources’, which includes their knowledge of language, presentations of the natural and 
social world, values, beliefs, assumptions and so forth (2001: 20). Those who want 
people to subscribe to a certain view, for example those who produce mass 
communications, have an effective means of ‘manipulating’ audiences by connecting 
their current experiences to pre existing discourses (Fairclough 2001: 128). In fact, 
Fairclough suggests that presuppositions can either be sincere or manipulative; it 
depends on the situation.  
 
On a more technical level, according to the methodology laid out by van Dijk, 
the discursive reproduction of power, which is the main object of critical analysis, has 
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two major dimensions: production and reception (1993: 259). Van Dijk distinguishes 
between the “enactment, expression or legitimation of dominance in the (production of 
the) various structures of text and talk”, and the “functions, consequences or results of 
such structures for the (social) mind of recipients” (1993: 259). Van Dijk argues that 
there are a variety of variables or properties that one can choose from when conducting 
CDA. However, focus must be on the text and speeches “that most clearly exhibit the 
discursive properties of the exercise of dominance” (van Dijk 1993: 270). As it is 
agreed that there is no ‘correct’ way to conduct discourse analysis, choosing the most 
appropriate ‘framework’ entirely depends upon the project at hand. Given the focus of 
this research, elements of van Dijk’s framework are most well suited to the focus of this 
research on asking how a form of American imperialism was legitimated after 9/11. 
Additionally, focus is on Othering and creating distinctions with which the Bush 
administration’s argument rested upon. Therefore, the following (van Dijk 1993: 264) is 
an example of a framework for conducting CDA by choosing representative variables to 
analyze discourses: 
 
a) Argumentation: the negative evaluation follows from the ‘facts’ 
b) Rhetorical figures: hyperbolic enhancement of ‘their’ negative actions and ‘our’ 
positive actions; euphemisms, denials, understatements of ‘our’ negative actions 
c) Lexical style: choice of words that imply negative (or positive) evaluations  
d) Storytelling: telling above negative events as personally experienced; giving 
plausible details above negative features of the events 
e) Structural emphasis of ‘their’ negative actions, e.g. in headlines, leads, summaries, or 
other properties of text schemata (e.g. those of news reports), transitivity structures of 
sentence syntax (e.g. mentioning negative agents in prominent, topical position) 
f) Quoting credible witnesses, sources or experts, e.g. in news reports  
 
The goal is to systematically analyze the discourses that promote certain ideologies that 
legitimated American imperialism. The first task is to systematically examine the 
textual and contextual properties of the exercise of dominance, and to provide evidence 
for such an account, bearing in mind this analysis is not ‘neutral’ (van Dijk 1993: 270). 
Research in CDA is largely concerned with the persuasive influence of power, a 
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concept associated with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony (Manchin and Mayr 2012: 24), 
an underlying influence to both CDA and CGP, discussed in earlier chapters. On a 
technical level, for example, lexical analysis provides us with an in depth look at how 
certain chosen words can signify particular values and ideas. Which words are chosen in 
speech and text and which are left out are equally important. The goal is that through 
lexical analysis, specific ideologies may be revealed (Ibid: 30).  
 
The key criteria chosen are those that most accurately represent the discourses in 
the remainder of this thesis. They are (a) lexical style, vocabulary, and choice; (b) 
implicitness which involves implications, presuppositions, and vagueness; (c) 
argumentation and persuasive devices; (d) rhetorical figures, and, (e) framing. These 
five aspects of analysis are most commonly used in the discourses presented in this 
research, and several examples of them will be seen throughout speeches and policy 
documents in following chapters. The following are general definitions of the criteria of 
CDA used throughout the entirety of this research. 
 
Lexical style, vocabulary and choice: This accounts for the tone, and the choice of 
words, and how they are used to convey negative or positive connotations. The words 
chosen to describe the situation are of utmost importance. Examples of this are 
emphasis of ‘our’ (American) good values with ‘their’ (the Other) negative values. 
Additional to this, is the use of what Fowler (1991) calls ‘over-lexicalization” in which 
“the existence of an excess of quasi-synonymous terms for entities and ideas that are 
particular preoccupation or problem in the culture’s discourse” (Fowler 1991: 85). This 
can be seen in several examples throughout the discourse in Chapters Four, Five and 
Six. For example, the recurrence of the word ‘evil’, or ‘enemy’ in Bush’s speeches 
consistently. Language can demonize an Other and hence create an identity of good 
versus bad (identity and difference). Power works in the background as it naturalizes 
dichotomies of ‘us/them’ and therefore naturalizes the power that America as ‘good’ 
should have over the Other as the ‘evil enemy’. For example, in Chapter Four, this 
refers to the way US hegemony is presented as good, while others cannot be trusted. In 
Chapter Five, an attack on ‘our way of life’ and ‘our freedoms’ versus an attack on ‘our 
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territory’, for example, are discussed to highlight the significant difference in how 
events are perceived, and consequently the reaction to them.  
 
Implicitness: A central part of the discourse relies on its vagueness, assumptions, 
presuppositions and implications. This includes the vagueness of who the enemies are, 
and where they are located, for example. Presuppositions include examples such as 
‘obviously good Americans’, and inherently evil ‘others’. Of special importance to this 
research is the need to ‘avoid global dangers’, ‘emerging’ or ‘future’ threats, and 
‘hostile’ powers; all which are very vague. It is also the ‘obvious’ need for American 
hegemony to secure a peaceful world. In fact, a ‘global’ war on terror in itself is very 
vague. Claims about indefinite time spans, estimated and vague numbers of spending, 
the dispersed nature of terrorism ‘everywhere’ all fall under this category. Also included 
are implicit assumptions and myths, such as ‘they hate our freedoms’. This is as an 
assumption that acts were carried out by terrorists in an act of sheer hate. Creating 
discourses around vague and implicit assumptions, give free reign to an administration 
that is looking to project imperial power. A ‘never ending’ war, coupled with 
assumptions about the ‘evil’ that could potentially harm America, legitimizes power to 
act to counter such potentialities.  
 
Argumentation and persuasive devices: When a statement, either positive or negative, 
follows from the ‘facts’, it sounds more convincing; hence why ‘facts’ are like ‘proof’ 
about the statement that will be made. In many instances, President Bush and other 
members of his administration will cite facts from credible sources such as the United 
Nations, various ‘statistics’, or other ‘expert’ sources and will then follow this by a 
statement (usually negative) about the Other. This includes what Carvalho (1998) refers 
to as ‘claims-making’, which involves language used at aiming to ‘‘show’’, ‘‘prove’’ or 
‘‘call attention’’ to a given point or matter. As all language is intentional, so too is the 
usage of facts to draw attention towards certain factors, and away from others. The 
‘facts’ are chosen carefully as to paint a particular picture, which supports American 
ambitions. For example, in Chapter Four, this research highlights the argumentative 
way that military spending is justified, by arguing for protection of American nationals 
and interests. Alternate arguments such as not sitting back and waiting for threats to 
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appear, and rather to be assertive and fend off threats before they materialize will be 
given importance. Chapter Five highlights the ‘fact’ that American foreign policy is 
outdated, and new policies must be implemented to cope with the new world facing 
America. Specifically in this chapter, there is a focus on persuasive devices in the form 
of an argument to demonstrate – ‘prove’ – new methods are needed to deal with the 
‘enemy’. Chapter Six focuses on the GWOT and Iraq and in many instances, Bush 
and/or his administration will quote facts from an organization such as the United 
Nations, polls and statistics, or other  ‘expert’ sources, and will then follow this by a 
specifically negative statement about ‘them’. For example, there are several instances in 
which President Bush emphasizes that the UN has given Iraq several chances to disarm, 
followed by a string of UN violations, and concludes his argument with a stance that 
Saddam is ‘evil’ and will not therefore disarm. Statements made in an argumentative 
style, by referencing ‘facts’, make an argument seem more legitimate. It also draws 
attention away from personal (or American) interests, and diverts the attention towards 
the issue at hand as an objective crisis that involves outside factors (such as the 
‘evidence’ of WMD, or the number of UN Security Council resolutions that were 
defied). It gives the impression that this is greater than direct American interest in Iraq. 
 
Rhetorical figures and devices:  This includes euphemisms, denials, metaphors and 
contrasts. In specific, metaphors and contrasts are often used to emphasize a certain 
point to create clear binaries.  Such devices strive to maintain dominance and 
inequalities, such as the use of contrasts in identifying a ‘dangerous and evil’ 
terrorist/state, against a ‘good’ and ‘pure’ America. Rhetorical devices also make the 
use of emotive statements in aims to unite people, such as claims of America as an 
innocent victim to senseless terrorist attacks.  Emotionally charged statements used in 
aims to gain support are also typical of this category. Many examples of this category 
can be found in Chapter Six. There are many examples of metaphors and contrasts to 
create the binaries of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ that are so prominent in the Bush 
administration’s discourse. These devices are used to portray the ideology that America 
is needed to ‘save’ unfortunate peoples (such in Iraq) from their tyrannical leaders, for 
example.  	
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Framing: Framing (Carvalho 2008) is to organize discourse according to a certain point 
of view or perspective. In involves a selection and composition, and therefore, selection 
is an exercise of inclusion and exclusion of facts, opinions, value judgments, etc. 
Composition is the arrangement of these elements in order to produce a certain meaning. 
What is excluded is in many cases, as important as what is included. Specifically in this 
section, framing is used to set up the narrative of a ‘post Cold War world’, and the 
‘unique responsibility of America’. 
 
The importance of these elements in analyzing discourse is that it helps to 
uncover the narrative that Bush and his administration created directly after 9/11, and 
especially in the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003. This research will be primarily a 
critical discourse analysis of primary documents such as the National Security Strategy 
(specifically the NSS 2002), speeches by George W. Bush and other key members of 
his administration, the 9/11 commission report, The Quadrennial defense review, the 
Defense Planning Guidance’s of a few key years in the 1990s, the Patriot Act, and other 
government documents. The speeches and documents chosen for this research are the 
ones that most clearly provide evidence to the themes within each chapter such as the 
changing nature of threat and danger, the need for American involvement – militarily 
and otherwise, imperial ambitions, a turn toward an aggressive foreign policy, 
American supremacy and grand strategy. As this is a thesis where the ideological roots 
of power through language are analyzed, the materials chosen are explicit, and 
representative of evidence pertaining to the research question.  
 
 More specifically, the materials chosen for CDA analysis are based on the 
assumption of this research that the use of language is intentional, and therefore 
ideology as presented through discourse is of great importance. The quotes chosen in 
this research exemplify specific discourses that provide materials for analysis on an 
ideological level. In some cases the language is very emotive, and has a specific 
purpose (which is expanded upon after each quote). In other cases, the language is used 
politically, to justify a policy. The quotes also exemplify the ways that language is used 
to unify and divide people, which will again, be expanded after each quote. As with any 
database of information, there are a vast number of quotes that could have been used 
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that are associated with the George W. Bush administration during this time period. 
However, the examples chosen have the strongest impact on their audience (the 
American public generally), and hence are most representative of the ideologies 
perpetuated.  
 
For example, in Chapter Four, the focus of the quotes chosen pertain to those 
who have been named major influences of President Bush’s ideological foreign policy 
thought. Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Zalmay Khalilzad, Paul Wolfowitz and 
Douglas Feith’s materials are analyzed using CDA. Further, they are then divided into 
the main themes: unilateralism, ensuring no rival to American power, America’s job to 
protect the peace, pre-emption, and military spending and power. The quotes chosen for 
each person, and theme are those that most clearly embody the ideological assumptions 
of the person and theme. The speeches, documents, and reports by each individual 
preceding 2001 were scanned to look for language that exemplifies their foreign policy 
objectives surrounding the themes outlined above. From those, samples from each 
person were taken that provided evidence that foreign policy thought that formed the 
basis of post 9/11 policies were present at an earlier time. A CDA was then conducted 
to identify key discourse that set up ideological basis for foreign policy implementation.  
 
Similarly, in Chapter Five, the focus is on the changing geography of danger, 
and the discourses surrounding new geographical dangers and our understandings of 
spaces. In particular, this chapter looks at the importance of framing as the focus is on 
the ‘script’ of a new world that was created after 9/11. Of crucial importance in this 
chapter are discourses surrounding the perceptions of the changing nature of geopolitics 
– both physically and ideologically. Hence, the quotes chosen for analysis were those 
that most clearly demonstrated language that signified a physical and ideological change 
in the direction of geopolitics after 9/11. The quotes most clearly demonstrate a rational 
for who is dangerous, where is dangerous, and what is considered dangerous in the new 
world the Bush administration was advocating after the attacks. Specific attention is 
also given to quotes that use language that provide a rational for military engagement 
and intervention based on the very threats, risks and dangers brought to light by the 
Bush administration. Also featured for analysis in this chapter once more, are the quotes 
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and language that demonstrate the simple binaries created for good/evil, us/them, 
here/there. These were then used as arguments over legitimacy for military intervention 
in justifying danger and evil in a new world. The quotes chosen exemplify the themes in 
the chapter relating specifically to: the ‘9/11 prism’; freedom and lifestyles under 
attack; understanding the conflict: good and evil; geographical uncertainty: danger is 
everywhere; new enemy, new policies; media framing, and unified by fear. The sections 
selected for analysis focus on the language that most clearly focuses on these themes as 
representative material for the type of discourses evident during the time immediately 
after the attacks. 
 
The last chapter for CDA analysis, Chapter Six focuses on the GWOT. The 
chapters are in order of a narrative beginning from Chapter Four in the 1990s, to 
Chapter Six, which is after 9/11, during the build up to the GWOT. The quotes chosen 
for this section are mainly justifications from President Bush, and specifically focus on 
just war legitimacy, humanitarian discourses and themes surrounding justifications for 
military intervention (such as pre-emption, for example). The themes also mirror the 
earlier discourses of the 1990s from Chapter Four. These quotes are representative and 
exemplary of the arguments made by Bush and his administration for military measures, 
and the declaration of a Global War on Terror. The quotes in this chapter specifically 
focus on justifications and rationales for instigating a GWOT, and more specifically, the 
invasion of Iraq, and preoccupations around the danger of Saddam Hussein. A focus is 
also given to two key documents: the NSS of 2002, and the QDR of 2001. These were 
the two most important documents produced after the 9/11 attacks which make direct 
reference to, and justify use of force in a GWOT, hence their importance for analysis in 
this chapter.  
 
Most of the primary materials range from the 1990s until 2005. After the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the subsequent 2004 State of the Union address, the 
economy started to take focus in American politics. By that time (2005), the Bush 
administration had accomplished most of what it wanted to implement: legislation such 
as the Patriot Act, war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security, and various other new and aggressive policies as a ‘reaction’ to 
	 73	
9/11. Therefore, the focus of the documents are in the run up to the war in Iraq, and the 
implementation of these policies. A variety of secondary sources such as scholarly 
articles, books, and interviews conducted with officials within and close to the Bush 
administration will also be used. The aim is to critically analyze the discourses used by 
the Bush administration and how they made their way into policy justifying actions 
after 9/11, and furthermore to legitimate future imperial actions of the United States.  
 
A critical discourse analysis will seek to explore whether the ideas for policies 
implemented after 9/11 were in the works before hand, and whether 9/11 was an 
opportunity for neoconservatives to implement these measures. How they then used 
9/11 to justify these actions and also use the changing notions of fear and danger to 
legitimate further imperial policies is the subject of this thesis.  Understanding how the 
discourses were created, and used as justification for foreign policy will prove the 
power of ideology and hegemonic discourses in the practice of legitimating foreign 
policy.  
 
2.5 CDA, CGP and Imperialism 
 CDA leaves us with some important things to think about. First, the importance 
of language and discourse in shaping our world, producing and reproducing power, 
and how it embodies ideological assumptions. Language is a social system, and the 
choice of words is powerful. Given this, discourses are intentional actions; they are 
powerful. The importance of power is a central area of focus for the CDA project. 
Finally, it is contextual, like CGP, and therefore the two together serve as a unique and 
critical tool. Moving through this research, we can then ask, what is the role of critical 
discourse analysis in understanding and analyzing imperialism specifically? One of the 
tasks of CDA is to trace the narratives of imperialism. This means uncovering the 
discourses of imperialism to reveal how they are constructed, maintained, and 
ultimately taken for granted beliefs about our world and global political system. 
Understanding how imperialism is presented in mainstream society (through speeches 
for example, that are heard nation wide by the public), analyzing the kind of language 
that is used to justify, legitimate and normalize it specifically in the context of post 
9/11 policies is a central aim of this research.  
	 74	
 CDA takes on the critical perspective of CGP and highlights its understanding of 
imperialism. CDA as a method also meshes together with the major themes of CGP. 
CDA can help to uncover how the discourses work, what they are really saying 
beneath the surface about imperialism and analyze the language used to legitimate this 
– a part of the first theme of CGP (the power of ideas). The second major theme, 
identity and difference, looks at how the Other is constructed. It also looks at how 
policies and identities are created and legitimated in relation to the constructed other. 
CDA therefore can look at the language of Othering, how it is created within discourse 
and how that is then used to justify imperialism and therefore actions against the Other. 
The last theme, the critical analysis of territory and how space is given meaning, is an 
analysis into how meanings that fill space are socially constructed and need to be 
acknowledged as such. It is these meanings that legitimate policy. Certain spaces are 
therefore constructed in particular meaningful ways (for example the axis of evil) and 
the language that constructs those meanings is vital to how such places and spaces are 
understood. CDA seeks to highlight that very language and how for example, actions 
can be legitimated against an ‘evil’ space and further the language that allows certain 
powers to take action. 
 
 As mentioned previously, the goal of CDA is to systematically analyze the 
discourses that promote certain ideologies that legitimate American power. CDA 
combined with CGP is a different approach for a number of reasons. First, it asks and 
answers the question ‘how’. How imperialism is legitimized, how language is used to 
do this, and how it becomes normalized and accepted in mainstream geopolitics. 
Whereas much of mainstream international relations is looking to create a ‘testable’ 
theory, critical geopolitics is a problem based approach that takes an interdisciplinary 
perspective to answer questions that are left incomplete by much of IR theory. CGP 
avoids the label of ‘theory’ and instead can be understood as a ‘lens’ in which to 
critically analyze the world. Critical discourse analysis takes this a step further by 
providing a method to execute the CGP methodologically. For example, if CGP 
questions how certain ideologies become normalized through discourse, CDA can 
answer that question by providing a systematic means to take apart language and trace 
the origins of the very discourses that legitimate actions. CDA complements critical 
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geopolitics and in unison they provide a critical and interdisciplinary approach to the 
question of imperialism, and how it can be legitimized. Chapters Four, Five and Six 
are an application of CDA under the themes of CGP with focus on the construction of 
foreign policy from the early 1990s until the end of George W. Bush’s presidency, the 
Global War on Terror, and changing geographies post 9/11. 
 
The next chapter will critique the main theories within international relations 
that have attempted to address the topic of imperialism. Following this, critical 
geopolitics will be introduced as a more critical way to analyze imperialism, addressing 
some of the missing gaps in the literature and the study of this topic, specifically post 
9/11. In this section imperialism will be presented under the three main themes of CGP 
introduced in this chapter (the power of ideas, identity and difference, and the critical 
analysis of territory). Chapters Four, Five and Six will be an application of critical 

























The academic argument that (American) imperialism is back was one made by 
Cox in 2003, amongst others (see for example, Bellamy Foster 2006; Gokay 2005; 
Steinmetz 2003). Following the reactions of the Bush administration to the 2001 
terrorist attacks, empire also regained popularity in the media, and across several 
academic disciplines. Was this a ‘new’ imperialism, or was it continuity in American 
foreign policy? Cox argues that there was an ‘imperial turn’ during the Bush years, and 
it was “by any stretch of the imagination, a most extraordinary phenomenon” (2004a: 
589). How and why this marked a turn in events is an important question. In his words,  
 
“Previously, the United States had at least paid formal lip-service to international 
institutions and global rules. Now, it appeared to have arrogated to itself the right to set 
standards, determine threats, use force, and mete out justice to those whom it deemed 
unworthy. Call it unilateralism; accept perhaps that it was the necessary response to 
real threats; define it how you will. It was still imperialism by any other name” (Cox 
2003: 6). 
 
However, does this mean that American imperialism was new? Were the 
foreign policies a reaction to 9/11 or were they consistent with a long history of 
American grand strategy. The central argument in this research is that 9/11 presented a 
perceived shift in danger and threat by the Bush administration, thus legitimating a 
more aggressive foreign policy, which this thesis categorizes as ‘informal imperialism’.  
Details of the argument to justify the use of the term imperialism are presented in a 
later part of the chapter.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a nuanced and contextual account of how 
American imperialism has developed through it’s history, and why that is a matter of 
importance for critical geopolitics. There are four key parts to this chapter. First, will 
be an ideological account of imperialism within the key concepts of exceptionalism 
and manifest destiny. Their main tenants and significance will be discussed in relation 
	 77	
to its impact on American imperialism. Second, several key points in history where 
American imperialism was a matter of debate, or proved to be a significant 
development in American empire will be discussed.  This section will look at whether 
or not Americans regarded themselves as an empire or not, the great debates of 1890s, 
as well as the second round of debates in the 1920s, World War Two, Post 1945 and 
the Cold War era, and finally the post 9/11 world will be addressed. After a historical 
grounding of American imperialism, the third section will provide a definition of how 
this research classifies US imperialism will be presented among a debate of hegemony 
versus empire. Fourth and finally, this chapter will consider why this is important to 
the field of CGP and how the three themes will be relevant in assessing US 
imperialism before concluding.  
 
3.2 Ideological roots: Manifest Destiny and American Exceptionalism 
The concept of manifest destiny and benevolent hegemony have both played 
into America’s larger discourse of exceptionalism since its very early days as an 
independent nation. These terms are important and foundational to the ideologies that 
become naturalized in geopolitics discourse, specifically. They have become a taken-
for-granted belief and have further become a part of the national identity. The 
importance of this, above all, is that these narratives are used to legitimize policies; 
specifically, military interventions in the name of fulfilling a manifest destiny, because 
of America’s exceptionalism or their ‘duty’ as a benevolent hegemon on the world 
stage.  
 
At the core of the founding of the United States of America was the belief that 
empire was wrong, and as a result the American Revolution sought to overthrow British 
imperial rule, rejecting both its monarchy and aristocracy. However, although rejecting 
this type of empire in its founding, in 1803 Thomas Jefferson declared an ‘empire of 
liberty’ by which he saw that it was America’s responsibility to spread freedom across 
the world. Along with the Louisiana purchase in the same year, the expansion of 
America westward was the beginning of the roots of the American empire. Territorial 
expansion was rationalized in this context as Americans believed their nation to be 
“chosen by Providence to spread its virtues far and wide” (McCrisken 2003: 12). 
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Weinberg argues that the Americans of 1803 were too close to the events of 1776, 
which rejected imperialism, and hence the imperialistic thesis had to be supplied with a 
“sugar coating” (Weinberg 1935: 34). He argues that the justification of the conquest to 
the Louisianans was that they would find “true liberty” by accepting Jefferson’s 
benevolent rule (Ibid). Jefferson’s rationale was that by expanding westward, and 
introducing American laws and government, the French settlers would assimilate into 
the United States. By ensuring American settlers migrated beyond America’s borders, it 
would spread republican culture and institutions without “traditional instruments of 
conquest”, hence spreading the Empire of Liberty (Cogliano 2014: 179). 
 
At the core of American imperialism, and American national identity are two 
interlinked ideologies: that of exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny. The first time the 
words ‘exceptional’ were used in regards to America, was in 1831 by Alexis De 
Tocqueville in his book Democracy in America where he says, “The position of the 
American is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic 
people will ever be placed in a similar one” (De Tocqueville 1961: 42). McCrisken 
defines American exceptionalism as “the belief that the United States is an 
extraordinary nation with a special role to play in human history; not only unique but 
also superior among nation” (McCrisken 2003: 1). It is a concept that has permeated 
every period of American history and as Madsen argues, is the single most powerful 
ideology in regards to American identity (Madsen 1998:1). As such, McCrisken notes 
two different strands of exceptionalism. One is the view that the United States is an 
exemplar nation; one that is anti-imperialist, isolationist, as defined by the term 
‘fortress America’ (McCrisken 2003: 2). The second is a missionary brand of 
exceptionalism that is represented by Manifest Destiny, imperialism, internationalism 
and the United States as leader of the free world (Ibid). To understand the difference 
then, it is necessary to first understand what is meant in this context, by Manifest 
Destiny. 
 
Weinberg defines Manifest Destiny as “the doctrine that one nation has a 
preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty mission, and…unique rights in the 
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application of moral principles” (Weinberg 1935: 8). Further expanding on this point he 
writes: 
 
The alchemy which transmuted natural right from a doctrine of democratic 
nationalism into a doctrine of imperialism was thus the very idea of 
manifest destiny. Which the doctrine of natural right created. But manifest 
destiny was such a creature as Frankenstein fashioned. Gaining control over 
the doctrine of natural right, it in effect changed the impartial law of nature 
into the unique code favorable to the rights of one nation (Ibid: 41). 
 
Manifest Destiny was used to therefore justify and rationalize territorial 
expansion because Americans believed their nation was unique. It was also the duty of 
Americans to “regenerate backward peoples of the continent” (Merk 1963:32). It seems 
that the term may have been first used in 1836, when Winthrop made a speech in 
Congress addressing the joint occupation of Oregan and said, “I mean that new 
revelation of right which has been designated as the right of our manifest destiny to 
spread over this whole continent” (Winthrop quoted in Pratt 1927: 79). Others such as 
Robert Johannsen and Anders Stephanson argue that it was John O’Sullivan in 1845 
who coined the phrase manifest destiny in reference to the mission of the United States 
“to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our 
yearly multiplying millions” (Stephanson 1995: xi). Merk argues it was born out of a 
“special variety of nationalism”  - in the resentment of European interference in the 
affairs of Texas (Merk 1963: 59). Stephanson argues that through the eyes of 
Americans, they had seen the light, and hence had a duty to develop and “spread the 
blessings of the most perfect principles imaginable” (Stephanson 1995: xii). Bell posits 
that Manifest Destiny was the “civil religion of 19th century America”, driven by the 
belief that America had the right to define it’s own fate, and that Americans were 
different from everyone else in world history (Bell 1975: 5).  
 
The first strand of exceptionalism embodies three key beliefs, according to 
McCrisken. One is that America is a “special nation with a special destiny” (McCrisken 
2003: 8). The second is that it is a nation different from the rest of the world, and 
specifically different from Europe; and third, that it will “avoid the laws of history that 
determine the rise and fall of all great nations” (Ibid). Americans did not see leadership 
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as an “international collaboration”, but to lead by their “brilliant example” in which 
America’s “moral influence was that of ‘mistress of the world’” (Weinberg 1935: 460).  
 
The first belief of the first strand of imperialism is embodied by the famous 
quote from John Winthrop in 1630 about the Massachusetts Bay colonists that it is a 
‘city upon a hill’ is one that has been formative in American identity and has been 
evoked repeatedly over the centuries (Winthrop 1630: 20). The concept of the ‘city on 
a hill’ is a belief that America and Americans are special, and they must save the world 
from itself, while displaying a spiritual, moral, and political commitment to their 
destiny (Madsen 1998: 2). Hence, this has proven to be an inherent part of American 
self-identity, and continues to be today. The second belief of this particular strand of 
exceptionalism, strongly rooted in Manifest Destiny, that claims by separating 
Americans from the European’s “class systems and structure of inheritance” by 
establishing a democratic society, they will have a chance to better their lives, unlike in 
the European class systems of old Monarchies (Ibid: 36).  Hence America sought 
imperial expansion abroad to increase their power; as Thomas Paine said ‘to begin the 
world over again’ (Paine 1894: 83). The third belief is that America would avoid the 
fall of a great nation, and was driven by the belief that geographic isolation from 
Europe would enable them to pursue a different course and prevent them from making 
the same mistakes that led to the fall of other great nations (McCrisken 2003: 10). 
 
The second main strand of exceptionalism – the missionary view- advocates a 
more aggressive presence of the United States in the world. This includes the expansion 
of the US into the affairs of other nations, but at the same time believing that America is 
“incapable of seeking domination over other peoples in its self-interest” due to the 
‘nature’ of America as a selfless nation, only seeking the betterment of others 
(McCrisken 2003: 11). This interventionist view, with it principles of American right 
and duty to intervene in other parts of the world, is what Theodore Roosevelt called an 
“international police power” (Weinberg 1935: 414). McCrisken argues that these 
Americans believe that “inside every foreigner there is the potential, even the desire, to 
be an American”, making it difficult for Americans to understand that other peoples 
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around the world have different values, norms, and perceptions that effect how they see 
the world (i.e. differently from Americans) (McCrisken 2003: 11). 
 
Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny took turns throughout the course of 
American history in the role that they played in the debates and development of 
American imperialism. The significance of these ideologies has spanned from 
America’s identity as a nation, and how individuals in society view and understand 
themselves as American citizens, to its foreign policy. From its self-identity to its 
actions on the international stage, the ideology of American exceptionalism and its 
Manifest Destiny have been, and continue to be profoundly significant in American 
history. The next part of this chapter will discuss the importance of how these concepts 
have shaped American imperialism, in a historical context. There are a few key 
moments in American history that will be the focus of understanding the development 
of imperialism. They are: the great debate and Spanish War in years 1898-1901, the 
1920s debate of isolationism versus internationalism, the outcome of WWII, the post 
1945 world and Cold War era, and finally a post 9/11 world.  
 
3.3 Manifest Destiny and American Exceptionalism Applied: The 
Development of American Imperialism  
 
The 1890s: The Great Debate & The Spanish American War 
During the 1890s, there was a crisis in America. Williams Appleman Williams 
argues that the Americans thought the continental frontier was gone and hence they 
needed to expand overseas in the form of economic and territorial empire that would 
provide the only way to maintain their freedom and prosperity (Williams 1979: 23). 
During this time, Williams argues that it marked the “death of the individual 
entrepreneur” and the success and rise of the corporation in America (Williams 1979: 
29). The crisis of unemployment led to the need for more markets abroad, driving an 
expansionist foreign policy objective. In 1896, industrial and political leaders viewed 
expansionist foreign policy as necessary (Williams 1979: 30). Williams writes that 
President Cleveland had deployed the Navy to defeat rebels in Brazil who were 
opposing unequal developing in economic relations with America (Ibid). In 1893, a 
newspaper in Omaha used the term Manifest Destiny to refer to Cleveland’s ability to 
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promote Manifest Destiny as ‘far as possible’ (Williams 1979: 30). In the same year 
Frederick Jackson Turner put forward the ‘Frontier Thesis’ that essentially claimed that 
expansion would equal democracy and prosperity (Ibid). 
 
In 1898, during the Spanish America war, a ‘Great Debate’ flared up between 
expansionists who wanted to annex the former Spanish colonies and the ‘anti-
imperialists’ who opposed this (McCrisken 2003: 12). This is where the two strands of 
exceptionalism clashed. The anti-imperialists believed that America was acting in a 
way inconsistent with their founding father’s principles, but still believed in the 
exemplary strand of American exceptionalism (McCrisken 2003: 13). The military 
intervention was necessary to ‘clean up the Cuban mess’ so that other foreign policy 
issues could be dealt with (Williams 1979: 37). The type of imperialism Bryan’s camp 
was advocating was framed around the view that the United States should ‘protect’ 
these nations through means such as the Monroe Doctrine in Cuba (Williams 1979: 47).  
 
The imperialist policies of Cleveland and McKinley were to defeat the 
revolution in Cuba, amidst pressures from metropolitan expansionists to confront Spain 
(Williams 1979: 40). The ideology of the Cuban invasion was justified by McKinley as 
based on the duty to save the Cubans from oppression; a humanitarian argument 
(Weinberg 1935: 186). In such arguments, the “general obligation to respect the right 
of self-determination is suspended when the allowance of such a right amounts to 
permitting a suicide” (Ibid: 292). That argument is still currently used by American 
administrations when presenting the American position to save a nation from itself, or 
its own leaders. All imperial policies were seen as altruistic in the eyes of Americans. 
Weinberg notes the Boston Journal claimed, that “to abandon Cuba to its own turbulent 
politicians seemed an imperilment… to the peace of the world” (Weinberg 1935: 425). 
Not only that, but the Americans went to war with Spain not only because of 
expansionist reasons, but also as an act of escaping some of the domestic turmoil at 
home; hence the war unified and served as a distraction (Williams 1979: 42). 
 
The first two groups debated the fate of Cuba and the Philippines as a matter of 
keeping them as traditional colonies or quasi-independent nations (Williams 1979: 46). 
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The imperialists claimed that it was “the duty and the manifest destiny of the United 
States to civilize and Christianize” (Weinberg 1935: 289). In response to the invasion 
of the Philippines and the controversy over consent, McKinley argued the following: 
“Did we need their consent to perform a great act for humanity? We had it in every 
aspiration of their minds, in every hope of their hearts” (Weinberg 1935: 294). He 
addressed non-consent with the rhetoric that their interference was welcome and 
needed, and America’s involvement can only be seen as a force for good. Interestingly, 
this discourse reappears at several points in America’s history, especially after 9/11, 
which will be addressed in later chapters. In order with their moral justification, the 
expansionists concealed their imperialism with the view that self-determination was not 
necessarily being taken away from the Filipinos, it was just being “held in trust until 
they were fit to exercise it” (Weinberg 1935: 297).  As the first two groups debated, it 
was actually the third group, Williams notes, that was made of mainly business men, 
politicians and intellectuals who opposed traditional colonialism but instead advocated 
open door policy (Williams 1979: 45).  
 
The third group eventually won the debate and open door policy became official 
foreign policy in America for the next half century (Ibid). Open door policy was 
essentially a policy that would see America’s economic strength “enter and dominate 
all underdeveloped areas of the world” (Williams 1979: 45). Brooks Adams called the 
policy America’s “economic supremacy” which would establish America as the 
world’s great economic superpower, without the “embarrassment and inefficiency of 
traditional colonialism” (Williams 1979: 50). But as Williams points out, when any 
advanced industrial nation tries to control the development of a weaker economy, this 
can only be essentially described as imperialism (Williams 1979: 55). 
 
1920’s debate: Isolationalism versus Internationalism  
The Open Door Policy continued after the Spanish American War, and became 
official foreign policy of the United States. However, another debate emerged yet again 
that would bring America’s power into consideration. After WWI, during the 1920s, a 
debate emerged in how to move American foreign policy forward: to engage in 
internationalism, or retreat and be isolationist. The two sides of the debate consisted of 
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those in Wilson’s camp who advocated joining the League of Nations with the premise 
that collective security would make the world safer for America’s Open Door Policy, 
and the anti-imperialist camp (led by Senator Borah, Lodge and Hoover) who were 
critical of American imperial expansion arguing it was neither economically necessary 
or morally just (Williams 1979: 122). The isolationists believed that avoiding the “petty 
squabbles” of Europe and sticking to their own hemisphere was the better idea 
(McCrisken 2003: 13). On the other hand, the internationalists believed that the United 
States had a “duty to intervene in world affairs” (McCrisken 2003: 14). 
 
The critical arguments of Borah and the anti-imperialists were important. He 
argued that America could not and should not take on a role that would keep the world 
safe for democracy. He saw this as an unrealistic argument as this view ignored the 
different cultural traditions of the world, and the potential of other nations to react 
against the US unfavorably (Williams 1979: 123). In essence, he argued that this view 
violated the spirit of democracy itself (Ibid). His anti-imperialists arguments were 
rooted in his belief that democracy could not be ‘exported’, or that citizens of a country 
could simply be given freedom by Americans or outsiders (Williams 1979: 125). On the 
other side, President Coolidge argued exactly the opposite, that any action that was 
deemed wrong within the United States should be equally wrong outside the United 
States (Williams 1979: 130). This clearly exemplifies the idea of exceptionalism: that 
the United States should serve as a model to the rest of the world, and is morally 
superior; hence, anything acting as an alternative to the values and norms of America 
deems it incorrect. The result of the debate was to reject collective security, but to 
continue to push American overseas political and economic expansion (Williams 1979: 
97). As Weinberg writes, “world empire demanded abandonment of isolation but the 
expansionists preferred to assert that abandonment of isolation demanded world empire” 
(Weinberg 1935: 457). 
 
When Roosevelt came to power and implemented the New Deal principles, it 
paved the way for a type of free trade informal empire (Williams 1979: 173). However, 
its success depending on the acceptance of American policies by the rest of the world, 
hence it led to some questioning if American imperial power could be dangerous (Ibid). 
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Because the United States had defined overseas economic activity as crucial to the 
interests of Americans, policy makers viewed any type of social revolution in those 
countries as a threat to their own interests at home (Williams 1979: 174). Hence, 
Roosevelt implemented the ‘Good Neighbour Policy’ with Latin America, which stated 
that good neighbours did not rock the boat. If these nations stayed friendly to American 
interests, there would not be any problems. This can be understood by no other means 
than informal imperialism: a way to influence the internal affairs of several other 
nations via a policy that implies that as long as said countries comply with American 
friendly interests, they will not have any problems. It sounds paradoxically, like a 
friendly threat; one that is not necessarily enforced by direct military force or economic 
coercion, but using the fear of non-compliance as a motivator.  
 
The road forward was eventually solidified when the internationalists ‘won’ the 
debate, when Pearl Harbour was attacked. In 1941 Henry Luce wrote in Life magazine 
that the “US must accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most 
powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the 
full impact of our influence” (Luce as quoted in McCrisken 2003: 20). Hence, America 
entered WWII as a “fully engaged” global power (Ibid).  
 
World War Two  
Williams argues that the United States fought World War Two (WWII) under 
the assumption that they were defending an anti-colonial democracy coupled with the 
duty to restore the world (Williams 1979: 201). With a continued importance on 
pushing the Open Door Policy forward, their own success and democracy therefore 
depended on their economic success and hence victory in the war (Ibid). Roosevelt’s 
goal was more than winning the war. His central objectives were freedom of speech, 
freedom to practice whichever religion ones chooses, freedom from want (which he 
defined as economic understandings that secure a peaceful world), and freedom from 
fear everywhere in the world (Roosevelt 1941). In order to win the war in his view, it 
would mean that peace and security in the world would be based on ‘universal values’, 
which meant those traditionally championed by Americans (McCrisken 2003: 14). 
Furthermore, ensuring this goal was an American ‘duty’. A poll at the end of the war in 
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1945 showed that 71% of Americans agreed that the USA should take an active role in 
world affairs (McCrisken 2003: 21). After WWII, American exceptionalism became 
more militant and missionary. In instances where there were any radical changes to the 
national economies in which the United States had an interest, it would use US troops, 
threats of violence, economic pressures, or embargoes to achieve the results it wanted 
(Kolko 1969: 82). During Eisenhower’s 1953 inaugural address, he stated, that “destiny 
has aid upon our country the responsibility of the free world’s leadership” (Eisenhower 
1953).  Hence, American exceptionalism was in full force, as part of overt foreign 
policy that it is American responsibility to lead the free world. Those who did not 
accept this view of open door expansion, both in the missionary sense and economically 
were not only considered to be wrong, but also they were seen as “incapable of thinking 
correctly” (Williams 1979: 206). Being American is an “ideological commitment”, 
argues Lipset (1996: 31). Hence, rejecting or challenging American values, would be 
‘un-American’ (Ibid). There was a strong sense of what it meant to be American after 
the victory of WWII, and why being American meant being exceptional and inherently 
a good force fighting evil as the US emerged a victor in the war.  
 
Post 1945 and The Cold War 
Post 1945, the US perceptions of itself had changed, producing political and 
economic circumstances that provided a unique opportunity for the US to shape the 
world in its own image (Kiely 2010: 97). Therefore, it has often been asked, ‘what is 
new about the American empire/ American imperialism after 2001?’ A brief and 
contextual history of modern American imperialism stresses the importance of 
imperialism in the nation’s past and present. As has been evidenced in earlier parts of 
this chapter, America as an imperial power is not a new concept, but its emergence post 
9/11 in a more aggressive form, is. The attitudes and ideologies that promoted 
American imperialism have been present, especially so since after the end of the 
Second World War, and specifically more so since the demise of the Soviet Union.   
 
Chomsky argues that in the post-war period, the United States sought to hold 
‘unquestioned power’, acting to ensure “limitation of any ‘exercise of sovereignty’ by 
states that might interfere with its global designs” (2003: 15). America was essentially 
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constructing policies with ‘allies’ in aims to achieve military and economic supremacy 
(Ibid). Kolko argues that the US government made it clear that its role in the world post 
1945 was to protect and advance American economic power, hence controlling the 
world economy (Kolko 1969: 83). When the Cold War was under way in 1947, the 
missionary strand of American exceptionalism was the focus of foreign policy 
(McCrisken 2003: 21). One of the key assumptions the Americans made during the 
Cold War was the American would be an agent of positivity and good in the world, 
against the evil Russians, providing the US with a “wonderful opportunity” to exercise 
their authority (Williams 1979: 231). This move toward an assertive missionary 
exceptionalism followed from Truman’s belief that it was not enough for American to 
provide an example in the world, but as the chosen nation, that they had to defend the 
rights of free people around the world against totalitarianism (McCrisken 2003: 22). 
President Kennedy also evoked references to the City upon a Hill, when he said, “we 
must always consider…that we shall be as a city upon a hill-the eyes of all people are 
upon us”, during the Cold War to remind Americans about their special role and 
purpose (Kennedy 1961). Following Kennedy, President Johnson also suggested 
exceptionalism in his discourse regarding Vietnam, which ultimately ended up to be one 
of the greatest failures of US foreign policy. He argued to the American people that, 
“because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather than territory or 
colonies, our patience and our determination are unending” (Johnson 1965). His 
argument is moral, based on an American responsibility and duty to help the 
Vietnamese people. Kolko argues that the Vietnamese intervention was the “most 
important single embodiment of the power and purposes of American foreign policy 
since the Second World War”, which reveals most clearly the ideological basis and 
motivating forces of the United States (Kolko 1969: 88). 
 
Systematically, the missionary brand of exceptionalism was being used by each 
President during the Cold War. However, the failure of Vietnam sparked a debate in 
America once more that in fact it was not exceptional, and in fact as Daniel Bell wrote 
in his article The End of American Exceptionalism, that America was a nation like any 
other (Bell 1975: 6). Kissinger also commented that the most important casualty of the 
Vietnam War was American exceptionalism (Kissinger 2000). Those who opposed, 
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such as Senator Fullbright, said that American power had succumbed to the arrogance 
of power, as his book title suggests, which he describes as “a psychological need that 
nations seem to have in order to prove they are bigger, better, or stronger than other 
nations” (Fullbright 1966: 5). He further argues that such nations, such as America, 
equate power and virtue with major responsibilities and universal missions (Ibid: 9). 
Because of this, Fullbright argues that America has in the past ‘hurt’ those who it has 
tried to help and suggests that Americans allow their “neighbours to make their own 
judgments and mistakes” (Ibid: 14).  
 
Hence, with America’s ego damaged, when President Ford came into power, his 
goal was to move American foreign policy back to traditional belief in US 
exceptionalism (McCrisken 2003: 48). During Ford’s time in office, the Mayaguez 
incident set a precedent for the use of US force; that it could be applied as long as there 
was a morally justifiable objectives and could be swiftly used with the maximum force 
necessary with fewest lives risked (McCrisken 2003: 53). Ford later recalled that the 
incident “resurrected America’s morale. It got us out of the depths of defeat in Vietnam” 
(Ford as cited in Cannon 2013: 378). It was a signal from the United States that it would 
pay whatever price to preserve its national honour. By the time President Carter came 
into office, McCrisken argues that America’s “moral compass had been lost”, and the 
traditional beliefs of the meaning of being American had been put into question 
(McCrisken 2003: 56). Carter, therefore said, that “the US will meet its obligation to 
help create a stable, just and peaceful world order” (Carter 1977a). Interestingly, Carter 
also uses the term ‘obligation’, hence still deploying exceptionalist rhetoric, but perhaps 
with a softer tone. At a question and answer session in Mississippi in 1977, Carter 
remarked that  
 
we’ve been filled with the worlds of Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson, 
Benjamin Franklin and George Washington, and others – that all men are 
created equal…so human rights is a part of the American consciousness. 
These kinds of commitments that I share with all other Americans make it 
almost inevitable that our country will be a leader in the world in standing 




Carter’s moral and humanitarian foreign policy combined missionary and traditional 
strands of US exceptionalism as he supported US military intervention if needed, but 
based his argument on moral grounds. This echoes Ignatieff’s argument for ‘Empire 
Lite’ in which imperial actions and policies are based on moral and humanitarian 
grounds. However, it was Ronald Reagan’s time in office, beginning in 1981, that saw 
the birth of the “new” American Empire, according to Cox. The first part of this new 
empire was the changes immediately following the collapse of the USSR, as American 
power was largely enhanced (Cox 2004a: 595). Cox argues, that years before George W. 
Bush’s election, the intellectual ground was laid for a more aggressive America on the 
international stage, with increases in military spending and a far more proactive role in 
shaping the world to its benefit (Ibid: 597). It is 9/11 that created the window of 
opportunity to implement the policies that had been on the back burner for years during 
the Reagan administration, that could not be passed through during the Clinton years. 
Cox argues that the American administration presented the world to be a very dangerous 
place after the attacks, and had taken it upon itself to fight the “savage war of peace”, 
protecting and expanding its empire of liberty (2003: 6). Therefore, Regan’s 
administration proved to be an important part of the more aggressive foreign policy that 
began to form after the Carter years. As a strong believer in US exceptionalism, Reagan, 
like Presidents before him, evoked the discourse of exceptionalism. In 1986 on the 
campaign trail he stated that “America [is] a land of hope, a light unto the nation, a 
shining city on the hill'' (Regan as quoted in Boyd 1986). Once again, the image of the 
shining city upon a hill was brought forward, always grounding American policies in a 
form of US exceptionalism. Reagan also famously said, “America has no territorial 
ambitions. We occupy no countries, and we have built no walls to lock our people in. 
Our commitment to self-determination, freedom, and peace is the very soul of America” 
(Reagan 1982). Like those before him, Reagan presented a discourse that explicitly 
stated that the United States was not a formal empire, as it does not seek territory. And 
also like those before him, his discourse did not in fact match American foreign policy 
actions. All of the imperial policies, military interventions, and various other avenues of 
influence taken by America were only in the best interest of others, to help them be 
more like America – the great nation, a shining city upon the hill.  
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Throughout the events of the Cold War, the rhetoric of US exceptionalism was 
evoked by each President, and by the time George H. W. Bush came into office, the 
world had entered the Post Cold War period, with Bush declaring a new world order.  
Bush declared that, “America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in high 
moral principles’ (Bush as cited in WAUDAG 1990). Bush saw the end of the Cold 
War as the acceptance of American values across the world, and solidified America’s 
‘special’ place in history (McCrisken 2003: 133). In line with benevolent empirical 
discourse, he claimed that it was the duty of the United States to help other nations 
reach the same level of freedoms enjoyed by Americans (Ibid). In his 1991 State of the 
Union address, George H.W. Bush said, “we also know why the hopes of humanity 
turn to us. We are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of 
freedom. And when we do, freedom works” (Bush 1991). Over and over again, 
President Bush used the discourse of America’s special role in the world to justify 
American actions and promote a world led by American values.  
 
Moral justifications were used during the Iraq war of 1990, where he stated that 
“standing up for our principle is an American tradition” (Bush 1990). He also used 
arguments of morality in the Panama invasion – evident in it’s title, “Operation Just 
Cause”. And in the Somalian crisis, where he explicitly said “to the people of Somalia I 
promise this: We do not plan to dictate political outcomes” (Bush 1992). He 
emphasized America’s humanitarian role when he stated ‘let me be very clear: Our 
mission is humanitarian (Ibid). President Clinton, despite his softer approach, stated that, 
“America remains the indispensible nation. There are times when America, and only 
America, can make a difference between war and peace, between freedom and 
repression, between hope and fear in the world” (Clinton 1996: 1257). Nothing can be 
clearer in declaring America as the only nation who can make a difference of such 
magnanimous proportions.  
 
Williams identifies three main conceptions that America is guided by in the 
realm of ideas, which becomes solidified by the Clinton years. One is the humanitarian 
impulse to help others; the second is to protect the principles of self-determination 
internationally (Williams 1979: 13). The third and most clearly imperial, is that “other 
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people cannot really solve their problems and improve their lives unless they go about it 
in the same way as the United States” (Williams 1979: 13). This thought specifically 
forms much of the ideological basis of American imperial thinking. Hence, since 
America’s early days, their experience has always been as an ‘exceptional’ people; their 
uniqueness has been central to their identity and their foreign policy. As Whitcomb says, 
“morality became the reference point of uniqueness; Americans were simply “better” 
than the common run-of-the-mill peoples of the world” (McCrisken 2003: 5). The 
reason this discourse has been so effective is that, as Hunt has argued, public rhetoric 
needs to draw upon values and concerns that are widely shared and easily understood by 
the public (Hunt 1987: 15). This is the thought underlying manifest destiny and 
exceptionalism, which was evoked once more after 9/11 under President George W. 
Bush. Ravenal argues that because this type of discourse “glosses over divisions and 
binds a society together”, Americans are used to hearing discourse about their identity 
depending upon foreign policy actions on the international stage, and hence, feel that 
their identity would be compromised if they shifted to a policy of restraint (Hunt 1987: 
3). This will become even more stark following 9/11. With an understanding of the 
historical significance of manifest destiny, exceptionalism, and the developments and 




Post 9/11 saw many policy changes, and the direction of American foreign 
policy took a sharp turn. It presented an opportunity to push through domestic and 
foreign policies that could be legitimated on an ideological level using 9/11 as its basis 
for legitimacy. The mainstream media and the public understood these to be a reaction 
to the events of 2011, which is why 9/11 worked so well in the favour of 
neoconservatives who came into power to implement these measures, along with 
President George W. Bush. Taken out of context, the attacks of 9/11 were regarded by 
the American administration as irrational attacks, materializing out of nowhere, paying 
no attention to context or the history of US foreign policy in the Middle East, as 
pointed out by Kiely (2010: 202). Chomsky also argues that the American 
administration intentionally removed the intent from the action of the terrorists, and 
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argues that the Actions of Americans in the Middle East were also removed from the 
analysis (Chomsky 2001: 31). Hence, we are left with an irrational terrorist act, and an 
innocent and unsuspecting American administration. Following this, the US 
administration used it as an excuse to reshape its role in the world; turning to an 
assertive foreign policy, which would include writing pre-emption into the National 
Security Strategy (NSS). The policy decisions and discourse of the Bush 
administration reflected strongly the underlying ideologies of American 
Exceptionalism, as evidenced in later chapters during CDA. 
 
During the Bush years, the classification empire made several appearances, as 
his administration had exhibited some worrisome behaviour. Not only the decision to 
go into Iraq ‘illegally’, but also the outright refusal of Washington to enter 
international agreements from the Kyoto Protocol to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which confirmed that the United States had redefined their position in 
international politics (Munkler 2007: 1). Moreover, the relationship between the 
United Nations (UN) and the United States of America (USA) was strained after the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. After an initial speech by George W. Bush stating that 
America would have to handle things alone even if UN backing was not present 
confirmed that America was going down a different path (Ibid). A part of this can be 
attributed to the long held ideologies of American exceptionalism. When the UN was 
presented as ‘unable’ to do its job properly, Bush made a case that it is America’s 
responsibility to protect the safety of the world. 
 
Dalby argues that the Bush Doctrine documents not only make explicit 
statements about pre-eminence and preventive war, but forcible regime change and 
interventions to handle ‘rogue states’, compromising other states’ sovereignty (even 
when not ‘at war’ with such states) (2008: 424). With what Dalby says is the ultimate 
foreign policy objective – eliminating tyranny on earth – it was made clear that 
“military coercion was back on the agenda in a manner that suggested an explicitly 
imperial agenda” (Ibid).  
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In contrast, a view such as Michael Ignatieff’s ‘Empire Lite’, presents 
American power as a new type of imperialism for the modern age that is perhaps just 
as explicit as the agenda Dalby is criticizing, but with a ‘softer’ approach and rationale. 
It is characterized by using force if needed, and militarily intervening, but by doing so 
with a commitment to human rights and democracy, as well as the promotion of free 
markets (Munkler 2007: 150).  This bears resemblance to the ways in which manifest 
destiny and American exceptionalism have come through in pervious foreign policy 
initiatives. The idea of ‘Empire Lite’, like manifest destiny, guises itself as a 
responsibility of a ‘chosen’ nation. It implies that America’s role in the world is unique, 
and its commitment to humanitarianism is strong and hence it must fulfill this 
responsibility and destiny. Alain Joxe, in his 2002 book Empire of Disorder makes a 
clear case for categorizing America as an empire. Joxe’s main argument about 
American influence is that America believes that all those who do not meet the 
standard of the American way, are either undeveloped, and therefore America will 
impose policies friendly to their interests; or in some cases they are labeled as enemies 
or dangerous, in which then military intervention becomes an option (Dalby 2008: 
427). This is a reminder of McCrisken’s argument made earlier, that Americans find it 
difficult to sometimes accept opinions and world views different from their own. It 
may lead them to think others are ‘backwards’ or ‘underdeveloped’, or ‘wrong’ in their 
beliefs. Joxe maintains that the policies post 9/11 were a mutation, engaging both a 
military and imperial vision (2002: 65). Bush basically threatened the world with 
Iraq’s fate; it was an example of what not to do, and to always play by America’s rules 
(Ibid: 67).  
 
After 9/11, Bush presented an urgent crisis and the American people 
responded. There was an overwhelming nationalist response from the American 
population giving Bush “free reign” to pursue military operations throughout the world 
(Joxe 2002: 70). Joxe argues that this is where the problem lies: that Bush “seems to be 
free to do practically anything he wants both inside and outside the United States. It’s 
an unheard-of, frightening situation” (Ibid). He used the fears of the people after 9/11 
to essentially legitimize American military involvement around the world by pre-
empting danger. Along the same lines, Panitch and Gindin argue that, 
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Only the American state could arrogate to itself the right to intervene 
against the sovereignty of other states (which it repeatedly did around the 
world) and only the American state reserved for itself the “sovereign” right 
to reject international rules and norms when necessary. It is in this sense that 
only the American state was actively “imperialist (2004:16). 
 
This creates a strong context to term American power as imperial. One of the reasons 
why 9/11 was an important turning point in US foreign policy was that is allowed 
previously controversial policies seem “far more acceptable” at home  (Cox 2003: 13), 
temporarily legitimizing a new sort of informal American imperialism. It is on these 
foundations that the term imperialism is justified in the context of this research. 
Michael Mann writes that the world should be made aware that America actually 
embraces its ‘new’ imperialism; all the unilateral actions (withdrawal from Anti-
Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM), not ratifying Kyoto, the Star Wars program, etc) are 
connected (2003: 2). “They are all part of the grand strategy for a global American 
Empire, first envisioned as theory, then after 9-11, becoming reality”, as he says (Ibid). 
Chomsky’s definition of how American imperialism works is that, 
 
the idea is to have independent states, but with weak governments that must 
rely on the imperial power for their survival. They can rip off the population 
if they like. That’s fine but they have to provide a façade behind which the 
real power can rule. That’s standard imperialism (Chomsky 2005: 45). 
 
Typical of American foreign policy actions past and present, by definition then, it 
seems America was an imperial power. 
 
To recap, the reasons this research will use the term informal imperialism is 
that; one, it is not solely based on territory, making it informal and immediately 
striking out the formal imperialism option. As Mann writes, “the new imperialists do 
not want to rule permanently over foreign lands. They want only an indirect and 
informal Empire, though one that threatens, coerces and even sometimes invades 
foreign states, improves them and then leaves” (2003: 13). Military intervention is still 
central, but it is not everything. Further, permanent control of those places which it 
invades is not a criterion either. Two, as part of the definition of informal imperialism, 
the state exercises economic influence, which is also very important. It doesn’t have to 
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be politics over economics, as realists suggest, or economics over politics, as Marxists 
would argue. It is multifaceted, as American power has proven. Authors such as David 
Harvey stress the importance of both, but is also careful not to underestimate economic 
imperialism. He argues that capitalist imperialist logic is about “exploiting the uneven 
geographical conditions under which capital accumulation occurs”, which keeps 
economic imperialism alive (Harvey 2003: 31). Michael Cox is correct to point out 
that although the economic and military capabilities are not as strong, considering the 
rise of China and the importance of Europe, in relative terms, the United States is still 
all powerful (Cox 2003: 21). In the first term of Bush’s Presidency, when Cox 
presented his view on American power, the United States still accounted for nearly 
thirty percent of world product, Wall Street was still the financial centre, and most 
‘international’ institutions took orders from Washington (Ibid). Importantly, the 
success of the American empire is a mix of being feared and being respected, as Cox 
argues (Ibid: 22). A third point about the classification of American power as an 
informal empire is, as Cox argues, that the United States performs tasks that others 
would not want to perform in the international system (some economic, some political) 
and argues that in large part this may contribute to its continued imperial power  (Ibid). 
Lastly, what separates it from a hegemon and makes it imperial, while being 
informally so, is that often it first seeks a consensus (like most hegemons) but failing 
this, it will still carry forward with whatever objective it was seeking (such as the war 
in Iraq). In cases where consensus is reached, the power seems more likeable and less 
forceful. The balance of sometimes seeking consensus, while sometimes charging 
ahead regardless makes it more than a hegemon, but not a formal imperial power. 
Keeping all this in mind, Bush declared a war on an ideology, gave America the right 
to pre-empt danger, and stated its intentions to act unilaterally. It is appropriate, given 
the state of America in the Bush era to call it for what it was, an imperial power. What 
makes it most interesting, is perhaps the beliefs of Americans and the discourse of the 
American administrations past and present that insist that they are not an empire, nor 
are they interested in imperialism. The common thread throughout, is the reference to 
America’s duty, role, responsibility to protect the world from some sort of danger, or 
protect its peace. Interventions that can not make a direct link to threat, are justified in 
terms of humanitarianism which is in line with their national identity to ‘stand up for 
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what’s right’, or help those ‘backwards’ nations of the world that ‘do not know how to 
help themselves’. These ideas of exceptionalism and manifest destiny make it clearer 
to understand the self-proclaimed legitimacy behind the actions of the American 
administration.  
 
The following sections will discuss defining American power based on the 
debate on hegemony versus empire, and how CGP can contribute to the debate about 
American imperialism.  
 
3.4 Defining American Power: Hegemony versus Empire 
A defense of the term informal imperialism as it is used in this research is 
necessary, and as such it must clearly be defended against the term hegemony before 
defining American imperialism in the following section. There are endless debates 
represented by existing literature on the question of whether America is in fact a 
hegemon or an imperial power. Michael Doyle in his book, Empires, discusses this 
difference in terminology. Doyle suggests that a hegemonic power controls much of 
the external, but little or none of the internal policy of other states (1986: 12). He 
argues that the control of only foreign policy is what characterizes a hegemonic power, 
and control of both foreign and domestic policy characterizes empire (Ibid: 40). 
Alternatively, Reich and Lebow argue that the definition that realists and liberals use 
has never really existed in practice. They claim that these schools frame hegemony as 
a question of power in the sense that material capabilities constitute power, and power 
therefore confers influence (2014: 5). They also argue that effective influence relies on 
persuasion – the act of convincing other that it is too in their interest to do what you 
want (Ibid: 6). However, what we have seen with America is that when the path of 
influence and persuasion do not work, they turn to force and coercion. Therefore, by 
either account, the United States as a hegemon does not quite fit.  
 
In contrast to this, Doyle defines the behaviour of empires to have effective 
control, formal or not, of a subordinate society (1986: 30), and therefore empires 
“determine who rules another society’s political life” (Ibid: 36). In the past, the United 
States had at several points in its history, militarily removed hostile governments in 
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place of ‘American-friendly’ ones. Although they have not annexed lands, expanded 
their territories, nor have had official ‘rules’ in place to determine the outcome of 
political life in other nations, the truth remains that America has still indirectly 
controlled several internal policies of other nations in the past. It also continues to do 
so today through military, economic, political and cultural avenues of power and 
influence. As Doyle argues, effective control of sovereignty does not necessarily 
require “a colonial governor with all the trapping of formal imperialism” (1986: 37). 
He describes informal empire in further detail: 
 
If enough of the articulation of interests in a peripheral state can be 
influenced, the aggregation of coalitions will be controlled; and if 
aggregation is thoroughly shaped, sovereign decisions will be controlled. 
Influence over implementation of adjudication of communication is roughly 
equivalent to influence over the aggregation or articulation of interests, 
since the first form of influence controls which policies can be carried out. 
The result is informal imperial control (Doyle 1986: 37). 
 
In fact, formal and informal imperialism can have the same outcome; only different 
forms of control. Therefore, Doyle’s definition of empire is a “relationship, formal or 
informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another 
political society”, which can be achieved by force, political collaboration, cultural, 
economic or social dependence (1986: 45). 
 
Other theorists such as Henry Kissinger and Heinrich Triepl use the terms 
synonymously, not emphasizing any categorical difference between them (Munkler 
2007: 43). Munkler, on the other hand clearly differentiates between the two uses,  
arguing that hegemony is supremacy within a group of formally equal political players 
whereas imperiality dissolves this equality and regards subordinate states as “client 
states” or “satellites” (2007: 6). More traditional theorists would argue that empires 
must go through rises and declines as well as spatial reach. However, as John 
Mearsheimer argues, in a multipolar system, all great powers are always “searching for 
opportunities” to acquire power over their competitors, and hegemony is their final 
goal (2001: 39). Empires are far less open to challenges from other powers unlike 
hegemons, as there is no ‘equal’ competition, and the imperial centre functions as a 
sort of umpire to ensure rivalry amongst other states does not lead to war (Munkler 
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2007: 40). Michael Mann also differentiates the two defining a hegemon as an imperial 
power playing by the rules, where a real imperial power abandons the rules and plays 
its own game (2003: 12). President Bush in his speeches, and in government policy has 
repeated that America will (and did) act unilaterally, and as was most evident in the 
invasion of Iraq, abandon the ‘rules’, making it an imperial power. What’s also 
interesting is that a part of what makes their imperialism informal is the Americans’ 
refusal to accept their power as imperial to being with. Instead they invoke long 
standing ideological notions of manifest destiny and exceptionalism, which exempt 
them from being ‘imperial’, but instead present American actions as benign. Hence, 
their image is one who only acts in the interests of others to protect them from 
themselves, or its duty to protect the world from danger and keep the peace. 
McCrisken’s argument earlier that Americans themselves believe they are incapable of 
domination purely in self interest, serves as a reminder of the ongoing importance of 
these ideologies in self-identity as a nation, and in foreign policy in real terms.  
 
As the existing literature demonstrates, the basis of the debate is whether to 
label America as a hegemon or an imperial power; and within the debate of 
empire/imperialism, whether their power can be defined as formal or informal 
imperialism. Based on policies and the behaviour of the Bush administration, the most 
suitable way to classify American power is as an informal empire. One of the 
prominent reasons that imperialism would be a better suited term, is that a hegemon 
requires some sort of consensus to rule. For example, a consensus was originally 
sought for the decision to go to war in Iraq as the UN was ‘consulted’, but as is known 
the war in Iraq went forth without UN backing. It was also heavily criticized by the 
international community. President Bush made it very clear that America will seek 
consent, however, failing that (and clearly indicated in the Bush Doctrine, and NSS) 
America will do as it sees fit should it not receive international support. The American 
administration basically gave itself a blank cheque to do whatever they wanted (or in 
their terms, whatever “necessary”) to protect American security and interests at home 
and abroad. The actions Bush took to invade Iraq is an example of an imperial power, 
following its own rules in fulfillment of its own interests. Therefore, it seems far more 
appropriate to categorize America as an imperial power, than merely a hegemon.  
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3.5 CGP and Imperialism 
 If we understand America as an imperial power, how terror is defined and 
handled, is of special importance in the context of imperial policy. For this reason, 
Dalby argues the continued use of critical geopolitics in challenging our 
understandings, and making explicit the hidden agendas, and geopolitical discourses 
that define terror, and enemy, danger, and fear, which ultimately justify or legitimate 
military action (Dalby 2008: 426). How can we explain American imperialism given 
the turn of events after 9/11? This is where CGP can make a contribution to the debate.  
 
There are three main themes that can be extracted from CGP throughout this 
research. The first is the power of ideas, which refers to how discourses legitimate and 
reproduce structures of power, and the social construction of taken-for-granted beliefs. 
It also incorporates the importance of ideology in the justification and legitimacy of 
actions, which is central to critical geopolitical thinking. Critical geopolitics is 
therefore more than a tool for policy makers; its goal is to investigate how 
“geopolitical reasoning is used as an ideological device to maintain social relations 
domination within contemporary global politics” (Dalby 1990: 15). The second major 
theme looks at identity and difference. Much of this is influenced by Edward Said’s 
work and the construction of the Other. Further, this accounts for how policies and 
identities are created and legitimated in relation to the Other. The last theme is the 
critical analysis of territory, and how space is given meaning. The meanings that fill 
space are socially constructed, and need to be recognized as such, as these meanings 
will legitimate policy decisions.  
 
Dalby writes that, “formulating matters in terms of empire has the huge 
advantage of putting the precise geography of the United States into question” (Ibid: 
429). He argues that following the standard international relations theories of 
classifying the United States as just ‘another great power’ is no longer enough as 
imperial policies and actions have developed. Ingram and Dodds suggest that 
geographical imaginations are essential to any critique of the GWOT and the 
understanding of security, and furthermore, to the construction of alternative 
imaginations (2009: 3). Geographical imaginations, in this meaning, are what Gregory 
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refers to as “the spatialized cultural and historical knowledge that characterizes social 
groups” (Gregory 1994), stemming from Edward Said’s imaginative geographies 
discussed in Chapter One. Michael Chertoff, the second Secretary of Homeland 
Security under George W. Bush had a vision to create a ‘world wide security envelope’ 
– a way to work with allies around the world to secure the entire globe (Ingram and 
Dodds 2009: 2). The goal is to treat those ‘inside the envelope’ with a high degree of 
trust and information necessary to make sure those seeking to harm America and its 
allies don’t slip through the cracks (Ibid). Ingram and Dodds rightly point out that such 
visions are founded upon “simplistic binaries”, but have profound geographical effects 
(Ibid). This type of language is essentially linked to the wider project of securing 
liberal globalization, and an imperial role for America in the world. As Ingram and 
Dodds argue, “this project is couched in terms of a simple imaginative geography, but 
it conceals a world of complexity” (Ibid). They suggest that rather than trying to 
reduce the complexity that is inherent in these discourses, we should instead recognize 
the geopolitical present as being constituted by multiple temporalities and spatialities 
that go beyond the state (Ibid: 3). 
 
Sparke claims that the informality of American imperialism “has not only 
allowed for exaggerated academic arguments about hegemonic decline”, but it has also 
enabled the rhetoric of American exceptionalism and thus self-denial of an empire 
(2005: 246). Contrary to Bush’s claims that America was not seeking any sort of 
empire, because they do not seek to acquire new territory, America was in fact an 
imperial power (Sparke 2005: 246). As highlighted earlier, American power isn’t only 
about territory, or even acquiring new territory at all; nor is it only about economic 
power. To be the world’s only superpower requires several avenues of influence, 
alongside military power. This is why CGP discusses American power in terms of 
informal imperialism. As Sparke writes,  
 
this mediated informal imperialism has effectively deterrirotialized and 
reterritorizlied the hyphen in the American nation-state, stretching American 
state authority in informal ways across national boundaries to create a 
hybrid and transnational hyphen-nation-state of market – as well as military 
mediated dominance (Ibid: 248).  
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Instead of trying to resolve these complex issues straight off the bat, Sparke 
says the goal of Critical Geopolitics (CGP) is to use the geographical challenges these 
issues present as tools with which to “unpack the complicity of the simplified 
geopolitical and geoeconomic visions” (2005: 28), which is precisely what this 
research seeks to accomplish.  What is also important is that ‘America’, as a greater 
ideological category, is presented to us in a very specific way; sometimes over 
exaggerated, but also taken-for-granted. Whether or not America is on the decline, or 
these post 9/11 wars are ‘new’, misses the most important point. The point is that they 
are perceived to be new; America is perceived inherently and unquestionably to be the 
most powerful nation; they believe that they are the exception. Therefore, there are 
very real policies that reflect these perceptions – founded or not. What is important 
about 9/11 is that the people in power presented a specific vision of the aftermath to 
Americans and the world and these perceptions were used to legitimize real policies.  
 
The presentation of the consequences after 9/11 led to what Debrix calls 
‘tabloid imperialism’. Stemming from his original argument about tabloid realism and 
tabloid geopolitics3, tabloid imperialism is the way in which dominant popular 
geopolitical narratives of revenge, offense, attack, and conquest were made 
mainstream (Debrix 2007: 938). Built upon the binaries of ‘out there’ and ‘over here’ 
that tabloid geopolitics promotes, tabloid imperialism has promoted Huntington’s 
Clash of the Civilizations thesis about ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and discourses emerged 
about how the United States had no choice but to attack back (Ibid: 937). Debrix 
argues that the discourse that emerged after 9/11, about fighting terrorism over there, 
before it comes over here quickly turned tabloid realism into tabloid imperialism 
(2007: 938).  
 
This imperialism is fuelled by endless fears and an endless war; where war 
becomes the norm. Boal et al. argue that 9/11 has “marked the elevation into a state of 
permanent war- of a long and consistent pattern of military expansionism in the service 																																																								3	Debrix	defines	tabloid	geopolitics	as:	“The result of mediatized discursive formations that take 
advantage of contemporary fears, anxieties, and insecurities to produce certain political and cultural 
realities and meanings that are presented as common 
sensical popular truths about the present condition” (Debrix 2008: 5). This will be discussed at length in 
Chapter Five.	
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of empire” (2005: 80). This type of permanent war serves empire as the permanence of 
the war itself becomes normalized and becomes a natural part of the state’s political 
life (ibid). An important point Boal et al. make is that the constant threats keep the 
empire functioning and always looking for and leaning toward war, as it is needed to 
sustain it (Ibid: 102). 
 
In a criticism of Huntington’s clash of the civilizations thesis, and Fukuyama’s 
arguments combined, Dodds argues that the major themes in their assessments are 
anti-geographical in that they ignore the complexities of the geography in international 
relations (2005: 6). What both authors do, and what Dodds criticizes, is a common 
criticism CGP makes when looking at ‘mainstream’ arguments which is that the 
division of the world into specific regions and zones underestimates the complexity of 
international relations, and leads precisely to the simplistic binaries that CGP seeks to 
debunk (Ibid). An example of this is when President Bush made his famous ‘axis of 
evil’ speech in which he “re-imagined global political space”, casting together three 
nations which previously had no common denominator to one another: North Korea, 
Iran and Iraq, and simply cast them as evil (Ibid: 4). 
 
Edward Said has also criticized Huntington’s binaries and his Clash of 
Civilizations thesis as forcing the entire world into categories – “sealed off identities” 
– that are mostly detached from human history to create a simplistic explanation of 
international relations (Dodds 2005: 10). Barnett’s thesis poses a similar problem. He 
categorizes the world into the Core (capitalist, liberal governments, open markets) and 
the Gap (globalization thinning or absent, corrupt governments) (Barnett 2004). His 
simple binary is much like Huntington’s but its focus is on the development and 
acceptance (or lack of) of globalization in various nations. Debrix also criticizes 
Barnett’s thesis by stating that it is essentially a grand strategy of hegemonic power, 
coupled with ideological control and permanent war for the US and it’s military (2007: 
938). One of the tasks of critical geopolitics is to document the glorification and 
implicit normalization (taken-for-granted beliefs) of military force and institutions 
(Kuus 2010: 9). 
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In essence, CGP problematizes simple binaries. It is a problem based approach 
that seeks to question perceptions and taken-for-granted beliefs. It takes into account 
geopolitics in the sense of how space is given meaning, and seeks to unpack the 
mainstream notions of how the world is categorized. Where imperialism is concerned, 
it provides an avenue to fill the gap in international relations theory as it seeks to 
uncover how ideologies become naturalized. This approach asks how; how perceptions 
are created, maintained, and used for justification in policy decisions.  
 
 When considering how American imperialism has been thought of, and how the 
underlying principles of manifest destiny and American exceptionalism have 
influenced Critical Geopolitics, we are reminded that the root cause of CGP is to take 
apart taken for granted beliefs. At the core of American foreign policy and identity are 
the now taken for granted, and deeply embedded ideologies of manifest destiny and 
American exceptionalism as this chapter has explored. In fact, Blomley  argues that 
American imperial actions are often ‘excused’ as it belongs to their manifest destiny. 
He argues that “foundational violences are frequently forgotten, or are rationalized 
according to some higher logic, such as manifest destiny”, which seems “commonplace” 
in American history (Blomely 2003: 6). This is precisely how discourses work, to 
normalize such ideologies to seem natural. The ‘duty’ of America to rid the world of 
evil (terrorism/terrorists) was a common discourse after the 2001 attacks. This 
continued as part of the legitimation into the invasion of Iraq. Part of the legitimacy 
being created was specifically through the discourses that surround America’s manifest 
destiny. This is exactly why words matter, why discourse matters, and above all why 
ideas matter. If the central claim of CGP is to dig deeper into the discourses and 
ideologies that inform foreign policy and help us understand the legitimacy behind 
empire, then the core ideologies of American identity and foreign policy inform the 
foundations of understanding American power. Hence, the importance of the core 
values of American foreign policy can be found in ideologies dating back as far as their 
founding. 
 
The remainder of this chapter will discuss a critical geopolitics view on 
American imperialism, divided into its three main themes: the power of ideas, identity 
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and difference, and the critical analysis of territory. This will provide a clearer 
application of the CGP lens in discussing imperialism.  
 
Power of Ideas 
The power of ideas concerns how discourses can legitimate and reproduce 
structures of power, and how these social constructions have an effect on policy 
making. It addresses the ideologies that become naturalized, and turn into common 
sense, or taken-for-granted beliefs. Once these discourses are naturalized, they are used 
to legitimate imperial actions. Underlying these taken for granted beliefs are the ideas 
of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny. As the first part of this chapter has 
proven, these ideas have significantly impacted American self-identity and foreign 
policy. These two underlying beliefs are arguable the foundations of much of 
American policy and identity, and hence strengthen the claim that the power of ideas 
are crucial in understanding American power.  
 
The end of the Cold War and the 1990s saw America’s unrivalled power in the 
world. Cold War discourse may have lost its credibility as a consequence of 1989, but 
the ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ and the military industrial complex behind them tried to 
create a ‘new’ set of enemies, as the Gulf crisis proved, in an attempt to re-structure a 
new world order once again (Agnew and Toal 1992: 202). Even after 1989, the first 
Bush administration continued to use Cold War discourses up until the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, which forced them to publicly recognize the threat form the Soviet Union 
had changed (Toal 1992: 440). 
 
The first Bush administration’s foreign policy towards the changes after 1989 
were shaped around the “unquestioned sense of Western superiority” (Toal 1992: 446). 
In his first foreign policy speech, Bush senior stated that with “prudence, realism and 
patience, we seek to promote the evolution of freedom” (Ibid: 443). The implications 
of this were that the world was still a dangerous place, and American hegemony is 
needed (Ibid: 447). Cold War reasoning worked because it was a means to persuade 
national security elites into an American conception of a world order (Ibid: 449). 
When this reasoning finally came to an end, there was an absence of a ‘scary’ enemy, 
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which is why 9/11 proved to be so effective. Toal notes that this foreign policy was a 
mix of geopolitics and ideology, as this goal could only be achieved through free 
markets, free trade, and American style modernization (Ibid: 447). 
 
Most of the 9/11 discourses were around a liberal imperial view of America. 
This meant the need for America to interfere globally to maintain peace, fight wars to 
save populations from tyranny, eradicate terrorism, and for a variety of humanitarian 
rationales. These attitudes are derived from the long standing notion that America is a 
‘City Upon a Hill’, and it’s special place in the world requires it to fulfill its role to 
better the world. Hence the notion for America’s ‘needed’ interference. There are 
imperial themes throughout many of the policy documents even before 9/11, but the 
difference is that after 2001, they were actually implemented. A central reason for this 
goes back to perception: the reasons for why 9/11 happened, how danger was 
perceived, and what the appropriate response to this was. The new danger of ‘global’ 
terror prompted serious changes in US foreign policy. The 9/11 commission concluded 
that if 9/11 has taught America anything, it is that “American interests ‘over there’ 
should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America ‘over here’. In this 
same sense, the American homeland is the planet” (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks 2004: 362). This basically meant that the strategy for Homeland defence was 
that home and away were the same thing, which legitimated interference abroad. Elden 
argues that in terms of foreign policy, this meant that “America needs to secure and 
extend the zone of democratic peace and globalized markets and pursue strategies of 
integration and, where necessary, intervention” (2009: 20). The idea that far away 
lands should be treated the same as a threat on American soil legitimated military 
intervention abroad.  
 
Lawrence Kaplan, member of PNAC, argues that America became an empire 
regardless of its intentions; that because of inevitable geopolitical rivalry and conflict, 
America needed to assume this role (Dalby 2007: 593). Again, this relates back to 
notions present since its founding that responsibility has been thrust upon America as 
the ‘chosen’ nation. There has always been a sense within America that has become 
naturalized, which is America’s role as global leader, world police, and defender of 
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liberty (depending on the situation). As mentioned above, this is what Theodore 
Roosevelt deemed international police power. However, with 9/11 scaring the 
American public into what Sparke calls “false geopolitical fears”, it was time once 
again for America to answer what it sees as its call of duty. The United States must 
protect its territory and sovereignty of course, however how it sees the territorial 
integrity of other nations is entirely contingent on what is deemed a ‘threat’ from other 
nations (Elden 2009: 25). These discourses create situations in which America must 
‘protect’ itself, but really this provides the potential to invade any nation not 
compatible with American interests (or, in the context of a GWOT, categorized as a 
“threat”). 
 
As Mamadouh and Dijkink argue, major changes in geopolitical contexts result 
in a reformulation of geopolitical visions, and “a re-articulation of geographical 
representations that is necessary to acknowledge and justify foreign policy changes” 
(2006: 357). This is precisely what happened. The Bush Doctrine marked a sharp turn 
in American foreign policy, making it official for the United States to basically do 
whatever it wants (unilateralism), with or without the UN, or any other international 
consensus. The language of the Bush Doctrine uses 9/11 to exploit their military 
supremacy and to shift the global balance further into their own advantage. According 
to Bush, the previous policies did not adequately address the geopolitics of this “new” 
world (post 9/11), and therefore, his administration put in place several policies that 
came to be known as the Bush Doctrine. In essence, it provided “an overarching 
conceptualization of how the world is organized, of what America’s role in that world 
is, and how American power is to be understood and used” (Dalby 2006: 34). After 
9/11, it was elaborated to specifically address the new issues that America faced. The 
doctrine drew on “existing geopolitical thinking and focused on ‘war’ as the primary 
response to what was understood as new ‘global’ dangers” (Ibid). The perceived shift 
in danger and the declaration of a Global War on Terror, which was very ambiguous, 
became an attempt to legitimate military intervention for decades to come. 
 
The ideas that are understood to be common sense, such as the United States as 
the global police, or America’s role, duty or need to lead the fight for liberty, stem 
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largely from the ongoing ideologies of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny. 
Hence, they are all socially constructed and attempt to legitimate imperialism as they 
present a specific world view that gives them ‘right’ to project their dominance on the 
global stage. Critical geopolitics can be useful to “deconstruct, unravel and expose 
discourses in order to lay bare the schemes of power operating beneath them” (Muller 
2008: 324) 
 
 These discourses become naturalized in our everyday language of American 
foreign policy. They become overarching ideologies that we subscribe to and are 
therefore used to legitimate a specific vision. In this case, it is the underlying 
ideologies of manifest destiny and exceptionalism that create specific discourses such 
as America’s natural ‘role to lead’, based on ‘new dangers’ that are ‘global’, that 
justified a GWOT and a basis for global military intervention. Not only that, but 
domestic measures at home in the United States that are by any measure, controversial 
(such as the Patriot Act). As Muller argues, “individuals shape discourses, draw on 
them intentionally, and deploy them strategically to pursue certain ends” (Ibid: 325). 
This is the importance of the power of ideas, which the Bush administration used to its 
advantage to ideologically legitimate American imperialism, using 9/11 as its rationale.  
 
Identity and Difference 
Identity and difference is one of the main themes found in CGP, and key in its 
approach to understanding foreign policy. The importance of the Other is that it creates 
foundations on which political activities, and policies are acceptable or not, creating 
specific types of identities. How we understand our own identity, is in relation to an 
Other. Themes of American exceptionalism are particularly important here. As 
discussed at length earlier in the chapter, exceptionalism embodies the belief that 
Americans are different from everybody else. It began with an understanding that 
Americans were different from Europeans, but later spread to a more general belief that 
they are different from the rest of the world. Much of American identity is built upon 
the ideas that make them different to the Other from their founding, to their current 
principles, values and norms. Who the Other is has varied in the past, but nonetheless, 
there was always the high held belief that Americans were not only different, but better.  
	 108	
In this regard, Amy Kaplan’s work on imperialism is worth mentioning. In her book, 
Anarchy of Empire, Kaplan compares the foreign, outward expansion (gendered as 
male) with the domestic understanding of the United States (gendered as female). 
Kaplan also analyzes how imperialism constructs domestic life. Instead of viewing 
imperialism as an ‘outward’ expansion, from the domestic to the foreign or alien, she 
looks at how imperialism creates identities at home in America. In her words, “the idea 
of a nation as home…is inextricable from the political, economic, an cultural 
movements of empire, movements that both erect and unsettle the ever shifting 
boundaries between the domestic and the foreign, between “at home” and “abroad”” 
(Kaplan 2002: 1). Additionally, Kaplan also looks at other elements such as film and 
literature in forming American identity and understanding how imperialism was 
culturally reproduced. Hence, her work is an interesting look at the construction of 
difference and identity through cultural and gendered understandings of American 
imperialism. Kaplan also analyzes how domestic metaphors of national identity are 
intertwined with understandings of the ‘other’, and hence they mutually constitute one 
another in an imperial context (Kaplan 2002: 4) In this case, the Other can be a political 
entity – a state, a terrorist organization, or an abstract Other (‘evil’). Why did America 
need an Other to legitimize its actions against? Edward Said saw the concept of the 
Other as an ideological tool to sustain imperialism. His point that Orientalism is a way 
to control, manipulate, and understand the Other is of great importance in the context of 
the question of American imperialism and its legitimacy. By creating an Other, it helps 
to mobilize a population to create an ‘us’, and identify a ‘them’. The act of socially 
constructed common enemy provided a unification point and attempted legitimacy to 
Bush’s actions towards in his decisions post 9/11.  
 
Examples of this can be found throughout American political history. The most 
obvious comparative example is the USSR. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union proved to 
be an effective Other for America to unite against. Dalby argues that,  
 
The discourses of ‘sovietology’, ‘realism’, ‘geopolitics’, were mobilized to 
describe, explain and legitimate the doctrines of ‘containment’, ‘deterrence’, 
and the provision of ‘national security’ around the portrayal of the Soviet 




Justifying foreign policy against an external threat creates unity at home, and 
potentially legitimacy abroad. At this time, realism was dominant in international 
relations and focused on power and war-making capabilities (Ibid). This type of 
discourse limits the possibilities for critical political intervention “precisely by its 
definitions of community and anarchy”, argues Ashley, and by how it specifies the 
realm of power (Ibid: 172).  
 
Post 9/11, the discourses have changed. The enemy is ‘unknown’, 
‘dispersed’, ‘everywhere’. Discourses are important in understanding power 
dynamics. Simple categories of good and evil ignore critical views of how 
policy can be shaped by ideology (Ibid: 175).  
 
Othering is especially useful when analyzing foreign policy. It investigates the 
geopolitical practices of security discourse, and the policies of containment militarism 
in terms of how security is constructed in spatial terms using classical geopolitical 
themes (Ibid: 172). It is in doing this that foreign policy is created, as it is literally a 
process of “making foreign” and creating ‘others’ to contrast the domestic ‘self’ 
against (Ibid). By creating an image of the ‘enemy’ that was a dangerous, unknown 
and a dispersed ‘evil’ that could strike at any time, propelled America full force into a 
Global War on Terror. Regardless of who the Other is, American history an foreign 
policy have proven to always use the Other to self identify what it means to be 
American. By creating these ideological binaries, legitimacy is created amongst 
Americans for their foreign policies. Hence, the notions of manifest destiny and 
American exceptionalism have been and continue to be important taken for granted 
beliefs in forming binaries that impact foreign policy decisions. This will become 
especially important in Chapter Four when justification for war in Iraq was pitched to 
the American public, where blatant examples of Othering can be seen. The final of the 
three themes, the critical analysis of territory, will focus on the meanings of space and 
how they are constructed and sustained through geopolitical discourse.  
 
Critical Analysis of Territory 
This section focuses on how space is created, recreated and rewritten by great 
powers, as outlined in Chapter Two. The quote from the 9/11 commission report, 
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“American interests ‘over there’ should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against 
America ‘over here’” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004: 362), gives a 
clear indication of how Bush intended to use 9/11 as an excuse to interfere anywhere he 
feels is a threat. If he categorized international space as part of the American 
‘homeland’, then the ‘right’ to interfere is self-evident. In addition to this, the 
perception of any state, terrorist or not, that does not agree with US policies could be 
deemed a ‘rogue’, ‘enemy’, or ‘terrorist’ state, further legitimating military action. 
Such foreign policies have the underlying assumption of the missionary brands of 
American exceptionalism, that would argue that it is acceptable to intervene militarily 
for a good cause. The way that spaces are branded and categorized have a deep impact 
on foreign policy implementation. If this is coupled with beliefs of an ‘Empire of 
liberty’, American superiority (morally, and militarily), and notions of a special role in 
the world to execute these beliefs, the consequences can be significant.  
 
 Space is a geographical factor, and therefore violence within these spaces should 
also be looked at through a critical geopolitics understanding. Blomley’s criticism of 
liberals and their views in regards to violence and law is mainly that they see violence 
as something outside the law, and outside the state (2003: 121). In fact, much of the 
violence today is actually state violence – violence that is on some grounds ‘legal’ or 
legitimized by states themselves. Blomley points out that violence has a geography and 
is important, because as he says “space matters to violence”, and part of our 
understanding of war and violence would benefit greatly from more geographical 
analysis than is immediately in front of us. As it relates to the exception and the 
creation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ binaries, Blomley asserts, “territorial imagery and 
constructions of ‘‘inside’’ and ‘‘outside’’ are put to work to justify violence, whether 
of the state or of paramilitary organizations” (Ibid: 123). For example, prison is a 
geographical space. The prisons of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib are prime examples 
of how violence is legitimized against “them” (the detainees) to protect “us” (citizens 
of America/the world). Blomley’s argument should be kept in the back of our minds, 
as a reminder of the geographical importance of violence and law, as we move forth in 
this analysis. His important argument is in regards to the relationship between law, 
violence and geography, as he argues, “an attention to violence is incomplete without a 
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critical geographic imaginary” (Ibid). He writes,  
 
Space gets produced, invoked, pulverized, marked, and differentiated 
through practical and discursive forms of legal violence. And property’s 
violence is itself instantiated and legitimized, yet also complicated and 
contradicted in and through such spaces (Ibid: 135). 
 
The most evident example for this is Guantanamo Bay prison. Gregory’s 
makes some notable points about the perception of space, the meanings that fill it and 
how those legitimize violence. He first points to how Agamben actually refers to the 
state of exception as a space of exception, noting that little attention has been given to 
the analysis of it as a ‘space’ (Gregory 2006: 407). Gregory writes that “conceptions of 
space need not be limited to the container model… and I prefer to treat space as a 
performance, a doing, because only in this way do I think it possible to show how the 
passages between inside and outside, law and violence, are effected” (Ibid). 
Guantanamo, and the context in which prisoners were put there, as terrorists in a 
Global War on Terror, made it ‘okay’ to commit violent acts against ‘them’ because it 
was necessary to protect ‘us’ from their threat. It is also the ideology of the GWOT 
that gives the space of exception its existence, and its ‘legitimacy’ to exist. In a ‘new’ 
world perceived to be full of unknown, dispersed dangers, lurking in every corner of 
every city necessitates places like Guantanamo to exist, according to President Bush, 
as is draws boundaries between inside and outside, ‘containing’ the threat.  
 
 Sharp wrote that ‘‘strategies of power always require the use of space and, thus, 
the use of discourses to create particular spatial images, primarily of territory and 
boundaries in statecraft, is inseparable from the formation and use of power’’ (1993: 
492). The way in which Bush defined certain spaces as dangerous (for example, Iraq), 
and certain spaces as legitimate for the use of violence (for example, Guantanamo), 
and others such as America as inherently good (for example, ‘land of freedom’) are 
important in how we understand the power of discourses in legitimacy. Ideas such as 
the ‘land of freedom’, and America’s ‘inherently good’ character are rooted in the self-
identity of Americans as a special nation, built on unique moral, spiritual and political 
commitments. They are important here as a big part of the legitimacy to intervene 
elsewhere, or to declare a foreign land as dangerous, stems from the idea that America 
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is benign and pure; only using force out of necessity as a chosen nation to protect the 
world. The ability to change, to its favour, the meanings of space in itself is an 
imperial action. To deem a place ‘over there’ a threat, and to then legitimate use of 
force against it as it is the ‘same’ as ‘over here’ would imply changing boundaries and 
the meanings of these places in terms of foreign policy, legitimating imperial actions. 
 
Conclusion  
The perceived shift that constituted a change in geographical imaginations 
ushered in what George W. Bush wanted the international community to believe was a 
‘new world’. The realization that borders can no longer protect America, and that the 
world was now dealing with an enemy who was dispersed, unknown, non-state, and 
potentially ‘everywhere’, meant that new policies needed to be implemented to 
respond to this new reality. The central question to this research seeks to understand 
how the Bush administration used 9/11 to legitimate American imperialism. This 
chapter has covered the ideological roots to American identity and foreign policy in its 
key conceptions of manifest destiny and exceptionalism, exploring the main debates in 
American history concerning imperialism. This chapter has also defined American 
power, and why imperialism, as a term, is justified in the context of American power. 
Also discussed, was the debate about the differences in hegemony and empire. 
Hegemons seek consensus, as does America, however when consensus is not reached, 
unilateral action will be taken, as made clear by Bush. As it was concluded at the end 
of the debate, Bush saw a version of American power that could pre-empt danger, 
declare preventive wars, act alone and if there was ever a question, 9/11 was used as a 
legitimizing point at every turn. On the basis of this debate, America is classified as an 
informal imperial power. Present throughout each section, and point in history, are the 
underlying ideologies of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny. Their 
significance is evident in understanding American self-identity, and American foreign 
policy legitimation. These ideas have formed the basis of much of the discourse that 
will be analyzed in coming chapters, and hence tracing their roots back to the founding 




This chapter provides an analysis of the legitimacy of American imperialism by 
introducing it under the three main themes: the power of ideas, identity and difference, 
and the critical analysis of territory and the meaning given to space. This section 
outlines ways in which to understand how imperialism was legitimized post 9/11. The 
power of ideas is important as it draws attention to discourses as social constructions 
in naturalizing ideologies. These ideologies form the basis of the beliefs we take for 
granted that are used to legitimate policies. Edwards Said’s work and Othering proves 
to be important in discussing identity and difference in creating an enemy in which 
Bush used to justify policy against. How space is given meaning, and the example of 
Guantanamo Bay prison shed light on how territory needs to be critically analyzed, as 
the meaning of spaces were changed under Bush legitimizing the use of violence in 
ways that previously did not exist.  
 
Coleman following Dijink argues that geopolitics is a narrative or story about 
political arrangements in the international space of the state system (Coleman 2004: 
484), and therefore when one set of ideas – a new frame, or lens is re-evaluated (ex. 
After 9/11, security and terror were re-evaluated), then the ‘new’ frame or lens 
invalidates the one before it. This is precisely what this research seeks to analyze. 
Language is powerful, and the discourses that construct such views become 
naturalized and therefore legitimate policy. A part of critical analysis is to ask how this 
is the case. The perception of a new world, a new danger, and a new era – all seen 
through the prism of 9/11 – invalidated all the notions of security, danger and threat 
that came before it and naturalized the responses to this ‘new’ threat. The goal then, is 
to understand how this happened through discourse, and what the consequences of 
those changed perceptions are for policy decisions that ultimately led to a legitimacy 
of American imperialism during the Bush years. In fact, one of the goals of CGP is to 
“document the explicit glorification and implicit normalization of military force and 
military institutions throughout society” (Kuus 2010: 9). Through the prism of 9/11, 
Americans were being prepared to accept permanent war as a normal way of life. The 
narrative of the ‘expected’ permanence of conflict started to become naturalized in 
everyday discourse in America. The re-imaging of space that Dodds discusses, also 
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applies to America, as it was filled with colour coded terror charts and constant 
warnings of pending threats.  
  
Armed with a CGP framework, a CDA methodology, and a critical 
understanding of imperialism, the next chapter will be the first of three chapters in the 
application of CDA through the lens of CGP to analyze the beginning of the foreign 
policy that would come to define the Bush regime after 9/11. The next chapter is the 
beginning of a narrative about the policies that were seen as a reaction to the 9/11 
attacks, but were in fact formulated a decade or so prior to 2001. Beginning with a 
history of Neoconservatism, and some detail on the influences behind the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy, the chapter will then use CDA to look at some of the 
major themes that were prominent after the 9/11 attacks as part of policy (unilateralism, 




















Chapter Four  
The Roots of American Imperial Ideology 
 
4.1 Introduction  
George W. Bush’s policies of unilateralism, pre-emption, and America’s ‘role’ 
or ‘job’ to protect world peace were made with no apology, and presented as a 
necessary consequence and reaction to the 9/11 attacks. However, these policies were 
foreshadowed by various documents in the 1990s, and influenced by the ideas of a few 
key people. These individuals had an aggressive, and expansionist agenda for US 
foreign policy. Formulated in the 1990s, their agenda became official policy when 
President George W. Bush took office, and more specifically after 9/11. 
 
Critical geopolitics is about unpacking the assumptions that surround 
geopolitical discourse. It seeks to unwrap the mythologies of the state, asking how 
national identities are created. This chapter focuses much attention on the notion of 
America as protector of peace, sole superpower, and the taken for granted belief in 
everyday discourse that has become common sense—namely, that the US is necessary 
as a superpower and protector of global security. It is evident in the language used that 
these assertions are taken for granted, as will become clearer in the sections where 
critical discourse analysis is used. For example, statements such as ‘since world peace is 
due to American efforts,’ or ‘because the United States is the only superpower’ imply 
that these are presented as common sense.  
 
The first of the three main themes of critical geopolitics adapted in this research 
is the power of ideas--for example, how discourses can legitimate actions or policies, 
the US as the ‘needed’ superpower in the world, and military strength as a necessity. 
This chapter looks at how issues are framed, and ideas are naturalized. The second 
theme, identity and difference will analyze the discourse to understand the implications 
of how national identity and the Other are created against one another. For example, 
much of the discourse implies that only the US can be trusted with such a great task as 
world peace, or leading the world with the strongest military, while ‘others’ cannot be 
trusted. Others are seen to be potential threats, dangerous, or not worthy of such a task. 
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The final theme of CGP focuses on the critical analysis of territory and how space is 
given meaning. Many explicit references are made in the discourse in regards to 
physically protecting American territory, but what is more interesting is what this 
implies for how the physical is used to protect the ideological. It is not only the threat of 
nuclear weapons causing physical damage, for example, but that the United States is 
spreading ‘freedom’ and protecting its ‘rights’ – which are non-territorial. Following the 
principles of CGP, this chapter seeks to question the ‘writing of truth’ in geopolitical 
discourse, and examines the social construction of geopolitical phenomena through the 
use of CDA methodology.  
 
The first part of this chapter covers a brief history of neoconservatism, and 
focuses on its beliefs about foreign policy. It also takes a look at the difference between 
the common understanding of ‘neoconservatives’ and those who may be called 
American supremacists. It then discusses the influences behind President Bush’s foreign 
policies. Five main people are within this influential group: Richard Cheney, Donald 
Rumsfeld, Zalmay Khalilzad, Paul Wolfowitz, and Douglas Feith. Following this, a 
critical discourse analysis will be presented on the ‘pre-existing conditions,’ i.e. the 
documents that came before the 9/11 attacks. These date back to the 1990s following 
the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, attention will be shifted to the Project for the 
New American Century (PNAC), a right wing think tank, which combines 
neoconservatives and American supremacists that so influenced George W. Bush’s 
foreign policy. This group represents a merging of views within the right, which would 
serve as a blueprint to Bush’s foreign policy. A critical discourse analysis of its 
documents will be presented, which shows a continuity in the policy suggestions of the 
early 1990s. Finally, the beginnings of the Bush government, where these individuals 
come together as a collective influence will be briefly discussed before concluding.  
 
This chapter represents a contribution to the overall research as it touches upon a 
few key important points. First, it will show that foreign policy after 9/11 was not a 
reaction to the attacks themselves, but rather, a continuation in foreign policy from the 
1990s. Second, it contributes to the research in pinning down the main influences in 
Bush’s ideology and formation of foreign policy. This sheds light on the rise and 
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importance of the neoconservative foreign policy ideology. Chapters Four and Five will 
demonstrate these themes recurring after 9/11, except at that point they are presented 
through the ‘new prism of 9/11’ (discussed in Chapter Four). This chapter serves the 
important purpose of pinpointing the origins of these policies and the assertion that in 
fact what was seen after 9/11 was but a continuation, and that 9/11 marked a turning 
point only in that it served as a window of opportunity to implement the policies fully.  
 
4.2 History of Neoconservatism  
The following provides only a brief and short history of neoconservatism as to 
ground the influences and rise of neoconservatism in America and to provide a 
background for the underpinnings of some of the major ideas and influences behind 
George W. Bush’s foreign policy. The background to the development of 
neoconservatism as a legitimate movement is important for a number of reasons. First, 
because of its influence from the Reagan years onwards, and especially during the Bush 
presidency (2000-2008) in policy making, understanding its cause and origins becomes 
more important. Second, many use the term neoconservatism without really 
understanding what it means. Understanding the ideological roots of how it formed as a 
reaction to liberals is important in understanding the foundations of neoconservatives’ 
ideology and policies. Third, a world view once seen as extreme or controversial 
became legitimate, and those who professed this worldview made it into spots of 
influence in Washington— in government, policy making, and beyond. Understanding 
their development and rise to prominence is an important piece of the puzzle. 
 
The roots of neoconservatism lie in the events of the 1960s and 1970s. The word 
itself came about originally to refer to those liberals who were troubled by the social 
movements in the 1960s and adopted more conservative view in response (Drew 2003). 
Two individuals stand out in the history of neoconservatism and the formation of a 
cohesive intellectual drive. Irving Kristol, dubbed the ‘god-father of Neoconservatism’ 
and Leo Strauss, who is credited with intellectually grounding the movement. Some of 
their views are said to have personally influenced prominent members of the Bush 
cabinet, like Paul Wolfowitz. Irving Kristol saw neoconservatism as ‘reformationist’. 
To him, it was an attempt to “reach beyond” contemporary liberalism, returning to the 
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original sources of a liberal vision and energy so as to “correct the warped version of 
liberalism that is today’s orthodoxy” (Drolet 2011: 5). Since the 1970s however, Leo 
Strauss was perhaps the most important thinker in developing neoconservatism as an 
intellectual movement. It is Strauss’s critique of the modern liberal democratic state that 
provided many neoconservatives with intellectual foundations for their struggle to 
reform political culture after the 1960s (Norton 2004: 10).  
 
Leo Strauss’s contribution and importance to the development and rise of 
neoconservatism comes from his critique of modernity. It was the way he presented the 
crisis of modernity that became a central element in neoconservative thought (Ibid: 117). 
His ideas are based on the belief that the contradictions between the way of life and 
practices of society could be resolved in thought but not in practice.  One of his core 
arguments is that by 
 
consigning happiness and virtue to the private sphere, modern liberalism has 
rendered impossible the notion of a common to which the political 
community must aspire in these conditions, the purpose of the modern state 
is limited to guaranteeing human life while refraining from ‘imposing on its 
members happiness of any sort’ (Drolet 2011: 83).  
 
As a reaction to the cultural revolution of the time, neoconservatism represented 
an opposition to the ‘left-wing’ intellectual movements of multiculturalism, post-
colonialism, post-modernism and feminism in American academics (High 2009: 479). It 
was triggered by the collapse of the liberal consensus in the 1960s, in which a loose 
ideological faction formed (Ibid: 278). Neoconservative ideology can be identified by 
three main categories, according to Drolet, which are capitalism, nationalism and 
imperialism (2011: 16). The amalgamation of neoconservatism as a political ideology, 
along with its ‘reluctant realignment’ with the Republican Party during the 1970s and 
1980s resulted in a return to ideology and an increased involvement in foreign policy 
debates (Ibid: 39).  
 
It is argued that the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was in part due to the 
efforts of neoconservatives. Following this, neoconservatives were in legitimate 
positions of power and no longer confined to magazines and newspaper columns; they 
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held important national roles in government (Drolet 2011: 51). Brandon High argues 
that “the neoconservatives could never have sustained political careers without 
developing a network of pressure groups and think-tanks. In this, neoconservatism was 
scarcely unique” (2009: 484). After the Cold War, neoconservatives had to regroup as 
their major enemy had been defeated. Irving Kristol (1996) wrote that 
 
with the end of the Cold War, what we really need is an obvious ideological 
and threatening enemy, one worthy of our mettle, one that can unite us in 
opposition. Isn’t that what the most successful movie of the year, 
“Independence Day”, is telling us? Where are our aliens when we most need 
them? 
 
Kristol’s quote sums up the neoconservative ideology: the search for enemies in 
order to legitimate military action and allow the United States to meddle in affairs 
outside its borders. William Kristol (son of Irving Kristol) and Robert Kagan wrote one 
of many pieces in Foreign Affairs calling for the movement not only to focus on 
domestic policy, but to apply Reagan’s policies to foreign policy. They argue that the 
“remoralization of America at home ultimately required the remoralization of American 
foreign policy” (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 30). Jonathan Monten argues that 
neoconservatism is not new, or necessarily a deviation, but rather it is consistent with 
the history of nationalist ideology in the United States, which has its foundation in 
liberal exceptionalism and the capacity for American power to bring about democratic 
change in the international system (Monten 2005: 116). 
 
What does it mean to be a neoconservative doing foreign policy?  
Neoconservative foreign policy is generally guided by unilateral action to 
promote democracy, free markets, and the maintenance of US primacy on the 
international stage. It also promotes pre-emption, vigorous action (i.e. using force when 
necessary), to champion the interests and ideals of America. Above all, it is putting US 
security concerns first in foreign policy, and rejecting ‘negotiations’ with ‘rogue’, 
‘terrorist’ or ‘communist’ states. 
 
Max Boot, an outspoken neoconservative, member of PNAC, and regular 
contributor to the Weekly Standard writes that,  
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the ambitious NSS that the administration issued in September 2002 – with 
its call for U.S. primacy, the promotion of democracy, and vigorous action, 
pre-emptive if necessary, to stop terrorism and weapons proliferation – was 
a quintessentially neoconservative document (2004: 21).  
 
These are the main components of neoconservative foreign policy, as seen in what came 
to be known as the Bush Doctrine. Boot openly writes on this matter and states plainly, 
what it means to make foreign policy as a neoconservative: using force when necessary 
to “champion” American ideals and interests, specifically for the spread of democracy 
which is seen to benefit the entire world, making it a less dangerous place (Boot 2004: 
23). Through neoconservatism runs the common theme that the world is inherently 
dangerous, and that the United States can help (in fact is needed) to make it safe. This 
language is observed in the speeches of Bush and his cabinet, with heightened emphasis 
after 9/11. Another prominent theme, brought to attention by Boot, is regime change. 
Boot argues that although it may seem radical, in fact, it is the “best way” to prevent 
crisis and war (Ibid). Boot, like other neoconservatives, is against negotiating with 
governments of rogue, terrorist or hostile states, as it is believed that this will only bring 
about further crises (Ibid). In an earlier book, Boot wrote that in fact democracy 
promotion is of utmost importance, as it will bring about peace. He concludes that 
“though the reasons have changed over the years, the United States has always found 
itself being drawn into ‘the savage wars of peace’ (Boot 2002: xix). Muravchik has also 
been outspoken about the idea that (imposed) democracy promotion is America’s most 
effective foreign policy, and should therefore take centre stage in its policy. He 
proposes three reasons why this is of great importance, which are: empathy for fellow 
humans, the belief that the more democratic the world, the friendlier it will be to 
America, and finally, the hope that a more democratic world will be a more peaceful 
one (Muravchik 1991: 8). Regime change and democracy promotion are therefore vital 
to the neoconservative foreign policy agenda.  
 
Finally, another major theme is the deep distrust and suspicion of the United 
Nations (UN), as Bush’s appointment of John Bolton as Ambassador has demonstrated. 
The UN naturally acts as a barrier to unilateralism, which neoconservatives promote. In 
fact, Irving Kristol argues that world government is a “terrible idea” leading the world 
to tyranny and further argues that international institutions lead to the “ultimate world 
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government…and should be regarded with the deepest suspicion” (Kristol 2003). In an 
interesting point relating to geopolitics and grand strategy, Kristol describes American 
interests and power as ideological, in the sense that its interests and goals are beyond 
material, beyond geographical boundaries. He argues that because of these ideological 
interests, inevitably the United States will be “obligated” to defend itself and its allies 
beyond its borders (Kristol 2003).  
 
Ultimately, what this means for America on the global stage is a “benevolent 
global hegemony”, write Kagan and the younger Kristol in 1996, after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union (1996: 20). A neoconservative making foreign policy therefore looks 
like an attempt to bring about global domination. America has been the sole hegemon 
since the end of the Cold War and therefore should exert its leadership and influence 
over “all others in its domain”, as neoconservatives would have it (Kristol and Kagan 
1996: 20). They believe that the principles that make up the Declaration of 
Independence are “not merely the choices of a particular culture, but are universal, 
enduring, ‘self-evident’ truths” (Ibid: 31). If they are taken as  fundamental values of 
neoconservatism, which by their own words they are, then they clearly set out an 
agenda for what neoconvservative foreign policy would look like, seeking to shape the 
world in America’s image. It is after the Cold War in the 1990s that neoconservatism in 
its current form really took off. However, it is important to note that those in Bush’s 
inner circle who are said to be most influential represent a mix of ‘neoconservatives’ 
and American supremacists. The differentiation between them is important, and will be 
addressed in the following section.  
 
Neoconservatives & American supremacists   
 It is important to differentiate between what is commonly referred to as 
‘neoconservative’ and those in Bush’s cabinet who were influential, and can be said to 
be ‘American supremacists’. Neoconservatives view themselves as the protectors of a 
‘liberalism betrayed’ by the events of the 1960s (Drolet 2011: 5). It emerges from the 
belief that liberalism as an ideology is unable to address the contradictions of the social 
world and often they see it as the sources of these contradictions (Drolet 2011: 8).  
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In the international arena neoconservatives are often nationalistic and believe in 
the cultivation and maintenance of a homogenous national identity, which has its basis 
in subordinating minority cultures to the white Anglo-Saxon worldview (Drolet 2011: 
16). They believe in the maintaining and deepening of America’s economic, political, 
cultural, and, importantly, military global supremacy (Ibid). In this category we can find 
the ideologies of Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and Zalmay Khalilzad.  
 
The second category of influential people in Bush’s cabinet can be called 
‘supremacists’, ‘hegemonists’, or ‘imperialists’. Often lumped together with 
neoconservatives, American supremacists have a slightly different agenda, and much of 
their focus of America’s primacy is especially in regards to the use of force. There is a 
wide consensus that the neoconservatives took over the White House with the beginning 
of the Bush Presidency in 2001. However, as Daalder and Lindsay note, this is in fact 
wrong on two accounts. First, it misrepresents the different intellectual streams within 
the Bush administration, and also running through the Republican Party (Daalder and 
Lindsay 2005: 14). According to their account, neoconservatives, whom they dub 
“democratic imperialists”, were more prominent outside the administration than within 
it. They were commonly seen on Fox News, and writing for the Weekly Standard (Ibid). 
The most important of Bush’s advisors, namely Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld 
are not neoconservatives, and they argue, neither is Bush. They are what can be 
classified as “American supremacists”— assertive nationalists that are interested in 
using American military power to neutralise threats and ensure military supremacy and 
control (Ibid: 15). However, these two groups share in common the idea that America 
had failed its primacy to advance its interests, especially under the Clinton 
administration. The neoconservatives are more concerned with remaking the world in 
America’s image, the American supremacists in projecting military force to ensure 
dominance. Therefore, their mutual goal is uniting militarily, economically, or 
otherwise to ensure America’s primacy is cemented.  
 
It is worth noting that Colin Powell, who was often sidelined, and Condoleezza 
Rice are generally lumped in with this group. They were realists who, although 
consulted by Bush on foreign policy, were not driving influences in his administration. 
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It was mainly Cheney and Rumsfeld who then installed Wolfowitz and Feith to the 
number two and three spots in the Department of Defence. This group together 
constituted the major influences behind President Bush’s foreign policy. These two 
‘strains’ – American supremacists and neoconservatives - came together in an 
influential think tank called the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), which 
will be the focus of the later part of this chapter.  
 
4.3 Influences behind President Bush’s foreign policy  
Of the many influential individuals linked to the drivers behind Bush’s policies, 
five are at the forefront as influential ‘neoconservatives’ or ‘American supremacists’ in 
Bush’s foreign policies. They are Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, 
Zalmay Khalilzad, and Douglas Feith. The ideas and implementation of policies that 
came about after 9/11 as a ‘reaction’ to the attacks can be traced back to some of the 
central ideas of these key people, hence their importance. Their writings prior to 
September 11, 2001 exemplify this. Behind every president is a group of influential 
people who advise the head of state on foreign and domestic policy, speech writing, 
legal implications, and so forth. This President in particular chose a group of people that 
constituted a very specific world view, one that began in the early 90s, if not slightly 
before in some cases. The ideas that came forward after 9/11 as a reaction to the attacks 
were in fact loosely formulated over a decade beforehand. Additionally, as will become 
clearer in this section, these individuals also have a long history with one another, 
working together on various projects both inside and outside of government positions, 
think tanks, and academic posts. Their personal history on foreign policy, as well as 
their history together during collaboration, proves to be an insightful education on the 
foundations and beginnings of what essentially formulated President Bush’s foreign 
policies, war plans, and discourse during his presidency. 
 
This section of the chapter will introduce each individual and through a critical 
discourse analysis of the materials written by them prior to 9/11, it will become evident 
that the policies of the Bush administration after the attacks were influenced in large 
part by the above mentioned individuals who actually advocated similar if not identical 
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policies during the 1990s. This also demonstrates that the policies were not a reaction to 
the events, but were formulated prior to the Global War on Terror. 
 
Richard Cheney 
Richard Cheney was arguably the most influential, and most powerful Vice 
President in American history. Montgomery wrote that “in the annals of the Vice 
Presidency…no President prior to George W. Bush was willing to give his vice 
president such enormous power. Few, if any, may be willing to do so again” 
(Montgomery 2009: xi). However, his views were formed far before his time as Vice 
President under Bush. Cheney is what could be classified as an American supremacist. 
His views do not necessarily represent mainstream neoconservatism. He himself said in 
his memoir, in reference to a conversation with George W. Bush and himself when he 
was being considered as his running mate:  
 
I told the governor he needed to understand how deeply conservative I 
was…I mean really conservative. I had a reputation of being somewhat 
moderate, partly, I think, because I wasn’t a ‘bomb thrower’ like some of 
my conservative colleagues, and partly because I got along with people all 
across the political spectrum. I needed to make sure the governor 
understood that my voting record was certainly not moderate (Cheney 2011: 
264). 
 
Cheney’s political career began in the late sixties when he was an intern under the 
Nixon administration. Later, under Rumsfeld he worked in congressional relations in 
the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), and once again as his assistant in the White 
House in the early 1970s. They met again when he worked with Rumsfeld in the 
transition period after the Watergate scandal, and also as his Chief of Staff under the 
Ford administration. Cheney has a long standing history with Donald Rumsfeld, in 
which as Bush’s Vice President, he chose Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defence.  
 
During the 1989 invasion of Panama by the United States, Cheney’s direction 
represented the Pentagon’s increasing willingness to use military force unilaterally 
(Montgomery 2009: 81). Cheney’s inclination towards large military missions became 
evident through the Panamanian invasion, and it is in fact Panama that established the 
“emotional predicate” that allowed the United States to gather support for Operation 
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Desert Storm a year later (Ibid: 84). Cheney’s advocacy of American military force and 
unilateralism again became apparent in 1991, when he advised that Congress be 
bypassed altogether in order to use force against Saddam Hussein. Bush senior did in 
fact turn to Congress, but Cheney was not pleased. Montgomery argues that if Cheney 
had been President, unrestrained unilateralism might have “ruled the day”, which we 
can see later as he was a major influence over George W. Bush (Ibid: 99).  
 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Cheney who was then Secretary of Defence, 
spearheaded a way to think about American foreign policy at the grand strategic level 
alongside “bigger-thinking, tougher-minded” ‘neoconservatives’ which included 
Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby and Eric Edelman (Lemann 2002: 42). In the 1990s, his 
involvement in the published papers for Defence Planning Guidance, and defence 
policies of the 1990s would make these views evident. It was in these documents that 
Cheney’s clear support for high military spending, unilateral policy, and American 
supremacy became clear. Additionally, the 1992, and 1993 documents promoted 
American pre-eminence and pre-emptive strikes. It also promoted the idea that no rival 
to America should be allowed or encouraged to emerge, ensuring US dominance of the 
international system. Specific examples to the documents bearing Cheney’s ideas will 
be detailed in following sections. 
 
Richard Cheney’s history provides us with a few important facts about his 
ideological roots. He is  a self-proclaimed very conservative person, first and foremost. 
His actions, voting record, and personal admissions have outlined that he has always 
had a willingness to use military force, and an inclination toward large military missions. 
Not only that, but he is a supporter of unilateral policies, and high military spending to 
achieve them. Understanding his history gives insight to his thought about foreign 
policy, which will be important when critical discourse analysis reveals his vision for 
American grand strategy. His views on a clear grand strategy continued to form into the 
1990s, but became overt under the Bush presidency, which will be the focus of the 





Cheney and Rumsfeld together were very influential in the President’s foreign 
policies. As indicated previously, they have a long history of working together in 
government. Rumsfeld began his career in politics early. In the 1960s he was a 
Congressman from Illinois, and later that decade was director of the OEO. Later, Nixon 
had appointed Rumsfeld as Counselor to the President where he had more exposure to 
top aides in the White House (Rumsfeld 2011: 130). He was representative to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early seventies before becoming the Chief 
of Staff under President Ford. In 1975 Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defence. He was 
only at this post a few months when he introduced a plan for a surge in defence 
spending and warned that the Soviet Union would be a military threat (Graham 2009: 
131). His 1976 budget requested an 8.9 billion dollar increase in defence spending. He 
justified this by warning that military trends were against the US unless it increased 
investment in the defence establishment and dedicated resources to developing new 
strategic weapons (Ibid). Without this, he warned, there would be a military imbalance 
and the US would be at a disadvantage. He eventually gained the approval of Congress 
for the increase in defence spending.  
 
Rumsfeld’s views on grand strategy were apparent in his early days in 
government. By the time of the Vietnam War, he was already an outspoken 
conservative and had little tolerance for views that promoted scaling back US 
involvement and reducing military posture (Ibid: 132). In his memoir he commented on 
this, saying that “I was willing to support a more robust military campaigning in 
Vietnam” (Rumsfeld 2011: 70). During the 1990s, he stayed in the political scene, even 
if not in a government role. He was a part of an advisory group of Republican 
congressional leaders on security issues. Rumsfeld had little confidence in the United 
Nations, which gave insight to his unilateral tendencies. He also signed the 1998 letter 
to Clinton by PNAC (discussed below), and although he was grouped into the 
mainstream as a ‘neoconservative’, his views advocated a far more imperial outlook.  
Herspring argues that “not since Robert McNamara in the 1960s has a secretary 
of defence been so hated by the military, nor has any secretary since McNamara played 
such a critical role in the formulation of national security policy” (2008: xv). He also 
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maintains that Rumsfeld was the only senior civilian decision maker who played such a 
central role not only in the transformation of the military, but also in the invasion of 
Iraq (Ibid). 
 
Rumsfeld’s personal history reveals a few noteworthy points. First, he had 
positions in several administrations including the Nixon and Ford administrations. Early 
in his career as Secretary of Defense in 1978 he already pitched a case for increased 
military spending. At that time he was already concerned with the ‘disadvantages’ the 
lack of military spending could cause (a point later echoed aggressively by PNAC). 
During the Vietnam War, not only did he not support scaling back, but in fact he was 
eager for more robust measures, signifying his commitment to an aggressive military 
presence. Additionally, like many neoconservatives and American supremacists 
especially, he made his distrust for the United Nations known. It was his long 
relationship with Richard Cheney that proved to be powerful and influential during the 
Bush years. It was especially after 9/11 that he became a popular figure in the media, 
and his influence became clearer. 
 
Paul Wolfowitz 
Paul Wolfowitz, like many in the Bush administration, has a long history of 
involvement in American politics both in and outside the White House. The influences 
of Wolfowitz’s ideology can be traced back to three major influences in his life. His 
father, his undergraduate years at Cornell and his relationship with Albert Wohlstetter. 
He grew up with the events of the Holocaust, as narrated by his father, having a big 
impact on his life (Solomon 2007: 9). In short, he came to the conclusion, through his 
father’s influence, that America has a moral responsibility in the world to rid the world 
of peril (Ibid: 10). At Cornell University, during his undergraduate degree, he met one 
of his personal influences Allan Bloom, a well-known and respected academic and 
neoconservative (Ibid: 11). Third, his relationship with Albert Wohlstetter, a senior 
policy analyst at RAND and academic at the University of Chicago. His work focused 
on nuclear weapons in the Middle East, which inspired Wolfowitz’s own PhD research 
(Ibid: 14).  
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In the late 1960s, Wolfowitz was recruited by Wohlstetter to conduct research 
for the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defence Policy. Together with PhD student 
Richard Perle (who would later become chairman of the Defence Policy Board under 
George W. Bush), they produced a series of papers promoting funding for missile 
defence, which was authorized by the senate (Immerman 2010: 201). Following this he 
worked for the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations, but it was during Reagan’s 
time that his views of global supremacy began to develop in full (Ibid: 206). His 
personal draft of the DPG in 1992 (which will follow in the next section) was dubbed 
the ‘Wolfowitz Doctrine’ (Ibid: 217), and proved to be a controversial document 
arguing for American supremacy and imperialism. 
 
In the 1980s, Wolfowitz was a strong proponent of the notion that the United 
States should act more unilaterally. He believed that America did not need to reach ‘an 
accommodation’ with any other world power (Solomon 2007: 45). He also had a long 
standing obsession with the danger of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and Iraq, which will 
be highlighted in the next part of this chapter. As is evident in his history, Wolfowitz 
was a supporter of unilateralism, using military power to ensure America’s place at the 
top of the international system as hegemon and his particular interest in the Middle East 
and Iraq. After 9/11, he became a household name to those who were unfamiliar with 
him before. He was a key influential member in the lead up to the Iraq War. In the 
aftermath of the 2001 attacks, along with Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz immediately suggested 
that Bush should invade Iraq (Dorrien 2004: 3). He believed that Hussein was behind 
the attacks themselves. Upon their advice, Bush asked that links between Saddam 
Hussein, Iraq and 9/11 be extensively explored. Wolfowitz strongly believed that the 
use of force should not and can not be approached in an “experimental way”, meaning 
that the US should be able to quickly decide to use force wherever it deems it to be 
needed (Ibid: 65). This would ensure that America remains at the top of the 
international pyramid. As it turned out, the war in Iraq did not result in the finding of 
hundreds of weapons of mass destruction, but to Wolfowitz that wasn’t important. As 
he summed up: 
 
The purpose of the war was to remove a threat to national and international 
security. Whether the Iraq War was right or wrong, it was not about 
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imposing democracy, and the decision to establish a representative 
government afterward was the most realistic option, compared with the 
alternatives of installing another dictator or prolonging the US occupation 
(Drolet 2011: 158). 
 
Wolfowitz was a staunch believer in assertive nationalism and “the number one 
theoretician of the administration’s ‘neoconservative phalanx’ (Immerman 2010: 223). 
His views were instrumental in the development of Bush’s conceptual framework in 
regards to global goals, and were said to be in sync completely with the President’s 
agenda (Ibid). James Mann referred to him as the most influential underling in 
Washington (Ibid). As such, 9/11 was a self-fulfilling prophecy for Wolfowitz that 
confirmed his worldview that was present from his early childhood (Ibid: 224). 
 
Like the others, Wolfowitz has a long history in US government and politics. 
Working with Ford, Carter and Reagan, his ideological views formed long ago. His 
central role in the drafting of the DPG is of great importance, and the document itself 
will be analyzed later in this chapter. Also like the others, he let it be known he was not 
a huge proponent of the UN, and believed in American unilateral action. His long 
standing fixation with Saddam Hussein and Iraq also proved to be central to the 2003 
invasion under the George W. Bush administration. Wolfowitz, perhaps not seen in the 
media as much as Cheney and Rumsfeld, was a hugely influential voice in policy 




Zalmay Khalilzad was originally born in Afghanistan, but carried out much of 
his education in Lebanon, and completed his PhD in Chicago. Like Wolfowitz, he was 
largely influenced by Albert Wohlstetter. Khalilzad has been influential throughout his 
career, and his posts have varied from being an academic, to working for think tank 
RAND, to serving under several Republican administrations, most influentially under 
George W. Bush. Under Bush, he was first the American Ambassador to Afghanistan, 
then to Iraq, and finally to the United Nations. Under the first Bush administration in 
the 1990s, Khalilzad was Deputy Undersecretary of Policy Planning. Under the Reagan 
administration, he advised on the Iran-Iraq War, as well as the Soviet war in 
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Afghanistan.  During the 1990s, he was part of an active group of neoconservatives who 
wrote about American global leadership. 
 
As part of RAND in 1995, Khalilzad prepared a report for the United States’ Air 
Force called From Containment to Global Leadership? America and the World After 
the Cold War. In it, he clearly outlines his stance on American power. The document 
outlines three potential routes that the United States could take, which he labels as 
neoisolationism, multipolarity and US global leadership. He suggests that if the first 
option is adopted, the US pre-eminence would be abandoned and focus would be on 
domestic problems. He argues that this would likely increase “major conflicts” and in 
the long run would result in large defence efforts, undermining US prosperity 
(Khalilzad 1995: viii). The second option presented is returning to pre World War Two 
multipolarity which would rely on a balance of power among several nations to 
dissuade the rise of a super power. In this option he projects “severe risks” which would 
result in the decline of US influence, negative economic consequences and competition 
from other powers (Ibid). The third and final option, which he sets up as being the best 
and obvious solution, is US global leadership and primacy. In this option he presents the 
world to be a safer place under US leadership, where liberal democracy and the rule of 
law would flourish. This is one of many pieces he would write on what role he sees for 
America on the global stage.  
 
Perhaps one of the least known influential figures to the public, Khalilzad made 
a name for himself early in his career. Not seen in the media spotlight often, he has a 
long history in government policy making. His views about  the way American grand 
strategy implemented by George W. Bush were seen early on in the 1990s, when he 
wrote as part of a think tank under the Clinton presidency, which did not support his 
views. He warned of the dangers if America did not step forward, and most overt were 
his strong views of US global leadership. Again, these formed the foundations of 
policies implemented after 9/11, but Khalilzad like Wolfowitz had a hand in drafting 
early version of the DPG, perhaps the most telling document of American grand 
strategy before 2001. His ideas proved to be influential under the Bush administration, 
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as many of the key policy ideas drafted but not implemented under Clinton, were 
realized under Bush.  
 
Douglas Feith  
Douglas Feith was a protégé of Richard Perle under the Reagan administration, 
and who is a well-known and outspoken neoconservative who served on Bush’s 
administration’s Defense Policy Board. Feith’s role in the Bush administration was to 
work under Rumsfeld forming defense planning guidance, from 2001 to 2005. Said to 
be one of the few that Rumsfeld trusted, he was loyal to him and often faced intense 
criticism (Woodward 2006: 208). His role in the government was to ensure that the 
policies advocated by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were implemented (Herspring 2008: 10). 
 
Feith has a law degree, but focused on national security issues and the Middle 
East (Ibid). He worked on the National Security Council before moving to the Pentagon 
where he remained until 1986 (Ibid). He was also a part of the group that signed an 
open letter to Clinton in 1999 calling the removal of Saddam Hussein. In his book, War 
and Decision, he defended the President’s decision to use the term ‘War on Terror’. He 
argues that the United States could not label a single set of terrorist organizations, nor 
the states that were involved with them which would result in declaring war against 
multiple nations (Feith 2008: 8). He also pointed out that in fact some of these nations 
are those who the United States would consider friends, and this would complicate 
matters. Therefore, a ‘better’ way to define the enemy, according to his own account, 
was to leave the definition vague and flexible to include a variety of categories of the 
enemy. He writes, “we needed a better way to define the enemy, one that would cover 
all the relevant bases but preserve our flexibility regarding how, when, and against 
whom we should act” (Ibid). What he is essentially advocating here, echoing what was 
heard from members across the administration:  anyone/nation/group could be 
considered a terrorist; any place is a potential danger or threat, and America can act at 
any time it feels its security is threatened to eradicate this threat.  
Feith’s views on American foreign policy were typically neoconservative. He 
referred to the ABM treaty as an ancient text (Feith 2003:1), and although he was upset 
with the aftermath of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, he was a strong proponent of pre-
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emptive strikes. He actually wanted the Pentagon to have control of post-war Iraq, and 
was unhappy with the handling of post-war Iraq and Afghanistan by the State 
Department (Woodward 2006: 108). Feith thought, like many others in the Bush 
administration, that an ideology can be defeated, and militarily so by declaring it a ‘war’. 
He said ‘we know’ ideologies can be defeated, like Soviet Communism and Nazism, 
radical Islamism can be discredited by failure (Feith 2003: 6). He did not take seriously 
the idea that interference would potentially give the ideological movement fuel. He 
claimed that Iraq and Afghanistan would welcome American troops as liberators 
because their people see “the potential for modernization, democratization, and 
liberalization of the economy, and they oppose and fear what they see” (Ibid). It was in 
fact American interference which they opposed. 
 
Few know of Feith’s role in American foreign policy. Like Khalilzad, his place 
was not in the media spotlight, but in the background. His history of policy writing, and 
focus on the Middle East made him a trustworthy asset to Rumsfeld. Like some of the 
others, he adamantly supported removing Saddam Hussein from office, and joined in on 
the open letter to Clinton in 1999; years before 9/11 and the issue of Iraq publicly 
resurfaced. His telling quotes about defining the enemy in his own words, is insightful 
to the processes by which language was used to specifically construct the enemy in such 
a way that it was open-ended.  
 
Each of these individuals came to play a significant role in the formation of 
Bush’s foreign policy; some behind the scenes, some like Rumsfeld and Cheney were in 
the centre of media attention. It is important to understand their ideological roots, as 
well as their historical interaction with one another and work in various government 
administrations. All this would suggest that this is not just any group of qualified 
individuals, but they were specifically chosen as they were representative of a world 
view that through the opportunity of 9/11, would usher in an era of imperial American 
policy. The following section looks at the materials written by these key players, and 
subjects them to a critical discourse analysis to unveil common themes of foreign policy 
initiatives in the 1990s, which would later be implemented after 9/11 during Bush’s 
presidency.  
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4.4 Pre-existing conditions: Critical Discourse Analysis 
The 1990s marked a new type of neoconservative agenda. After the fall of the 
USSR, the United States remained the only ‘superpower’, which further legitimized 
their role as leader of the free world.  This section will follow some of the main themes 
that will be highlighted in Chapter Six: unilateralism, ensuring there is no rival to the 
USA, America’s ‘job’ to protect the peace, pre-emption, and military spending and 
power. The views, documents, and policies below are mainly from the 1990s, up until 
just before the 9/11 attacks. The relevance of this section seeks to provide evidence that 
that the discourses in the aftermath of 9/11 were not promoting a reactionary agenda, 
but rather, that those discourses were part of a previous agenda. These ideas and the 
influence of this group put into context our understanding of the ‘pre-planned’ agenda 
that promoted American imperialism long before Bush was elected to office, and 
changed the course of foreign policy after 9/11. These materials are evidence of the 
gradual influence, and formation of a ‘neoconservative’ - supremacist agenda, that Bush 
would adopt as his own in his time in office.  
 
Using CDA this section will focus on the ideological views of the most 
influential people to Bush’s foreign policy. There are six major themes that come up in 
the documents below. Many of them mirror the themes in Chapter Six and hence show 
that the original arguments for the policies that were seen as a reaction to the events of 
9/11 actually existed more than a decade prior. It is also evident that these key players 
and authors of these documents were very influential as their ideas carry through as they 
take up posts in the Bush administration and the policies they advocated for in the 
1990s were implemented.  
 
Unilateralism  
Unilateralism was one of the things that defined Bush’s term in office, and in 
fact, the Bush Doctrine. President Bush’s foreign policy took shape after 9/11 and 
focused on pre-emption, unilateralism and democratic regime change. However, long 
before the ‘need’ for pre-emption as a reaction to 9/11 was argued, in the early 90s, pre-
emption was already mentioned in the first draft of the DPG for 1994-99 written largely 
by Wolfowitz and Khalilzad under Richard Cheney as Secretary of Defence. Three of 
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the most influential to Bush were responsible for the document that later Cheney took 
ownership of and published under his name in 1993. It was later revised and ‘toned 
down’. In the first draft, the authors wrote that 
 
A confluence of friendly though potentially competing powers holds 
considerable promise for promoting collective action to regional or local 
aggression, as was the case in the recent Gulf War, but also requires that the 
United States be postured to act independently when collective action 
cannot be orchestrated or when an immediate response is a necessary 
presage to a larger or more formal collective response (Department of 
Defense 1991). 
 
Nothing can really determine what is ‘necessary’ and would therefore determine an 
immediate response. The structure of the policy is vague, and it is also argumentative in 
that it presents an argument for unilateralism when collective action either fails, or there 
is not enough time to ‘consult’. As is now known, Bush backed out of the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty ABM when he came to office, but long before then Rumsfeld also 
advocated that treaties such as the ABM muddle America’s power and it is best to 
retract from such treaties as he says here: 
 
There just isn't a doubt in my mind. If we relieve ourselves of the 
restrictions of that [ABM] treaty so that we do not have to do contortions to 
do what is the quickest, cheapest, most effective way of doing this 
[providing missile defenses], and organize to do it in an effective way, that 
the United States will be able to do it (Rumsfeld 1999).  
 
Here, Rumsfeld uses argumentation to advocate for a withdrawal, as the ABM treaty is 
seen as an obstacle. Instead, he argues that the alternative when America can deal with 
the problem alone, is the best way, i.e. cheaper, quicker and more effective, presenting 
his arguments as facts. 
 
Douglas Feith in the summer of 2001, preceding the attacks, while Bush was 
already in office was involved in a hearing on the ABM Treaty and presented his view 
that the treaty is an obstacle to American interests. Emphasizing the fear of what could 
happen if left for too long – the danger, and the race against time – he suggested 
America make a quick exit:  
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We are in a race against time—and we are starting from behind. Thanks in 
no small part to the constraints of the antiquated ABM Treaty, we have 
wasted the better part of a decade. We cannot afford to waste another one 
(Feith 2001: 18). 
 
Again, in an argumentative tone, he warns that time ‘cannot be wasted’ in such a 
situation. Again, with some fear mongering below, he accuses past governments of not 
taking the threats seriously, and further accuses them of putting the Treaty before 
American national security and interests: 
 
For the past decade, our government has not taken seriously the challenge of 
developing defenses against missiles. We have not adequately funded it, we 
have not believed in it, and we have given the ABM Treaty priority over it 
(Feith 2001: 17). 
 
Further, he argues that: 
 
The countries pursuing these capabilities are doing so because they believe 
they will enhance their power and influence; because they believe that if 
they can hold the American people at risk, they can prevent us from 
projecting force to stop acts of aggression, and deter us from defending our 
interests around the world (Feith 2001: 18). 
 
He uses fear and the argument that other nations are enhancing their abilities with aims 
to put Americans at risk, and to further deter the United States from pursuing interests. 
He is presenting a case for the withdrawal, based on ‘facts’ as his argues for unilateral 
action and an exit from the treaty.  
 
Most of the unilateral action is focused around the arguments against the ABM 
treaty. The language is always in that of an argumentative tone, using persuasion – 
warning of future problem that could arise if policies are not amended. Unilateralism is 
a policy of imperialism and therefore the links would seem evident. However, it is 
interesting that as imperialism can never be ‘advocated’ by a government, the language 
used to frame the issues is of utmost importance. It is a type of persuasive language that 
argues that there is no other choice; i.e. for the safety and prosperity of Americans, 
withdrawing from the ABM Treaty is the only reasonable option. This type of 
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persuasion is common to the discourses of these individuals, PNAC and the Bush 
administration, therefore suggesting a continuation of foreign policy objectives.  
 
Ensuring no rival to American Power 
Another key theme which will be explored in Chapter Six is the belief that there 
should be ‘no rival to American power’. With the confidence of winning the Cold War, 
the 1990s saw the beginning of an era for American dominance, with no real 
competition. An earlier version of the DPG, which was leaked to the New York Times 
before it was published, was featured in the paper and it caused much uproar. This was 
the first time the public was made aware of a grand strategy for global domination and 
American hegemony. Parts of it were therefore rewritten, softened and scaled back in 
the final publication. However, the original leaked document had already done the 
damage and made aware the true policy initiatives. It states that: 
 
There are other potential nations of coalitions that could, in the further 
future, develop strategic aims and a defence posture of region-wide or 
global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the 
emergence of any potential future global competitor…we are prepared to 
reconstitute additional forces should the need to counter a global threat re-
emerge (Department of Defense 1992). 
 
These threats are likely to arise in regions critical to the security of the US 
and its allies….the US will be concerned with preventing the domination of 
key regions by a hostile power (Department of Defense 1992). 
 
In plain language, the above statements explicitly state that America should ensure that 
no global competitor should emerge. This is how the post-Cold War world was being 
framed. Framing, as mentioned, is especially important as it creates a foundational 
narrative whereby the rest of the ‘plot’ fits in. Additionally, it is vague as he states that 
‘potential nations’ that ‘could, in the future’ develop means to globally dominate. It is 
vague, and very futuristic, avoiding any concrete statements about who or which nations, 
or what those means could be, and therefore, justifying preparedness for any situation. 
 
The leaked version of the DPG also openly argues that the United States must 
retain access to the region’s oil (in the Middle east and Southwest Asia). Special 
attention is also given to the Arabian Peninsula: 
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In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain 
the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western 
access to the region’s oil. We also seek to…protect US nationals and 
property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways…it 
remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of 
powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian 
Peninsula.  (Department of Defense 1992).  
 
Again here it is plainly stated that no other power should come to dominate, ensuring 
that the United State is the sole hegemon. Also, there is some use of argumentation as 
the document states this is to ensure the protection of nationals, property, and the 
safeguarding of air and seaways. 
 
In a copy that has been declassified, however remains heavily excised, it states that the 
United States should prevent any 
 
Hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under 
consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions 
include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, 
and Southwest Asia ((Department of Defense 1992a).  
 
Not only is the rise of a global rival again explicitly discouraged, but the regions that are 
named nearly encompass the world in an attempt to leave it open and vague. Additional 
to this objective is the following, that the United States must  
 
Show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that 
holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not 
aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their 
legitimate interests (Department of Defense 1992a).  
 
It is made clear that rivals ‘need not aspire’ to greater roles, and that the United States 
has a role to play as a leader in making sure this does not happen. This is a part of the 
framing over the overall objective of American grand strategy: that America’s is a 
necessary role, and that special role is to ensure that it is the sole leader of the world. 
 
It is evident that principles of imperial policy are embedded into this document. 
This is also made evident by the outcry that the leaked document to the New York Times 
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caused and the shock the public felt when it was implied America seeks imperial 
powers.  
 
One year later in 1993, Cheney who was then Secretary of Defense during the George 
H.W. Bush Presidency, solidified this world view. In 1993, his Regional Defense 
Strategy called for America to shape the future of international relations, and preserve 
the peace. His strategy advocated for a special role for America in the world, under the 
assumption that it is their job to protect world peace.  With the end of the Cold War and 
no global threat immediately in sigh, Cheney advocated that  
 
it is the intent of the new Regional Defense strategy to enable the U.S. to 
lead in shaping an uncertain future so as to preserve and enhance this 
strategic depth won at such great pains (Cheney 1993). 
 
Here, he remains vague in addressing the ‘uncertain future’, but frames the issue around 
the new strategic depth the US has won (i.e. sole superpower). He advocates that it is 
indeed America’s strategy and goal to lead the world. Khalilzad was another key and 
influential player in the formation of Bush’s foreign policy, and as such, his writings 
from the 1990s also demonstrate his neoconservative objectives for American’s role in 
the world. In 1995, Khalilzad wrote a paper with RAND for Project Air Force entitled 
From Containment to Global Leadership? America and the World After the Cold War, 
suggesting similar key themes to the effect of ensuring that there is no challenger to the 
United States. Khalilzad makes overtly clear that force should be used if any hegemon 
attempts to take over critical regions:  
 
[The United States must] prevent hegemony over critical regions: the United 
States should be willing to use force if necessary for this purpose (Khalilzad 
1995: ix).  
 
He also argues that the America should be prepared to defeat any potential challenger 
not allied with the United States, and this should be done by ensuring military pre-
eminence. He states the goals are to: 
 
Preserve US military pre-eminence: for the foreseeable future, this means 
having the capability for fighting two major regional contingencies nearly 
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simultaneously…For the longer term, it should consider moving toward 
sizing its forces to be able to defeat the plausible military challenges to 
critical American interests that might be posed by the two next most 
powerful military forces in the world – which are not allied with the US 
(Khalilzad 1995: x). 
 
This crosses over two major themes: one is ensuring that there is no rival power to 
America, and second, the argument for military spending. Because he warns of the 
dangers of emerging threats, by using argumentation he posits that America should have 
the military power and force to pursue these goals.  
 
Two years later, in 1997, Khalilzad co-authored a piece for RAND called Strategy and 
Defense Planning for the 21st century. In it, he reiterates his previously held views that 
 
U.S. leadership will help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival and 
multipolarity, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another 
global cold or hot war and all its dangers. (Khalilzad 1997: 14) 
 
Here, implicit is that American leadership is the only way to avoid war(s). This 
presumes that the US should leader, that it’s leadership is necessary, and that its 
leadership maintains peace. It is full of assumptions and presumptions about American 
power. Overall, Khalilzad’s key opinion that unilateralism is best for the United States, 
as he sees dangers in the possibility of a multipolar international system. Not only does 
he advise the United States remain the sole superpower, but that other nations are 
clearly dissuaded from rising to challenge the US. 
 
In the quote below, Rumsfeld reiterates America’s ‘unique’ role in the world to lead. He 
is framing the issue around America’s special role, requiring the nation to act as leader 
of the world. 
 
We have to deal with shifting ambiguities in ways that advance our own 
national interests while also meeting our unique leadership responsibilities 
in the world (Rumsfeld 1998: 12). 
 
The general argument for ensuring that there is no rival power to America is a 
mixture of argumentative statements that it is because American leadership is needed 
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for peace and stability, as well as more implicit statements that suggest the world is 
better off with one superpower. The language is not only to preserve America’s status as 
hegemon, but to ensure that no potential competitor gets the idea to rise to superpower 
status. This is for a variety of reasons, though some are blunt. For example, the 
reference to ensuring America has access to oil, while others are more subtle and vague 
– ‘protecting American interests’, which could mean anything. All of this is being 
framed within the context of ‘the post Cold War era’ in which America is the only 
superpower, and unique provider of peace and security. Framing is a very important tool, 
because once the frame is in place, further narratives can fit easily into the larger frame 
of American power. It then becomes clearer to understand how the common sense 
beliefs such as ‘America the sole super power’ become naturalized, and accepted into 
everyday geopolitical discourse. It is clear then once examined, that the discourse leads 
to yet another aspect of imperialism: leader of the international system, and additionally, 
ensuring no other state aspires to such a role.  
 
America’s job to protect the peace  
The idea that it is America’s ‘job’ to protect the peace is familiar in political 
discourse. It is also framed within the larger responsibility of the USA as sole 
superpower. Once that frame is set up, it seems ‘natural’ that because the US has 
assumed this role, that they are now protectors of world peace.  
 
In the 1990s, where the bulk of these imperial views come to light, Wolfowitz wrote a 
piece of Foreign Affairs in 1994 about Clinton’s first year in office. He concludes that, 
 
In the longer term, much greater threats could emerge if the United States 
fails to maintain the broad peace and stability that has been achieved in the 
great power centres of Europe and Asia (Wolfowitz 1994: 34). 
 
The world is still sufficiently dangerous that it requires leadership to 
maintain peace, leadership that only the United States can provide and from 
which the United States benefits along with most other nations (Wolfowitz 
1994: 34). 
 
In the above quotes, the world is framed as still being ‘sufficiently dangerous’, and 
warns of potential emerging dangers once more, which sets up the narrative that a 
	 141	
powerful player is needed to make it safe. The argument is also made that it will 
continue to be dangerous if the US isn’t involved in ensuring peace and security. 
Implicit is that it is America’s job therefore to maintain this peace, and second, it is 
argued that American leadership is welcome around the world, benefitting not only 
America but the rest of the world.  
 
Not too long after, in 1997, Khalilzad co-authored another RAND piece with 
Ochmanek which was a Strategic Appraisal entitled Strategy and Defense Planning for 
the 21st century. They conclude that  
 
put simply, the United States is the world's preeminent military power and 
the chief "exporter" of security (Khalilzad and Ochmanek 1997 preface: iv).  
 
They maintain that for the foreseeable future, it will be America that will need to defeat 
the challenges posed by insecurity. It in therefore in their opinion that  
 
even in the absence of a superpower adversary, much depends on the United 
States getting its defense strategy, planning, and resource allocation right 
(Khalilzad and Ochmanek 1997 preface: iv).  
 
The above passages argue that the United States is once again required to provide and 
promote peace, and that they are the primary exporter of security, as the authors write. It 
is assumed that because the US is the sole superpower, it automatically puts them in the 
role of responsibility to world peace and security. This also implicitly promotes high 
military spending for defense, for the good of international safety, as much as its own. 
Again, they capitalize on the ‘unique’ position of the United States and its capacity and 
duty to lead: 
 
Because of its unique capacity to lead, the United States has both the 
opportunity and the responsibility to work actively to foster an environment 
in which such values can spread. For these reasons, there can be no 
responsible alternative for the United States to an ambitious strategy of 
global leadership and engagement in the affairs of these regions (Khalilzad 
and Ochmanek 1997: 3). 
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In the above passage specifically, the issue is clearly being framed around the unique 
role of America, and its responsibility. These two frames are among the most important 
in advocating for American global dominance. It is also argued that there can be no 
alternative, that this is the only way forward for America. In 1998, one year after the 
above publication, Rumsfeld  stated that: 
 
As the sole world power, we have an opportunity to contribute to peace and 
stability in our still dangerous and untidy world. But we can do so only if 
our diplomacy is backed by military capabilities appropriate to the next 
century (Rumsfeld 1998: 13).  
 
Again, the issue is first being framed as America as the sole superpower of the world.  
The ‘opportunity’ for the US to protect that peace is once again made evident as part of 
the frame. Further, the continued reminder of a dangerous world is argued, and 
ultimately this argumentation style results in a promotion of defence spending. 
 
America’s special and unique role, and even more so its ‘job’ to protect the 
peace is central to the frame for US global dominance. This theme will be seen 
reoccurring in later chapters in the discussions of discourse after 9/11, where it was 
spun as a reaction to the events. Frames are of special importance when taking into 
account taken for granted beliefs, which critical geopolitics strives to expose. The idea 
that it is ‘natural’ or that it’s a given that America’s role is to dominate and protect 
world peace, can be traced back to specific discourses and a set of ideas at specific 
times in American history. Of special importance is the end of the Cold War as it 
marked a moment in history where one nation remained as superpower. Despite the end 
of the Cold War, the argument is that the world is still dangerous, and the US is 
expected to protect the world from those dangers. A mix of framing and argumentation, 
the ‘dangers’ of the world afford an opportunity for the US to ‘protect’ all. This 
discourse is a taken for granted geopolitical discourse to this day; that the world 
‘depends’ on the US, it is  the Americans’ ‘role’. However, what is also interesting is 
that this fits in to America’s long history with benevolent hegemony. They argue time 
and time again, that they never asked for this role, but have no choice but to fulfill it. 
This is clear also by the references made above to ‘no responsible alternative’ – it is 
taken for granted that America provides the only solution. The United Nations in fact is 
	 143	
the world’s ‘peacekeeper’ but the United States does not emphasize their role as such, 
and argues for peace on its terms – an imperial outlook. 
 
Pre-emption  
Another prominent and important theme that will be discussed in Chapter Six will 
be discourses around pre-emption. After 9/11, pre-emption was seen as necessary, and 
as a direct reaction to the attacks of 2001. However, like many of the points discussed, 
this idea started to form in the 1990s, due to an effort from key influential people who 
would later become a part of Bush’s foreign policy team. Although there is not much 
dialogue about pre-emption, at it was evident form the leaked document that it was far 
too contentious and ‘extreme’ for its time, it is important to note a few key lines that 
existed in the early drafts of the DPG in 1991 which evidence that pre-emption was in 
the minds of neoconservatives.  
 
The first real mention of pre-emption can be found in the official first draft of the 
Defence Planning Guidance in 1991. In it, it states that  
 
The new strategy requires the ability to act quickly and decisively with a 
range of options against regional or local threats on short notice with 
modern, highly capable forces it requires also that we remain mindful of 
future or emerging threats by providing the wherewithal to reconstitute 
additional forces, if necessary, to offset the challenge or a revitalized global 
threat (Department of Defense 1991).  
 
The warnings of “future or emerging threats” and the need to “offset” these potential 
threats, are perhaps the beginnings of pre-emption. The language, however, is again 
vague. Any ‘emerging’ or ‘potential’ threat is a justification for preemptive action. 
Intentionally so, such wording allows a more open script towards dealing with future 
scenarios. The only other reference to pre-emption is again found in the 1991 draft and 
states the United States will  
 
retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing those wrongs which 
threaten not only its own interests, but those of its allies or friends, or which 
could seriously unsettle international relations…In general the US role will 
be that of a leader and galvanizer of the world community  (Department of 
Defense 1991). 
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Here, it is implied that the United States may possibly act first – pre-emptively – in 
‘addressing wrongs’. It is also vague, because it is stated that this action can be directed 
toward not only America’s interests, but any ally or friend. Ultimately, the issue is 
framed once more with an overt message that the United States is the global hegemon: 
‘leader and galvanizer’ of the world. More overt instances of pre-emption occur in the 
early 2000’s in PNAC documents, which will be analyzed in the following section. 
 
Military spending and power 
Another common theme that is central to neoconservative ideology is a 
sustained military presence around the world, which above all requires high defence 
spending. This argument appears several times throughout the 1990s especially when it 
was believed by the core of neoconservatives that the Clinton administration was not 
doing enough defence spending wise. Post Cold War, during a peaceful period, this was 
more difficult to rationalize, which is why post-9/11 the argument for defence spending 
was supported by many across party lines.  
 
In 1992, when Cheney was Secretary of Defence, he presented his annual report 
to the President and Congress in which he wrote: 
 
Today, the United States faces a fundamental choice. We can make the 
investments required to maintain the strategic depth that we have won – a 
much smaller investment than we made to secure it. Or we can fail to secure 
these advantages, and eventually the threats will not be remote, they will not 
be vague, and we will not have the alliances and the capabilities to deal with 
them. The cost of waiting until then to respond would likely be much more 
expensive, and the outcomes much riskier, than the cost of sustaining 
adequate military capabilities now (Cheney 1992: 2). 
 
The above is a mixture of a warning and a responsibility. Cheney uses argumentation in 
presenting an ultimatum to the United States: that it can either invest and secure their 
‘strategic depth’ (hegemony), or failing this, threats will develop and it will be too late. 
Scare tactics in an argumentative style will later become a hallmark of the George W. 
Bush presidency’s discourse. Cheney’s influence is made clear as his ideas of high 
military spending are promoted throughout his time as Secretary of Defence. He 
continues with this train of thought in the same document; an excerpt below: 
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It is important that we exploit our advantageous position and preserve 
capabilities needed to keep threats small. If we do not maintain sufficient 
military power, we are likely to find that a hostile power fills the vacuum 
and once again presents a regional challenge. This in turn will force the 
United States to accept higher levels of defence expenditures at a higher 
level of threat to our security and a higher risk of war (Cheney 1992: 2). 
 
Once more, Cheney presents a scary ultimatum in an argumentative style. The choice is 
to keep spending high, maintain military power while maintaining their ‘advantageous 
position’ (hegemony), or risk a ‘hostile power’ competing or taking over American 
power and dominance. The term ‘hostile powers’ is vague as there is no direct threat at 
the time of this document, and claiming any hostile power could potential develop 
leaves room for maneuver as the threat is undefined. Additionally, a separate argument 
is made that Cheney is actually trying to save the government money by investing now, 
before ‘things get out of hand’. 
 
Wolfowitz, known for his aggressive neoconservative views, particularly in regards to 
military force wrote that: 
 
The use of force cannot be approached in an experimental way, by 
dispatching military personnel to Haiti to withdraw them if they meet 
opposition; or embarking on a hunt for Aideed to abandon if it gets difficult. 
Nor can leadership be exercised simply by going and asking other countries 
for their views (Wolfowitz 1994: 34).  
 
Here he alludes to unilateralism in his statement that ‘leadership cannot be exercised by 
asking other nations for their views’. Clearly, to him, this is not an option for America. 
Additionally, it shows weakness in the ability to lead. He also argues that the use of 
force should be a decisive action (‘not experimental) in reference to Clinton’s track 
record. He advocates that America should have a strong presence in the world. During 
the Clinton years is when the rise of neoconservatism really surged, mainly in 
retaliation to Clinton’s multilateral way of governing. In 1998, Rumsfeld gave a speech 
at the Heritage Foundation and spoke about the future of defence spending: 
 
The U.S. spends only about 3 percent of gross national product on national 
defence, a level below even that of the pre World War II period. This is not 
enough to keep us ahead of other countries in exploiting the revolution in 
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military affairs, in seizing the growing opportunities and meeting the 
mounting requirements in information warfare, and in gathering the 
necessary intelligence in our modern world (Rumsfeld 1998: 13). 
 
Using argumentation, Rumsfeld argues that the current amount spent on military 
defences are not enough to compete with other countries, and will not be enough for the 
United States to capitalize on opportunities. Implicit is the argument that this can pose a 
danger if America is not number one in defence spending as he mentions the ‘mounting 
requirements’ in various types of warfare. Also implicit, is that the United States should 
be number one when it comes to defence spending, not only that it should ‘keep up’ but 
that it should surpass other nations as he says that the current amounts will not keep 
America ahead of others.    
 
A similar argument is seen in Douglas Feith’s views in 2001 when he was appointed 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Before 9/11, but after Bush came to power, he 
presented at the hearing for the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. He said: 
 
If we do not build defenses against these weapons now, hostile powers will 
soon have—or may already have—the ability to strike U.S. and allied cities 
with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. They will have the power to 
hold our people hostage to blackmail and terror. They may secure, in their 
estimation, the capability to prevent us from forming international coalitions 
to challenge their acts of aggression and force us into a truly isolationist 
posture. And they would not even have to use the weapons in their 
possession to affect our behavior and achieve their ends (Feith 2001: 18). 
 
Similar to the fear mongering argumentation seen throughout much of neoconservative 
arguments, Feith’s assertion that not building defences and spending more money now, 
will lead to disaster later. Again, there is talk of ‘hostile powers’, which is vague and 
could be any nation or group. Even more vague is his claim that they could potentially 
use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. To cover all his bases, he asserts that a 
potential hostile power could then potentially use any sort of weapon to attack. The type 
of attack? Again very vague: blackmail, hostage-taking, terror. He also argues that a 
potential international coalition may compete with the United States. So again, the issue 




This threat is not fictional. It is not limited. It is not remote. And it is not 
going to disappear if one or another troublesome regime disappears (Feith 
2001: 23). 
 
Technically, at that point, the threat was fictional, however he claims otherwise. He also 
argues that even if one ‘troublesome’ regime is to disappear, America is still not safe. 
This is important because implicit here is the argument that America can go after any 
regime that poses a threat, and because there are so many ‘hostile’ to America, it leaves 
the door open, as he emphasizes the threat is ‘not limited’. He also frames the issue 
around being ‘American’ and Americans uniting for a common cause. His lexical style 
that ‘we are all Americans’ (seen many times after 9/11) appears in the statement 
below: 
 
This is not a partisan issue. We do not now know whether the President who 
first faces a crisis with a rogue state capable of striking Los Angeles, Detroit 
or New York with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons will be a 
Republican or a Democrat. But we do know that individual will be an 
American. And that is how we too must proceed—not as Republicans, or 
Democrats, but as Americans (Feith 2001: 23). 
 
He argues ‘Americans’ should unite against the hostile enemy – the Other. In an 
argumentative style, he asserts this is not a partisan issue. He also emphasizes once 
more using over-lexicalization the weapons could be of a ‘nuclear, chemical, or 
biological’ nature. Given this, he is arguing for a withdrawal from the ABM Treaty as it 
constrains Americans efforts to combat these hostilities, and argues for a more 
aggressive ‘exploration’ of technologies:  
 
It requires more aggressive exploration of key technologies, particularly 
those that have been constrained by the ABM Treaty. So we plan to build 
incrementally, deploying capabilities as the technology is proven ready, and 
then adding new capabilities over time as they become mature (Feith 2001: 
19). 
 
The plea for a withdrawal and for increases in military spending are made in an 
argumentative style as to emphasize the benefits to America and the dangers if they 
continue on the same path. 
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Military spending and power are within the frame that America should be the 
world’s only superpower. Following this, the argument is that America must spend 
money on the military. The persuasive devices are all warnings of vague hostile or 
potential powers rising, or showing the world the US is weak. Most of the scenarios are 
based on ‘what ifs’, presenting spending as a necessity to fulfill their role. Persuasion 
and argumentation are ways at claims making, and help ‘prove’ a point, as the 
discourses is in the formulation of ‘facts’. However, most of these ‘facts’ are vague, and 
the potential and hostile dangers that have not yet formed, are hardly evidence. No 
imperial power can be a true influence without a strong (if not the strongest) military, 
and therefore, military supremacy goes hand in hand with imperialism.  
 
The themes highlighted in this section by this specific group of influential 
people summarize the major themes which would come to define the Bush Doctrine. 
These measures were not implemented during Clinton’s administration in the 1990s. 
However, the ideas presented in the documents above were implemented under 
President Bush, and promoted through specific discourses that sought to introduce these 
measures to the public as a reaction to the events of 9/11, which will be analyzed in 
Chapter Six. Given the history of these influential people and the critical discourse 
analysis of their key writings in the period preceding 9/11, what can be concluded? It is 
apparent that all of these key players advocated implicitly or in some cases, more 
explicitly for American imperialism. Overtly, they all advocate American hegemony, 
but the fact that they all support unilateralism, and withdrawal from the AMB Treaty for 
example would make apparent that it is a step beyond hegemony, for global domination. 
Arguments for being the sole hegemon are complimented by stating that they should 
clearly be ‘ahead’ of other nations, even preventing them from surpassing the United 
States in any way or even coalescing together to provide any competition. Imperial 
undertones are evident in the framing of US power as ‘unique’, a ‘responsibility’, and a 
‘duty’.  
 
Perhaps what is most telling is the content of the various drafts of the DPG by 
Wolfowitz, Cheney and Khalilzad. These are among the most contentious and direct 
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documents advocating American primacy. Most telling perhaps is that the original 
language was changed after the document had been leaked to the New York Times, 
which tells us two key things. One is that for its time it was ‘too direct’, even too 
aggressive.  The fact it raised so many eyebrows suggests it was something new – a 
departure in some ways from previous foreign policy, where it was evident that the 
influence and ‘rise’ of neoconservatism could be felt. Two, it says something about the 
‘acceptance’ of these policies post 9/11 when they were in fact put into practice (to be 
discussed in chapter six). It makes clear then, that 9/11 acted as a crucial window of 
opportunity for this group of individuals to implement their policies, without as many 
raised eyebrows as 9/11 was enough justification for all.  
 
What else is interesting, is that the language post-9/11 was more emotional, 
whereas the language of these documents are more in an argumentative style, using 
little to no metaphor and rhetorical devices. A more detailed comparison will be made 
after the post-9/11 materials are presented in Chapter Six. Another key finding is that 
the language remains vague. In the post-Cold War period, when the general world 
situation was peaceful, the threats and dangers remained very vague. Several references 
are made to potential ‘hostile’ enemies, or rogue states. Also vague are the weapons that 
may or may not be used: predictions of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons are 
made reference to several times.  
 
Key is the language of warnings throughout these documents. If the United 
States does not do this, then even more dangerous thing may happen. Leaving it vague, 
fears about future and potential enemies, weapons and events are created. The benefit of 
vague language is an open script, while still being able to argue a dangerous scenario. 
This is especially true of the argument for increased military spending, and American 
military supremacy. The solution to all of these dangerous potential situations is an 
increase in military spending and to ensure that America remains the only hegemon. 
Mostly, this means a powerful military presence around the world. The grand strategy in 
the 1990s pointed toward an American imperial power, provided by the unique 
‘moment’ that the Soviet Union fell, leaving America as sole superpower. The 
following section will explore what happened when these neoconservatives and 
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American supremacists came together in a think tank called the Project for the New 
American Century, consolidating their worldviews in a more assertive argument for 
American imperial power.  
 
4.5 Merging of views: The Project for the New American Century & 
the Ideological Basis of Bush’s Foreign Policy 
 
In the late 1990s, the neoconservatives and the American supremacists came 
together to join what is largely regarded as a right wing think tank called the Project for 
the New American Century (PNAC), urging the United States to pursue a more 
aggressive and forward foreign policy. Of the above mentioned individuals, all but Feith 
were members of PNAC (Rumsfeld, Khalilzad, Wolfowitz and Cheney). It was founded 
by William Kristol (son of Irving Kristol) and Robert Kagan, two very outspoken 
neoconservatives whose popular book Present Dangers echoed what the PNAC 
advocated. Many accounts of the ‘neoconservative’ influence on Bush’s foreign policy 
point fingers at PNAC, and thus, much of existing analysis takes PNAC as its starting 
point. However, before PNAC was formed, the members were already advocating for 
similar policies, as seen in the sections above. Hence, it is important to consider that 
1997 is not in fact the beginning point, and therefore the analysis is more thorough 
when considering how the views of those involved came together in the formation of 
this group and how their ideological roots merged into this think tank.  
 
Established in 1997, the themes that are most important to PNAC are pre-emption, 
America’s role as world peacekeeper, large increases in military spending, and ensuring 
that there is no possible rival to America, solidifying America as the most powerful 
nation on earth. The PNAC is concerned with America’s defenses and holds that the 
decrease in military spending would jeopardize America’s role as superpower in the 
world. Dalby writes that  
 
This PNAC blueprint was an explicit attempt to provide continuity with the 
earlier Cheney defence department planning in the first Bush administration. 
As such it provides a loosely consistent set of priorities and a geopolitical 
framework for a grand strategy based on military supremacy against any 
potential state rivals to American power (2006: 39). 
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In other words, these documents suggest a blueprint for American imperialism in the 
21st century. The organization was formed during the Clinton years. However, Clinton 
ran a very different administration and therefore the PNAC did not have much hope in 
him. However, the election of George W. Bush in 2000 opened up many possibilities. 
Many members of PNAC joined the Bush administration and became credible claims 
makers, who constructed news reports (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 624). Additionally, 
many of these people constructed the discourses that were popularized before the 
invasion of Iraq. At least seventeen members of PNAC held positions in the Bush 
Cabinet; some more public positions than others. Among the members who laid down 
the foundation for a new American empire (other than the above mentioned key players) 
were former and current (at the time) governmental officials, including Jeb Bush, 
Bush’s brother. Richard Armitage, another member of PNAC was named Deputy 
Secretary of State, and John Bolton was the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security Affairs, and later became U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations. This was a controversial choice to most people, as John Bolton is known for 
being a ‘far right neoconservative’ who is known for having contempt for the UN and 
international law in general, and his views would suggest he believes in American 
supremacy.  
 
Slowly but surely, other members joined the Bush administration. Elliott 
Abrams, who ranks high up in PNAC was appointed to direct the Global Democracy 
campaign and also appointed to oversee Middle Eastern Policy from his “perch in the 
National Security Council” (Barry 2005). Abrams became one of the Bush 
administration’s highest profile officials, as he later acted as Bush’s envoy to Europe 
and Israel among other responsibilities (Ibid). Other well known officials include 
Richard Perle who became chairman of the board for the Defence policy Board 
Advisory Committee and I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, whose career ended in scandal, was 
Chief of Staff to Vice President Richard Cheney. Project directors William Kristol and 
Robert Kagan also have a long history of involvement in U.S. politics, and their 
influence on both Bush administrations has been significant. William Kristol, son of 
Irving Kristol, was chief of staff to Vice President Dan Quayle during the first Bush 
Administration. He is also a regular on Fox News, and is editor of the Weekly Standard. 
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Robert Kagan is co-founder of PNAC alongside William Kristol. He is a contributing 
editor to the Weekly Standard, a columnist for the Washington Post and has had plenty 
of involvement in the previous American administrations. From 1985-1988, Kagan was 
Deputy for Policy in the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. From 
1984-1985, he was a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and 
principal speechwriter to Secretary of State George P. Schultz. In 1983, he served as 
foreign policy advisor to Congressman Jack Kemp and as Special Assistant to the 




PNAC was eventually ‘shut down’ in 2006, into the second term of the Bush 
presidency. The reason for this, as cited by former Executive Director of the think tank 
was that their mission was accomplished, “we felt at the time that there were flaws in 
American foreign policy, that it was neo-isolationist. We tried to resurrect a Reaganite 
policy. Our view has been adopted” (Reynolds 2006). Although PNAC is no longer, its 
influence and effects can be traced back to the members who comprised it. Their major 
document, released in 2000, was much more open than the official policy documents of 
the 1990s. Here, the imperial American dream is far more overt. The final section is a 
critical discourse analysis of the PNAC documents that can be understood as a merging 
of the neoconservatives and American supremacist views which make up the 
underpinnings of Bush foreign policy 
 
There are four main principles outlined by PNAC, which are as follows: 1) 
defend the American homeland, 2) fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous 
major theatre wars, 3) perform the “constabulary” duties associated with shaping the 
security environment in critical regions and 4) transform U.S. forces to exploit the 
“revolution in military affairs” (Donnelly 2000: v). It is specified that the organization 
seeks to build upon a defence strategy outlined by the Cheney Defence Department 
towards the end of Bush Senior’s administration (Ibid: ii). These themes are then 
echoed by what came to be known as the Bush Doctrine, and written into policy in 
documents like the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defence Review in 
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2001 and 2002. The following is a critical discourse analysis on the documents by 
PNAC exemplifying imperial roots in foreign policy.  
 
Ensuring no rival to American Power 
The deterrence of any rival to American power was a theme seen in the 
documents in the preceding section. With the coming together of the two ‘strands’ of 
Bush’s influence in the Project for the New American Century, the themes continue, 
and at time become more overt. Importantly, the issue continued to be framed within the 
context of America as the sole superpower, and unique role to protect the peace and 
remain as global leader. Because some time had now passed since the end of the Cold 
War, the frames are mainly surrounding American military superiority and the role of 
America to be leader of the world. 
 
In a book called Present Dangers published by two leading member of PNAC, 
listed under the PNAC publications list, they openly argue for an aggressive American 
hegemony. In this first passage, interestingly, not only is American hegemony promoted, 
but it is also framed in such a way that it is actually welcome by the world:  
 
Most of the world's major powers welcome U.S. global involvement and 
prefer America's benevolent hegemony to the alternatives  (Kristol and 
Kagan 1996: 21). 
Further more, they argue that, 
 
American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of 
peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American foreign 
policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as 
possible. To achieve this goal, the United States needs a neo- Reaganite 
foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence (Kristol and 
Kagan 1996: 23). 
 
So the argument presents no alternative, in fact. They argue that the only reliable 
defense option against crisis and a breakdown of world peace is for American 
hegemony to be maintained. This means that there should be no competition, leaving 
America as the sole hegemon. The joint argument is made here for military supremacy, 
American hegemony and ensuring there is no rival as they imply this in the statement 
America is the only reliable power.  
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The passage below, again taken from Kagan and Kristol’s article: 
 
But the enormous disparity between U.S. military strength and that of any 
potential challenger is a good thing for America and the world. After all, 
America's world role is entirely different from that of the other powers 
(Kristol and Kagan 1996: 26). 
 
Similar to the first quote, they also argue here that the disparities between militaries is 
not only good for America, but good for the world. They imply that the world should 
desire an American hegemon. Once more, the argument is framed around America’s 
‘unique role’ as is implied in the last sentence.  In 2000, when PNAC’s key publication 
was released, it opened with the statement that there should only be one superpower, 
unchallenged, and that should be America: 
 
At present the United States faces no global rival. America’s grand strategy 
should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the 
future as possible (Donnelly 2000: i). 
 
Additionally, stated is the need to: 
 
deter the rise of a great power competitor as one of the main military 
missions (Donnelly 2000: 2). 
 
In one of the more blunt statements, they plainly argue that America should remain sole 
superpower, additionally ensuring no power is to emerge as competition. This is made 
as an argument for a main military mission; again linking the two together. The lexical 
style is consistently that American hegemony is good; it is always presented in a 
positive light for America, and for the world.  
 
In language very similar to that of the leaked 1992 DPG, the PNAC plainly state their 
position that no rival is to emerge, posing a challenge to the United States. It is clear 
that the neoconservative position on foreign policy it to maintain dominance, while 




Today, that same security can only be acquired at the “retail” level, by 
deterring or, when needed, by compelling regional foes to act in ways that 
protect American interests and principles (Donnelly 2000: 3). 
 
In argumentative language, the authors suggest that ensuring there is no rival would 
ensure the protection of American interests. Their arguments are always put in context 
of what would happen if they ‘do not’ do something. The authors argue that the reason 
no great power has risen to challenge the States has been due to its overwhelming 
military presence in the world. Therefore, if America wants to retain this position, they 
maintain that it must continue to project its military power:  
 
Up to now, they have been deterred from doing so by the capability and 
global presence of American military power. But, as that power declines, 
relatively and absolutely, the happy conditions that follow from it will be 
inevitably undermined (Donnelly 2000: i). 
 
Here, ensuring there is no rival to America is being framed within the larger issue that 
this has only been successful because they have had military might to back American 
political power up. Without this, they argue that competitors may rise, and the goal of 
the US should be to ensure this does not happen. As in the first section of documents, 
the arguments are framed around American unique role in the world, and American 
supremacy – emphasizing no rival is to emerge. A difference in the PNAC documents is 
that often the discourse is more direct in some ways, as they are a think tank and not 
responsible to the public, the same way official government discourse (like that of the 
1990s) is. The next section will continue the theme from the first section on American’s 
job to protect the peace.  
 
America’s job to protect the peace 
Throughout the 1990s, we saw that the ‘neoconservatives’ and the American 
supremacists both argued that it was America’s duty, job or unique role to protect the 
peace. When PNAC was formed, their views carried forward, and protecting the peace 
was central to PNAC discourse. 
 
Stated in the opening remarks of their key document, Rebuilding America’s Defenses in 
2000, they write: 
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From its inception, the Project has been concerned with the decline in the 
strength of America’s defenses, and in the problems this would create for 
the exercise of American leadership around the globe and, ultimately, for 
the preservation of peace (Donnelly 2000: i). 
 
Behind most of what the PNAC argue, is always an argument involving a warning. In 
this instance, they argue that the decline in the strength of the US military will cause 
problems for American leadership and, ultimately, they tie this to the preservation of 
world peace.  They use argumentation in most their discourse while framing issues 
around American leadership. Below, a similar point is made: 
 
…we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership, of the 
costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in 
maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East… 
(Donnelly 2000: preface). 
 
Once more the issue is framed within the ‘natural’ role of American global leadership, 
and its emphasis on that leadership’s necessity to maintain global peace and security. It 
is presented in an argumentative manner to imply that the responsibility of this great 
power of world leader, requires America to protect the peace. Several more references 
to the vital role of America to maintain peace are made throughout the publication: 
 
America’s global leadership, and its role as the guarantor of the current 
great-power peace, relies upon the safety of the American homeland; the 
preservation of a favorable balance of power in Europe, the Middle East and 
surrounding energy- producing region, and East Asia; and the general 
stability of the international system of nation-states relative to terrorists, 
organized crime, and other ‘non-state actors’ (Donnelly 2000: 5). 
 
Here, without question, they title America as ‘the guarantor of the current great-power 
peace’. This is a primary example of a taken for granted belief, as it is presented as a 
given. Again, the issues are being framed around America’s global leadership and 
responsibility as a common sense understanding of how the international system works.  
 
The statement below demonstrates the implicit belief in America’s role in protecting 
world peace. As the quote begins with “since”, it implies the belief that this is a fact: 
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Since today’s peace is the unique product of American pre-eminence, a 
failure to preserve that pre-eminence allows others an opportunity to shape 
the world in ways antithetical to American interests and principles 
(Donnelly 2000: 73). 
 
This is an important statement because it implies firstly that the peace enjoyed in the 
world at present is a not only a product of American involvement, but American 
preeminence. Second, using argumentation, it plainly states that if global dominance is 
not maintained, other powers may try and ‘shape the world’ to suit their interests, which 
runs the risk that they may not be in line with American interests. This is the typical 
fashion of much of the statements the PNAC makes: in the tone of a ‘warning’. In this 
case, ‘if America doesn’t remain as sole superpower’, then the peace could be 
compromised, and worse yet – another superpower may emerge.  This statement is 
loaded with assumptions about American power, its role in the world, its right to 
preeminence, and naturalizes the expectation that American interests should dominate 
the world, while preventing others from taking over. 
 
Not only is the point about protecting peace, but using American military force in 
order to do this. These statements attempt to legitimize American military involvement 
all over the globe under the guise of world peace. Maintaining peace is correlated to 
having a strong military, and subsequently if peace is to continue, more money must be 
spent on military capacities. There is also mention of ‘potential’ or ‘future’ threats, and 
‘very different’ challenges – all using vague language. Militarily preparation is 
essential, even taking pre-emptive measures to secure the peace. 
 
Keeping the American peace requires the U.S. military to undertake a broad 
array of missions today and rise to very different challenges tomorrow, but 
there can be no retreat from these missions without compromising American 
leadership and the benevolent order it secures. This is the choice we face 
(Donnelly 2000: 75). 
 
Framing a policy as a peace-keeping measure is far more persuasive to not only those 
inside government, but to the wider public. This was especially important after 9/11, 
and these themes will reemerge in later parts of this thesis to provide rationale for 
imperial policies implemented after 2001 under the Bush presidency.  Below, the 
warning is sent again with argumentation: 
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The current American peace will be short-lived if the United States becomes 
vulnerable to rogue powers with small, inexpensive arsenals of ballistic 
missiles and nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction. We 
cannot allow North Korea, Iran, Iraq or similar states to undermine 
American leadership, intimidate American allies or threaten the American 
homeland itself (Donnelly 2000: 75). 
 
Again, the issue is that the American peace will vanish if money isn’t spent on military 
and defense.  It is made clear that an alternative to American power should not rise and 
the argument is that this can jeopardize world peace, and American interests. Their final 
warning is that: 
 
The blessings of the American peace, purchased at fearful cost and a century 
of effort, should not be so trivially squandered (Donnelly 2000: 75). 
 
Here, it is framed as the ‘blessing’ of American peace. Implicit is that the world should 
be thankful in a way for the peace the American has given it. Following this, a final 
warning that this ‘blessing’ should not be squandered. Assumed is that America is 
needed to maintain this peace.  
 
The majority of the arguments made through these discourses are the necessity 
for American leadership in maintaining the peace, protecting America and protecting 
others around the world. Much of the language is presented through argumentation, 
with a constant warning tone, ridden with warnings of what can happen if America is 
not there to protect the world. In the 1990s, the documents focused on the main event, 
the immediate end of the Cold War. Now that some time has passed, the discourse from 
these documents is framed not only within Post Cold War context, but with the added 
provisions that if America wants to continue its success, it should: be dominant, protect 
world peace, spend money on the military, and so on. There is a slight change in the 
frame, with the same message coming through – American dominance. The next section 







Whereas pre-emption was a more contentious topic in the early 1990s, and it 
was difficult to advocate through official policy documents, and especially after the 
backlash of the leaked DPG. However, by the late 1990s when PNAC was formed, their 
publications were far more overt. Largely unknown to the public, their publications did 
not cause alarm. But those in policy circles were listening; as many members of PNAC 
went on to take up position in the Bush government. On the PNAC website, under their 
list of publications, a mixture of documents can be found. The major theme is American 
military dominance. 
 
In a 1998 article, Gary Schmitt, former project director, wrote that: 
 
The simple but critical point is that size counts. It matters especially when 
the US military is expected to deter aggression around the globe, maintain a 
presence to provide stability in various regions, handle smaller 
contingencies such as Bosnia, and fight a major conventional war if and 
when called upon (Schmitt 1998: 53). 
 
Here, Schmitt is hinting at pre-emption. Again, the frame of the situation is the 
expectation that global security is America’s responsibility. The lexical choice that 
implies pre-emption is that the United States is ‘expected to deter aggression’. Not only 
should it defend itself when attacked, but it should actively deter threats before they can 
reach America. He follows this in the same publication at a later point by arguing: 
 
As the dominant power in the world, it need not sit passively on its hands, 
trusting that other countries will remain friendly to its interests. An 
improvement over previous defence studies, the QDR report addresses not 
only potential threats but how the United States- by forward deployment, 
military operation other than war, and alliances – can mould the 
international environment (Schmitt 1998: 55). 
 
Again, first his argument is framed around America as the ‘dominant power’, which in 
itself justifies a variety of military actions. The words used in this passage that America 
cannot be ‘passive’, addressing ‘potential threats’ and ‘forward deployment’ all suggest 
that Schmitt like those in PNAC are promoting pre-emption as a strategy. Here however, 
he uses argumentation by again sending a warning that passive behaviour, and too much 
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trust in others can lead to a crisis in which the US is not in control of the ‘international 
environment’.  
 
In the same year, another publication cited on the PNAC website, written by Schmitt 
and Kagan maintain that:  
 
…although we may not know precisely when the new threats will emerge, 
we should know for a certainty that we have entered a new strategic 
environment. In that environment, the number of states trying to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them will grow, and 
the threat posed by such weapons will become increasingly standard feature 
of international life (Kagan and Schmitt 1998: 21). 
 
In the above passage, the authors keep the language vague— the ‘precise’ time the 
threats will emerge is unknown. But they advocate that there will be some sort of 
weapons of mass destruction. All this is done in an argumentative warning tone to set 
up the following argument: 
 
As the QDR points out, adversaries can exploit our vulnerability in order to 
deter or, if it comes to that, defeat an otherwise vastly superior American 
military force (Schmitt and Kagan 1998: 22). 
 
Here, the authors warn that if they do not step up their defences, this will leave America 
in a vulnerable position, again using argumentation. Ultimately, they argue that either 
the US can choose to wait until a disaster occurs (by coping), or, as they make evidently 
clear, make the first move: 
 
Either we are going to be endlessly trying to “cope” with problems that are 
increasingly difficult to cope with—to “manage” situations that become 
inherently less manageable—or we are going to move aggressively to shape 
the international environment (Weekly Standard Editorial Board 1998: 8). 
 
The ultimatum is pre-emption – ‘move aggressively to shape the international 
environment’ – implies that waiting until threats reach America’s shores is not an option, 
and the imperative is instead to take the first step to prevent those threats from fully 
emerging. Finally, in the bluntest of arguments, in the preface of the 2000 document, 
the authors open by affirming that,  
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The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to 
shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they 
become dire. The history of the past century should have taught us to 
embrace the cause of American leadership (Donnelly 2000: preface). 
 
Above, the argument for pre-emption is made much more explicitly than in the DPG of 
the early 1990s. It is clear in the wording to “shape circumstances before crises emerge”. 
Again, implying that a crisis could occur, and arguing that the situation must be 
controlled before it can fully materialize, pre-emption is a central focus. In the same 
paragraph, they also argue the need to “meet threats before they become dire”. As 
always, the tone is of a warning, the potential for a situation to become “dire”, if action 
is not taken. The idea of pre-emption is presented mainly in terms of the dangers that 
could exist if the United States does not consider pre-emption. The language is vague; 
filled with ‘potential threats’ and various ‘crises’ and the need to shape ‘circumstances’. 
If not, they argue that the US remains ‘vulnerable’, and thus ‘forward’ deployment is 
needed. All of this culminates in the need to ensure military power to sustain American 
global dominance– the primary goal of the project’s advocacy. The next section will 
focus on military spending and power. 
 
Military spending and Power 
Throughout a majority of their publications, much of their rationale for defence 
spending increases are technical in nature (number of aircrafts, personnel required, type 
of equipment, etc). However, the examples provided are those where authors make 
arguments that tie the demand for increases in spending to broader arguments for 
imperial grand strategy.  
 
The first example is from the opening pages of the 2000 document, Rebuilding 
America’s Defenses: 
 
In sum, the 1990s have been a “decade of defense neglect.” This leaves the 
next president of the United States with an enormous challenge: he must 
increase military spending to preserve American geopolitical leadership, or 
he must pull back from the security commitments that are the measure of 
America’s position as the world’s sole superpower and the final guarantee 
of security, democratic freedoms and individual political rights (Donnelly 
2000:4). 
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Most of the material by PNAC regarding military spending is blunt and straightforward. 
In the above example, using argumentation, they clearly state that increasing military 
power is directly linked to the preservation of American global power. Not only that but 
their lexical style in choice of words that not only is America the sole superpower, but 
also the ‘final guarantee’ of security, democracy and political rights. The responsibility 
to preserve the peace is brought up in a way that requires the need for military might to 
do so:  
 
And in fact, over the past decade, the failure to establish a security strategy 
responsive to new realities and to provide adequate resources for the full 
range of missions needed to exercise U.S. global leadership has placed the 
American peace at growing risk (Donnelly 2000: iv). 
 
In the above passage, again in a warning-like tone, the argument made is that it is the 
fault of the government for not spending an adequate amount on military that has put 
America at ‘risk’, and that as a result their global leadership role may diminish. As most 
of their material, it is always presented as an ultimatum, and warning, prefaced by 
dangerous situation that may occur as a result of non-action. This point is made again 
explicitly in the following: 
 
American peace is to be maintained, and expanded, it must have a secure 
foundation on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence (Donnelly 2000: 4). 
 
Again, in an argumentative tone, peace is being threatened if America does not maintain 
military superiority, which of course means high spending. Again below, they argue 
that to translate US pre-eminence into results, they must maintain military strength: 
 
American land power remains the essential link in the chain that translates 
U.S. military supremacy into American geopolitical preeminence (Donnelly 
2000: 30). 
 
Below they argue that military power is linked to political results. Here it is implied that 
policies can be secured (forcefully if needed) through military power.  
 
the need for ground maneuvers to achieve decisive political results endures 
(Donnelly 2000: 30). 
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Again, in warning-like argumentation, the project argues that America currently lacks 
the ability to achieve these political response, stressing once more the importance of the 
military: 
 
Conversely, an American military force that lacks the ability to employ 
ground forces that can survive and maneuver rapidly on future battlefields 
will deprive U.S. political leaders of a decisive tool of diplomacy (Donnelly 
2000: 30). 
 
Any serious effort at transformation must occur within the larger framework 
of U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets. 
The United States cannot simply declare a “strategic pause” while 
experimenting with new technologies and operational concepts. Nor can it 
choose to pursue a transformation strategy that would decouple American 
and allied interests (Donnelly 2000: 50). 
 
 
In the second paragraph especially, they refer to larger national security issues as 
interlinked to military preeminence. Once more, the absence of a prepared military 
would result in problems for the US. In an argumentative style once more, they focus on 
the negative effects this would have to American and allied interests. Similar, the 
statement below focusing on the link between American military preeminence and 
overall American grand strategy: 
 
in general, to maintain American military preeminence that is consistent 
with the requirements of a strategy of American global leadership (Donnelly 
2000: 51). 
 
Consistent with the majority of their publications, the need to increase military spending, 
and maintain levels that allow American primacy are framed within the fact of America 
as sole superpower, and its ‘job’ to protect the peace, ensure there is no rival, and fulfill 
their unique role. All of this, they argue, cannot be achieved without military 
preeminence. In turn, high levels of defense spending are needed to maintain America’s 
role in the world. They argue that military power is directly linked to American grand 
strategy, and that without it, their political objectives may be jeopardized. Again, the 
warning of a world where America is not sole superpower is presented as a dangerous 
place – more dangerous than present- in which there is chaos and crisis.  
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What has a critical discourse analysis told us about the Project for the New 
American Century and its influence on President Bush’s foreign policy? The difference 
here, and in the previous section is that the PNAC is where the American supremacists 
and neoconservatives come together, largely identifying uniformly as ‘right wing’ in the 
representation of the think tank. A few important points to note are that first, the 
language is more explicit in some areas. For example, whereas pre-emption was far 
more contentious in the earlier documents (such as the DPG), here it is more overt. This 
is likely because as a think tank, it does not have to answer to the entire population. In 
the case of the DPG, or any official government document, language is at times more 
guarded, and more carefully chosen. Because of this fact, it is conceivable that the 
language is more overt.  
 
Second, with the exception of Feith, all the major influential people mentioned 
in this chapter were signatories and members of PNAC. This means that after they left 
government posts, and prior to entering the Bush administration, they were publishing 
their ideas and had a clear vision for American grand strategy.  
 
Third, as with the previous section, the critical discourse analysis unveils that 
the principles behind the Bush Doctrine, and the War on Terror were formulated long 
before 9/11. They were not a reaction to events, but rather a window of opportunity to 
position these ideas better to be accepted as policy. As with the previous section, the 
language is less emotional than that of the documents and speeches post-9/11, and the 
discourses are largely presented in a form of argumentation. Where as the discourses 
after 9/11 used the attacks as ‘proof’ of what could happen if aggressive foreign policy 
was not pursued, the documents presented here are warning of vague and future threats 
(perhaps alluding to a 9/11 type event) and frame the issue around the end of the Cold 
War, and America’s sole super power status. Post-9/11, there is the new frame of the 
‘9/11 prism’, which will be explored in the next chapter.  
 
4.6 The Beginnings of the Bush Government 
What September 2001 provided was a rationale to implement an agenda that had 
its beginnings in the 1990s. It was Krauthammer who urged for an “America Unbound”, 
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and after 9/11, with a group of influential ‘neoconservatives’ (although the term is used 
loosely to refer to the people mentioned above) made that possible (Daalder and 
Lindsay 2005: 12). Bush had outlined some of the implemented policies on his 
campaign trail, and parts of it were in fact put into place when he took office. However, 
the ‘revolution’ observed in foreign policy came largely after, and was attributed to 9/11 
(Ibid). 
 
Daalder and Lindsay summarize Bush’s revolution in two main beliefs. First was that in 
a new and dangerous world, the best if not the only way to ensure security was if 
America sheds the ‘constraints’ imposed on it by friends and allies alike; second, that 
America’s position in the world made it an appealing target to countries hostile to the 
West and therefore America could not count on others to protect it (Ibid). These ‘beliefs’ 
led to what is known and previously discussed as the Bush Doctrine.  
 
       Cheney and Rumsfeld no doubt had the largest role behind the personal and 
intellectual influences of Bush’s view on foreign policy, especially after 9/11. However, 
this influential group of individuals above all had a very important role to play in the 
new direction of American foreign policy after 2001. In the summer of 2001, months 
before the 9/11 attacks, in his first public appearance, Rumsfeld declared that the 
current strategy at the time was not working and instead he called for the US forces to 
be able to swiftly defeat one enemy, and hold a second enemy at bay (Graham 2009: 
243). This was actually a ‘softer’ approach from the previous strategy that would 
require the military to win two simultaneous wars. However, a new requirement was 
added that said the US homeland should be defended. Like many statements to follow it, 
it was vague and only those in the inner circle of the Pentagon really knew what this 
meant (Ibid). Rumsfeld also made evident signs of a more aggressive US military stance 
by dissuading enemies from “even thinking of developing certain weapons or taking 
menacing action” (Ibid). He was setting the scene for a profound shift towards a 
restructured armed forces and new weapons choices, and with 9/11, his hopes had 
become a reality. His major role immediately after 9/11 was to educate opinion leaders 
on how the world had “changed” and how the increase in spending was necessary in 
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order to implement Bush’s plans after 2001 in the “new” and “dangerous” world (Ibid: 
269). 
 
Cheney claimed in his own memoir that America was embarking on a 
“fundamentally new policy” (Cheney 2011: 332). He said no longer was America 
hunting down individual people or terrorist cells, it had to be bigger, bringing down 
entire networks, organizations and nations who support them (Ibid). He claimed, as 
Rumsfeld had, and the world would hear Bush say, “it was all new”, and they (the inner 
policy circle) knew it was going to be a long war (Ibid). Cheney’s influence should not 
be underestimated. Subhawong writes that, “his influence in the Bush Administration 
touches everything from energy concerns and foreign policy to editing tax proposals 
and refereeing cabinet disputes” (2008: 282). In Cheney’s view, the attacks of 2001 
created an ‘urgent necessity’ of granting the President ‘unrestrained authority’ to defend 
the nation (Montgomery 2009: x). In his eyes, this was a rationale to use any and all 
means at the government’s disposal, which fit in with his ideological thoughts on 
American supremacy. These thoughts would come to greatly influence Bush himself 
and the policies implemented thereafter.  
 
Cheney and Rumsfeld’s desire for a more assertive American presence in the 
world, coupled with increase in military spending that would allow them to project 
greater force was acknowledged by Bush after 9/11. Additionally, the ‘emergency’ 
measures that were put into place after September 11th left the Presidential power nearly 
unchecked, largely due to Cheney’s influence in the matter. Wolfowitz’s influence was 
also evident. Immerman writes that while Cheney was advocating that America save the 
world from itself, Wolfowitz believed that the Untied States had the capability to 
remake the world (Immerman 2010: 219). A worldview that he held personally since a 
young boy, Wolfowitz started a campaign to actualize the vision of America he always 
believed in; an image of a nation with moral purpose and “unassailable military might” 
(Ibid: 216). 
 
Following the same neoconservative thought, Feith indicated that after 9/11, 
America could not count on its security by being defensive, and there was no practical 
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alternative than to pursue and offensive strategy. He said, “we have to reach out and hit 
the terrorists where they reside, plan and train, and not wait to try to defeat their plans 
while they are executing them on U.S. soil” (Feith 2003: 3). Feith actually compared 
Political Islam to Communism, accusing it of promising a ‘utopia’ it cannot deliver, 
creating a uniform enemy for America (Ibid: 6). 
The invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein was something all of 
these individuals advocated for in the past; and in a serious way during the 1990s. 
Wolfowitz had a special preoccupation with unseating Saddam, as did Khalilzad, which 
is made blatantly clear from their article ‘Overthrow Him’, written in 1997. 
Wolfowitz’s top priority after the 9/11 attacks was to rid the world of Saddam Hussein 
(Immerman 2010: 221). He believed that publicly calling for his removal would send 
the right signals to the world that America would not be tolerant of those who reject US 
values and primacy (Ibid). Rumsfeld has also ordered that a link be found between 
Saddam and 9/11 minutes after the attacks. Cheney also made clear his position after the 
ball got rolling on Iraq that Saddam Hussein has ‘perfected’ cheating and deception 
tactics and there would never be any assurance he would comply with UN resolutions 
even if they were imposed (Daalder and Lindsay 2005: 136). The combination of 
neoconservative policies, coupled with the ideological drive of Rumsfeld and Cheney 
can be seen in the documents of the Project for the New American Century, which was 




Critical geopolitics asks us to question the world, and especially those beliefs we 
take for granted about our geopolitical environment. Critical discourse analysis provides 
a way to methodologically do that. As it is evidenced through this analysis, the language 
is carefully constructed to frame American imperialism in several important ways. One 
is that imperialism is essential; American dominance is needed, to protect interests and 
keep America safe. Two, that is actually favoured, and better for the rest of the world 
leading to a peaceful and secure international environment. Three, is that it is a duty; 
America’s role as the benevolent hegemon is not asked for, but needed as it has ‘no 
choice’ as superpower to take responsibility and fulfill its destiny.  
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American imperial power is presented within two key frames: the end of the 
Cold War, and its unique role in the world. These two are the main frames in which the 
rest of the narratives fall. The major ‘themes’ or discourses create a parallel narrative 
that is evident once highlighted. The discourses in the first part of the chapter pertaining 
to the documents of the 1990s, and those of the late 1990s and early year 2000 when 
PNAC was formed are nearly identical. So are too the discourses in Chapter Six. This is 
of importance as it shows a continuation in foreign policy thought from the early 1990s 
through the presidency of George W. Bush.  
 
The key themes or discourses highlighted are all indicative of imperial power. 
There are clear policy objectives that not only should America remain the global 
hegemon, but that no other should come to rival it, the high spending on military, 
unilateral actions and its monopoly on ‘protecting the peace’. This means America can 
decide who is dangerous and who is not. For example, one of the quotes directly states 
that the United States is the only reliable power to do this.  
 
Critical discourse analysis has highlighted that language is power. Our 
understanding and perceptions of our geopolitical environment are shaped in large part 
by how it is presented to us. This will become even more important after 9/11, which 
allowed a window for these policies to be implemented. Critical geopolitics gives us a 
lens in which to ask these questions, and consider their implications. The next chapter 
will focus on how perceptions of a changed world were reason to implement new 
policies. The most important point that the continuation of policy ideas and discourse 
shows, is that the policies after 9/11 were not a reaction to the attacks, but were framed 
as such, with a realization that the same ideas existed beforehand. The significance of 
the next chapter will be the frames that were set up to create the perceptions of a ‘new’ 
era, a changed world that can never be the same again, the ‘new’ threats, dangers and 









There is no use in pretending that all we know about time and space, or 




The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new 
evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We acted 
because we saw the evidence in a dramatic new light—through the prism of 
our experience on 9/11 -Rumsfeld 2003. (Sparke 2007: 342) 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 Key to the analysis of how the Bush administration attempted to legitimize a 
type of American imperialism, are specific perceptions of the changing nature of threat, 
danger and fear, that were present after 9/11. Geared mainly at an American audience, 
but received internationally, perceptions about the changing nature of geography and 
geopolitics aimed to gather support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as 
domestic measures that were implemented, such as the Patriot Act, and other ‘tougher’ 
regulations at home, to combat terrorism. Many have argued whether or not these were 
‘new wars’, or if Al Qaeda, or Iraq and Saddam Hussein were ‘real’ threats that would 
warrant action.  However, whether or not the threats were real, or whether geography 
had changed, or whether the security of the United States was truly at risk, are not the 
most important elements in analyzing the legitimacy that the US administration was 
seeking. What is perhaps more important to assess, is how the perception that the wars 
were new, that the threats had changed, that the geopolitical landscape had morphed 
into the unknown, warranted an aggressive and assertive response from the Americans.  
 
 As Toal states, “geopolitics is a discursive event and a cultural production; modes 
of writing and representation, used to convey public messages (political or not) are of 
necessity the media through which the geopolitical discourse circulates” (Toal as quoted 
in Debrix 2008: 11). Therefore, critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a methodology, is 
complementary to the application of critical geopolitics as a tool for analysis. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, CDA is both an interdisciplinary method, and a tool by 
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which to understand how language and discourses shape our world. It provides a critical 
framework to understand how power is (re-)produced, embodying ideological 
assumptions that meaningfully shape how we understand the world around us, in our 
everyday lives. Of specific importance in this chapter is ‘framing’. Framing is the way 
that discourses are used or organized according to a certain viewpoint or perspective. It 
is an exercise in the specific selection (and exclusion) of language to produce certain 
meanings. In the second part of this chapter, the CDA method will be expanded upon, 
and applied to the discourses focused on the changing nature of danger, and perceptions 
of a new world after 9/11. 
 
 The first section of this chapter will focus on the work of critical geopolitics on 
the changing nature of danger, geopolitical fears, and media ‘tabloid’ geopolitics. The 
changing geography of danger covers the fear of the unknown Other and future fears. 
This is an analysis of how those in CGP looked at how Othering and the perceptions of 
the fear of the unknown, created a narrative for geopolitical fears. Tabloid geopolitics 
covers the media and ‘pop culture’ elements of how discourses move from 
administrative levels to media politics, and how the population is affected by these 
discourses. Following this, the second section will be a critical discourse analysis. In 
part two of this chapter, attention is focused on the days, weeks and months following 
9/11 in the year 2001. This is where the majority of framing took place, setting up 
notions of a dangerous world, a new enemy, and a need to rearrange American life. This 
in turn, laid down much of the discursive framework used for the justification of the 
wars in Afghanistan, and in particular, Iraq.  
 
5.2 The Changing Geography of Danger  
The production of a story of how the geography of danger had changed, was 
being put into place quickly after 9/11, as the emotions and fears of that day were fresh 
in the minds of the international community, and above all, the American people. The 
Rumsfeld quote at the beginning of this chapter illustrates perfectly what this chapter 
seeks to make sense of. It is actually the last line that is applicable beyond the war in 
Iraq, to domestic policy: “through the prism of our experience on 9/11” (Rumsfeld 
2003). It is this ‘prism’ that was constructed through perceptions of a changed world, 
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filled with unknown unknowns, new and unforeseeable danger and threats. As Sparke 
argues, this was formulated in such a way that it created a script or a sales pitch, geared 
at the American public (2007: 341). When the geography of danger is understood to 
have changed, what does this mean for the spaces that are impacted? How does this 
change the way we think about, and respond to the ‘new’ geographical dangers? 
 
 What made 9/11 particularly important to Americans was the spectacular way in 
which it happened, on live TV, for everyone to see. It has been claimed that the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon are important elements in what has been called the 
‘American imagination’ (Dittmer 2005: 634). They were therefore particularly 
important to the script that resulted from the attacks. Since the attacks, Ground Zero has 
often been labeled ‘sacred space’, in the media especially, as has New York City 
(Dittmer 2005: 634). After 9/11, the phrase “We’re all New Yorkers now” (Ibid) was 
often heard in interviews in the media, as the entire nation rallied behind their sacred 
city.  
 
Perceptions are arguably very powerful. Ulrich Beck, in his writing on the Risk 
Society, states that we now live in a word where risks, “whether they are imagined, 
potential or happening now”, are part of a society that is “unpredictable, uncontrollable 
and ultimately incommunicable” (Beck 1999: 41). Rachel Pain states that actually, Beck 
is not indicating that the world is more dangerous per se (2009: 469), but that risk is 
debounded in “spatial, temporal and social terms”, so that the central issue becomes 
how to control the uncontrollable, in everything from politics to everyday life (Beck 
1999). Bush used precisely this storyline, making constant references to how America 
could be attacked anywhere at anytime, perpetuating fear among many of the American 
population. 
 
Before 9/11, many Americans were under the assumption that they lived in 
some sort of exempt state where such fears did not exist. It was argued by the Bush 
administration that 9/11 ‘changed’ all of this (i.e. the new ‘prism’ that everything can 
now be seen through), and today, as Robin maintains, the “fear of terrorism, 
orchestrated and manipulated by the powerful, is being used to reorganize the structure 
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of power in American society” (Pain 2009: 470). The attacks, and the realization that 
terrorism is something that merges national and transnational concerns, resulted in 
several geographical changes. The language had also changed to reiterate the change in 
danger.  One of the most blatant ways in which the Bush administration made it clear 
that they saw the geography of danger had changed, was in creating the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).  In a “monumental act of restructuring the architecture of 
US government”, the creation of the DHS consolidated twenty-two government 
agencies together, with over 180,000 employees, to ensure that efforts “to defend this 
country are comprehensive and united”, as Bush put it (Mabee 2007: 386). Katz argues 
that the very formation of the DHS, with little to no popular objection as an “uber 
security apparatus”, despite the fact that in fact such an institution goes against some of 
America’s more ‘sacred myths about itself’, exposes what she called ‘banal nationalism’ 
(2007: 351). In turn, she says this leads to ‘banal terrorism’, which produces a sense of 
terror and fear in an ‘everyday way’. She writes, 
 
The common (non)sense constructed and assumed around terrorism (and 
terrorists) in all sorts of banal ways can be hailed at moments of crisis to 
authorize such things as a suspension of civil liberties or an open-ended and 
clearly never-ending “War on Terrorism” (Katz 2007: 350). 
 
Katz argues that banal terrorism aids in creating the binaries that we come to take for 
granted; i.e. ‘we’ are threatened by ‘them’, ‘they’ hate ‘us’, or ‘we’ share a homeland  
(Ibid: 351). A further step that is problematic, is how these notions legitimize and 
authorize actions to be taken against ‘them’. Katz argues that not only does this produce 
xenophobic discourses, but it allows us to channel threat and danger. Even more 
problematic, is the way in which these discourses then lead to ideas about “duty” and 
“honour” which are exhibited in legislation, such as the Patriot Act (Ibid). The Patriot 
Act is not the only controversial legislation with damaging effects on civil liberties. 
However, it is the most cited and well known example, due to the extreme nature of the 
bill. There were several others. Among them, passed immediately after 9/11, was the 
President’s Surveillance Program (PSP), which greatly expanded the National Security 
Agency’s (NSA) authority. The legislation permitted the NSA to conduct electronic 
surveillance within the USA, without an order from the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC), providing certain ‘conditions’ were met (Offices of 
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Inspectors General of the Department of Defense Department et al. 2009)4. A second 
example is the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, mainly 
targeted at airport security measures, but may be better known for its provision allowing 
fully body scans at airports (United States Congress 2004). Another example, is the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA 2008 
amendments), which although passed towards the end of Bush’s Presidency, allowed 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to authorize the electronic communications 
of Americans’ without a warrant5 (United States Congress 2008: 3). This particular 
sense of patriotism is dangerous. Moreover, the American ‘homeland’ is given a 
different meaning through the discourses in which Othering takes place. The emphasis 
of ‘terrorism’ and ‘homeland security’ together, created the perception that everything 
had changed. In the new world that we now live (i.e. post 9/11), terrorism is of key 
concern, and therefore defending the ‘homeland’ is of utmost importance. Mabee argues 
that,  
 
the articulation of international and transnational terrorism as a key issue in 
US security policy, as a result of the 9/ 11 attacks, has not only led to a 
policy rethink, it has also included a bureaucratic shift within the US, 
showing a re-thinking of the role of borders within US security policy 
(2007: 386). 
 
As a result, not only was international security and foreign policy reordered, but the 
state itself became securitized, on a domestic level as well. More policing on the streets 
of America itself, laws and legislations that effect American citizens at home, in their 
everyday lives were introduced. Additionally, this securitization, and the ‘acceptance’ 
of terrorism into a permanent and dangerous threat, along with the creation of the DHS, 																																																								
4 The unclassified document states that: “The specific intelligence activities that were permitted by the 
Presidential Authorizations remain highly classified, except that beginning in December 2005 the 
President and other Administration officials acknowledged that these activities included the interception 
without a court order of certain international communications where there is "a reasonable basis to 
conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al-Qa'ida, affiliated with al-Qa'ida, or a 
member of an organization affiliated with al-Qa'ida” (Offices of Inspectors General of the Department of 
Defense Department et al. 2009: 4). Additionally, “Each Presidential Authorization also included a 
requirement to maintain the secrecy of the activities carried out under the program” (Offices of Inspectors 
General of the Department of Defense Department et al. 2009: 5). 
5 The legislation states that “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon the issuance of an order in 
accordance with subsection (i)(3) or a determination under subsection (c)(2), the Attorney General and 
the Director of National Intelligence may authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 year from the effective 
date of the authorization, the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
States to acquire foreign intelligence information” (United States Congress 2008: 3). 
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normalized the US government’s actions in response to the threats. In particular, both 
that which should constitute a threat, and how to respond to it (Mabee 2007: 389). 
Theoretically, Bush argued that anywhere in the world could be dangerous, because 
terrorists themselves are dispersed throughout. Borders became the centre of focus once 
again.  
 
There are a few ways to look at the issue of borders and how they have changed 
post 9/11. From one perspective, borders meant nothing to the terrorists as they flew 
planes into the heart of America. Due to this realization, physical borders were 
tightened, not only in the United States but also internationally. For instance, the 
immediate increase in security at airports, especially at US-Canadian and US-Mexican 
borders, was just the first step. Immigration laws also became stricter. All of this was 
meant to keep ‘them’ on the outside, and away from ‘us’.  Kolossov argues that “in the 
mass consciousness, the perception of external threat gives rise to the aspiration to 
minimise or to cease all contacts” with the undesirable Other (2005: 619). An alternate 
perspective on borders is that while physical borders were being tightened, the borders 
of America, with regard to protecting their interests, were stretched to constitute the 
whole world. The entire planet became the American homeland. The main narrative of 
the Bush administration was that “the state boundary is now not merely the line marking 
the limits of the state territory and territorial waters”, as some postmodern accounts of 
border studies literature state  (Kolossov 2005: 623). 9/11 changed the geopolitics of 
borders in two ways – physically at home with tighter security allowing fewer ‘in’, and 
also by giving America unlimited scope to protect its interests worldwide.  
 
How danger is perceived, where it is perceived to be coming from, and who it 
targets, are all factored into policy making. The fear mongering produced by the Bush 
administration created a certain view of danger, and what to be fearful of.  Many of our 
views are based on what we hear and see in the media, and what our leaders tell us. The 
official response to the 9/11 attacks securitized international terrorism, as well as 
ushering in a new environment of security, in the form of the GWOT. What 9/11 
accomplished for the Bush administration, is what Pearl Harbour did decades ago - a 
comparison which is often made. It served to warn Americans of the “dangers of a new 
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era, of a new environment of threat” (Mabee 2007: 391). In the discourse of the 
administration, this environment required a “new environment, and effectively, a new 
concept of security” (Ibid). 
 
As such, certain areas became more, or newly, dangerous. The labeling of these 
areas as 'threats' or ‘risks’, justifies certain parts of the world as ‘requiring 
involvement’; whether they are rogue states, zones of instability or ‘states of concern’. 
The United States used this as a justification and legitimate reason for military or even 
economic involvement (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007: 411). It is an exercise in how space is 
given meaning, and how meaning changes to fit policy. Sharp argues that strategies of 
power always require the use of space, and thus discourses are used to create specific 
spatial images, which are inseparable from the establishment and use of power (Sharp 
1993: 492). At the same time, while the US is designating certain areas as dangerous, 
and certain nations as part of the “axis of evil”, it has itself entered an exceptional space, 
where the law is suspended and the space inside the United States is given a different 
meaning – i.e. exemption from the law. Barnett assesses the ‘pre-emptive’ war’s 
implications, concluding that it was an instrument by the state that essentially sought to 
“extend its stable security rule set into the essentially lawless Gap’’ (Barnett, 2004: 7). 
As the United States was making new ‘rules’ for the Other state, it was simultaneously 
exempting itself from all.  
 
What these authors are arguing is that perceptions of danger had changed, and 
this change in danger was the excuse for the exception and all that was to come after 
9/11. What makes CGP a useful addition to the discussions surrounding 9/11 and its 
consequences, is that CGP focuses on taking apart the taken for granted beliefs by 
shedding light on how the change in perceptions of danger have been used as 
justification for policies, both domestic and foreign, and ultimately the declaration of 
the Global War on Terror. These authors analyze the taken for granted beliefs in tabloid 
geopolitics, and the perceptions of danger involving futuristic geopolitical fears. They 
reintroduce the importance of borders and territory as a crucial part of the analysis of 
9/11’s consequences. Therefore, it can be seen that CGP advances our knowledge and 
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understanding of the exception by allowing us to see how geographical perceptions of 
danger were ultimately the excuse for the exception after 9/11. 
 
5.3 Geopolitics Fears  
Unknown & future fears 
As the focus of this chapter is on perceptions, specifically that of the changing 
nature of danger, it is important to understand the geopolitical nature and implications 
of this. In what Matthew Sparke calls “geopolitical fears”, this section will cover the 
geopolitical elements and their implications. This involves what can be generally placed 
into two main categories: future fears (‘unknowns’) and Othering. 
 
After 9/11, the fear of terrorism was widespread in America. It became a central 
concern for Americans who were suddenly alerted to this ‘new’ danger. What does it 
mean to terrify? Who was more terrifying: the terrorists or the American government? 
Allan Pred defines what it means to terrify; it is to 
 
frighten greatly, to instill intense fear, to drum up image of horrible disaster, 
brutal punishment, or death hovering just around the next corner, or the one 
after that or at least some proximate corner – out of sight, waiting to pounce, 
to strike arbitrarily, to perhaps target YOU. To terrify is to subject others to 
extreme dread to produce in them an anxiety of the anticipated but 
unpredictable, to colour their minds with shades or trepidation, to pack their 
mental baggage with images and advance notices – or “threat advisories” – 
that cause worry and disease, and, consequently, to insist upon their being 
vigilant (2007: 363).  
 
This definition would indicate that it was in fact the American government doing most 
of the terrifying of its citizens; altering them to the dangers and simultaneously offering 
the solution of policies that would ‘require’ more government control over everyday life. 
For example, in 2004, President Bush stated that “it is tempting to believe that the 
danger is behind us. That hope is understandable, comforting -- and false” (Bush 2004b). 
Not only the aggressive foreign policies of unilateralism, and the pre-emption of danger 
(that would eventually lead to the invasion of Iraq), but domestically as well. For 
instance, in the exchange of their civil liberties and freedoms (Patriot Act, FISA 2008, 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, PSP and others) for their ‘security’.  
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Rachel Pain argues that Davis’ prophesy that “fear has a brilliant future” (Davis 2001: 
390) in light of Americans’ anxieties, have led them to trust a ‘revamped National 
Security State’ (Pain 2009: 470). This is precisely why a key part of the critical 
geopolitical framework is to question and take apart common sense beliefs, and hence 
Sparke argues that it is the responsibility of geographers to “examine persistently, 
collaboratively, and critically the geographical grounds of hope and fear” (2007). In 
doing so, he maintains that we can “debunk the false hopes and groundless fears” 
(Sparke 2007), thereby lifting the veil of the taken for granted beliefs that many critical 
geopolitics scholars seek to do.  Sparke’s view provides an insightful interpretation on 
the consequences of September 11th. He argues that the contemporary issue of 
“geopolitical fears” - political fears and their implications, played a big role in how the 
war in Iraq, and post 9/11 policies were structured and consequently sold, to the 
American public. His view is that the American establishment manufactures fear like a 
product that its citizens will want to buy. Sparke claims that fear has become an 
essential part of politics in the United States, and the selling of fear was crucial in order 
to gather support for the Iraq War from the general American public. Notably, support 
never came from the international community or the United Nations.  
 
The support for the GWOT has relied significantly upon the production of 
anxiety, as argued by Pred (2007: 364) and others. The geopolitical fears and anxieties 
produced by “fear filled forms of situated knowledge” that are further “infused with 
distortions, misrepresentations and disinformation” (Ibid), were produced by discourses 
by the Bush administration, and further perpetuated by the media (which the next 
section will cover). The next chapter will cover in detail the lead up to the GWOT, 
however, the ‘geopolitical fears’ created by the perception of a change in danger 
provided justification and legitimacy for policy actions both domestically, and in the 
case of Iraq, internationally. Sparke expands on this point here:  
 
It was specifically fear of this evil other that was most instrumental because 
it made it possible for the President and his administration to connect 
widespread and visceral feelings of insecurity among Americans in the post-
9/11 present to much narrower and calculative concerns with America’s 
strategic future. It was in this way that the futurological fears ironically 
became a retroactive justification for war (Sparke 2007: 341).  
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It is more than just about Iraq, the centerpiece of the Bush Doctrine. Sparke draws 
attention to the fact that the argument of America needing to see the world through a 
new ‘prism’ was a powerful one, ultimately altering America’s strategic vision (2007: 
343).  
 
 All of these play on the emotions of the public. Discourses around the changing 
nature of threat, specifically after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 
built on narratives of ‘inside’ (i.e. white, western populations) and ‘outside’, which was 
created by “imaginary geographies which reproduce discourse about dangerous spaces 
and others” (Pain 2009: 470). Pain questions the fact that given all of these discourses, 
little attention is paid to whose fear it is, that is being discussed; i.e. who names fear, 
who claims it and who ultimately feels it (2009: 471). Engin Isin argues that in fact, 
managing the population around risks has resulted in what he called the ‘neurotic 
citizen’. Isin argues that the “neurotic subject that has become the object of various 
governmental projects whose conduct is based not merely on calculating rationalities 
but also arises from and responds to fears, anxieties and insecurities” (2004: 217). The 
central argument this research is making in this respect is that these discourses are 
constructed in a way that benefits those in power, and further that these discourses are 
born from perceptions about a change to the nature of danger. Therefore, the 
geopolitical fears that Americans experienced after 9/11 were crafted to fit a wider 
policy agenda of imperialism.  
 
It was not relevant how futuristic, real or unreal these fears were for the Bush 
administration. The chief of British intelligence later recorded in the Downing Street 
memos, ‘‘the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy’’ (Sparke 2007: 
341). Debrix and Barder argue that a shift took place whereby conditions of heightened 
security were legitimized by the production of fear, which in turn legitimized violence. 
This made it ‘normal’ and expected for a population who had been told their lives were 
constantly at risk (2009: 401). Rubin writes that “[al]though fear has a politics, we often 
ignore or misconstrue it, making it difficult to understand how and why fear is used” 
(2004: 3). This is where critical geopolitics can help us understand the reasons why. 
While a critical discourse analysis will help us understand how it is used. In the second 
	 179	
part of this chapter, CDA is employed as a methodology to put the CGP lens to use. The 
questions that CGP asks about power, taken for granted beliefs, the social construction 
of fear, good and evil, and the construction of an enemy will be analyzed through the 
use of CDA. This will make clearer the importance of the ideational, and the power of 
language in created and sustaining these perceptions.  
 
Othering: Fear of the Foreign  
The ‘future fears’ that Sparke argues are so important in the justification and 
legitimacy of current policies, are further exaggerated by the Othering that takes place 
in political discourse. Jodi Dean contends that the “geopolitical imagining of an ‘‘evil’’ 
other was undoubtedly key in this regard because it created an imaginative space where 
all sorts of illogical and pre-political, if not always religious, feelings of fantasy and 
faith could be projected with gung-ho conviction” (Dean 2005). Hence, the scripts about 
the Other, who were characterized to be “despotic, hate-filled Orientals” turned out to 
play an important role in the support for American actions at home (Sparke 2007: 343). 
 
Othering has been the focus of much of the analysis in this research, however, 
how it fits into the larger geopolitical scripts about the perceived change in the nature of 
danger, fear, and threat as seen through the ‘prism’ of 9/11 is the specific focus of this 
chapter. Said’s work on imaginative geographies (2003: 72), mentioned in chapter two, 
is particularly important in contextualizing this analysis. The next chapter will 
demonstrate the specific discourses that went into legitimating the GWOT; Othering 
being a crucial element of the rhetoric. Dean stresses that Bush’s “ontological evil” (i.e. 
Other) conflates all violence, crimes, threats and even the potential or possibility of any 
sort of these things into one “theatre of absolute struggle” (Dean 2005). Essentially, the 
facts are not the key issue. It is Bush’s language in his conviction that portrays a world 
with the “excesses of evil flowing throughout” (Ibid) the globe that enables all the 
fingers to be pointed toward one massive, decentralized evil. This evil Other will serve 
as legitimacy for policies in the foreseeable future, setting up an everlasting system of 
legitimacy, providing it is maintained.  
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Fear (and hatred) of the Other unites people as it becomes a common experience 
that is shared. Rubin argues that when people lack the moral and political principles to 
bind them together (which was often the story in America pre 9/11 at the time) an event 
such as this, and an enemy to rally against brings people together – beyond the lines of 
divide. Rubin maintains that it is the “experience of being afraid...for only fear we 
believe, can turn us from isolated men and women into a united people” (2004: 3). He 
argues that we blind ourselves to the real world conflicts that make fear an instrument of 
political rule and advance, and instead, remain in a state of fear (Ibid). As such, 
Americans rallied behind their ‘homeland’ and the space in America was given a 
revamped meaning; it was the place that was not that other place – the one full of 
terrorists. Definition against an Other and terrorists is not a completely new comparison 
in American history. As mentioned before, in the past the USSR was considered the 
Other, communism was an ‘evil’, even further back once Britain was the Other. The 
identity and difference of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not unique, but the way that 9/11 gave such 
a broad, vague and indefinite justification to using this Other is new. Americans 
understood what they were, in relation to what they were not; always in opposition to an 
Other. Guntram Herb looks at the way that physical territory constructs national 
identities and concludes that the rationale behind the territorial strategy is what he calls 
‘territorial scripts’ and it is conceived as a ‘geography’ (2004: 141). There are two main 
categories: territorial differentiation, and territorial bonding in the construction of 
national identity. Differentiation defines who is included and who is excluded and 
makes the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ visible. It bonds the opposite, fusing the population 
together and creates an emotional bond (Ibid: 144). This will be further elaborated in 
later parts of this chapter through a critical discourse analysis. The script, therefore, is 
what acts as the narrative that serves as a justification for the strategy (Ibid). Conversi 
also makes the point that what unifies nations are by opposing others; i.e. internal 
cohesion is attained by external differentiation (Ibid: 142). 
 
Geopolitical fears of the unknown and of the other were instrumental in 
legitimizing policy decisions, at the very least to the American public, if not abroad. 
The anxieties that inevitably arose out of the constant fear mongering of the Bush 
administration after 9/11, were a success due to the abstract nature of the fears 
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themselves. They were unknown, and futuristic. No one could really pinpoint anything, 
which is why they were so effective. It was the connection between the already high 
anxieties of the public, with the exaggerated misrepresentations of the actual level of 
threat from global terrorism that meshed together to form a security state. This, of 
course, was perpetuated largely by the media, which the next section will look at.  
 
5.4 Tabloid Geopolitics 
The discourses about changing danger and threat may have originated at the top 
levels of government, but what makes them resonate with the general population? Not 
surprisingly, the media is the major outlet of information for most people. Generally, 
television is the most dominant and effective as it allows repetition. A study by Scott 
Althaus, conducted after the 9/11 attacks, found that the majority of media consumption 
in the US still comes through television news. Cable TV, local TV and network TV 
news together made up a large majority, followed by newspapers, radio then internet 
(Althaus 2002: 519). In 2014, the American Press Institute published that 87% of 
Americans get their news from “TV” sources, while 69% get their news from their 
laptops, followed by radio (65%), and print media (61%) (American Press Institute 
2014). For example, the morning of September 11th, the world watched the planes fly 
into the tower over, and over and over again; ensuring the images were cemented to 
memory. Although the media can in fact inform us, and provide us with a great deal of 
insight about the world, it can as easily distort what we see and hear, thus becoming a 
form of misinformation as well. The media can in fact perpetuate the fear mongering 
tactics that are observable at the government level. 
 
Francois Debrix investigates the representation of geopolitical news in the media 
and discovers what he calls “tabloid geopolitics” (TG). He defines it as   
 
The result of mediatized discursive formations that take advantage of 
contemporary fears, anxieties, and insecurities to produce certain political 
and cultural realities and meanings that are presented as commonsensical 
popular truths about the present condition (Debrix 2008: 5).  
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As a discursive formation, TG is a mode of knowledge production, and can be easily 
created, transmitted and redirected to produce ‘truth-and-knowledge-effects’ (Debrix 
2008: 14). Debrix argues that tabloid geopolitics played a big role in selling the war to 
the American public, by capitalizing on their fears. He maintains that that tabloid 
geopolitics is a form of geopolitics that is taken by the media, especially in the United 
States, in matters regarding national security, war, and global terror (Debrix 2008: 5). 
Not only is it a medium, it is also a discourse, and all those who claim to speak in the 
interests of the public can partake in it (Ibid). However, used as a form of propaganda, it 
can be misleading. Tabloid geopolitics is a “discursive public enterprise that seeks to 
proliferate narratives and images intended to saturate and satisfy the global cultural 
landscape” (Ibid: 5). As such, TG is sometimes just there ‘to sell’; i.e. it has abandoned 
a more meaningful goal to actually relay real life news events, and in its place, caters to 
the audience of the ‘tabloid universe’ (Ibid: 7) where they can manipulate stories to give 
them a guise of ‘truth’ or real news-telling, but in fact are inaccurate, and sometimes as 
a result are detrimental. 
 
In a study on the critical geopolitics of danger in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
Nick Megoran looks at the differences between the two nations and how danger is 
represented in the media. What is important to take away from his analysis is how this 
can be generalized and what it says about discourse, power and policy. One case study 
is of the Uzbekistan government who bombarded the population with the idea their state 
was in mortal danger (similar to what happened after 9/11 in America), and how it 
legitimized authoritarian rule (of President Islam Karimov) against the dangers of the 
state (Megoran 2005: 556). In this case, the government was then able to seize control 
of pop culture outlets, such as various media sources to perpetuate its message. In the 
United States, media has protections under the constitution, however, Alan Pred argues 
that following the 9/11 attacks, government at all levels began to restrict information 
that was available to the public. Although the media outlets were not coerced, they 
began to “read like official gazettes…television news simply gave up and followed the 
order of its corporate owners” and in the period before the war (2007: 365).  Pred’s 
argument suggests that US journalists were “far too reliant on sources sympathetic to 
the administration”, while dissenting views were generally shut out (2007: 365). 
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Therefore, parallels can be drawn between Megoran’s analysis and Pred’s critical 
reading of the influence of media on our understanding of geopolitics. Megoran goes on 
to asses the US foreign policy impact and concludes that foreign policy is in fact “a 
series of boundary-producing practices that are central to the constitution, production, 
and maintenance of US political identity” (2005: 558). 
 
The role of critical geopolitics in this is to question and unveil the production of 
geographical knowledge, in how it pertains to foreign policy and interstate relations 
(Megoran 2005: 558). The “texts” that guide the foreign policy making process are 
“actively concerned with the scripting of a particular American identity” and it becomes 
an exercise in boundaries, which depend on identifying ‘danger’ (Ibid: 560). Going 
back to the Uzbekistan case, interestingly, similar language was used in the media 
discourse (i.e. the ‘others’ as ‘evil’ – a parallel with post 9/11 rhetoric). Dissenting 
views in the media were treated as outsiders or traitors who were ‘evil’; motivated 
purely by irrationality (Ibid: 563). Similarly, Bush’s famous quote that “you’re either 
with us or with the terrorists” sought to portray anyone not in complete agreement with 
US actions as siding with terrorists.  
 
Much of what was being said in the media complemented - almost echoed - 
what was being said at the top levels of government. Altheide, in his analysis of mass 
media and terrorism, argues that the attacks on America were defined in the media as an 
assault on American culture (2003: 991). This brought citizens of different political 
strokes together, collectively as ‘Americans’, allowing the population to unify as a 
collective. Altheide contends that in fact “news media and popular culture depictions of 
the US reaction to terror attacks reflects a culture and collective identities steeped in 
marketing, popular culture, consumerism and fear” (2003: 991). Further, he argues that 
the mass media actually have a role in promoting fear, which has accordingly been on 
the increase since the ‘discovery’ of international terrorism on 9/11 (Ibid: 986). 
 
An important tactic in the fear mongering that Altheide draws attention to, is the 
linking of terrorism to crime and security, where terrorism is constructed in such a way 
that implies the law alone is not enough to deal with or provide security (2003: 992). 
	 184	
Hence, the implementation of ‘emergency measures’, such as the PSP or the Patriot Act. 
Altheide draws upon the work of Giroux who argues that the sense of urgency, like the 
panic visible after 9/11 and the rush to push through policies, results in ‘emergency time’ 
as Giroux calls it. This essentially stops citizens from rationally and collectively 
debating over issues democratically (Altheide 2003: 993), and in its place, the sense of 
urgency legitimizes legislation such as the Patriot Act, PSP, and FISA amendments, and 
so on because of a declaration of a GWOT. “The major impact of the discourse of fear 
is to promote a sense of disorder and a belief that ‘things are out of control’” (Ferraro as 
cited in Altheide 2003: 995). The logic to this is that then policies and actions can be 
justified and legitimated in order to keep the population ‘safe’. Both the invasion of Iraq, 
and the passing of the Patriot Act and other similar documents symbolized measures 
that were ‘necessary’ for the US government to take to secure their citizens.  
 
To demonstrate how important perceptions, and media specifically are in 
legitimizing behaviour, take for example a study conducted by Kull et al. on perceptions 
and knowledge of audiences. The key findings revealed that “gross misperceptions” 
were linked with general support for the war in Iraq, and even more so, with those who 
watched Fox news (Kull et al. 2003: 582). Some additional data on this point may be 
useful in emphasizing how reliance on media sources can significantly alter world 
perceptions, and even more in the case of Fox news mentioned above, as it is most 
sympathetic to the administration.  In fact, a study in 2010 by Aday, found that Fox 
News, 
 
not only tilts right, but serves as a reliable megaphone for the Bush 
administration’s arguments, including allowing administration officials (and 
their allies) to dominate other voices, and giving less play to critical sources 
and even-handed analyses”; an important finding (Aday 2010: 157). 
 
Given this, it is important to note that Kull et al. concluded that those who watched Fox 
news as their primary news source were  
 
2.0 times more likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found, 
1.6 times more likely to believe that WMD had been found, 1.7 times more 
likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war, and 2.1 
times more likely to have at least one misperception  (Kull et al. 2003: 589). 
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It is not only Fox news that echoed the fears of the administration. It was understood 
that to question the administration in the matter of the GWOT and Iraq specifically, 
would be unpatriotic. Coupled with this was the idea that it would be ‘disrespectful’ to 
the troops to not show full support. Conclusive to their findings, Kull et al. argue that 
the reluctance of the media to challenge the administration and simple become a “means 
of transmission” (Ibid: 593) of those in top levels of government, makes getting a 
balanced opinion from the media nearly impossible. Furthermore, they conclude that it 
appears that President Bush has the capacity to lead the public to assume false beliefs in 
support of the administration’s position (Kull et al. 2003). 
 
Further, Althiede claims that because these are matters of national security, that 
journalists rely on administration news sources for information about the operations, 
reactions to counter-attacks, reports about soldiers, and so on (Altheide 2003: 995). 
These become authoritative sources, and the messages from the administration get 
passed down through the media and they all ‘merge’ together as propaganda (Ibid). Bill 
O’Reilly, a popular and controversial conservative commentator on the Fox News 
network, is a representation of the type of realist tabloid geopolitics that many 
Americans gather their day-to-day information from. Debrix argues that O’Reilly’s 
cultural and political representations are part of the phenomenon in American culture 
that fashion similar techniques, ideologies and sometimes ‘practical outcomes of tabloid 
geopolitics’ since the late 1990s (Debrix 2008: 146). 
 
 Shirlow and Pain argue that the sensational headlines by the media often obscure 
rational debate (2003: 17) and in place tell an incomplete story to feed the appetite of 
the audience. Tabloid realists want their audience to believe that by engaging in 
/supporting a war (i.e. the GWOT, Iraq, Afghanistan) is to be on the side of ‘good’, with 
‘us’, which creates a ‘triumphalist’ meaning, while distorting, confusing and 
destabilizing meanings of what to be afraid of (Debrix 2008: 77). The simple binaries 
created by the Bush administration therefore, get passed down and repeated in the 
mainstream media. This results in average citizens hearing the same thing repeatedly, 
constructing a uniform story. Media analysis is a vast area of research, and its depth is 
largely outside the work of this thesis, however, popular geopolitics is a part of the three 
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type typology that Toal and Dalby describe, and therefore it is important that it be 
recognized as an important force in shaping our world view.  
 What this section contributes is the use of CGP literature to draw attention to the 
power of language, discourse and the power of perception. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, much of international relations theories overlook ideational factors. They also 
omit the root causes, and opt for theory testing instead. This chapter is again addressing 
the question of ‘how’ the perceptions are created, not solely their consequences. The 
contribution of using a CGP lens to draw attention to missing pieces of the analysis, and 
then using CDA to fill in some of those gaps is the goal in the following section. The 
discussions in this section around media, framing, the language of the attacks of 
freedoms and life style, the binaries of good and evil, the ‘changed’ nature of danger 
and the ‘new’ enemy have been brought to light through CGP. In the following section, 
the goal is to take apart these discourses and show how the power of language can 
create ideologies used to legitimate imperialistic policies.  
 
5.5 Critical Discourse Analysis 
But, see, our fellow citizens must understand that September the 11th, 2001 
changed the equation. It's changed the strategic outlook of this country – 
Bush 2003. 
 
        In its simplest form, Foucault states that discourses are anything that can be said or 
written, or represented by someone or some institution with or without a specific 
objective (Debrix 2008: 13).  Jackson reminds us that the language of politics is 
deliberately structured to shape our perception of the world (2005: 21). Therefore, he 
maintains that there is “no way can we assume that the words of these ranking officials 
are unconscious, accidental or unplanned” (Ibid: 27). This research argues that the 
discourses used in politics are intentional and are a form of power, manipulation, and 
they construct ideologies. As it is maintained that discourses do ideological work, there 
are three aspects to CDA that are considered, and interlinked: language, power and 
ideology. In this chapter, the focus has been on the perceptions of the changing nature 
of the threat and the new world, and the ‘prism of 9/11’, that the Bush administration 
expected America and the world to view international relations through. Specifically, 
framing is of importance here, and is described below. These geopolitical fears, that the 
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previous section describes, are an important part of the discourses of a ‘post 9/11 world’ 
that Bush presented to America (and the world). As Weldes et al. remind us, all 
insecurities are culturally produced (1991:1). This is where CDA is most useful. Van 
Dijk argues that the core of CDA involves a “detailed description, explanation and 
critique of the way dominant discourses (indirectly) influence such socially shared 
knowledge, attitudes and ideologies, namely through their role in the manufacture of 
concrete models” (1993: 259). 
 
 The discourses in this chapter focus on the days to months immediately after 9/11 
in 2001, mainly September through to December. This is because this is when the major 
‘shift’ took place within the Bush administration, and the focus of the discourses were 
on the ‘changed world’ after 9/11. Beginning toward the end of 2001, and start of 2002 
(as the next chapter will demonstrate), the discourses shifted much more toward 
Saddam Hussein and the pending war with Iraq. However, soon after the 9/11 attacks 
were when the framework of all that was to follow was set up. This is when Bush and 
his administration presented the idea of a new world, a dangerous world; a world full of 
unknown dangers and dispersed enemies. 
 
Framing: The ‘9/11 prism’ 
Framing as Carvalho (2008) describes is to organize discourses according to a 
certain point of view or perspective. This is of utmost importance to how the Bush 
administration sought legitimacy for its imperial policies post 9/11. Framing is crucial 
because it sets up the entire narrative to follow. Once the ‘situation’ is contextualized, 
everything else follows in that context. CGP analyzes political phenomena as situation 
and contextual and therefore it is important to understand how the issue is being framed, 
in order to unpack the discourses around it. In the case of this research, and this chapter, 
the frame in which everything was constructed around was the ‘prism’ of 9/11 that the 
Rumsfeld quote at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates: 
 
The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new 
evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We acted 
because we saw the evidence in a dramatic new light—through the prism of 
our experience on 9/11 (Rumsfeld 2003 as cited in Sparke 2007). 
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The Bush administration told the American public, and the world, that everything 
should now be seen through this new prism. Bush and his cabinet also emphasized that 
this is a ‘new war’, a ‘new era’, a ‘new world’, a ‘new enemy’ and so on. This is 
perhaps the most crucial factor in this entire analysis as framing is what sets up the 
initial equation. Once it was established that everyone was now living in a ‘new world’ 
changed forever by September 11th, the rest of the narratives fit into the main plot of a 
changed world. Below are prime examples in the early days, weeks and months 
following the September 2001 attacks, that use these discourses to frame the new world 
Bush wanted the world to accept. 
 
Exemplified in the first set of quotes is the general notion that the world and life for 
Americans changed on September 11th. The discourses are representative of what Bush 
and his administration saw to be a clear shift, ushering in a new world. Vice President 
Richard Cheney clearly frames the issue below: 
 
I think the important thing here is for people to understand that things have 
changed since last Tuesday [September 11, 2001], the world has shifted in 
some respects. This is a qualitatively different set of circumstances. This is 
going to be the type of work that will probably take years (Cheney 2001b). 
 
Cheney asserts that there has been a worldwide shift.  The events of 9/11 ushered in a 
new world, and with that he says a different set of circumstances. Following this, he 
makes a vague statement that this ‘type of work’  - implicit is the conflict – will 
‘probably take years’; an unidentified length of time. In the quote below, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft makes use of rhetorical devices such as metaphor in describing 
the events as turning wheel of history, and assertively stating the world will ‘never be 
the same’. He frames the event as a major turning point, providing the set up for further 
action to be taken. 
 
On September 11 the wheel of history turned, and the world will never be 
the same. A turning point was reached, as well, in the administration of 
Justice. The fight against terrorism is now the first and overriding priority of 




This kind of fact-finding and information-sharing conference is so critically 
important to the new environment that we find ourselves confronted with 
since September 11 (Ridge 2001) 
 
Similarly, in the quote above, Tom Ridge, head of Homeland Security, argues that the 
world and America have entered a ‘new environment’ as a result of 9/11. Below Bush 
emphasizes the ‘new and sudden’ challenges that face America as a consequence of the 
attacks. Second, is Tom Ridge speaking on a similar point that the new challenges have 
presented a need for new solutions, overtly arguing that these problems ‘did not exist’ 
before. 
 
Since the 11th of September, the men and women of our intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies have been relentless in their response to new and 
sudden challenges (Bush 2001g). 
 
It's going to take all of us--private and public, federal and local--working 
together to find solutions to problems that did not exist before September 11 
(Ridge 2001). 
 
On September 10, when you went into your office…there were certain 
challenges that you ... As of September 11, in addition to those challenges to 
our security and prosperity, we discovered that there's a new set of 
challenges (Ridge 2001). 
 
 
Further, Bush maintains that America has become a ‘different country’ overnight. This 
emphasizes that the world and America should come to understand 9/11 as a clear cut 
turning point, and beginning of a new world. See below: 
 
We are a different country than we were on September the 10th, sadder and 
less innocent, stronger and more united. And in the face of ongoing threats, 
determined and courageous (Bush 2001j). 
 
Below, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s quote demonstrates that not only has the 
world changed, that life has also change, framing the situation as more than a change in 
politics but a change in the daily lives of Americans. Similarly, Bush’s statement also 
frames it the same way. 
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I think that every American understands that life changed on September 11 
(Rice 2001). 
 
Tonight,…many of us are…learning to live in a world that seems very 
different than it was on September the 10th (Bush 2001j). 
 
The moment the second plane hit the second building, when we knew it was 
a terrorist attack, many felt that our lives would never be the same (Bush 
2001j). 
 
Below is a quote from Tom Ridge, in which he states that lives are different now. They 
have to constantly think about their security, how to maintain safe. Again, this 
emphasizes that September 11th constituted a turning point: 
 
And literally of Americans go to work every day trying to think of ways to 
make their community, their county, their city, their commonwealth or state, 
their country more secure. We just never looked at them that way before 
September 10, and now we do (Ridge 2001). 
 
The issue is subsequently framed as a ‘new kind of conflict’. Below, Rumsfeld 
demonstrates this by defining 9/11 as a new battlefield, a different conflict, and 
specifically one that is new for America. Geographically, they are potentially at war 
with up to ’60 different countries’, meaning the geography of danger has changed. No 
one single nation state is an enemy, nor wholly responsible for the acts of terrorism.  
 
We are, in a sense, seeing the definition of a new battlefield in the world, a 
21st-century battlefield. And it is a different kind of conflict… it is in a 
major sense new for this country (Rumsfeld 2001). 
 
..It's a new kind of war. And I understand it's a new kind of war… and this 
government will adjust, and this government will call others to join us... 
(Bush 2001a). 
 
 This is a different war from any our nation has ever faced, a war on many 
fronts, against terrorists who operate in more than 60 different countries. 
And this is a war that must be fought not only overseas, but also here at 
home (Bush 2001j). 
 
In this last quote especially, the idea of equating a war that is fought overseas and at 
home implies war may affect Americans, domestically – more than their tax money 
alone. The script is framed to implement policies that would combat this ‘at home’ as 
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well. Not only is it a new war, Bush and his administration argue, it also changes the 
way people ‘see’ terrorism. Taken out of context, 9/11 is seen as the first act of global 
terrorism. However, as it is the first on American soil, previous events worldwide are 
almost disregarded and 9/11 stands alone as the day that changed everything: 
 
But I think it is also fair to say that the events of the 11th of September have 
fundamentally changed the way in which people look at terrorism and acts 
of terrorism (Powell 2001b). 
 
Cheney echoes this in the following quote, emphasizing that because it happened in 
America, it is different:  
 
…But this time because of what happened in New York and what happened 
in Washington, it's a qualitatively different set of circumstances (Cheney 
2001). 
 
The next subset of discourse refers to the ‘new enemy’ and the ‘different enemy’, that 
has confronted America: 
 
This is different. The enemy is in many places. The enemy is not looking to 
be found. The enemy is hidden. The enemy is very often right here within 
our own country….(Powell 2001b). 
 
In the quote above, Powell makes use of over-lexicalization while framing. He makes 
repeated reference to ‘the enemy’, which is considered ‘new’, within the same 
paragraph. The geography of danger has clearly changed in his view, as the enemy is 
everywhere, hidden and not looking to be found. Due to its geographical uncertainty, he 
follows this by saying that: 
 
it isn't always blunt force military, although that is certainly an option. It 
may well be that diplomatic efforts, political efforts, legal, financial, other 
efforts may be just as effective against that kind of an enemy as would 
military force be (Powell 2001b). 
 
The enemy is ‘new’, and therefore how it should be dealt with is uncertain. 
Geographically, borders will no longer protect America, and there is no specific target 
site to ‘attack’ in retaliation, as understood below: 
	 192	
I know that an act of war was declared against America, but this will be a 
different type of war than we're used to. In the past, there have been beaches 
to storm, islands to conquer... But I know that this is a different type of 
enemy than we're used to (Bush 2001c). 
 
Bush reiterates this point again below. The enemy is framed to be new, and the enemy 
is different both psychologically and geographically as the enemy is everywhere and 
hidden: 
 
Secondly, they understand that unlike previous war, this enemy likes to 
hide…And they [other nations] join me in understanding, not only the 
concept of the enemy but that the enemy is a different type of enemy (Bush 
2001k). 
 
Further emphasized is the ‘new’ thought process required to deal with the ‘new’ type of 
war. Additionally, any enemy that is hidden, is one that is geographically difficult to 
find. Implicit is then the idea that they must search ‘everywhere’; everywhere is now a 
legitimate target if it means combating terrorism. The quotes below, first by Bush 
himself, then by Rumsfeld, demonstrate the framing of this issue as a new conflict/war: 
 
It's going to require a new thought process. And I'm proud to report our 
military, led by the secretary of defense, understands that; understands it's a 
new type of war (Bush 2001c). 
 
As we have said, and I don't think it can be repeated enough, this is a very 
new type of conflict, or battle or campaign or war or effort, for the United 
States…(Rumsfeld 2001a). 
 
White House representative Ari Fleischer echoed this and briefed the press: 
 
Finally, as the president said in his remarks this morning, freedom and 
democracy are under attack. The American people need to know that we are 
facing a different enemy than we have ever faced…(Fleischer 2001). 
 
His statement also makes use of very pointed vocabulary in his lexis. For instance, he 
chooses to say that ‘freedom and democracy’ are under attack. A point which will be 
emphasized again later in this section.  
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Framing is crucial because it constitutes the foundation of the narrative. Framing 
contextualizes 9/11 as a new danger, dramatically changing the way of life for 
Americans, and a turning point for international relations. It is the blueprint to the 
discourses that will then build upon the notion of the ‘prism’ of 9/11. It constructs a 
certain worldview, or perspective that becomes taken for granted once it is repeated 
over, and over again. As critical geopolitics seeks to question and take apart the taken 
for granted beliefs, it is important to first understand the ‘frame’ in which they are 
created. 
 
Freedom and lifestyles under attack 
Categorically, the attacks on 9/11 were described as attacks on the ‘American 
way of life’, by President Bush and his entire administration. The way that they were 
framed as an attack on freedoms, American lifestyles, liberty, and so on, make it a war 
beyond territory and politics. The perception was that the new war was more than a 
territorial, ethnic, or political war. Accordingly, the discourses exemplify the 
importance of the use of words, what is implicit in what is being said, the way it is 
being said, and it sets up an argument for what the appropriate reaction should be. It 
also helps to unite ‘us’, and vilify ‘them’, which the lead up to the Afghanistan, but 
more so, the Iraq War, provided legitimacy especially at home in the United States.  
The following two statements by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld demonstrate this 
point perfectly as he claims that the attacks, 
 
strikes directly at our way of life: way of life of a free people (Rumsfeld 
2001c). 
 
It's not restricted to a single entity--state or non-state entity. It is an attack 
on a way of life (Rumsfeld 2001). 
 
Using terms such as ‘way of life’ use rhetorical devices by presenting the audience with 
emotionally charged statements. The reaction to a ‘war on terror’ is different to a “war 
over territory”, and distinctly so from a ‘war on a way of life’. The latter is emotionally 
charged, implying it affects every single American because of the way that they live – 
politics aside. Not only is it seen as an attack on American life, but he emphasizes that it 
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is an attack on free people. Implicit in this is that the enemy is not free and does not 
support freedom. Within the same speech, Rumsfeld reiterates again that this war is 
over a way of life, and adds that it is unlike wars of the past. 
 
 What this war is about is our way of life. And our way of life is worth 
losing lives for. The era of antiseptic warfare...no one getting hurt in the 
US…will not work with this enemy…let there be no doubt (Rumsfeld 
2001c). 
 
Bush makes several statements about the attack on freedoms leading up to the Iraq war 
and beyond. Below is a representation of some of those in the days, weeks and months 
just after the September 11th attacks, which framed the issue as an attack on a certain 
way of life. 
 
In reference to the ‘enemy’, Bush depicts them as such that are filled with hate and 
everything associated with American lifestyles. He uses emotionally charged statements, 
his tone and lexical style emphasize how much they ‘hate’ everything: 
 
These people can't stand freedom. They hate our values. They hate what 
America stands for (Bush 2001k). 
We're fighting people that hates our values. They can't stand what America 
stands for and they really don't like the fact that we exist (Bush 2001h). 
 
So again, Bush is assuming that they hate freedoms, all Americans, and their values. He 
does not receive it or project it as a political exercise, but instead, solely focuses on 
emotions and feelings of ‘hate’, which is in his opinion, is why the terrorists committed 
such acts. Further, the second quote uses exaggeration to claim that they do not even 
like the fact America exists. Vague and exaggerated, this is meant to elicit an emotional 
response of rage from Americans towards the enemy. He reiterates this point again 
below: 
 
But there are other terrorists in the world. There are people who hate 
freedom. This is a fight for freedom. This is a fight to say to the freedom-
loving people of the world: “We will not allow ourselves to be terrorized by 




Once more, categorically the attack is understood to be an attack on freedom by people 
who hate freedom. Also, a new category is created, i.e. “freedom-loving people of the 
world” versus the freedom hating enemy. He also contrasts freedom  with fear below: 
 
Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom, the great 
achievement of our time and the great hope of every time, now depends on 
us (Bush 2001e). 
 
In the above passage, Bush uses rhetoric to contrast freedom and fear, in constructing 
ideological divide between the enemy and Americans. In the same speech, Bush makes 
references, again which are rhetorical and vague, to describe the threat: 
 
Our nation, this generation, will lift the dark threat of violence from our 
people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, 
by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail 
(Bush 2001e). 
 
He uses emotionally charged language and metaphor, to appeal to the public. For 
example, to rally people ‘by courage’ to unite them together in the fight against the 
‘dark threat’. Below he uses similar tactics: 
 
We will not be terrorized so that our hearts are hardened. Nobody can 
threaten this country. Oh, they may be able to bomb buildings and obviously 
disrupt lives, but we're too great a nation to allow the evildoers to affect our 
soul and our spirit (Bush 2001d). 
 
A few different things are going on in this passage. Again he makes use of emotion and 
metaphor, stating that American hearts are ‘hardened’. Following this, he again refers to 
evil, ‘the evildoers’, and finally, he says they cannot affect their ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, 
using rhetoric and alluding to a greater effect outside the physical bombing of American 
soil, i.e. their souls cannot be touched.  
 
Most of these emotionally charged, implicit and suggestive statements are all framing 
the issue in such a way as to generate a specific response. Namely, that there are evil 
people whose inherent hatred for America, their freedoms, and their lifestyles, have 
attacked America for no other purpose other than because their hearts are filled with 
hate. The quotes also suggest that the purpose of the terrorists’ threats, is to instill fear . 
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Moreover, Americans should simultaneously not be afraid and live life, while also being 
fearful of the enemy, lurking at every corner. The mixed message is vague and either 
side of this coin is used where applicable.  
 
It is especially interesting that the Bush administration emphasizes how the 
terrorists’ goals are to instill fear, given that the United States created a colour coded 
fear chart (the terror alert of the Department of Homeland Security). If anyone was 
responsible for scaring Americans daily, it was the multiple news reports, and constant 
interviews with ‘experts’, and the fear-mongering by the Bush administration. However, 
while there were those ‘experts’ who brought up American foreign policy in the Middle 
East, and the military involvement of American in several nations as a possible driving 
force of terrorist activity, none of these political messages were carried through by the 
Bush administration. To them, it was simple: the terrorists are evil doers who hate 
Americans, liberty and freedom, and thus this is a war directly on the American way of 
life and freedom itself by ‘freedom-haters’. Simple binaries were being introduced and 
perpetuated, to gain support for the actions America would take. The next section 
provides more pointed examples of Othering and contrasts, used to create these binaries 
in the context of a ‘new world’. 
 
Understanding the conflict: good and evil 
In the days and weeks following the attacks, a picture of the enemy was painted 
by the Bush administration, and following this, the media. According to them, the 
contrast was simple; it was a matter of good and evil. These are examples of what Herb 
(2004) calls differentiation: who are ‘they’ are, and who ‘we’ are by contrast. The 
opening two quotes are within the same speech, and directly contrast each other. Below, 
first is a description of the terrorists, followed by a description of Americans: 
 
Those who struck our country didn't realize--didn't realize, because they're 
so evil and so dark and so negative. They couldn't realize that there's going 
to be such good that comes out of what took place in America (Bush 2001f). 
 
 
We're resolved. We are strong. We're determined. We're patient. And this 




In the first instance, Bush depicts terrorists as evil, dark, and negative, before 
contrasting ‘them’ with ‘us’ (Americans), who are resolved, strong, determined. He sets 
up very clear binaries about the Other – whom is implicitly evil, and Americans – 
inherently good. Below Cheney describes them as follow: 
 
What we have here are a group of barbarians that they threaten all of us, that 
the US is the target at the moment (Cheney 2001b). 
 
He describes them as a ‘group of barbarians’ targeting Americans. Bush also uses the 
word barbaric to describe the enemy in a speech below: 
 
It's an enemy that likes to hide and burrow in and their network is extensive. 
There's no rules. It's barbaric behavior. They slit throats of women on 
airplanes in order to achieve an objective that is beyond comprehension. 
And they like to hit and then they like to hideout. But we're going to smoke 
them out. And we're adjusting our thinking to the new type of enemy. These 
are terrorist that have no borders (Bush 2001c). 
 
The above statement has several different elements. Firstly, it is very emotionally 
charged and the choice words present a clear image of the terrorist. For example, Bush 
chooses to focus on an enemy that ‘slits the throats of women’, as opposed to saying 
kills many people. The graphic imagery builds public rage against an enemy that 
commits appalling acts. Secondly, he refers to the goals of the enemy as ‘objectives 
beyond comprehension’. Once more, an apolitical Other is presented that has no goal 
but to directly harm Americans, only because they are full of hate. The actual objectives 
outlined by Al Qaeda (specifically political), are ignored, and not even brought up. It is 
as if they do not exist, and the enemy is reduced to a barbaric irrational monster. Again, 
geography is brought into light when Bush states that the ‘new’ enemy has no border, 
they hide, they burrow; essentially they are everywhere. In contrast, below, Bush argues 
that ‘they’ cannot stand American values, which are wonderful, free, and grounded in 
education. These are all presented as characteristics that ‘bother’ the enemy: 
 
They can't stand what America stands for. It must bother them greatly to 
know we're such a free and wonderful place, a place where all religions can 
flourish, a place where women are free, a place where children can be 
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educated. It must grate on them greatly. But that's what we're going to keep 
doing, because that's what America is about (Bush 2001i) 
 
The contrasts are mostly clear, representing simple binaries but some implicit. For 
example, ‘our’ (American) children can be educated, by free women, in a tolerant 
society accepting of all religions, whereas the barbaric enemy does not tolerate any of 
these things because they are presented to implicitly be against American values. 
Cheney is asked in once instance about his response to a video on Bin Laden that was 
released. The interviewer asks him, ‘why someone would do what he does?’ and 
Cheney responds:  
 
Obviously he’s filled with hated for the US and everything we stand for – 
freedom and democracy. He has for whatever reason developed this hatred 
of everything that relates to the US (Cheney 2001b). 
 
In a separate statement, Cheney similarly responds to why anyone would target America 
by saying, 
 
I think we have to recognize we are the strongest, most powerful nation on 
Earth, that we've got a tremendous set of accomplishments and an 
enormously bright future ahead of us. There are those in the world who hate 




Here, Cheney’s lexical choices to describe America as ‘strong’, ‘powerful’, a nation 
with ‘tremendous accomplishments’ and a ‘bright future’, is implicitly contrasted again 
a jealous and dark enemy who hates America’s ‘goodness’ and will do all it can to bring 
them down. Here the enemy is not understood to be political, or rational, but jealous and 
evil – seeking only to destroy America for what it does not have itself. Again below, the 
negative attributes of the enemy are portrayed; it is an irrational, apolitical, and evil 
enemy in Bush’s presentation: 
 
We've seen the enemy in the murder of thousands of innocent unsuspecting 
people. They recognize no barrier of morality; they have no conscience. The 
terrorists cannot be reasoned with; witness the recent anthrax attacks 
through our Postal Service (Bush 2001g). 
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The enemy is an amoral type of evil, with no conscious. This is a stark contrast to the 
moral American citizen who has deep ‘values’. The enemy loves war, and Americans 
do not seek it. Rumsfeld makes use of this contrast is below: 
 
The Americans, as you know, do not seek war. We did not seek this war. It 
was thrust upon us. It is a matter of self-defense, and the only way to defend 
against terrorist acts is to take the battle to the terrorists. It was thrust upon 
us, and we love liberty, and we need to do whatever it will take to defend it 
(Rumsfeld 2001b). 
 
Here, Rumsfeld insists, through the use of over-lexicalization, that the war was ‘thrust’ 
upon the United States. He also implicitly says, by claims-making that, ‘obviously’ 
American are not war seekers: ‘Americans, as you know, do not seek war’. He argues 
that Americans love liberty, implying that the terrorists do not. In his rhetoric, it all 
boils down to a fight between good and evil, the framing of the entire GWOT: 
 
We are at the beginning of what I view as a very long struggle against evil. 
We're not fighting a nation and we're not fighting a religion. We're fighting 
evil. And we have no choice but to prevail (Bush 2001h). 
 
This is vague because it is a ‘very long struggle’, with no identifiable, single enemy, 
and also vague and negative because it is ultimately ‘evil’. In President Bush’s 2004 
State of the Union speech, he continued with this binary, even after the invasion of Iraq: 
 
As democracy takes hold in Iraq, the enemies of freedom will do all in their 
power to spread violence and fear. They are trying to shake the will of our 
country and our friends, but the United States of America will never be 
intimidated by thugs and assassins (Bush 2004b). 
 
The enemy is referred to as an enemy of freedom, who wishes to spread violence and 
fear, as they are thugs and assassins. In contrast, Bush makes it clear that America (and 
its friends) will not be intimidated by them. Again, Americans (and allies) are ‘good’ 
and the enemy is ‘evil’; the sharp contrasts continue through his discourse even after the 
invasion, and the start of a new government. This always reminds Americans, and the 




Because of American leadership and resolve, the world is changing for the 
better (Bush 2004b). 
 
 
Here, the presupposition that is it because of America that the world is a better place. 
This implies America’s good nature, its necessity to fight evil, and the outcome of the 
world as a ‘better place’. Again, a very simplistic binary is presented: good and evil. 
Bush’s language, and that of his administration, are full of contrasts. They surround 
what it means to be us-good-Americans, and what it is to me them-evil-terrorists. The 
stark black and white categories make it easier to ignore the complexities behind them, 
so ‘everyday’ citizens can rally together against ‘them’, simply because they are evil. 
Void of political intent and motivation, the evil enemy has come to attack the good and 
peaceful Americans. They are barbaric, warmongers who only want to destroy all that is 
free and peaceful. The discourse does not leave any room for anything in between,. This 
prepares the nation to rally collectively against them, while they unite as Americans. 
The identity of Americans is presented as constituting everything that the terrorists are 
not; and vice versa. Once again, Othering takes centre stage in the discourse of the Bush 
administration.  
 
Geographical uncertainty: danger is everywhere 
Earlier in this chapter, a quote by Ferraro appeared: “the major impact of the 
discourse of fear is to promote a sense of disorder and a belief that ‘things are out of 
control’” (Ferraro in Altheide 2003: 995). The perception that the enemy is everywhere 
was a result of a new era, which made a big difference in rallying Americans together 
against a common Other. One attack may have scared Americans, but the fear needed to 
be long lasting in order to create legitimacy for long lasting policies. Below are prime 
examples in the days, weeks and months after 9/11 that speak to the quote above. The 
goal is to scare the public into believing the enemy is everywhere, and that because the 
geography of danger has changed, nowhere is safe. 
 




To be realistic we have to recognize a terrorist can attack at any time at any 
place it may be an airplane one day, it may be a ship or a subway or a car. 
Therefore the only thing we can do is what the president said. We have to 
wage a war it has to be taken to them where they are, and it will be a 
broadly based sustained effort, not in a matter of days or weeks but over 
years (Rumsfeld 2001c). 
 
Not only is Rumsfeld being vague in his lexical choices, such as ‘broadly based 
sustained effort’, and that it will take a number of years, but he also expresses the 
geographical implications. They can be anywhere, at any time, at any place. He 
emphasizes what this can mean, instilling fear in every aspect of life, i.e. they can be in 
airplanes, ships, subways, even cars. The fear-mongering continues: within the same 
interview, Rumsfeld suggests the terrorists are well financed and organized. This is 
suggestive that rather than the very loose network that constitutes Al Qaeda, they are 
very organized and pose a real danger on a daily basis: 
 
We will need to do a host of things and I should underline, these people, 
these terrorists, are cleaver and purposeful and well financed. They can’t 
function without the tolerance of other states. Countries around the world 
have even harbouring and permitting the terrorist activities. They need to be 
dealt with as well (Rumsfeld 2001c). 
 
Cheney echoes the vague assertions about the lifespan of the potential GWOT: 
 
This is going to be a struggle that the US is going to be involved with for 
the foreseeable future, there’s not going to be an end date…it will require 
constant vigilance on our parts… a major effort and use of military force 
(Cheney 2001b). 
 
Above Cheney makes clear that Americans should be prepared to be involved in this 
conflict for the long haul. The danger of the enemy is presented as being dispersed and 
as there is not a single geographic area to target, the only ‘solution’ is to essentially 
attack everywhere if needed. Again, he is vague. However, he says this will be a major 
effort and involve military force – not specifying how. Geography comes into play once 
more when Bush asserts that the enemy knows ‘no border’: 
 
Many world leaders understand that that could have easily--the attack could 
have easily happened on their land. And they also understand that this 
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enemy knows no border (Bush 2001c). 
 
 
Bush also asserts that this could have happened to any other nation, as there are no more 
borders in this new dangerous world full of global terrorism. Below, Cheney puts the 
nation on alert to the fear of more attacks: 
 
The direct attack on our nation has put us on notice that the enemy is 
resourceful and ruthless. We have to assume there will be more attacks. 
That is the only safe way for to us proceed (Cheney 2001a). 
 
Cheney presupposes that there will be more attacks, and tells the American population 
so, ensuring to keep them alert. Again, he uses negative adjectives to describe the 
enemy as they are ‘ruthless’. Similarly, below, Bush goes a step further to argue that the 
nation is still under attack. He also argues the war is also at home in America. Nowhere 
is safe is the central message: 
 
But there is another front in this war, and the front is here at home. It's 
something that obviously we're not used to in America. We've had oceans 
which have protected us over our history. Except for Pearl Harbor, we've 
never really been hit before. And yet, on September 11, this great land came 
under attack, and it's still under attack as we speak (Bush 2001f). 
 
 
Further assertions about the dangerous enemy being everywhere, are made by Tom 
Ridge in his description of them as ‘shadow soldiers, that hide amongst the American 
people’. The vocabulary used exaggerates the situation, since they are described to be 
lurking in the shadows, everywhere: 
 
The people we are combating are shadow soldiers, and I think we have to 
look at them that way. They were among us; they turned a commercial 
airliner into a weapon. And this is just not the kinds of threats that this 
country has been accustomed to dealing with. But we're working together, 
we are dealing with them and we will deal with them (Ridge 2001). 
 
Finally, Ashcroft presents an imminent and serious threat, his language suggesting 
grave danger for America: 
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The American people face a serious, immediate and ongoing threat from 
terrorism. At this moment American service men and women are risking 
their lives to battle the enemy overseas. (Ashcroft 2001). 
 
His language is vague because he says both that the threat is immediate, and also that it 
is ongoing. The language is meant to cover all situations possible: what America should 
do now, and what it should continue to prepare for. 
 
The language is chosen to keep Americans on edge, preparing for an attack at anytime. 
The geographical uncertainty of the enemy makes it impossible to pinpoint a site of 
attack. Danger is presented to be everywhere and anywhere. Nowhere is safe: one’s car, 
a subway train, a plane, the streets, and so on. Because danger is so dispersed, the only 
way to combat it is to monitor the world as if it is your own backyard. This is the 
proposition the United States made as a foreign policy objective when they declared that 
threats ‘over there’ should be regarded the same way as ‘over here’, legitimizing their 
intervention around the globe.  
 
New enemy, new policies  
What is the solution to all of this? New policies to combat the new world of 
risks and dangers, of course. After the attacks of 9/11 were framed as the start of a new 
era filled with new dangers lurking in every corner, the implications of this were that 
the current policies are not suitable to deal with the new threats. Geographically, there is 
no limit to terror spatially, and thus Bush called for a revamping of policies directed at 
terrorism, and the way America conducts war in the new ‘post 9/11 era’.  
 
Rumsfeld argues that because of 9/11, the nation is on high alert, and everything is 
being done to implement new ‘arrangements’: 
 
We should all have a heightened sense of awareness…we have a whole set 
of rules that have existed since decades and what we need to do and what 
we are doing is to review those and ask ourselves how we have to shift our 
arrangements now (Rumsfeld 2001c). 
 
This type of argumentation that the entire set of rules that existed are no longer effective, 
legitimizes the creation of new policies and rules due to the events of 9/11. In a separate 
	 204	
speech, some of these specifics are revealed by Rumsfeld. The new policies reflect the 
new world as he calls for a ‘distinctly different’ way of handling threat: 
 
We intend to put them on the defensive, to disrupt terrorist networks and 
remove their sanctuaries and their support systems. This requires a distinctly 




As Bush introduced the ‘anti-terrorist’ law (the Patriot Act) into legislation, he 
emphasizes that these new laws will take into account ‘new realities and dangers’. 
Again the situation is being framed within the context of a new world and his argument 
is that new laws are needed accordingly: 
 
The bill before me takes account of the new realities and dangers posed by 
modern terrorists (Bush 2001g). 
 
Colin Powell then later confirms this new bill, and emphasizes that the government will 
do everything and anything it takes to come up with ‘new policies’ - the argument 
following the new dangers: 
… we will come up with new policies. We'll come up with new procedures. 
We'll come up with new organizations. We'll come up with whatever it 
takes to prevail on this conflict, as the president has said (Powell 2001). 
 
Again, on the issue of the Patriot Act, Bush said: 
 
Inside the United States, where the war began, we must continue to give our 
homeland security and law enforcement personnel every tool they need to 
defend us. And one of those essential tools is the Patriot Act, which allows 
federal law enforcement to better share information, to track terrorists, to 
disrupt their cells, and to seize their assets” (Bush 2004b). 
 
President Bush presented the Patriot Act as a necessity –an ‘essential’ tool. He 
emphasized that it would help track terrorists and seize their assets, but failed to 
mention what that would mean for civil rights liberties for Americans. In 2004, when 
the Patriot Act was set to expire, President Bush in his State of the Union address said: 
 
Key provisions of the Patriot Act are set to expire next year. (Applause.) 
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The terrorist threat will not expire on that schedule.  Our law enforcement 
needs this vital legislation to protect our citizens. You need to renew the 
Patriot Act (Bush 2004b).  
 
He is emphasizing the danger of the terrorist threat, by claiming it will not expire when 
the legislation does and therefore there is a ‘need’ to renew the Act for the safety and 
security of Americans. Bush also capitalized on how the attacks of 9/11 presented an 
‘opportunity’ to revamp US foreign policy. Speaking in reference to Middle Eastern 
policy, Bush sees this is a window to cooperate with other states and argues that 
terrorism should be a cause to bring all together against a common enemy:  
 
Let me say that, in terms of foreign policy and in terms of the world, this 
horrible tragedy has provided us with an interesting opportunity.... I think 
there are some interesting opportunities to shake terrorism loose from 
sponsor states (Bush 2001i). 
 
Because the enemy is framed as new and different, Vice President Cheney also uses this 
frame to persuasively argue that the diplomatic ways, and treaties are a thing of the past 
as the new enemy will not understand from these. There will not be any negotiations he 
asserts, and again pinpoints the need for new means to deal with the enemy, ultimately 
ending in their total destruction: 
 
…In the terrorist, however, we have enemies with nothing to defend. A 
group like Al Qaeda cannot be deterred or placated or reasoned with at a 
conference table. For this reason, the war against terror will not end in a 
treaty. There will be no summit meeting or negotiations with terrorists. The 
conflicts can only end with their complete and permanent destruction and in 
victory for the United States and the cause of freedom (Cheney 2001a). 
 
 
Cheney also describes the Other as those with ‘nothing to defend’ once more removing 
intention from their actions. The choice of negative words to describe the enemy as 
those who cannot be reasoned with, or come to a treaty agreement upon, confirms that 
they are not the ‘same’ as Americans or enemies in the past. Additionally, an enemy 
with no geographical location cannot be contained or deterred. Ridge also expresses the 
urgency in the new policies as he summarizes Bush’s intentions and the creation of the 
department of Homeland Security – a significant change to the structure of government. 
Framed within the new context of September 11th, he assures the people that new 
	 206	
resolutions are being sought:  
 
President Bush immediately met with his foreign policy experts on the 
National Security Council and he also took the unprecedented step of 
creating a Homeland Security Council … I assure you were working hard 
prior to September 10, but as of September 11 working night and day, 
working with you to provide for the common defense, to provide for our 
domestic security (Ridge 2001). 
 
 
Perhaps one of the most subtle, but important policy changes, was Bush’s desire to go 
after anyone/nation/organization supporting or not turning in – terrorists. This is 
potentially a wide range of nations as it is so vague. Hence, the door is open to 
intervention anywhere in the world. Cheney emphasizes this point in what is different 
now (post 9/11):  
 
what's different here, what's changed in terms of U.S. policy is the 
president's determination to also go after those nations and organizations 
and people that lend support to these terrorist operators (Cheney 2001). 
 
 
The presentation of a new enemy is very important. If the justification that the enemy is 
new and the policies are outdated can be presented, then the solution would be new 
policies. This comes in the way of a Global War on Terror and a pledge to go after not 
only the terrorists themselves, but any nation that has any connection to the terrorists 
whether it be financial, or harbouring them. 9/11 was presented as so sudden and severe 
that it was seen as a total shock to the foreign policy makers (in America, at least). The 
groundwork is being set here for a dramatic change in foreign policy as demonstrated 
above when Bush and his team claim that a distinctly different approach is needed. 
 
Media Framing 
There have been several media studies done in depth, such as Kull et al. on the 
language used in the mainstream news after 9/11. This research is not an in depth media 
analysis; this would be an entirely different research project on its own. However, it is 
important to draw attention to the fact that media does matter, and the ‘tabloid 
geopolitics’, that Debrix and others discuss, is real, and has real effects. For more 
detailed media analysis, there are several good articles covering the media aspect in 
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depth such as many of the projects conducted by Policy on International Policy 
Attitudes (PIPA)/Knowledge Networks (KN); articles by Kull et al. 2002, Anker 2005, 
Edy, Meirick and Patrick 2007, and Stroud and Sparrow 2011. 
 
The following are a few select examples of the media’s reaction just days after the 
attacks when Bush had declared a global war against the ‘evil’ terrorists. The point is to 
draw attention to the language that trickles down into the media and is used by 
journalists on air in the major television stations in America, to have a glimpse into the 
importance of media, and to call attention to further critical discourse analysis on this 
matter. 
The following were taken from news broadcasts from CNN, NBC, FOX and CBS. 
NBC reports on September 11, 2001 state the following in a conversation on the news 
between reporters (NBC News 2001): 
 
we are at war; 
 
it will cost us in loss of life and it will cost us in terms of our psychological 
security that we have in this country we are going to have to revisit a lot of 
our freedoms as a result of this kind of a attack; 
 
national security event of an untold magnitude that this country will have to 
deal with; 
 
this place [America] remains an enormous target in the eyes of a lot of 
people and we are so vulnerable because of all those things that make us so 
great: our freedoms and our sense of security that we have, America has 
been changed today by all this. 
 
 
The above report by commentators for the NBC not only echoes, almost verbatim, much 
of the rhetoric the Bush administration was using after the attack, but the same 
rhetorical devices can be seen. What is more important however, is to note that already, 
from day one, the media was preparing Americans to “revisit a lot of their freedoms”, as 
they are now “at war” and it is because an enemy filled with hate has attacked the 
because of the things that make America great, i.e. freedoms and sense of security”. The 
immediate reaction is not to question any political motive behind the attacks, nor to find 
out information about the ‘platform’ of the terrorists, but to conclude at once that 
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America is a great nation that naturally would attract hateful enemies.  
On CBS, in an interview with former US ambassador to the United Nations on 
September 11, 2001, diplomat Richard Holbrooke speaking to Dan Rather is asked 
about his opinion and analysis on what has happened on 9/11. He responds: 
 
When America’s resolve is there, when Americans are united…like on Pearl 
Harbour…when we rally international support behind us, we have always 
prevailed, and I have no doubt we will prevail here. There will be 
consequences – the world is going to change… From big things like our 
mindset and our international leadership, this will not be a day like others. 
The world will change because of what has happened today. 
 
Specifically of importance is the second part of his answer when he frames the issue as 
a day different from any other, a day when the world changed, and the impact for 
Americans, i.e. their ‘mindset’ must change.  
 
Fox News on September 16, 2001(Fox News 2001), just days after the attacks had a 
panel of ‘experts’ on their news to discuss 9/11. Brit Hume, Bill Kristol (of PNAC), and 
Richard Gephardt (the house leader at the time) discussed what 9/11 meant for America, 
and Americans. Bill Kristol immediately responded: 
 
Action is the proper response to evil. 
 
Brit Hume echoed this thought and added in: 
I certainly think it has brought us back to some very basic way of looking at 
the world, that there is good and evil.  
 
Both Hume and Kristol parrot the Bush administrations binaries on good and evil. Later 
in the program, attention is paid to the ‘new’ war as argued by the Bush administration. 
The house leader Richard Gephardt says: 
 
We’re in a new world and we have to think anew, we have to open our 
minds to new ideas and find the right answers. 
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Further, he also repeats the framing of the issue around an attack on humanity and 
civilization, not just a territorial attack. Following this, he reiterates the vagueness of the 
war as long and difficult, against a new type of enemy:  
 
I think people all over the world now know that this was a strike not just 
against American but against civilization and against humanity; 
 
A long complicated difficult war against a very unique and new kind of 
opponent. 
 
Finally, CNN news coverage (CNN News 2001) just three days after the attack, on 
September 14 2001, covered discussions with Bill Bennett, a conservative American 
pundit who was being interviewed on the day of the prayer service for 9/11 victims. He 
states this day as a ‘moment of clarity’ and goes on to explain: 
 
Things that were problems before are not now in the hearts and minds of 
Americans because things have been put in perspective we now are taking 
acknowledgement of what’s most important. The lives of Americans are 
being changed. The best of us is coming to the surface. 
 
The CNN news reporter then asks him ‘how do you explain how something like this 
could happen?’ He responds: 
 
We’re going to have to re-learn things we forgot. First you explain it is a 
dangerous world. Second you explain that there is such a thing as good and 
such a thing as evil, and we saw them on display on Tuesday. Third, you 
explain that the US although we have had a tremendous 10 years, virtually 
living in a bubble of peace and prosperity. That bubble has burst – its over. 
And it is now a dangerous world in a way that a lot of people have forgotten. 
  
Here, Mr. Bennett reiterates how dangerous this new world is. Not only that, but similar 
to the Bush administration’s claims, that the ‘bubble’ that Americans were previously 
living in for so long – immune to the dangers of the world – has been burst. Finally, he 
makes it clear that there is good and that there is evil in the world. These words were 
used during the Cold War, but they resurfaced uniformly across media and government 
discourses immediately after the 9/11 attacks. He continues with his analysis: 
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It’s a dangerous place [the world], the US is a country hated by a lot of 
people in the world, and we must never lose our vigilance, and must pay 
much attention to our defenses, intelligence and capabilities. 
 
Here, Bennett reiterates that the world is a dangerous place, and the reasons for attack 
upon America are implicit to be of jealousy and hate as it is simply a country ‘hated by 
a lot of people’. Again, political motivations of any kind are not discussed.  
 
The importance of this is to simply demonstrate that within hours to days after the 
attacks, the media quickly took up the Bush administrations stance, and framed the 
issue in the same was that the administration did: a new war, a new era, fighting a new 
and different enemy and above all an irrational attack by evil doers on what it is to be 
‘American’. The ‘experts’ and those being chosen for interviews at the most critical 
times of coverage, in the immediate days following the attacks, all had a unified view 
on the matter. In fact, it seems that this was the ‘American’ view to take. According to 
the Bush administration it should be understood as an attack on American lifestyles and 
freedoms, and it was clear from day one that it was being framed to be understood as a 
new era. It was no longer post Cold War, it was now post 9/11. The media did not 
hesitate to follow suit and repeat quickly the discourses coming from the top down from 
the Bush administration.  
 
Unified by fear 
Earlier in this chapter, fear was discussed as a unifying force. The experience of 
going through something together as a collective, even if negative, can end in that 
collective becoming more cohesive. This is what Herb (2004) refers to as territorial 
bonding; fear created an emotional bond between Americans, and to their land as it was 
physically attacked. Fear and hate unite one group against another. In this case, the 
collective is understood to be the entire American population, and the Other are the 
terrorists. In order for this unified collective to remain this way, and continue support 
for further policy, it was essential that they remained in a state of fear, and remember 
why it was that they came together to unite. The following are examples of how the 
Bush administration’s discourse promoted this unification. 
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Speaking at the prayer service for 9/11 victims just three days after the attacks, Bush 
said: 
 
Today, we feel what Franklin Roosevelt called, ``the warm courage of 
national unity.'' This is a unity of every faith and every background. This 
has joined together political parties and both houses of Congress. It is 
evident in services of prayer and candlelight vigils and American flags, 
which are displayed in pride and waved in defiance. Our unity is a kinship 
of grief and a steadfast resolve to prevail against our enemies. And this 
unity against terror is now extending across the world (Bush 2001b). 
 
The nation is seen to have suddenly unified. He emphasizes that this crosses religious, 
ethnic, and party politics. He also says that this is a unity of grief, reminding Americans 
about what it is that has united them. It is emotional language, and he ends by 
reminding everyone that this unity will help them prevail against the enemy. Below, 
Powell attributes the unification of the Senate and the Congress due to the crisis at hand. 
The fear or further attacks, and the sorrow the of event itself has unified even political 
parties he claims: 
 
We're very grateful for the resolution that has come from the Senate and the 
support that the Congress is giving to our efforts. It shows the United States 
as a nation, as a people coming together in this time of crisis and showing 
our determination to move forward deliberately and decisively to deal with 
this particular incident, as well as the broader threat represented by world 
terrorism (Powell 2001b). 
Cheney uses this an as opportunity to argue that American have been divided for a long 
time, but they are now one as they proceed to tackle the enemy: 
 
But I think there is a unity and a spirit out there that I have not seen for a 
long time in this country. I see it on Capitol Hill between Republicans and 
Democrats. I see it in the workers who were cleaning up the mess in New 
York where the president visited yesterday. I see it in the people I've talked 
with (Cheney 2001). 
 
 
Cheney also uses emotional language as he makes references to people who helped 
clean up the streets of New York, and describes it as a story and makes personal 
references to people he has talked to himself. 
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 The American people are united. They're united in the resolve to help heal 
the nation. But they're also united in the understanding that we've entered 
into a new day, and we'll deal with it (Bush 2001i). 
 
Ultimately, Bush asserts that it is the unification that will lead to Americans prevailing 
under the circumstances. He divides the world once more into good and evil, Americans 
being on the side of good, and praises them for their remarkable spirit and resolve.  
 
We're learning about terror and evil, and our country is responding 
forcefully. The American people have got remarkable spirit and remarkable 
resolve. We are strong, we are united and we are determined to prevail 
(Bush 2001f). 
 
Those who were not unified, and who were not compliant to Bush’s policies, were not 
focused on in the immediate aftermath. The newspapers, media, administration officials 
and most others focused on a united America; united against the other, driven by hate, 
sorrow and fear.  
 
Conclusion 
What does CDA reveal? That what is understood to be common sense is not in 
fact ‘the way it is’. It is constructed as such so that it becomes naturalized. First the set 
up of a new era and a dangerous and unknown enemy. Next they are plotting America’s 
demise; they have no political intentions, and only hearts full of darkness and hatred for 
the American ‘way of life’. Following this, they could be anywhere, in someone’s 
backyard, on a plane, train, bus, or car; they are hidden amongst the American public 
and abroad. The constructions build up to create an enemy so scary that the only way to 
deal with them is to regard everywhere on earth as the American homeland and thus 
anywhere is subject to American attack. All of these discourses create a certain 
narrative that becomes the justification and legitimacy points for policy. For example, 
as it has been demonstrated, an enemy that is hidden and everywhere will require 
American military resources to track it down and defeat it. This involves conflict and 
war, which means the American taxpayer’s approval is preferred (although not 
required). In order for this to happen, Americans need to be afraid and vulnerable when 
it comes to their safety, so that the solution to their insecurities will be offered by the 
US government: ‘we’ll go after them’ to ‘make America safer’, and so on. This 
	 213	
legitimates the American government to use military force. Not only that, but as 
demonstrated above, several quotes also imply that Americans should be willing to 
‘give us’ or ‘reconsider’ some of their freedoms in the short term (for example, their 
privacy) for longer term security and freedom overall (from the terrorists).  
 
What CDA also reveals is that what is left out is equally as important. As 
demonstrated throughout, the omission of the political aims and objectives of the 
‘enemy’ is never mentioned. In fact, it is quite the opposite: they are understood to be 
driven by hatred and envy alone, because they ‘can’t stand’ the ‘American way of life’. 
They are reduced to irrational monsters not comparable to Americans; peaceful, 
freedom loving, strong, etc. The question is repeatedly asked to various members of 
Bush’s administration: specifically Cheney, Rumsfeld and Bush himself, about why the 
terrorists would do such a thing? The response is repeated over and over again that they 
hate Americans, and their way of life. This builds up an image of an irrational, hateful 
enemy, which Americans can point a finger at, and build rage of their own against. 
Their fear combined with their anger toward the enemy hence unites them. The script is 
then ready to implement policy. Unknowingly, they are legitimizing American 
imperialism as they stand behind Bush in his policy toward the GWOT, and treating 
‘over there’ like ‘over here’, further legitimizing military force and violence.  
 
 Central to the critical geopolitical model is unpacking taken for granted beliefs. 
How did Americans come to understand what (or who) good and evil is? The focus of 
this chapter has been on pinpointing the construction of a ‘change in danger’; the 
perception that danger is everywhere, posing a real risk to Americans. If an American 
citizen who knows little to nothing about American foreign policy, or Al Qaeda for 
example, and lived through 9/11 hears their President and the media repeatedly say 
‘they hate us’, they hate our ‘freedoms’, our ‘way of life’, a social construct is created. 
This is evident in a large number of polls conducted between 9/11 and the start of the 
Iraq war. Many Americans felt so much rage because they were told that a group of 
irrational hate filled people hate them and what they stand for. Americans were left to 
feel victims to irrational attacks targeted at civilians, removing the political intent and 
attack to the US government and its policies. They were ready to give up their freedoms, 
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to in turn, protect their freedoms. They were prepared to exchange some civil liberties 
for security because they were scared to death. Most the frightening was done by the 
government and media with constant references to the new dangers of the world, rather 
than actual terrorist events. They were also prepared to back their government in an 
illegal war against Iraq. The beginnings of this are in the framing and how these 
perceptions are created, which is what this chapter demonstrated. The importance in the 
choice of words, a political exercise, is telling of the kind of ‘new world’ Bush and his 
administration wanted Americans to perceive. The vagueness about the enemy being 
anywhere and everywhere, and a potential counter attack lasting years, decades even 
was set up in the early days after 9/11. Presuppositions and assumptions fill the 
language of the Bush administration as they ‘explain’ what 9/11 meant, and what its 
consequences are. Prevalent again is contrasting ‘us’ with ‘them’ in building a national 
identity around what the other isn’t. Perhaps the sharpest of contrast, good and evil, 
divide the world into the simplest of binaries with serious and complex implications for 
international relations.  
 
The significance of this chapter is the discourse that put in place foundations for 
a narrative on the ‘new’ world America faced, and the perceived change in danger and 
threats to not only the US, but the international community. Now that this frame had 
been introduced, the rest of the story in the lead up to the GWOT fitted perfectly into 
the new world that the Bush administration created through its carefully chosen 
discourse. The following chapter will continue this narrative with a focus on the 












 The Global War on Terror 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The narrative has come to the final chapter of this thesis, and the final chapter of 
CDA. So far, several important things have been made clear and understood through a 
CDA analysis. First, in Chapter Four, it was evident that the discourse of an American 
grand imperial strategy was not a reaction to the events that took place on September 11, 
2001. The beginnings of an aggressive form of American power started to form as early 
as the 1990s, as was evidenced through the examples of documents, speeches, and 
publications referenced in Chapter Four. CDA has also revealed that the key influential 
people behind President Bush’s foreign policy have interacted with one another before, 
both inside and outside the government in previous administrations. It was their key 
ideas that were brought to the forefront after the 9/11 attacks, and created the 
foundations of the Bush Doctrine. Understanding that these foreign policy initiatives 
were not a reaction to 9/11, but were in fact pre-planned, chapter five revealed through 
CDA, that a specific narrative of a new world was created and the discourse suggests 
that this was due to the 9/11 attacks. Further, the Bush administration asked we now see 
everything through the new ‘prism’ of 9/11, warranting a series of changes in foreign 
policy, and ultimately a war in Afghanistan and Iraq. After the changing perceptions of 
geography were created, this provided the basis for the rest of the narrative for a GWOT, 
a war with Afghanistan and Iraq, and several other policy changes, including the Bush 
Doctrine initiatives (pre-emption, unilateralism, regime change) to fit into the wider 
story. This brings this research to this chapter where the final part of the narrative fits in. 
 
This chapter focuses on the discourses that defined the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT). Doty argues that the importance of ‘how’ questions are that they “examine 
how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects and objects” which 
creates specific interpretations of the world, while simultaneously excluding others 
(1996: 4). Those who use CDA maintain that the use of language is both a conscious 
and intentional decision; therefore, language is a powerful tool in constructing our 
reality, and in understanding power relations. As Jackson argues, language has a 
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“reality-making” effect; meaning it has a way of constructing reality and not only 
reflecting it (Jackson 2005: 23). Language is important because it “affects perception, 
cognition and emotion, it inevitably also affects concrete political action; it has 
consequences for social processes and structure” (Ibid). Therefore, this chapter looks at 
the discourses and seeks to answer a part of the question of ‘how’ Bush tried to 
legitimate American imperialism, with specific focus in the discourses surrounding the 
Global War on Terror, and the implementation of these in the invasion of Iraq. 
 
Continuing with the same methodology used in Chapters Four and Five, this 
chapter will focus analysis on the discourses that most clearly demonstrate the 
legitimacy of American power in the context of the GWOT. To summarize, this will 
mainly include four main linguistic tools in discourse analysis, which can be found in 
the methodology section.  They are: lexical style, implicitness, rhetorical devices, and 
argumentation. The data for this chapter is comprised of mainly quotes by George W. 
Bush, and policy documents such as the National Security Strategy 2002 and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001, as evidence of the discourses used to legitimate 
American imperialism, specifically surrounding the GWOT. The data ranges from 
September 11, 2001 to the lead up to the Iraq war in 2003, and shortly afterwards. The 
quotes and excerpts used are representative of the types of discourse used to legitimize 
military action in the Global War on Terror, specifically in the invasion of Iraq.  
 
It begins with a critical discourse analysis of the Global War on Terror, which is 
divided into ‘themes’ which represent the discourses chosen to represent the way in 
which the use of American power is justified. The discourses represented in this chapter 
are: just war discourses, humanitarian discourses, America’s ‘job’ to protect the peace, 
pre-emption, ensuring no rival to American power, and unilateralism. These are parallel 
to some of the discourses in Chapter Four, which show that in fact these claims were 
not a reaction to 9/11, but rather a continuation of the policy ideas we saw emerge in the 
1990s. By analyzing these discourses in parallel, it will become evident that they are in 
fact the same, or very similar, to the claims of the 1990s, except now the language has 
been made to fit the narrative of a new world that 9/11 brought with it, as outlined in the 
previous chapter (Chapter Five). In the second section, attention is paid to the role of the 
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war in Iraq in American grand strategy and the two main themes are perpetual war, and 
the intentional confusion of Iraq and Saddam Hussein with Osama Bin Laden and 9/11, 
in order to justify an invasion.  
 
6.2 The Global War on Terror: A Critical Discourse Analysis  
This section looks at discourses used to create legitimacy for the Global War on 
Terror, and for the invasion of Iraq. The discourses are divided into major themes, 
which are: just war, humanitarian discourses, America’s ‘job’ to protect the peace, pre-
emption, unilateralism and the belief that there should be no rival to American power. 
Using CDA, this section seeks to draw attention to specific discourses and how they 
worked in ways to create legitimacy for Bush’s foreign policy agenda, specifically in 
regards to the GWOT. The assumptions expressed by Bush and his administration, 
found in speeches and official policy documents form ideologies about the world, and 
more specifically, America’s role in it especially post 9/11. Richard Jackson writes that:  
 
The war on terrorism therefore, is simultaneously a set of actual practice – 
war, covert operations, agencies and institutions – and an accompanying 
series of assumption, beliefs, justifications and narratives – it is an entire 
language or discourse (2005: 8).  
 
CGP seeks to expose the social construction behind these ideologies, and how, in turn, 
it creates identities (good/evil, us/them), and categories of inside and outside, 
legitimizing military action. CDA compliments this approach methodologically by 
taking apart discourses in order to understand how they work in ways to serve specific 
ideologies. Paying special attention to the major themes of CGP, especially the power 
of ideas through discourse, and identity and difference (which will be especially 
important in this section), this section will provide a critical reading of the Bush 
administration’s discourses.  
 
A real effort was made at legitimizing the GWOT, Iraq, the creation of 
Guantanamo Bay prison, and the Patriot Act, to name the major changes. Therefore, this 
is a project in understanding how, and through which discourses the Bush 
administration attempted to create legitimacy for these changes. These discourses matter 
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as they constituted major legitimizing points for Bush’s GWOT and the Iraq invasion. 
This is of importance as the social constructions, represented in these discourses, 
naturalize ideologies that go on to create justifications for the use of force, and further 
legitimate the need for American power to deal with the situation. As a key component 
to imperialism – the ability to project great military force - the following discourses 
serve as examples as to how an open ended script for war was justified by the GWOT, 
and left the United States with a blank cheque for American empire. 
 
Just War  
Post 9/11, Osama Bin Laden could not be found, and therefore Afghanistan but, 
more importantly Iraq, created distractions from the failure to deal with a missing Bin 
Laden, and came to represent major actions in the perpetual Global War on Terror. In 
order to gather support, Bush began to use ‘just war’ discourses, which re-introduced 
the concept into political discourse in the United States. As Hardt and Negri write:  
 
The concept of justice serves to universalize war beyond any particular 
interests toward the interest of humanity as a whole. Justice tends to 
generalize war beyond its proper scope and confuse it with other social 
realms, such as morality and religion (2004: 15).  
 
Just war doctrine is a disputed concept because it entirely depends on who defines what 
is just. There are three main components to just war theory: Jus ad bellum, which refers 
to actions before war is declared – the justice of war; jus in bello, which is just and fair 
conduct during war, and lastly, jus post bello, which is the responsibility and 
accountability of parties after war (Moseley 2009). The section that is relevant to this 
research is jus ad bellum – pre-war actions taken by the Bush government. To this, there 
are six further criteria. They are: having a just cause, being a last resort, being declared 
by a proper authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, 
and the ends being proportional to the means (Ibid). 
 
The international community, while generally supporting a “War on Terror”, 
saw the war in Iraq to be largely illegitimate. However, in the view of Bush and his 
administration, the discourse would prove that they believed in their cause and believed 
they were fighting a just war. Each criterion is demonstrated by Bush below. 
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(i) Having a just cause 
Bush repeatedly justified the war in Iraq, the centerpiece to the GWOT, in terms of 
having a just cause. The goal of America was to “disarm Iraq, to free its people and to 
defend the world from grave danger” (Bush 2003b). He justifies his cause by 
demonizing Saddam, emphasizing Saddam’s contempt for peace, and his willingness to 
put innocents in harm’s way: 
 
America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules 
of morality. Saddam Hussein has placed Iraqi troops and equipment in 
civilian areas, attempting to use innocent men, women and children as 
shields for his own military; a final atrocity against his people (Bush 
2003b). 
 
In the above statement, Bush is using argumentation to provide his audience with ‘facts’ 
to support his argument that Saddam Hussein needs to be removed, by arguing that 
Saddam uses innocents as shields for his military.  The quote below from the 2002 State 
of the Union demonstrates implicitness in his use of words:  
 
We have seen the depth of our enemies' hatred in videos where they laugh 
about the loss of innocent life (Bush 2002).  
 
Here, Bush chose to say that the ‘enemy’ is ‘laughing about the loss of life’. In a very 
vague statement, with no pointed evidence, Bush implies that the enemy is simply 
laughing at the loss of life, removing any political intention. This would imply they 
have no aims but to seek entertainment and joy from the loss of American life. This 
creates a specific view of the ‘enemy’ that makes it easier for the public to ‘hate’, and 
therefore, legitimize military action against. Below, in the 2004 State of the Union 
address, after the initial invasion, President Bush emphasizes that the war was a just 
cause by declaring, 
 
The work of building a new Iraq is hard, and it is right. And America has 
always been willing to do what it takes for what is right (Bush 2004b). 
 
(ii) Last resort 
The second criterion is that war be used as a last resort. Several of Bush’s 
statements confirm that from his perspective, invading Iraq was a last resort. He begins 
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his argument in 2002, the year prior to the invasion. The following set of quotes 
emphasize the negative actions and attributes of the Iraqi government in his lexical style, 
while emphasizing American ‘goodness’ and innocence. Speaking in Cincinnati, Bush 
warns: 
The world has also tried economic sanctions -- and watched Iraq use billions 
of dollars in illegal oil revenues to fund more weapons purchases, rather 
than providing for the needs of the Iraqi people (Bush 2002c). 
 
The world has tried limited military strikes to destroy Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction capabilities -- only to see them openly rebuilt, while the 
regime again denies they even exist (Bush 2002c). 
 
The world has tried no-fly zones to keep Saddam from terrorizing his own 
people -- and in the last year alone, the Iraqi military has fired upon 
American and British pilots more than 750 times (Bush 2002c). 
 
 
In the examples above, Bush is really emphasizing that the ‘world’, which consists of 
American allies, is inherently good and united in its goals to try every means possible to 
disarm Saddam without the necessity of war. He also emphasizes that they did this in 
order to stop Saddam from ‘terrorizing his own people’, highlighting Saddam Hussein’s 
negative attributes. He continues by saying: 
 
After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, 
inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam 
Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his 
capabilities to make more. And he is moving ever closer to developing a 
nuclear weapon (Bush 2002c). 
 
 
Again, President Bush emphasizes “we” to group those (who represent ‘us’) against the 
enemy, Saddam (“them”). Not only is he marking a clear divide, in this instance he is 
also using argumentation again as he presents facts, such as the avenues that have been 
tried (containment, sanctions, inspections, etc) and the end result is still a negative 
statement that Saddam is closer to a nuclear weapon. As we now know, there were no 
such weapons, and even at the time of this statement, solid proof was not offered for the 
‘weapon’ that Saddam was developing; only speculation. Statements made in 2003 to 
the lead up to the invasion, and finally, on the evening of the invasion itself by Bush, 
maintain that everything was done to peacefully stop Saddam Hussein, and war has 
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become the last option left: 
 
Almost three months ago, the United Nations Security Council gave 
Saddam Hussein his final chance to disarm. He has shown instead utter 




In the above statement, Bush uses an argumentative form of language in which he states 
that the United Nations gave Saddam chances to disarm, using facts to support his point. 
Following this, he uses vague implicit statements to show that Saddam shows “utter 
contempt” for the UN and the world. These are emotive statements used to provoke 
negative feelings towards the ‘enemy’. Choosing to use specific words, he also tries to 
emphasize that everything was done in requirement to justify a just war against Iraq. In 
his final statements to Americans, the United Nations, Iraq, and indeed the international 
community, Bush states: 
 
Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not 
disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power. For the last four-and-a-half 
months, the United States and our allies have worked within the Security 
Council to enforce that Council's long-standing demands…The United 
Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will 
rise to ours (Bush 2003c). 
 
 
In this statement, the President uses argumentation in which he specifically makes 
reference again to how the United States and the United Nations have tried to disarm 
Saddam using diplomatic avenues. In his own defense of potentially going to war 
without the support of the UN, he also makes points that he is forced into this decision 
by the unwillingness of the UN to “do it’s job”, again supporting his argument that war 
is a last resort.  
 
It is evident that Bush uses a variety of linguistic devices to gather support; he is 
also arguing that war is an inevitable last resort, and tries to justify his cause of just war. 
He uses a mix of argumentation by reference to facts, such as UN Security Council 
resolutions; an emphasis of the positive attributes of America and the negative attributes 
of Saddam Hussein in his lexical style; the implicitness in his speeches about the 
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thoughts and actions of the ‘enemy’ in attempts to prove that war is a last resort, making 
it a legitimate and just war.  
 
 (iii) War declared by a proper authority 
     This criterion does not need any evidence as the war in Iraq was initiated by 
George W. Bush, commander in chief of the United States army; and President of the 
United States of America. 
 
(iv) Possessing right intention 
Among the reasons for going to war with Iraq were humanitarian violations by 
the Iraqi government, their alleged possession of WMD, and posing a real threat to 
America and its neighbours. Amongst the intentions for war, the two most important 
were to maintain world peace (as Iraq was presented as a grave threat to this), and, of 
course, it was an important step in winning the Global War on Terror. Statements 
supporting these points are below: 
 
In all of these efforts, however, America's purpose is more than to follow a 
process. It is to achieve a result: the end of terrible threats to the civilized 
world (Bush 2003). 
 
Bush’s lexical style emphasizes America’s inherent ‘good’ qualities, and is advocating 
that America is selfless in that it wishes to answer a call to a greater purpose, that of 
abolishing threats to the whole world. Below is a further demonstration of his argument 
of right intention to pursue Iraq.  
 
Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the 
freedom and security of the American people (Bush 2003). 
 
Below, he continues with his emphasis that America only wants peace; that America is 
pure in its good intentions, and it is with this intention that they must go to war.  
 
We seek peace. We strive for peace. And sometimes peace must be 




Once more below, America’s positive qualities are emphasized. America is “strong”, 
“honourable”, and that they, selflessly, sacrifice to save others. 
 
America is a strong nation and honorable in the use of our strength. We 
exercise power without conquest, and we sacrifice for the liberty of 
strangers (Bush 2003). 
 
In the examples above, much of Bush’s linguistic devices are in his lexical style and the 
emphasis of positive American actions and intentions, such as America as ‘strong’, 
‘honorable’, and selfless.  
 
(v) Having a reasonable chance of success 
The fifth criterion for pre-war actions in just war is that the operation will have a 
reasonable chance of success. At the time, Bush assumed that the war would be easier 
than it was. However, analyzing only the discourse at the time with the knowledge 
available, Bush presented a case for guaranteed success. At the time he declared war on 
Iraq, he said: 
 
My fellow citizens, the dangers to our country and the world will be 
overcome. We will pass through this time of peril and carry on the work of 
peace. We will defend our freedom. We will bring freedom to others. And 
we will prevail (Bush 2003b). 
 
Here, once more, Bush is using very modest reasons, such as ‘bringing freedom to 
others’ as part of his reasoning to go to war in Iraq. This highlights America’s good 
intentions, while ensuring that America will ‘win’ the war.  Again, he ensures the 
United States will prevail: 
 
And if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the full force and might of 
the United States military, and we will prevail (Bush 2003). 
 
 (vi) The ends proportional to the means 
The final condition to jus ad bellum is the justification of the ends being 
proportional to the means. President Bush reassures the public that everything will be 
done in order to spare innocent lives and that it will be a targeted operation. The 
following statement, made at the 2003 State of the Union address demonstrates this: 
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If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means, 
sparing, in every way we can, the innocent (Bush 2003 state of the union)  
 
Following this, on the eve of the invasion, Bush states in a special message on 
television declaring war on Iraq: 
 
I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make 
every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm. A campaign on the harsh 
terrain of a nation as large as California could be longer and more difficult 
than some predict. And helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable and free 
country will require our sustained commitment (Bush 2003b). 
 
 
Here, Bush uses very vague statements to support his point, saying that the mission may 
be “longer and more difficult” than predicted – not really clarifying what that could 
potentially mean in real terms. He continues by saying it will require “sustained 
commitment”. This leaves room for an open ended, perpetual war. Bush, intentionally, 
uses vague statements as not to put off the population from the costs of war, while 
supporting his point that this is necessary and the means are proportional. He also 
deploys rhetorical devices, such as metaphors, in explaining that Iraq is “harsh” terrain, 
the “size of California”, as to provide some imagery that Americans can relate to in his 
argument.  
 
Through the lens of George W. Bush and his administration, the six criteria for 
just war were fulfilled and, therefore, by their judgment, they successfully made a case 
for a just invasion of Iraq.   Kofi Anan famously declared it an illegal war (long after it 
took place), and the United Nations did not support the invasion (BBC 2004). However, 
according to Bush, America was leading a just mission, as a last resort, to save the 
world from an evil tyrant. His logic led him to believe he had made a compelling 
argument to the American public, and to the world, for a justifiable war, coupled by the 
fact that in his view the United Nations wasn’t ‘doing its job’, leaving him no choice. 
He did this by using language that is vague, making unclear statements about the length 




In paying specific attention to the language used, CDA always considers how 
power is at work. A key part of this, as van Dijk (1993) argues, is influencing the mind. 
The portrayal of Saddam Hussein as not only a dictator, but a person with deep seeded 
hatred and defiance for the American way of life, is an emotive way to gather support 
and rally Americans against an Other. The binaries that are created through discourse 
legitimize military action, and, simultaneously, delegitimize Saddam Hussein and Iraqi 
regime.  He also uses argumentation as a linguistic device, and presents ‘facts’ to 
support his ideas such as the number of times Saddam has defied the UN Security 
Council or the atrocities committed against his own people. Above all, Bush frequently 
emphasizes positive American actions, values or principles while demonizing Saddam 
and emphasizing negative traits. Richard Jackson argues that central to the counter-
terrorism campaign is ‘information management’ and ‘message manipulation’, therefore 
it is crucial to realize that the language used is planned and conscious, and is in no way 
accidental (Jackson 2005: 27). CDA takes apart the language to show how power 
works. In consistence with critical geopolitics, these discourses shed light on the 
importance of the power of ideas, and identity and difference – two of the keys themes 
in CGP. The next sub section specifically focuses on humanitarian discourses and how 
they were used to legitimate war. 
 
Humanitarian discourses 
This section provides evidence of the humanitarian discourses used in the 
justification of the invasion of Iraq - the first preemptive strike in the Global War on 
Terror. President Bush’s emphasis is two-fold: it covers Bush’s demonization of 
Saddam based on his long record of human rights violations on one hand, and how 
removing him would be beneficial to the people of Iraq on the other. The importance of 
this section focuses on the fact that Saddam Hussein’s violations are not new and, 
certainly, not post-9/11. Granted Saddam did, in fact, inflict terror upon his own people, 
and was a known mass violator of human rights over the course of his dictatorship. 
However, the crucial point is how Bush used these factors as a very sudden and 
emergent threat that needed to be dealt with, connecting the urgency of dealing with 
Saddam’s human rights violations to the greater GWOT in a ‘post 9/11 world’. These 
discourses added another dimension to the legitimacy he sought to invade Iraq, and 
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represent a liberal imperialist platform. In this section are examples of the rhetoric that 
Ignatieff refers to as ‘Empire Lite’6; using humanitarian discourses to legitimate 
intervention, for the good of the Iraqi people, and as a moral obligation for America. 
   
If the question is how Bush used 9/11 to legitimate American imperialism, a 
very important part of the Global War on Terror and Bush’s decision to invade Iraq fit 
‘humanitarian’ justification. In 2002, one year after the 9/11 attacks, in an address at the 
United Nations General Assembly, Bush began the humanitarian argument against 
Saddam Hussein. He begins by outlining his violation of human rights: 
 
Last year, the UN commission on human rights found that Iraq continues to 
commit extremely grave violations of human rights and that the regime's 
repression is all-pervasive (Bush 2002b). 
 
 
In the above quote, Bush is using argumentation by making reference to facts, such as 
the United Nations human rights violations. He also uses vague statements such as 
reference to Saddam’s repression in his country to be ‘all pervasive’, without really 
giving any more detail. Bush also emphasizes the torture of citizens by Saddam’s 
regime, and the infringement on civil liberties and wrongful imprisonment.  
 
Tens of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have been 
subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution and 
torture by beating and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation and 
rape (Bush 2002b). 
 
Wives are tortured in front of their husbands; children in the presence of 
their parents; and all of these horrors concealed from the world by the 
apparatus of a totalitarian state (Bush 2002b). 
 
 
In the two statements above, he continues to use argumentation as he begins with 
numbers and ‘facts’ about the atrocities that Saddam has committed, to convince people 
he is a danger to the world and his people. In the second quote, he makes a more 
emotional argument as he speaks about wives watching husbands being tortured, with 
children in their presence, culminating in an argumentative statement that Saddam 																																																								6	See	Chapter	Three	for	Ignatieff’s	definition	of	Empire	Lite.		
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Hussein is responsible for terrible acts, followed by the point that he runs a totalitarian 
state. Jackson argues that language structures our cognition, and it affects our emotions 
(Jackson 2005: 22), which is why emotive statements are very appealing.   
Contrary to the government of Iraq, Bush states that America’s ‘goal’ is the liberation of 
the Iraqi people from human suffering, and once again emphasizes the good intentions 
of America: 
 
The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. They've suffered too 
long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause 
and a great strategic goal (Bush 2002b). 
 
We must stand up for our security and for the permanent rights and the 
hopes of mankind (Bush 2002b).  
 
 
Bush changes the meaning of war in Iraq using a more emotional approach, stating that 
they have suffered in ‘silent captivity’, implying that America is their savior who can 
set them free. He does this by promoting America as an unambiguous good force; one 
that is committed to a greater ‘moral cause’, whom stands up for human rights. Finally, 
a promise to Iraqis that the United States will ‘save’ them from an evil dictator, and that 
America condemns human rights violations and must take action upon principle: 
 
America believes that all people are entitled to hope and human rights, to 
the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. People everywhere prefer 
freedom to slavery; prosperity to squalor; self-government to the rule of 
terror and torture. America is a friend to the people of Iraq. Our demands 
are directed only at the regime that enslaves them and threatens us. When 
these demands are met, the first and greatest benefit will come to Iraqi men, 
women and children. The oppression of Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomans, 
Shi'a, Sunnis and others will be lifted. The long captivity of Iraq will end, 
and an era of new hope will begin (Bush 2002b). 
 
 
The intention in this statement is to stress the positive attributes of American culture, 
and the good intentions of the American government. Specifically, in the second 
sentence, Bush uses contrasts as a rhetorical device by making reference to the 
opposites in the way that Americans live, in ‘freedom’, to the exaggerated state of 
Iraqis, who live in ‘slavery’. He continues with contrasts as evident in his examples of 
‘prosperity’ and ‘squalor’, ‘self-government’ to the rule of ‘terror and torture’.  
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One year later in the same year the invasion of Iraq would begin, in his 2003 State 
of the Union address, Bush continues to outline points previously made about torture, 
the suffering of women and children, and the oppression resulting from human rights 
violations by Saddam: 
 
Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained: by torturing 
children while their parents are made to watch. International human rights 
groups have catalogued other methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq: 
electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation 
with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape. If this is not evil, then evil 
has no meaning. And tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed 
people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country, your enemy is 
ruling your country (Bush 2003). 
 
 
President Bush carefully chooses his words to emphasize the negative attributes of 
Iraq’s regime and their ruler instead of focusing on American attributes. He focuses on 
the methods of torture by giving details of the violent methods used by Saddam’s 
regime to obtain confessions backing his statement with ‘facts’ that human rights 
groups have collected. Also, an example of over-lexicalization, “if this isn’t evil, then 
evil has no meaning” and “your enemy”, where Bush repeats certain key words.  
 
At the time of the invasion, although there were supporting nations, only Britain 
and Australia made significant contributions with troops and funds7; America had no 
support from the UN or the majority of the international community. The main 
American justification for war was the belief and ‘evidence’ that Iraq possessed WMD. 
After they could find no such weapons, the language focused far more on the need to 
“free the Iraqi people”, as a central justification.  Six days into the war with Iraq, Bush 
made a speech at Macdill Air Force base in Florida. He spoke about the combat in Iraq 
and the victories so far. He also made several references to the humanitarian reasons 
that necessitated the invasion: 
 
Iraqis are a good and gifted people. They deserve better than a life spent 
bowing before a dictator. The people of Iraq deserve to stand on their feet as 																																																								7	Figures:	about	255,000	American	troops,	45,000	British,	and	2,000	Australian.	<	http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0908900.html>		
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free men and women -- the citizens of a free country (Bush 2003e). 
 
 
He follows this by saying that, 
 
This goal of a free and peaceful Iraq unites our coalition. And this goal 
comes from the deepest convictions of America. The freedom you defend is 
the right of every person and the future of every nature. The liberty we prize 
is not American's gift to the world; it is God's gift to humanity (Bush 
2003e).  
 
Bush uses contrasts to differentiate Iraq under Hussein, which is spent ‘bowing’ before 
a dictator, and Iraq after American intervention, which is a ‘free’ nation. The second 
statement, in particular, underlines Bush’s portrayal of America and its allies as those 
who defend freedom, and are inherently of good intention, using positive language in 
reference to America, and negative uses in references to Saddam’s regime. 
 
Once Bush declared victory on May 1, 2003, with the mission accomplished sign 
hanging over him on the military ship USS Abraham Lincoln, he said, “In the battle of 
Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed” (Bush 2003d). The ongoing battle 
that would come after this declaration had not been predicted. In the same speech, he 
spoke about the accomplishments of the war in the humanitarian aid of the Iraqi people: 
 
Decades of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their 
oppressors or desire their own enslavement. Men and women in every 
culture need liberty like they need food and water and air. Everywhere that 
freedom arrives, humanity rejoices; and everywhere that freedom stirs, let 
tyrants fear (Bush 2003d). 
 
The President uses negative statements describing Iraq under Saddam as ‘oppressed’ 
and ‘enslaved’. He also makes use of both contrasting statements and metaphors in his 
choice of words in this instance. He firstly contrasts that success has brought Iraq 
freedom, and has freed them from the lies and intimidation of their old regime. He also 
makes reference to tyrants who should ‘fear’ freedom, and the rest of the world where 
‘humanity’ will ‘rejoice’ in freedom. The third sentence makes use of metaphors as he 
states that men and women ‘need liberty’ like they would need food or water; stressing 
the importance of what America has accomplished.  
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Humanitarian discourses played an important role in justifying the war in Iraq. 
For those who did not necessarily agree with a preemptive strike on Iraq or were not 
convinced by the evidence of the existence of WMD, reasons for alarm over human 
rights violations by Saddam Hussein appealed to an alternative dimension of 
justification. In the grand scheme of things, Hussein’s human rights violations and 
stories of the terror he inflicted upon his own people strengthened Bush’s argument for 
war. His rationale was complimented by the specific language he used in his speeches, 
which portrayed a carefully constructed image of Saddam Hussein; especially contrast 
between Hussein’s regime, by identifying the human rights abuses, and declaring him as 
‘evil’, while focusing on the good intentions of America and its allies in the moral 
obligation to ‘save’ the people of Iraq. Humanitarian discourses proved to be an 
important part of Bush’s narrative for Iraq, and central to how he attempted to create 
legitimacy for military action as Bush created an Other for the American public to point 
a finger at. Portrayed as a monster who torments his own people, Bush presented an 
argument that Saddam must be immediately removed from power. The discourse 
creates binaries that would justify action to remove Saddam Hussein from power such 
as equating Saddam and his regime with ‘slavery’, ‘squalor’, ‘terror’, ‘torture’ and 
‘captivity’, while using contrasting discourse to portray American values as having a 
‘moral cause’, and contrasting the American way of life as being ‘hopeful’, having 
‘dignity’, ‘prosperity’ and above all, ‘freedom’. By presenting the Iraqi regime and 
Saddam Hussein in a negative light with emphasis on humanitarian violations with 
binaries, it provided legitimacy to remove him. 
 
America’s job to protect the Peace 
One of the most emphasized points of legitimacy for preemptive actions, the 
Global War on Terror, and the invasion of Iraq, was the self-assigned job of the United 
States to protect the peace. This involves protecting not only America, but also its allies 
and essentially the world. There is a long history to this point, stretching back centuries. 
Certain political discourses within America have for a long time, if not since its 
inception, claimed America as exceptional, and thus given the state the duty, if needs be, 
of protecting world peace, as discussed in Chapter Three. Doty would argue that the 
understanding of these meanings to be “fixed and true” is evidence of the link between 
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power and knowledge (Doty 1996: 7). The ‘role’ or ‘job’ of America to protect the 
peace has been portrayed as natural. Doty maintains that the link between power and 
knowledge “permits meanings and identities to become naturalized, taken for granted” 
(Doty 1996: 7).  
 
As the 1990s proved to be a relatively peaceful era after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, there was not a direct threat to aim military efforts towards. 9/11 
disrupted this peace, altering public perception making them suddenly aware that they 
were being threatened by dangerous global enemies. In Chapter Three, it was made 
evident that protecting the peace – via military power – was an argument made in the 
1990s by key advisors serving in George Bush Senior’s administration and by think 
tanks associated with neoconservatives during the Clinton administration. September 11 
provided a ‘concrete’ reason through which to legitimize increases in military funding 
to ensure America remained preeminent, as that is what was needed to win the GWOT 
and protect the peace. The ideology that American power is needed is evident in 
documents and publications before 2001, but made explicit and implemented with the 
election of Bush and the events of September 11.  
 
       This section covers the discourses surrounding the ideology that it is the job of the 
United States to protect the peace. Not only that, it has become an official defence 
policy to protect world peace; doing so by projecting military force around the globe. 
The goal for foreign policymakers, argues Hansen, is to “present foreign policy that 
appears legitimate and enforceable to its relevant audience” (Hansen 2006: 28). 
Through these discourses, it will become evident that war is presented as a means to 
maintain peace. Part of this rationale are discourses that state the United States cannot 
be left in a vulnerable position, as it would jeopardize world peace. Therefore, in this 
view, all must be done to ensure American pre-eminence in the world. 
 
Speaking at Westpoint on June 1, 2002, Bush says the following: 
 
Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We 
fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We 
will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will 
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preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And 
we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every 
continent (Bush 2002b).  
 
Here, President Bush presents America as a protector of world peace, a self-assigned 
job, that does good for the world. He does this by focusing on the positive attributes of 
America, such as their commitment to fight and be ‘just’; to ‘build good relations’ and 
‘encourage’ free societies. These are all positives that America can supply those 
suffering with. This is done by, again, by separating ‘us’ (America and its allies) against 
‘them’ (the ‘terrorists and tyrants’) who pose the threats. This overall idea that America 
as a nation has a ‘cause’, which is to fight for peace, is communicated by such discourse. 
As van Dijk notes, discourse serves as the medium by which such ideologies are 
persuasively communicated to society (van Dijk 1997:25), and therefore there is always 
an element of power at play, as it is in the interests of the American administration to 
have military control over strategic areas, which can be accomplished by the ‘role’ of 
America s peacekeeper.  
 
In the preface of the 2002 National Security Strategy, which was a key document 
in the Bush Doctrine as it was published after 9/11 and, therefore, focused a great deal 
on the aftermath of those events, a similar discourse is put forward: 
 
As we defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic 
opportunity to preserve the peace…Today, the world’s great powers find 
ourselves on the same side— united by common dangers of terrorist 
violence and chaos. The United States will build on these common interests 
to promote global security (The White House 2002: preface). 
 
In the excerpt above, the role of America to defend the global peace is demonstrated. It 
is prefaced by a ‘historic opportunity’ and, ironically, suggests that this is a time when 
America and the world should strive for peace instead of prepare for war. It seems 
ironic because while military action is seemingly being initiated, it is presented as ‘good’ 
and ‘peaceful’ by the language in order to legitimize what is otherwise ‘violent’ as a 
means. A contrast is also made using rhetorical devices to group America and the world 
who are united, against the terrorists, violence and chaos. Again, in the statement below, 
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at the 2003 State of the Union address, Bush emphasizes America’s ‘job’ to preserve the 
peace, as America is the leader in saving the ‘hopes of all mankind’: 
 
Once again, this nation and our friends are all that stand between a world at 
peace, and a world of chaos and constant alarm. Once again, we are called 
to defend the safety of our people and the hopes of all mankind. And we 
accept this responsibility (Bush 2003). 
 
Contrasts are used again in making his point. He places a line between America and its 
friends, and everyone else, by arguing that America is the last hope for a world that is 
full of ‘chaos’ and ‘constant alarm’. American power is portrayed as needed in saving 
the world from chaos. In the last two quotes, ‘chaos’ is repeated to draw attention to a 
world where terrorists can cause harm; an example of over-lexicalization. The use of 
contrasts and over-lexicalization make clear the Othering of Saddam and the Iraqi 
regime, and therefore legitimize the use of American power in maintaining peace. 
 
In a speech that later addresses his ‘message to Iraq’, he says: 
 
The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and 
peace in that region. Our goal will not be achieved overnight, but it can 
come over time. The power and appeal of human liberty is felt in every life 
and every land. And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred 
and violence, and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits 
of peace (Bush 2003c). 
 
 
In this statement a few different linguistic devices can be recognized. Firstly, Bush is 
emphasizing, once more, the positive attributes of America such as their goal to 
‘advance liberty’, and to bring peace. Second, he uses contrasts by stating that 
‘freedom’ will overcome ‘hatred’ and ‘violence’. Finally, he uses vague language to 
cover his bases, and states that this goal will be achieved ‘over time’, which leaves the 
door open for future administrations to use similar rationale to their ends. As all words 
are choices and all language is intentional, the examples of vague language construct 
future legitimacy for military intervention. It does this by focusing on how long and 
undetermined the fight to bring ‘freedom’ to everywhere in the world could take. By 
associating free societies with the eradication of hatred and violence, these discourses 
serve to legitimate the use of military action and regime change in order to bring about 
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‘peaceful’ and ‘stable’ societies.  
 
In 2004, in a speech where Bush defended the war in Iraq, he also outlined three 
ways that his administration proposes to sustain democratic peace. They are: defending 
the peace, protecting the peace, and extending the peace, all of which involve military 
action.  
 
First, we are defending the peace by taking the fight to the enemy. We will 
confront them overseas so we do not have to confront them here at home  
(Bush 2004). 
 
President Bush begins by identifying that defending the peace would mean fighting the 
‘enemy’ over ‘there’ before they have to confront them on American soil. He continues 
to explain how terrorist activities are being disrupted, while minimizing the ‘space’ they 
have to conduct their activities. Second, he states that:  
 
We're protecting the peace by working with friends and allies and 
international institutions to isolate and confront terrorists and outlaw 
regimes…To be effective, that global response requires leadership -- and 
America will lead (Bush 2004). 
 
 
By using contrasts, the good ‘friends and allies’ against the ‘terrorists’ and ‘outlaw 
regimes’, Bush sets the tone that it is a battle of us against them. He continues by 
incorporating all those involved on the side of America, clearly stating that America 
will take on the job as leader in the preservation of world peace. Lastly, Bush outlines 
his third part of the formula that America’s goals are to protect the democratic peace, 
and, subsequently, the only way to do this is through military operations throughout the 
world.  
 
Third, we are extending the peace by supporting the rise of democracy, and 
the hope and progress that democracy brings, as the alternative to hatred and 
terror in the broader Middle East. In democratic and successful societies, 
men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they 
turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic 
governments do not shelter terrorist camps or attack their neighbors. When 




Consistently using contrasts as a rhetorical device, once more, Bush sets a line between 
those who support democracy as the direct alternative to those who suppose hatred and 
terror. He continues by contrasting the different ways in which these societies function, 
i.e. democratic governments live in peace and justice, whereas those who are not a 
democracy will shelter terrorists and ‘attack their neighbours’. He also makes mention 
that in democratic and successful societies, people ‘turn their hearts and labor to 
building better lives’ – an emotional statement – contrasted to those who ‘swear 
allegiance to malcontents and murderers’. Among the four main tools of CDA outlined 
in the methodology section, contrast and rhetorical devices are one of the clearest in 
defining sharply ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
 
Protecting the peace is a broad and vague argument, which is why it is so easily 
applicable to any threat. After the end of the Cold War, an argument was made by 
neoconservatives to ‘embrace’ US leadership8. Through discourse and time, the aim was 
that US supremacy would become naturalized. The idea that the world is peaceful due 
to US leadership was an argument repeatedly made by the neoconservatives, through 
think tanks like the Project for a New American Century, and through official 
government documents as seen above. When Bush came into office, following the 9/11 
attacks, he took a similar stance. As made clear in the methodology section, power is 
most effective when we are unaware that it is working (van Dijk 1993), and we come to 
believe something such as US supremacy being ‘natural’ becomes common sense. After 
9/11 and the declared GWOT, Bush equated ridding the world of terrorism and 
terrorists as the way to world peace, led of course by America. The discourse provided 
an ideology that made military action seem as it is a task for presented peace, rather 
than instigating aggression. The binaries created through the contrast of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
allowed the US to attack ‘them’ by creating an Other, because they are presented to be 
‘evil’. 
Following this, the argument to invade Iraq fit in to Bush’s justification for a 
Global War against Terrorism. The discourses presented by Bush suggested that all 																																																								8	In	the	preface	to	Rebuilding	America’s	Defences,	a	key	publication	by	the	Project	 for	a	New	American	 Century,	 a	 neoconservative	 think	 tank,	 the	 authors	 say:	 “The	 history	 of	 the	 past	century	should	have	taught	us	to	embrace	the	cause	of	American	leadership”	(Donnelly	2000:	preface).		
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things were linked: Iraq was a threat, and the need to immediately deter threats given 
America had entered a GWOT was priority in national security strategy after 9/11. The 
discourse presented an argument for a legitimate initiation of military action by the US 
as it is seen to be in the ‘best interests’ of the world. 
 
Pre-emption 
Possibly the most ambitious policy of the Bush Doctrine was pre-emption. Bush’s 
claims that America could actually pre-empt danger, and thus intervene militarily 
anywhere that posed a potential threat, was a sharp turn and departure point in 
American foreign policy. This section will demonstrate how September 11th marked a 
turning point, and justification to implement these measures as a way to legitimize 
American imperialism.  
 
The National Security Strategy, which served as the Bush Doctrine in policy terms, 
echoed what was written in the Project for a New American Century and Defense 
Planning Guidance publications. The preface to the NSS in 2002 asserts that,  
 
…As a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against 
such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend 
America and our friends by hoping for the best (The White House 2002: 
preface). 
 
The intention to act before threats materialize is a policy that is difficult to defend, and 
in this specific instance, it is even presented as ‘common sense’. However, with 9/11 
being the ‘proof’ of not doing so, pre-emption officially became part of national defense 
and security policy. The above uses implicit language in the suggestive statement that it 
is ‘common sense’ for America to act preemptively given the events of 9/11. It also 
connects the current experiences to pre-existing ones, as Fairclough (2001) outlines as 
important. This fits in with Americans’ previous experience of the world, as they are 
prompted to remember 9/11, and what could happen if there is inaction. There is also 
some exaggeration when Bush states that the US cannot hope for the best and must 
attack preemptively instead. Surely, one can be prepared without taking action, which is 
still a far way from ‘hoping’. Jutta Weldes argues that social constructions become 
common sense when particular representations of reality are treated neutrally, as 
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representing what is ‘real’ (Weldes 1999: 226). Weldes maintains that common sense is 
the naturalization of constructed representations which obscure the ideological effects, 
and become taken-for-granted beliefs (Weldes 1999: 226). 
 
Pre-emption as an argument, in itself, is implicit. It assumes that terrorists will 
attack and it is implied that the only way to prevent this is to attack first. The 2002 
National Security Strategy makes this clear: 
 
Defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at 
home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches 
our borders…We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our 
right of self- defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to 
prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country (The 
White House 2002: 6). 
 
The idea that self-defense takes the form of preemptive action is contentious. Simply 
stated, this is an argument for acting forcefully against a potential threat that has not 
actually materialized as a matter of ‘self-defense’. Self-defense is generally understood 
as using force to defend one’s self in a situation where force has already been used. This 
point is strongly defended below: 
 
It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this 
new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States 
can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The 
inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and 
the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ 
choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies 
strike first (The White House 2002: 14). 
 
In this document, the argument for pre-emption is made by using implicit language, and, 
specifically, vague sweeping statements. The sentence in reference to the ‘goals of 
rogue states and terrorists’, which actually have not been outlined, continues to state 
that the ‘magnitude of potential harm’ could mean a number of things. The vagueness 
of the language allows for assumptions to be made that support an argument without 
facts. What this statement also contends is that due to the attacks of 9/11, global terror is 
presented as a new type of threat. This ‘sudden’ realization requires an immediate 
overhaul of American foreign policy, and an offensive (i.e. preemptive) national 
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security plan. Paying special attention to demonize rogue states, the document also 
expands this to their ‘terrorist’ clients, emphasizing negative qualities of the ‘enemy’: 
 
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before 
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the 
United States and our allies and friends (The White House 2002: 14). 
 
Pre-emption is no longer implied, like previous defense planning in the 1990s, or even 
in the prior PNAC documents – it is explicit in the NSS. Either by explicitly calling for 
preemptive action, or demonstrating that potential threats need to be handled before 
they are active threats, it makes clear American foreign policy was heading down a 
different path. Further, 9/11 is the constant reference for legitimacy as to why foreign 
policy needs to be overhauled. Bush’s argument that enemies will not ‘warn’ America 
before they attack means that America must attack first, preemptively. The failure to do 
this, in his view, will potentially result in another 9/11-type event. This stems from the 
perception that danger and fear had transformed, ushering in a new era of globalized 
threats, in the form of global terrorism. The perception of the ‘new’ threat of global 
terrorism is what Weldes refers to as the construction of crisis, whereby a ‘crisis’ 
appears as an objective fact, but in fact she argues that they are social constructions 
forged by state officials; an important point to keep in mind (Weldes 1999a: 37). 
Central to CDA is to always ask how power is at play. By legitimizing pre-emption as 
an act of self- defence, America gives itself the power to use force upon any state by 
referencing 9/11 as an example of not being proactive. It maintains a view that no state 
can stand in the way of American power as it is justified by discourses of a changed 
world with new threats.  
 
Finally, an important point in the NSS that attempts to justify pre-emption that 
provides a summary of the reasons it is necessary is below: 
Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional 
means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of 
terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons 
that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning 
(The White House 2002: 15). 
 
	 239	
The document uses language that demonizes the terrorists so that it makes it necessary 
to preemptively attack them in America’s defense. The lexical style of the entire 
publication is to emphasize American positive qualities while drawing attention to the 
negative qualities of potential enemies, creating an Other. Much of the attention is on 
the enemy’s means to harm America through unconventional approaches, using ‘terror’, 
and potentially ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and that this will be done ‘without 
warning’. Speaking at a commencement speech at Westpoint, which comprise some of 
Bush’s most quoted statements, he lays out his case for pre-emption: 
 
We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We 
cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign 
nonproliferation treaties, and then systematically break them. If we wait for 
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. The war on terror 
will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, 
disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge  (Bush 
2002b).  
 
President Bush uses language that again calls attention to the negative attributes of the 
Other, such as making reference to the enemy as a ‘tyrant’, and emphasizes how they 
‘systematically’ break treaties they sign for peace. Because of the way that he portrays 
the enemy (whom is not specified, and could be anyone) through his language, he also 
argues to legitimize pre-emption as a strategy. He clearly states that it is the ‘only path 
to safety’, based on the negative attributes he highlights of the enemy provides no other 
choice. His argument is that, if for any reason, the government feels that a threat could 
potentially form, it has right to take action before that threat materializes. All of this 
rhetoric is justified by the fact that there was no overt threat at the time of 9/11, but 
America was still attacked. Hence, the only reasonable response is to attack others 
before America is attacked once more.  
 
In one of his most cited statements pertaining to the Iraqi threat, he states that, 
 
Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering 
against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof 




The above statement was made in 2002, when George W. Bush was speaking to a 
crowd in Cincinnati about the danger of Saddam and the Iraqi threat. He uses metaphor 
as a rhetorical device to attract attention to the potential dangers that terrorists may 
cause should they be left unchecked. Jackson argues that the feeling of threat and 
danger has an important political function in that it usually constructs a collective 
identity as individuals are known to unify in the ‘face of danger’  (Jackson 2005: 115). 
The ‘smoking gun’ as a ‘mushroom cloud’ was one of the most cited lines by Bush 
during his presidency, and he used this metaphor to evoke fear about the potential 
dangers of another attack, thus justifying the use of preemptive force.  
 
President Bush justifies pre-emption by asserting that the terrorists and tyrants would 
not give America notice should they strike. He tries to further legitimize his argument 
by warning that someone like Saddam Hussein cannot be trusted: 
 
If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words 
and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and 
restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option (Bush 
2003). 
 
Bush argues that Hussein is not someone who can be trusted, implying by his words that 
he is potentially insane and out of control. He continues to use negative language to 
characterize Saddam so that preemptive actions can be justified. In his final warning 
message to Iraq, Bush says that: 
 
The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this 
threat. But we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along 
toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror 
can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed (Bush 
2003c). 
 
The President portrays America as the innocent victim who has not invited such threats, 
but has no choice but to face them. He uses contrasts as a rhetorical device by arguing 
that America will be on the course of ‘safety’ instead of the ‘tragedy’ that will be 
caused by the enemy. He also uses hyperboles such as ‘the day of horror’, which has not 
yet come, to unite the public and scaring them for what may or may not happen. Bush 
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has confirmed that before a real threat can materialize, and it is ‘too late’, the military 
will act to remove the potential danger. Below, he continues to defend his position by 
suggesting that to not act would result in a greater threat: 
 
We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear 
suddenly in our skies and cities (Bush 2003c). 
 
Bush uses rhetorical imagery such as meeting dangers before they are seen ‘in our skies 
and cities’. The imagery of danger, an obvious reference to that which happened on 
9/11, is meant to muster emotions that would lead the public to support his policies. 
Such emotive language is intended to create legitimacy as he connects potential dangers 
directly to what happened on September 11th; linking the discourse to past experiences 
as Fairclough (2001) has defined as coherence, which is how discourse fits in with our 
previous understanding of the world (2001: 65). As Bush said in 2004, “America must 
remember the lessons of September the 11th. We must confront serious dangers before 
they fully materialize” (Bush 2004). 
 
There are several important things to note here. First, are the discourses on the 
changing notions of danger and threat. Also, are the means in which the potential 
‘enemy’ can carry out attacks (chemical/biological weapons, WMD, etc) coupled with 
the assumption there will be no official warning (similar to the 9/11 attacks). All this 
creates a discourse of fear and danger geared towards legitimizing preemptive attacks: a 
proactive strategy for the US military to have a presence anywhere in the world. Of 
importance are the ways in which President Bush chooses to create this narrative. There 
are several rhetorical devices such as contrast, hyperboles, vagueness and many 
assumptions made about ‘potential’ threats, the form they will come in, and what 
consequences they may produce. The imagery of mushroom clouds and dangers in the 
‘cities and skies’ is meant to provoke fear so that the nation will be behind his policy of 
pre-emption so that it may seem legitimate.  
 
Additionally, the discourse emphasizes that the geography of danger and threat has 
changed, and the means and actors who pose a challenge to the United States (and the 
world) have also changed. Hence, global terrorism and global terrorists are to blame for 
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this ‘new’ form of violence. Given this ‘new’ reality, the discourses legitimize pre-
emption as a method of self-defense. By delegitimizing actions of terrorists, based on 
their inability to be trusted, and the violent means they choose to attain their goals, pre-
emption is regarded as not only a form of self-defense, but also a rational and legitimate 
option in the GWOT. Richard Jackson argues that the authorities have intentionally 
constructed a very widespread and deep fear of terrorism after 9/11 that not only is it 
rational to be afraid, but it would be irrational to not be afraid (Jackson 2005: 94). The 
idea that danger can be pre-empted sounds far-fetched, but after 9/11 certain policies 
became acceptable in order to protect the American homeland.  The references to 
‘mushroom clouds’ in American cities by Bush, or the reasoning that terrorists will not 
warn before they strike, all supported this point. With the tragedies of 9/11 and the 
perception of danger looming around every corner of the earth, the discourses used in 
policy documents and by Bush made 9/11 an overarching rationale. Intentional efforts 
to link discourse to previous experience, as to ‘scare’ people into imagining what could 
happen in the face of inaction, is also evident. The right to pre-emptively intervene 
anywhere before a real threat materializes in a war that is perpetual provided an open-
ended narrative for American imperialism for years to come.  
 
Ensuring no rival to American power 
Another central discourse to the GWOT was that there should be no rival to 
American power. After the end of the Cold War, which saw America and liberal 
democracy as the victor, there was no superpower rival to the United States. This result 
allowed for a rearrangement of the international system in their favour, as there was no 
real competitor left to the United States. After President Bush was elected, and the 9/11 
attacks that followed, ensuring that there would be no rival to American power re-
emerged in discourse. The importance of these discourses are in highlighting the fact 
that these imperial ambitions were not formulated after 9/11 or as a reaction to the 
events, as we saw evidence of them in the previous section. It is, however, to show how 
9/11 was used as the reason to promote a different, more forward foreign policy agenda 
to ensure attacks like September 11th does not happen again. Through the American 
national security lens, these foreign policy initiatives were to be presented as a response 
to the ‘new world’ that involves global terrorism. President Bush’s administration 
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presented the argument that the only way to protect America, and to ensure another 9/11 
does not happen again is to ensure American global dominance.  
 
Although Bush may not have specifically spoken about this point publicly, it is 
evident in the policy that deterring any rivals is in the national interest, and should be an 
active part of national security. The paragraph below taken from the National Security 
Strategy states that military power needs to be strong enough to ‘dissuade’ any potential 
challengers to American domination: 
 
We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from 
experience that some enemies cannot be deterred. The United States must 
and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy—
whether a state or non-state actor—to impose its will on the United States, 
our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces sufficient to support 
our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to 
dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of 
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States (The White House 
2002: 30). 
 
In this document, the language makes clear to differentiate the ‘enemy’ from ‘friends 
and allies’. The discourses create binaries, targeting an Other that ‘we’ (America, 
friends, allies) need to be shielded from. It also presents the Other or ‘enemy’ in a 
negative light as they are assumed to be plotting and strengthening their military power 
to attack, while presenting America as an innocent victim, only striving to protect and 
defend its ‘freedoms’. No mention is made of any political reasons that may attract 
enemies. The discourse is in defense of America’s ‘right’ to dissuade any rivals from 
emerging to contest their power. Gellman argues that “the NSS reflects a strategic 
worldview ‘substantially similar’ to the Defense Planning Guidance, but “this time, they 
think they can pull it off” (Bhuta 2003: 18). That is perhaps the most important point: 
because of what happened on 9/11, and what was perceived as a new ‘era’, these 
specific discourses validated the policies that were implemented. Again, in a separate 
government publication, the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001, released shortly 
after 9/11, states the same danger of a potential regional power to develop:  
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Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, 
the potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to 
threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests (QDR 2001: 4). 
 
In language that is implicit and vague, the document suggests that ‘the potential exists’ 
for power to develop ways to harm the United States. In reality, the potential always 
exists, hence, it is a potential threat. To use a hypothetical situation as justification not 
only for pre-emption as futuristic ‘evidence’ in the preceding section, but to take it one 
step further and ensure no one is to emerge as a rival to American power, demonstrates 
the language used to justify a specific world view of American power.  The review 
document consistently advocates for the ‘deterrence’ and ‘dissuasion’ of its enemies or 
potential rivals:  
 
DoD [Department of Defense] must always be able to meet its missions. It 
must deploy forces to assure friends and deter potential adversaries; it must 
acquire new capabilities to dissuade potential enemies from challenging U.S. 
interests; and, if necessary, it must defeat foes in combat (QDR 2001: 58). 
 
Emphasis is given to protecting ‘US interests’ and ‘friends’, while ensuring ‘foes’ and 
‘enemies’ and potential ‘adversaries’ do not emerge to challenge the Untied States. 
There are many contrasts, and back-and-forth between enemies and friends, making 
sure the distinction is always made. There is reference to ‘potential’ enemies and 
adversaries, making use of vague language that does not pinpoint an immediate threat, 
but any potential threat or competitor that may emerge.  
 
The events of 9/11 led to a specific use in the NSS that justifies policy to dissuade 
nations from becoming potential competitors or rivals. In the QDR written shortly after 
the attacks, it is again made clear that the United States influences the nature of military 
competitors, and therefore military spending should be kept high to maintain this 
influence. The premise of the argument itself is imperialistic: not only does the United 
States seek to maintain its superpower, but it seeks to dissuade, and eliminate any 
potential rival. By using language that creates binaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the policy 
documents released after 9/11 made a case for imperial policies against the backdrop of 




After the 2001 attacks, the Bush administration presented unilateralism as the only 
option for America, if the UN, specifically, does not respond to its requests. This was 
seen as a reaction to 9/11, and portrayed a view that the world had changed, and ‘new’ 
threats such as global terrorism had emerged, leaving no other option for the United 
States to protect the homeland, diverting another 9/11-style event. In 2003, at the State 
of the Union address Bush states that  
 
The United States will ask the U.N. Security Council to convene on 
February the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq's ongoing defiance of the 
world. Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence 
about Iraqi's legal -- Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide 
those weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups….we will 
consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not 
fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we 
will lead a coalition to disarm him (Bush 2003). 
 
 
In an argumentative style, Bush begins his statement by informing the audience that 
there will be a presentation of ‘evidence’, such as Saddam’s ‘illegal weapons 
programs’, and his attempt to ‘hide’ those weapons from inspectors. He presents these 
as facts that soon the UN Security Council will be briefed about. Further, Bush 
demonizes Saddam Hussein and uses language in his lexical style that again emphasizes 
his negative attributes such as his ‘links to terrorist groups’. Not only is this vague, but 
it implies that he does in fact have such links. He also portrays American unilateral 
actions in a positive light as he says for the safety not only of his own people, but for 
‘the peace of the world’, demonstrating America’s positive attributes once more to 
‘save’ the world. 
Later in 2003, Bush addressed the nation and sends a message to Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein. He maintains that America is left with ‘no choice’ but to lead the invasion 
themselves. At the same address to the nation he asserts that: 
 
Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not 
disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power. Many nations, however, do 
have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to peace, and a broad 
coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world. The 
United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so 
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we will rise to ours (Bush 2003c).  
 
 
Here, Bush argumentatively states the facts about the struggle to disarm Iraq. In this 
case, not only does he demonize Hussein, who he claims is the reason that Iraq will ‘not 
disarm’, but he also makes negative statements about the UN, stating they do not share 
America’s ‘resolve’ to meet the danger posed by Iraq. By stressing negative attributes 
of the UN in this instance, he makes his case that there is no other choice but to go in 
unilaterally and remove Hussein. Not only in matters pertaining to the GWOT or Iraq, 
but in other international realms, Bush lead the United States to a new era of 
unilateralism. Not only did the President not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, he also withdrew 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. This was a significant move towards US 
unilateralism. Bush defended the withdrawal of America by stating that:  
 
I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to 
develop ways to protect our people from future terrorists or rogue state 
missile attacks (Bush 2001l). 
 
He continues his defense by justifying it as it relates to the ‘new’ era after 9/11: 
 
Today, as the events of September 11th made all too clear, the greatest 
threats to both our countries come, not from each other or other big powers 
in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning or rogue states 
who seek weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2001l). 
 
 
We know that the terrorists and some of those who support them seek the 
ability to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via missile. And we 
must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop effective defenses 
against those attacks (Bush 2001l). 
 
Bush uses a variety of rhetorical devices such as hyperboles as he refers to the terrorists 
who will ‘deliver death and destruction to our doorstep’. He also assumes that this will 
be done by missiles, a statement made without any facts presented, which would 
legitimize opting out of the ABM treaty. Further, his exaggerated and emotional 
statements all portray the enemy in a negative light, as one that seeks death and 
destruction; striking without notice, and contrarily portrays his decision to withdraw 
from the treaty as a self-defense measure in light of the 9/11 attacks. He also uses over-
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lexicalization in his constant references to ‘rogue’ states, repeatedly portraying a 
specific image of a dangerous rogue state. President Bush clearly states that America 
will not seek the consensus of the international community or be hindered by treaties 
when it comes to American security. If need be, the United States will act alone, and has 
the right to develop any defenses necessary to defeat terrorism and ‘win’ the War on 
Terror. 
 
In a 2003 speech in Michigan, Bush repeated in similar words his support of 
unilateralism should cooperation with other nation states and the UN fail: 
 
So I call upon the world to come together and insist that this dangerous man 
disarm. But should they choose not to continue to pressure Saddam, and 
should he continue to defy the world, for the sake of our peace, for the sake 
of the security, this country will lead a coalition of other willing nations and 
we will disarm Saddam Hussein…And for the name of peace, we will 
prevail (Bush 2003g). 
 
 
In the above quote, Bush’s lexical style is setting a line between those who are on the 
side of America, and everyone else. In this instance, he makes a distinction by saying 
‘should they choose not to continue to pressure Saddam’, then ‘we’ (i.e. America) will 
use the full force of the military. He also uses negative statements about Saddam such 
as his continual defiance of the world, and that he is a ‘dangerous man’. To the contrary, 
by using contrasts as a rhetorical device, America is portrayed as searching for peace 
and security for itself, and the world. His choice of words make clear the distinctions 
between enemy and friend, and culminates in his argument that if left with no choice, 
unilateral action will be taken to disarm Iraq.  
 
When Bush came into office, unilateralism quickly became one of the signatures 
of his foreign policy. The President did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and additionally 
withdrew the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. His preemptive 
invasion of Iraq was justified by the logic that the United Nations did not live up to its 
responsibility, as Saddam Hussein presented an immediate threat. As a result, America 
declared a preemptive war upon Iraq, which was also deemed an ‘illegal’ war. In the 
process, President Bush legitimizes not only the Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein, but 
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more importantly the United Nations and every nation that doesn’t ‘share’ America’s 
‘resolve’. In turn, the discourses legitimate American unilateralism as a proactive step 
in combating the GWOT, as no one else can be trusted to collaborate in a situation 
where America’s securities or interests are at stake. Talks of unilateralism, legitimized 
by discourses around fears of 9/11 type attacks, took centre stage in Bush’s 
administration, and formed a part of Bush’s ‘doctrine’, and American foreign policy.  
 
6.3 Iraq and the Global War on Terror 
What role does the GWOT play in the legitimacy of American imperialism? 
After 9/11, discourses of fear, Othering, and the changing notions of threat and danger, 
were used to legitimate imperial policies, which were implemented after the GWOT 
was declared. First, because it is a ‘global’ war, it leaves any nation open to attack if it 
is deemed a threat. The GWOT covers state and non-state actions, which in reality 
means that America gave itself the right to attack any nation affiliated with terrorism; 
even if only harbouring terrorists (known by the state or not). Second, the declared War 
on Terror is inherently a perpetual war. ‘Terrorism’ doesn’t belong to any one state, or 
as witnessed on 9/11, to a state at all. It is not possible to attack and defeat terror in any 
conventional sense, and therefore this creates an open-ended script to legitimize 
American military involvement in combat all over the world as part of the ‘GWOT’. 
Third, since the United States took on the role of leading the war, it also made clear that 
if other nations were not on board, including the UN, it would act alone. Finally, the 
GWOT was being used as a tool to promote peace, however contradictory that sounds. 
The main argument was that America must fight terrorism on a global scale in order to 
make the world a more peaceful place. Since America’s role is to protect the peace, in 
this logic, it seemed ‘natural’ that eradicating terrorism would bring about peace.  
 
The invasion of Iraq was an example to the world of what could happen if a 
nation defies the United States; an example to other ‘rogue’ states.  In the newly 
declared Global War on Terror, Iraq served as the first concrete example. The lead up to 
the war is a demonstration of the legitimizing discourses Bush used, mentioned above, 
which include the just war argument, humanitarian arguments, and the job of America 
to protect the peace. It also serves as an example of a mainly unilateral effort (U.S. led, 
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without support of the United Nations at the very least), and the first example of 
preemptive war under President Bush.  
 
After 9/11 and the declaration of the GWOT, Iraq was presented as an urgent 
threat, and the invasion was portrayed as a reaction to the events. References were made 
to the first Iraq war, and Saddam’s continuing defiance of the United States, however 
removing him was suddenly more urgent given the events of 9/11. This final section 
below will explore some of the discourses surrounding perpetual war, the use of 
language that blurred the lines between Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, and 
also the way in which this was used to link Iraq to the 9/11 attacks, legitimizing an 
invasion through the American national security lens.  
 
Perpetual war  
Like the War on Poverty or the War on Drugs declared in the past, the War on 
Terror is a never-ending ‘conflict’. It is not possible to declare war on an ideology and 
‘win’. It is an unrealistic endeavor to either kill an ideology or to prevent everyone who 
chooses to use terror as a means. As Hardt and Negri argue, when Bush announced that 
there would be Global War on Terror, “they emphasized that it would have to extend 
throughout the world and continue for an indefinite period, perhaps decades or even 
generations” (2004:14).  
 
Bush and his cabinet made it a point to emphasize that the war may last for an 
undetermined period of time; ‘decades’ or ‘generations’, leaving the script open for 
future Presidents to pursue, and to maintain a foreign policy suited to perpetual war. In 
theory, as a ‘global war’ on terror can have no end, it must involve the “continuous, 
uninterrupted exercise of power and violence”, and thus leaves the door open to 
imperial policies for years to come (Ibid). In Multitude, Hardt and Negri argue that: 
 
When crisis is no longer limited and specific but becomes a general omni-
crisis, when the state of war and thus the state of exception become 
indefinite or even permanent, as they do today, then contradiction is fully 
expressed and the concept takes on an entirely different character (Hardt and 
Negri 2004: 8). 
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This speaks to the reality of perpetual war. It is a way to continually legitimate imperial 
actions and the use of force against a never-ending threat. Even once the immediate 
threat had passed, the ‘war’ was ongoing. Whenever legitimacy was required for an 
action or policy that was regarded by others as aggressive (i.e. the Patriot Act, the 
invasion of Iraq), reference was always made to the “War on Terror”, and the necessity 
of the action in ‘winning’ the war. Because of the perceived shift in danger and threat, 
war had also changed: it is now endless in order to deal with unknown dispersed 
enemies, who can in reality never be defeated entirely. On this basis, it can be argued 
that a never-ending war against terror was a way to maintain global dominance. 
Defending the homeland was not the sole or central reason to go into Iraq. Just war 
doctrine and fighting terrorism served as distractions. As 9/11 provided an overarching 
legitimacy for action, it served as a reason to implement the American grand strategy of 
global dominance suggested by neoconservatives and American supremacists a decade 
prior. In fact, this point was echoed in the 2002 NSS: 
 
The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain 
duration (The White House 2002: preface). 
 
It emphasizes its unknown length and ‘new’ qualities: 
 
The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our 
history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive 
enemy over an extended period of time (The White House 2002: 5). 
 
In both the National Security Strategy quotes, implicit language is used by making 
reference to vague time frames by stating that the war could be of ‘uncertain duration’, 
and may be fought against ‘an extended period of time’. By using such vague language, 
it leaves opportunity for future wars and military interventions to fall under the umbrella 
of the GWOT. “The constant presence of an enemy [via the GWOT] and the threat of 
disorder are necessary in order to legitimate imperial violence”, write Hardt and Negri 
(2004: 30). The enemy has become abstract, it is unknown and unseen and yet ever 
present, proving it’s most important role: “to prop up legitimation where legitimation 
has declined” (Hardt and Negri 2004: 30). The GWOT essentially legitimizes any 
military intervention for the foreseeable future.  
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The Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001 makes the case for American military 
intervention all over the world, using as its justification the GWOT. As such, being a 
global war, it will by nature, require American forces to be dispersed to every corner of 
the earth for an unknown time: 
 
Unlike the Cold War period, where the key geographic regions of 
competition were well defined, the current period has already imposed 
demands for U.S. military intervention or activity on virtually every 
continent and against a wide variety of adversaries…Instead, the United 
States could be forced to intervene in unexpected crises against opponents 
with a wide range of capabilities (QDR 2001: 5). 
 
Additionally, in the 2002 State of the Union address, Bush claimed that the GWOT has 
an indefinite timeline: 
 
far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning (Bush 2002).  
 
Given the events of 9/11, the language of the QDR is far more direct yet ‘acceptable’ 
than the Defense Planning Guidance reports of the early 1990s that were seen as 
controversial. The discourses presented the changed nature of threat and danger as a 
‘fact’, and allowed for the QDR, in turn, to present the need for military intervention as 
a fact given the consequences of 9/11. The reality is that September the 11th has forever 
become a reference point and legitimizing tool for global domination for the United 
States, brought upon by a GWOT. The document uses vague language that maintains 
US intervention is needed ‘on virtually every continent’, implying a never-ending war. 
The QDR also states that: 
 
The goals of the strategy recognize that the military will continue to 
generate forces to conduct a wide range of missions for the foreseeable 
future (QDR 2001: 67). 
 
In both excerpts of the QDR, vague statements allude to the perpetual nature of the 
GWOT. Speaking in 2004, after the Iraq war had been ‘won’ – a premature statement 
by Bush – he reiterated that the overall war is not yet over: 
 
In this challenging period of our history, Americans fully understand the 
dangers to our country. We remain a nation at risk, directly threatened by an 
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enemy that plots in secret to cause terrible harm and grief. We remain a 
nation at war, fighting for our security, our freedom, and our way of life. 
We also see our advantages clearly. Americans have a history of rising to 
every test; our generation is no exception. We've not forgotten September 
the 11th, 2001. We will not allow our enemies to forget it, either (Bush 
2004).  
 
Several linguistic tools are being deployed. Again, there is vagueness about the enemy 
and what they seek to accomplish- ‘plots in secret to cause terrible harm and grief’. 
Additionally, the political intent is once more removed from the intentions of the enemy 
as Bush says America is ‘fighting for its way of life’, implying the enemy is attacking 
America out of pure ‘evil’ and ‘hate’. This demonizes the enemy and portrays America 
as the victim, legitimizing actions to protect themselves while making reference to the 
9/11 attacks directly. Contrasts are also made between the enemy and America. 
Americans are seen to ‘rise to every test’, whereas the enemy plots in secret to cause 
great harm. The image of the enemy constructs a target in the Global War on Terror, 
and legitimates American action against them. 
 
The importance of perpetual war is that it provides “an open-ended script for the 
Global War on Terror” that was “clearly envisioned” (Elden 2009: 16). Donald 
Rumsfeld had directed his staff to “go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not”, 
having in mind a bigger picture for U.S. policy (Ibid). The GWOT provided a new 
opportunity and justification to promote high spending levels under the pretense that 
America must defend the world from terrorists and maintain world peace by using their 
military power.  The QDR in 2001 replicates this point, and further states that the ‘new’ 
world post 9/11 demands US military to be present in every corner of the world. The 
use of language is deliberate in order to present a world view that promotes and 
legitimizes American imperialism, through its unquestioned power and military 
presence, as a consequence of the 9/11 attacks. The GWOT was presented as a 
perpetual war through the use of language that makes references to vague time frames 
regarding how long it could take to ‘defeat’ terrorism, as well as who the enemy could 
be, and where the terrorists are located. Further, language used to demonize anyone not 
sided ‘with America’, automatically assuming they are with the terrorists, set enemy 
lines making clear that America was on the side of good, whereas anyone opposing 
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them sided with evil. Weldes argues that in cases like this, where there is little or no 
challenge to the legitimacy of discourses that become powerful and seem ‘common 
sense’, those discourses become dominant “and competing representations are easily 
dismissed as at best naïve, and at worst treasonous” (Weldes et al. 1999: 18). Bush’s 
statement, "you're either with us or against us in the fight against terror" (Bush 2001n), 
is a prime example of a simplistic binary that he creates with his choice of language. 
Here, it insinuates that by not siding with America, one is automatically siding with 
terrorists, implying that America has the right to be suspicious of anyone not on their 
side, as the alternative leaves only the terrorists.  
 
The Global War on Terror presented a unique opportunity, as it could be justified 
to go to war anywhere in the world using the same reasoning. As Bush wanted the 
world to believe, the nature of danger and threat had changed, therefore American 
foreign policy too had to change to counter this global threat. The ‘new world’ that 
confronted America so dramatically on 9/11 became the legitimacy behind all future 
military actions. In any scenario where American interests are at stake, and could 
require the engagement of military force, a new crisis does not necessarily have to 
emerge. The GWOT, in itself, is an open-ended script for perpetual war, encompassing 
anything from human rights violations to engaging in terrorist attacks and all that could 
potentially exist in-between. It is an intentionally ambiguous rationale, allowing it to be 
used for a variety of justifications.  As was seen during Bush’s time in office, the 
GWOT was the central justification for the foreign policies he put forward.   
 
6.4 Intentional confusion: Linking Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, 
and 9/11 
 
         After the attacks of 2001, and the inability of the Bush administration to locate 
Osama Bin Laden quickly, mentions of Saddam began circulating, pulling focus 
towards Iraq and away from Bin Laden. At the time, the persistent references to 
unseating Saddam Hussein had circulated, Iraq had not attacked America; in fact Iraq 
never attacked America. It is much harder to persuade the American public to go to war 
for no reason other than protecting American interests abroad, without there being an 
active threat. However, after 9/11, by forcefully and falsely connecting Saddam Hussein 
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to the September 11th attacks, they found public support to finally unseat Hussein. At 
the height of Bush’s popularity, in March 2003, American support for the President was 
at 71%, and the support for a war with Iraq had reached 76%; a large majority (Gallup 
Polls 2004). Dalby argued that,  
 
Once the events of September 11 were interpreted as a ‘global’ war on terror 
then the geopolitical categories from the first Bush administration and the 
PNAC documents shaped the subsequent prosecution of American policy. 
The specific geographies of Al Qaeda and struggles in the Gulf region were 
swept aside by the geographically inappropriate specifications of global 
struggle and the discursive repertoire of global security was awkwardly 
applied to the new circumstances in late 2001 (Dalby 2006: 42). 
 
The above suggests that Saddam Hussein was linked intentionally to Osama Bin Laden 
and 9/11 in order to fulfill a previous agenda set out by neoconservatives, using the 
attacks as a reason to tie it all together. Saddam had nothing to do with 9/11, but unable 
to find Bin Laden, manipulating Americans into believing that Saddam has the 
capabilities to destroy America was the next best bet as America had plans for Iraq long 
before 9/11. Why should Americans be afraid of the small nation of Iraq and its nuclear 
‘capabilities’ versus another larger nation that already has WMD? Weldes argues that it 
is because this ‘insecurity’ is socially constructed. She argues that there is an 
established common sense that is created in discourse, and foregrounds some dangers 
(like Iraq, for example) while omitting others (Weldes et al. 1999: 12). She asserts that 
it is the discursive construct of the meaning of the threat that has been made up, not the 
existence of the weapons themselves, in this example (Weldes et al. 1999: 12). 
 
In all the discourse used by Bush et al, the political motives of Bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda were completely ignored. Bush and his administration constantly stated that Bin 
Laden and Al Qaeda were just “evil doers” who hated America, Americans, democracy, 
and their freedoms. They were reduced to inflicting terror for terror’s sake, removing 
any type of political intention from their acts. Americans needed someone to blame, and 
channel their rage following the attacks towards. Once Bin Laden could not be found, 
they plugged Saddam Hussein and Iraq into the vacant spot, using the Global War on 
Terror as a reason to go urgently after Hussein.  
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Since citizens were already fearful and vulnerable post 9/11, it was the perfect 
time to forge the Iraqi link. President Bush justified the pre-emptive strike against Iraq 
by repeatedly claiming that Saddam Hussein was linked to attacks on the United States, 
that he had not complied with the United Nations about weapons inspections, and still 
possessed numerous weapons of mass destruction that he planned to use, that the U.S. 
attack Iraq (Altheide and Grimes 2005: 618). This is a crucial point and says a lot about 
prior intentions. He stated that Iraq should be “a principal target of the first round in the 
war against terrorism” (Ibid). Iraq was not immediately attacked in large part due to 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s argument that there had to be wide public support of 
such an attack and therefore the invasion was put off, to Rumsfeld’s disappointment, for 
another two years (Ibid). 
 
Elden writes, “the justification for action against Iraq was based on a number of 
conflicting and contentious claims” (2009: 112). Among them were Saddam’s links 
with, or harbouring terrorists, his threat to neighbours (especially Israel), and, of course, 
the main argument that he was pursuing or already had weapons of mass destruction 
(Elden 2009:12). “This was both a confused, and intentionally confusing, rationale,” 
writes Elden, and he is correct (Ibid). All these reasons were distractions, some had 
legitimacy, and some were just made to portray a ‘scarier’ Saddam Hussein, so that the 
public would be behind the administration when it decided to go to war. 
 
An example of this is below, in a speech Bush made in 2003 in Michigan: 
 
The war on terror is not confined strictly to the al Qaeda that we're chasing. 
The war on terror extends beyond just a shadowy terrorist network. The war 
on terror involves Saddam Hussein because of the nature of Saddam 
Hussein, the history of Saddam Hussein and his willingness to terrorize 
himself….Saddam Hussein has terrorized his own people. He's terrorized 
his own neighborhood. He is a danger not only to countries in the region, 
but as I explained last night, because of al Qaeda connections, because of 
his history, he's a danger to the American people. And we've got to deal 
with him. We've got to deal with him before it is too late (Bush 2003g). 
 
 
Demonstrated in the quote above is President Bush’s use of vague language first 
about the war, as it is ‘not confined’ and ‘extends beyond just a shadowy terrorist 
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network’, implying that anywhere and anyone could pose a threat to the US. Second, he 
uses a lot of negative language to characterize Saddam Hussein, some of which does not 
entirely make sense, such as his willingness to ‘terrorize himself’. His over-
lexicalization of the words “terrorist/terrorize” in this quote ensures Hussein is clearly 
understood as a terrorist, with terrorist ties. He also does the same with the word 
‘danger’, using it repeatedly.  He emphasizes the dangers associated with Hussein and 
the risks of not removing him as he has been associated with Al Qaeda.  He also says 
that the United States is needed to make the world a safer place. Once again, he places a 
line between good and evil and by his language portrays America as one who can ‘save’ 
the world from evil. This statement by Bush summarizes many of his ideological 
reasoning for going into Iraq that were brought to light over the course of his campaign 
to invade Iraq: his alleged connections to terrorism/terrorists, human rights abuses, 
inflicting terror on his country, his neighbours, and so on. He is presented as a direct 
danger to his neighbours and the United States. 
 
Following this, Hussein’s human rights violations crept up and were highlighted 
by Bush and his cabinet, and UN resolutions were quickly passed to deal with the newly 
dangerous Iraq. Althaus and Largio argue that “long before the war against Iraq actually 
commenced, and while Osama bin Laden was still on the run, news coverage came to 
focus squarely on Saddam Hussein and the situation in Iraq” (2004: 795). They uncover 
that it was after Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address when Iraq was named part of 
the “Axis of Evil” that focus switched from Bin Laden to Saddam Hussein. In that 
address, Bush stated that, “Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to 
support terror”, and then followed by saying “States like these, and their terrorist allies, 
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush 2002). 
Althaus and Largio also found that in the time between May 2002 and August 2003, 
Bush had publicly mentioned Bin Laden’s name on eight instances, in comparison to 
Saddam Hussein’s name which was mentioned 185 times in the same period [see figure 
2](2004: 796). They additionally found that from about mid-August to September of 
2002, a variety of polls conducted by different organizations found that a majority of 
Americans actually believed that Saddam Hussein was personally responsible for 
9/11[see figure 3](Ibid: 797). Their article concludes that: 
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The shift from Osama to Saddam occurred in media coverage during August 
of 2002, but began four months earlier in the public statements of President 
George Bush. As Osama bin Laden faded in news coverage and all but 
disappeared in President Bush’s public statements, clear efforts were made 
by the Bush administration to replace Osama bin Laden as America’s 
foremost enemy by linking Saddam Hussein to the War on Terror (Ibid: 
799). 
 
Saddam Hussein was not only linked to Bin Laden, but the accusations continued, and 
Bush attempted to link him to the events of 9/11. In 2002, Bush links the urgency to 
confront Iraq directly to the events of 9/11: 
 
Some citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem, why do we 
need to confront it now? And there's a reason. We've experienced the horror 
of September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate America are 
willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our 
enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use 
biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon (Bush 2002c). 
 
Without any evidence of Saddam or an Iraqi involvement to the events of 9/11, Bush 
tries to forge a link to the urgency to disarm Saddam and invade Iraq as a result of the 
9/11 attacks. In his language he implies that a force of evil has attacked Americans, who 
are innocent, out of pure hatred towards America. He is also implicitly arguing that 
enemies are ‘eager’ to use weapons against Americans. In 2002, in a separate speech, 
Bush confronts criticisms about why Iraq, and why now?: 
 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant 
who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. This 
same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has invaded and brutally 
occupied a small neighbor, has struck other nations without warning, and 
holds an unrelenting hostility toward the United States (Bush 2002c). 
 
In the above, the President continues to use negative and strong language to describe 
Saddam, calling him a ‘tyrant’ multiple times and uses an argumentative tone as he lists 
facts about Saddam’s prior offences: ‘invaded and brutally occupied’ his neighbours, 
and has ‘struck without warning’, and his rhetorical emphasis of Hussein’s ‘unrelenting 
hostility toward the United States’, which has the tone of a view that is based on far 
more than ‘evidence’ or ‘facts’. In another example in a similar tone, Bush links Iraq 
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and Al Qaeda together by suggesting their enemy is the same – The United States. He 
additionally expresses the ‘glee’ that Saddam’s regime displayed when America was 
attacked on 9/11: 
 
We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common 
enemy -- the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda 
have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders 
who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq…We've learned that Iraq has trained al 
Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we 
know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully 
celebrated the terrorist attacks on America (Bush 2002c). 
 
The repetitive use of the words ‘we know’ would imply that Bush is referencing a fact. 
He tries to forge a connection by default by suggesting that both Saddam and Al Qaeda 
‘hate’ America. Whether this is true, and for what reasons, are not disclosed. However, 
the tone is argumentative and he puts forward his statements as facts regarding 
Saddam’s search for weapons and the links between those Al Qaeda members who have 
allegedly fled to Iraq. He then makes the statement that Saddam’s regime ‘gleefully’ 
celebrated the attacks. Many nations in the Arab world demonstrated their ‘glee’, as 
Bush terms it, after the attacks, however that alone cannot link Iraq to Al Qaeda or 
become a reason to attack a nation. The President, intentionally, uses emotional 
language that will likely stir anger in Americans, hence the worlds ‘gleefully 
celebrated’, as they will be reminded of their pain and feel strongly toward those who 
find happiness in their loss. Once more, Bush’s statements remove political intent; they 
remove anything beyond an inherent hatred for Americans by the enemy. In 2003 Bush 
stated that,  
 
Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the 
Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal 
weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass 
destruction against Iraq's neighbors and against Iraq's people (Bush 2003c). 
 
President Bush presents the intelligence as fact, referring to not only American 
intelligence, but that found by Other governments that leave ‘no doubt’ about Iraq’s 
WMD. Weldes et al. argue that discourses are sites of social power, especially when 
coming from official sources, such as the state. One of the reasons being for this, as is 
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evident in several of Bush’s speeches, are his references to ‘intelligence’, and such, 
stating what ‘he knows’ as fact. Weldes et al. say that officials often claim access to 
information that is denied by most outsiders (1999:18), but is presented as a fact which 
is nearly impossible to dispute as the general public cannot see the intelligence, most of 
the time. Even after the invasion, when no WMD were found in Iraq, Bush defended his 
position by continuing to link Saddam Hussein to the attacks of 9/11. In a speech 
defending the war he argues that: 
 
Although we have not found stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, we 
were right to go into Iraq. We removed a declared enemy of America, who 
had the capability of producing weapons of mass murder, and could have 
passed that capability to terrorists bent on acquiring them. In the world after 
September the 11th, that was a risk we could not afford to take (Bush 2004). 
 
In a conflicting statement, Bush states that although he admits that no WMD were 
found, but claims to ‘know’ that Saddam had the capability to produce weapons of mass 
murder. This is the ‘nature’ of preemptive war that is based on hypotheticals and threats 
that have not yet fully emerged. Still trying to forge the link between the Iraqi regime 
and either Al Qaeda, Bin Laden or the 9/11 attacks, he reminds his audience of the 
September 2001 to remind them of their anger and to gain ‘acceptance’ by the public 
that his reasons to invade were legitimate, even if only preventative. At a later point in 
2004, Bush answers a question from a reporter about the incorrect intelligence on Iraq, 
and if he still believes it was a justified cause to invade given the lack of WMD found: 
 
Knowing what I know today, we still would have gone on into Iraq. We still 
would have gone to make our country more secure. He had the capability of 
making weapons. He had terrorist ties (Bush 2004a). 
 
The only justification here is that he “had terrorist ties”, a vague and inconclusive 
statement, and that “he was capable of making weapons”. This is also an example of 
over-lexicalization, where Bush on several instances emphasizes Saddam’s ‘capability’ 
to make weapons.  
 
This section provided examples of how President Bush repeatedly discursively 
tied Saddam Hussein and Iraq to Osama Bin Laden and 9/11 in order to justify an 
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invasion of Iraq based on the need to take action in the GWOT. As various authors have 
argued, the intentional act of confusing Saddam and Osama, and presenting ‘evidence’ 
of alleged ties between the government of Iraq and terrorist organizations, were made in 
attempts to justify an invasion that was portrayed as a reaction to 9/11 and the GWOT, 
but were in fact on the agenda decades prior. Bush’s insistence of ‘knowing’ that Iraq 
has WMD, were coupled with his human rights violations to present a case for 
intervention. Iraq also served as a warning to other states; proving America would  and 
can take military action unilaterally, and preemptively to defend itself in the new 
GWOT, should other states not side with America. 
 
Conclusion 
Years before 9/11, a handful of influential neoconservatives had predicted that 
only a catastrophe could bring revolutionary change, and on September 11, 2001, the 
revolution began. It was Osama Bin Laden who attacked America, but unable to find 
him and having interests in Iraq and in the region (more generally), Bush went after 
Saddam Hussein. With carefully chosen language, Bush created a specific discourse 
around the Global War on Terror, and the justification for an invasion of Iraq. By 
linking Saddam Hussein to not only Osama Bin Laden, but to the attacks on 9/11, Bush 
managed to gather public support in believing the war in Iraq would be the most logical 
course of action in the GWOT, and in defending America and the world from terrorism. 
As Iraq was only one part of the War on Terror, it was also a clear example to nations 
who America had interests in, of what could happen if they don’t comply. The GWOT 
left the doors open for intervention by America on a number of grounds: humanitarian 
grounds, harbouring terrorists, being a terrorist state, not cooperating with America on 
intelligence regarding terrorists, and so on. The GWOT encompasses almost anything, 
and is so vague that any number of ideologies and discourses could legitimize an 
intervention, or military conflict. Iraq was the first example of a unilateral and pre-
emptive strike justified on the grounds of fighting the GWOT, and therefore serves as a 
concrete example of the power of discourse in legitimizing action.    
 
This chapter, following the principles of CGP, aimed to highlight the importance 
of language, and how ideas that seem ‘common sense’ are carefully constructed to 
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promote specific worldviews and agendas. The emphasis on binaries in the discourses, 
meant to create distinct but simple categories pitting ‘us’ against ‘them’, can be seen 
throughout the language used  by Bush, but also written into government documents. 
Creating an Other after 9/11, allowed the Bush administration to legitimize a number of 
policies based on ‘new’ threats, and dangerous ‘others’. Bush presented a plan to 
overhaul US foreign policy based on logic based on ‘changed’ nature of danger and 
threat, legitimized by a global war changed the idea of war itself (preemptive, and 
‘global’), and implied a perpetual conflict. The war in Iraq was the first example in the 
GWOT of a preemptive strike, exemplifying the ‘post 9/11 discourses’ in a legitimizing 
role. Themes of American dominance are evident throughout, but with the events of 
9/11, legitimacy for aggressive foreign policies measures were granted by policy 
makers. As Armstrong argues: 
 
The plan is for the United States to rule the world. The overt theme is 
unilateralism, but it is ultimately a story of domination. It calls for the 
United States to maintain its overwhelming military superiority and prevent 
new rivals from rising up to challenge it on the world stage. It calls for 
dominion over friends and enemies alike. It says not that the United States 
must be more powerful, or most powerful, but that it must be absolutely 
powerful (Armstrong as cited in Altheide and Grimes 2005: 624). 
 
This quote demonstrates a summary of ‘American grand strategy’. The implementation 
of a global war without something as catastrophic as 9/11 seemed unimaginable. 
Therefore, the attacks and fear of future attacks provided an overarching legitimacy of 
imperial policies well into the future. In the past, wars such as ‘the war on drugs’ or ‘the 
war on poverty’ were used to create cohesion in society and unite the public together for 
a just cause, while implementing some. However, none of these could legitimize pre-
emptive military action in any corner of the globe. The attacks on American soil by 
‘unknown’ enemies, who have a variety of nationalities and political motives makes 
them nearly impossible to target. The vagueness and ambiguity of the discourses 
surrounding the GWOT make it more acceptable to legitimize further interventions by 
America on the basis of protecting the peace, fighting terrorists, or staging humanitarian 
interventions, for example. The reasons are endless in a ‘war’ defined by vague 
language and open-ended scripts for military intervention. This is the role the GWOT 
plays in America imperialism: an open-ended legitimation of future military action, 
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allowing the United States to reign as sole superpower and promote a world that 
embraces US supremacy.  
 
This chapter is the final piece in the narrative started in Chapter Four, using 
CDA. In Chapter Four, the ideas about American grand strategy, foreign policy, and 
imperialism were evidenced through documents which have their origins in the 1990s. 
By focusing on a  key group of influential players and their writings, it was clear that 
the initiatives seen after 9/11 in the perception of a ‘reaction’ to 9/11, were in fact 
already in the early stages of planning. This is important as it demonstrates their 
existence before 9/11, and a continuity in American imperial policy thought. Chapter 
Five then brought to light the frame of a new world after 9/11, and the changing 
perception of danger and fear. Through the ‘prism’ of 9/11, a narrative was set up that 
created a scenario where new policies were needed to deal with new threats. Hence, the 
foreign policies implemented after 9/11 were understood to be a reaction to the events. 
Once this narrative was in place, and a frame of a new and dangerous world filled with 
global terror was set up, Chapter Six demonstrated how the discourses declaring a 
‘Global War on Terror’ were formulated, and further, how these led to a war in 





























At the outset of this thesis, this research sought to answer the question ‘how did 
the Bush administration use 9/11 as a way to legitimize American imperialism’? It 
answered this question by analyzing the role of discourse and ideology, with the goal of 
understanding how discourses were used to promote a specific worldview. 
 
This thesis took the angle of combining critical geopolitics (CGP) with critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) to provide a unique framework and methodology in 
international relations research that can address the importance of the role of ideas, and 
hence address some of the missing gaps in the literature that has attempted to tackle post 
9/11 power in the United States. To recap, CGP and CDA in conjunction provide 
critical and important ways to identify the role of ideas in the furtherance of power. 
Together they emphasize the importance of language and discourse in producing and 
reproducing power, and in turn how this embodies ideological assumptions. The basis 
of critical discourse analysis is that language is intentional, and hence it is a choice, 
making it a powerful source in shaping our understanding of the world.  The application 
of CDA to CGP research provides a more robust framework and method for analysis, 
especially in the area of language, ideology and power. Previous research in the field of 
CGP has not systematically applied any given method, and hence, it left CGP more 
open to criticism in the way of empirics in research. CGP vehemently argues the 
importance of ideas, but does not present a systematic way to approach this analysis 
empirically. Too often, CGP has been brushed aside by more ‘rigorous’ theoretical 
approaches, especially in the field of international relations. CGP provides an 
alternative, critical framework in the study of international relations, and it has much to 
add as an interdisciplinary approach. However, the lack of methodological rigor in the 
field has downplayed its importance and contribution. One of the key contributions of 
this research has been to bring CGP back into the conversation as a valid theoretical 
approach, supported by CDA in the analysis of political phenomena. This thesis asserts 
that not only has this addressed a gap in the theory/method approach within CGP itself, 
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but also addressed the gap in international relations for an alternative critical 
frameworks, that move toward a more interdisciplinary analysis.  
 
This thesis has used CGP and CDA together to trace the narrative of imperialism 
and American grand strategy from the 1990s through some key documents, and 
compared them to the ‘new’ policy proposals by the Bush administration after 9/11, 
making evident that there exists a continuum. The ways in which imperial ideas and 
policies were naturalized, and made common sense in society were presented through a 
methodological analysis of key text and speeches throughout this research.  
 
The narrative of this thesis began with an exploration of imperialism. Chapter 
Three explored definitions of imperialism; specifically a contrast of imperialism (formal 
and informal), and imperialism’s contrast with hegemony. As international relations 
evolve, so should our definitions. ‘Imperialism’ embodies a different meaning today, 
than the imperialism of past Roman and British empires, which would seek to annex 
territories, and conquer through war. Although formal empires are non-existent today, 
informal imperialism exists, and hence, this thesis has argued that the best way to 
classify American power would be as an informal imperial power. This thesis has also 
argued that American imperialism needs to be understood within the larger historical 
context of their claim to exceptionalism and manifest destiny, which have both shaped 
America’s understanding of itself. This research has traced the ideological roots of 
imperialism to two key concepts: manifest destiny and American exceptionalism. 
Through a historically grounded assessment of the ideological impacts of these concepts, 
a clear pattern of imperial discourse was evidenced. In unpacking these two overarching 
ideological notions, a clearer understanding of American self-identity and foreign policy 
emerged. These narratives have created an overarching identity for America and its role 
in the world, creating ideas that promote the view that America is the ‘only one’ who 
can take on the role as world leader, and further that it is its manifest destiny to do so. 
The discourse surrounding the exceptionalism of America has allowed American power 
to seem legitimate both inside its borders, and within the international system. While 
American governments prefer consensus and legitimacy, when lacking, they have, and 
continue to claim that they will do whatever they find necessary to fulfill their goals. 
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This may come by force or coercion, and therefore, to simply call American power 
hegemonic is not quite fitting. The mixed methods America practices, but its ultimate 
commitment to ‘go it alone’ would make informal imperialism a better suited term.  
 
Once the definition of informal imperialism was made clear, this thesis outlined 
how a CGP lens can be used in the study of imperialism. The three themes that run 
through the analysis are the power of ideas, identity and difference and the critical 
analysis of territory. Combined, these themes look at ways of Othering, the role of 
language, discourse and hegemony, and the ways in which space is given meaning and 
changed according to those in power. CDA provides a methodological tool in which to 
analyze and take apart embedded discourses in depth. Using this framework and 
methodology, Chapter Four to Six of this thesis constituted a narrative ranging from the 
1990s through to George W. Bush’s presidency. It highlighted the ideological roots and 
drive of the Bush foreign policy agenda and its origins in neoconservative and 
American supremacist thought. These three key chapters are a critical discourse analysis 
of speeches and text, tracing the ideology that would make up the Bush foreign policy 
agenda. Although the policies during his presidency were largely attributed to a reaction 
to the 9/11 attacks of 2001, this analysis has clearly shown that in fact the policies were 
a continuum of foreign policy thought.  
 
This thesis has argued that the role of 9/11 was that it presented a unique 
opportunity to implement these policies. Chapter Four begins with a key group of 
influential players, and an analysis of their discourses dating back to the 1990s. Here, it 
becomes evident that a grand strategy of American imperialism was being proposed. 
Their language is analyzed to expose the imperial tendencies and policy suggestions 
similar or identical to what was implemented after 9/11. Chapter Five builds on this and 
details the story told after 9/11, of an image of a ‘new world’ that the Bush 
administration created. A world where the perceptions of the changing nature of danger 
and threat presented by the ‘new’ enemy, required new policies to combat them. During 
the immediate period after 9/11, much of the framing took place for what would set the 
stage for a war in Afghanistan and more importantly the invasion of Iraq. In Chapter Six, 
the discourses surrounding the GWOT and the Iraq invasion are analyzed and it 
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becomes evident how discourses work. By Othering the enemy, and creating simple 
binaries of good and evil, us and them, inside and outside, the Bush administration 
sought legitimacy for its imperial actions. Not only the invasion and war with Iraq, but 
the domestic implications that the ‘new enemy’ posed for civil liberties such as the 
Patriot Act, the PSP, and the intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act. 
 
By systematically implementing CDA within a framework of critical geopolitics, 
this research has also made a contribution to critical scholarship on contemporary 
American imperialism. This thesis has highlighted the link between former foreign 
policy initiatives with the ‘new’ policies post 9/11 to prove that American foreign 
policy after 2001 is but a continuation of earlier initiatives. Further, the link between 
‘old’ and ‘new’ foreign policies are made by examining the ideological basis of these 
policies with a specific focus on the role of language.  Contemporary scholarship in the 
area - and more specifically within IR - often neglects the importance of language and 
ideas when it discusses foreign policy. This research has not only emphasized its 
importance, but also offered a combination of framework and method to provide a 
robust alternative critical approach to scholarship.  The use of critical geopolitics as an 
overarching framework, and more specifically the three themes (the power of ideas, 
identity and difference, and the critical analysis of territory) has presented a concrete 
and empirical way to analyze contemporary American power, by looking at the role of 
ideology as an important and often overlooked dimension for analysis. The benefit of an 
interdisciplinary framework is that it can cross disciplines, hence bringing IR and 
geography together in dialogue to form an alternative approach to research.  
 
7.2 What structural approaches can be learned from CDA and CGP? 
As CGP asks the ‘how’ questions, this research asked how the Bush 
administration tried to legitimize American imperialism after 9/11. It is therefore 
important to understand how those in power construct and perpetuate discourses that 
strive to normalize a certain ideology to benefit themselves.  Critical geopolitics 
provides a framework for those studying international relations to ask these critical 
questions. The intention of such questions is to dig deeper, to the roots of ideology and 
‘common sense’ beliefs and understand how such beliefs become embedded and 
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naturalized. CDA provides a tool for doing so that is not currently used widely in CGP 
or international relations. The combined approach represents a critical way to ask a 
different set of questions that focus on the ideational, and move away from theory 
testing and assumptions, while incorporating overlooked areas such as discourse, the 
meaning of space, and the power of language.   
 
For example, while many theories ask ‘what are the conditions necessary for a 
state to become imperial’, or ‘why do states seek to become powerful’, CGP asks a 
question such as ‘how is imperialism legitimized’. The CGP approach seeks to 
understand how ‘truths’ are created, naturalized into our ideology, and then legitimized. 
Instead of accepting America as an imperial power, or accepting that American power is 
‘needed’ to protect peace, different questions need to be asked that question these 
common sense or taken-for-granted beliefs. The integration of a critical analysis of 
territory and the ways in which space and place are given meaning, and specifically how 
power can rewrite those global spaces and places is something that CGP offers for 
incorporation into international relations. As demonstrated in this thesis, how a certain 
place such as Iraq can become dangerous or rogue, while other spaces such as 
Guantanamo with its prison can be exempt from United States laws is something that a 
great power such as America decides. It is important, therefore, to understand how the 
classifications of these spaces are created, then normalized, and finally accepted. The 
ways in which discourse can shape our political (and in fact, everyday) world is 
something that CGP seeks to uncover, and as this research has demonstrated its unique 
combination with CDA can provide a way to methodologically analyze the effects of 
discourse.  
 
Structurally and methodologically, CDA offers a useful tool to analyze the 
importance of language. Often, sweeping statements are made within literature that state 
‘language matters’ or ‘words are powerful’; but, how? It is not often taken to a level 
beyond that. While other kinds of discourse analysis and linguistic analysis have looked 
specifically into text, CDA looks into power, ideology, and seeks to connect these 
insights within the larger picture. The goal is to understand power, question how it is 
sustained by de-naturalizing the language of power. The incorporation of CDA in a 
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systematic way into a critical geopolitics framework is something that has not yet been 
implemented rigorously. This methodology offers CGP the validity of a robust critical 
alternative to studying international relations. It provides ways to focus on language, by 
picking apart the ideologies behind the words to understand how discourse becomes 
normalized. As demonstrated in Chapters Four to Six, there is much to unpack from 
even the simplest of claims made by the Bush administration. For example, the way in 
which language is used to advocate a certain point of view can be empirically assessed 
by looking at it through framing – a technique in CDA analysis. Or, the ways in which 
metaphors can connect to bigger ideas such as self identity, and bring a nation together 
are able to be identified through CDA. Alternatively, it also looks at how language can 
divide people, by Othering, and the repetition of simple binaries until they become 
accepted and naturalized. Often, metaphors, rhetorical devices and contrasts are heard in 
speech. CDA provides a way to see the intentional use behind these linguistic devices, 
and how the can form peoples opinions, self-identity, and in this case, rationalize 
policies.  Importantly, they are also used to create binaries. The systematic use of CDA 
allows the words used to be picked apart and shows how they fit in with the larger 
ideological picture. A structural approach combining CGP with CDA therefore provides 
a way to assess American imperialism on the level of ideas. Hence, the role of ideas is 
key to this research and key to the framework of CGP and methods of CDA. 
 
7.3 What has critical discourse analysis revealed? 
Returning to the research question of how the Bush administration tried to 
legitimate American imperialism as a consequence of 9/11 would point to a key factor: 
discourses and the role of ideas are key. Not only has the evidence proved that the 
policies were not necessarily a reaction to 9/11, as the early 1990s documents exhibited 
similar if not identical language, but that the discourses and language can be altered to 
the context. The framing in the discourse that took place after 9/11 of a dark, and newly 
dangerous world created a specific plot and the necessity for a ‘hero’. The reasoning 
presented was that since the attacks, America has been confronted by a scary, new, and 
dispersed enemy (global terrorism). Therefore, as the most powerful nation, leader of 
the free world, and the nation that has been directly attacked, there is no choice for the 
United States but to strike back. This discourse was created through various lines of 
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reasoning such as: just war and humanitarian reasons in the invasion of Iraq, an 
unknown enemy that ‘hides in the shadows’, and America as the only responsible and 
powerful nation to deal with this global enemy as their duty, among others. All of these 
discourses: ‘world leader’, ‘unknown enemy’, ‘just war’, were perpetuated through 
speech, and policy documents, and further perpetuated by the media, to create a 
narrative that would allow for the aggressive measured proposed in the 1990s to be 
implemented after 2001.  
 
The three chapters that constitute a critical discourse analysis present several 
important findings. Chapter Four and the documents of the early 1990s uncovered a set 
of important discourses. First, imperialism is essential, and further, that American 
dominance is needed to keep interests and Americans safe. Second, that American 
dominance is actually favoured and ‘better’ for the rest of the world in securing a 
peaceful international environment. Third, that it is America’s duty and role as a 
benevolent hegemon (hence, not asked for, but accepted) to take responsibility and 
fulfill their destiny. In the 1990s, the key frames that American imperial power was 
presented within were the end of the Cold War, making the United States the sole 
superpower, and its ‘unique’ role in the world. The similarities in the documents of the 
1990s and the major PNAC publication in 2000 are striking. Also noteworthy, is the 
merging of the neoconservative and American supremacist views in the think tank 
PNAC just before George W. Bush was elected. Chapter Four revealed the key 
discourses that America should remain the global hegemon, that no other nation should 
be able to rival it, a continuation of consistently high spending on military, the use of 
unilateral actions, and its monopoly on protecting the peace. The conclusions revealed 
that America reserved the right to decide who is dangerous and who is not. Ultimately, 
the combinations of these analyses revealed that the discourse promotes the idea that the 
United States is the only reliable power to make these decisions. 
 
 In Chapter Five, CDA revealed that what is often thought of as ‘common sense’ 
is not just ‘the way things are’. The importance of social construction and the role of 
discourses to naturalize ideologies were once again made evident. CDA demonstrated 
how a new era and a dangerous new enemy was set up within a specific frame. This 
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enemy was said to be plotting the demise of America, with no political intentions, 
driven solely by hate, jealousy, and distaste for the American way of life. This 
construction was important as it especially antagonized the enemy, and reduced them to 
nothing more than a hate filled group of fanatics, making it easy to rally behind 
America to defeat this enemy. Polls showed that the American people approved of 
President Bush’s actions and his handling of the ‘new’ threat. Important characteristics 
of the new enemy such as being dispersed, hidden, and everywhere, were the 
justification of military resources to target and defeat them. Because America cannot 
necessarily pinpoint who, or where the enemy is at any given time, it provided an open 
path for military action for the foreseeable future. This was presented as essential in 
order to make, and keep America safer. There was also an understanding that in order to 
keep Americans safe, they may need to trade some of their civil rights and freedoms for 
the greater good (such as certain types of privacy). Importantly, CDA also revealed that 
what is left out is as important as what is included. For example, the omission of any 
political aims of Al Qaeda, and the focus instead on a script that presented them as 
apolitical, and simply hate filled, ‘evildoers’, presented an image of an irrational Other. 
CDA made it clear how Othering occurred through discourse, and how this was used to 
rally support behind American actions and against the terrorists in such a way that a 
blind support for future military intervention was being crafted. CDA presents us with 
an understanding of the significance of framing through discourse, and how narratives 
can be created that may justify future military action.  
 
 Chapter Six demonstrated that the declaration of a ‘Global War on Terror’ 
launched an abstract mission. There had not been an event that could make such an 
abstract, open-ended justification for military intervention in every corner of the earth 
possible – until September 11, 2001. Once the frame was set up for a new world, the 
discourse shifted from a focus on Osama Bin Laden (after he could not be found) to 
Saddam Hussein and Iraq. As Chapter Four revealed, Iraq was a long-standing issue for 
neoconservatives and American supremacists alike. In the fog of the 9/11 attacks and 
the American anger toward Al Qaeda and Bin Laden, the Bush administration was able 
to tilt discourse toward Iraq and the GWOT, which Chapter Six discussed. This chapter 
had a number of key findings. First, it highlighted how Osama Bin Laden and Saddam 
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Hussein were intentionally confused, and fused into one another through carefully 
planned discourses that would link 9/11, the GWOT, Bin Laden, Saddam and the need 
to protect America from future attacks. In fact, this was accomplished so successfully 
that by the time of the invasion of Iraq, many Americans were using Bin Laden and 
Hussein’s names interchangeably. The just war discourses against Iraq and 
humanitarian reasons, combined with the claim that Hussein was harbouring weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) paved the way for a war in Iraq, with Americans in support 
of the actions of the Bush administration. Also of importance was the vagueness of the 
language, the open-endedness of the GWOT script, and the specific use of emotional 
language to try and legitimize American military actions. The invasion of Iraq was the 
epitome of the Bush Doctrine in practice: unilateralism, pre-emption, and regime 
change. It also signaled an important message to the rest of the world: if your 
administrations disagrees with America, they will use their ‘right’ to preempt danger 
and preemptively attack, proving that they are the sole superpower. The role of the 
GWOT in the grand strategy of American imperialism therefore was an open-ended 
legitimation for future military action that would allow America to maintain its role as 
sole superpower and promote a world that embraces American supremacy. CDA took a 
part some of the key language that perpetuates this ideology, and can be seen as a 
narrative through Chapters Four to Six. 
 
 One of the key findings of this research at a theoretical level is that language 
matters. By looking at key examples, CDA methodologically demonstrated just how 
important language is in constructing our worldview. Throughout the CDA in this thesis, 
attention was paid to specific ‘tools’ of language construction and how they were used 
to construct a specific set of ideologies to legitimate imperialism. What proved to be 
important was firstly, framing. Framing is important because it organizes discourses 
according to certain points of view. Hence, setting up the narrative from the first speech 
after 9/11 that introduced a changed world was key. What was also found to be 
important was what was excluded from the discourse, was just as important as what was 
included. For example, the intentional a politicization of the enemy, by not addressing 
any of their political goals, and reducing them solely to a hate-filled, and irrational 
group, allowed Americans to rally around their government in support of retaliation. 
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This was specifically important as it ensured that America was portrayed as an innocent 
victim against an ‘evil’ Other. Additionally, the general vagueness of the language - 
such as references to unknown time scales, whatever resources ‘necessary’, and the 
constant references to the enemies geographical reach (i.e. ‘everywhere’)  - ensured that 
no amount is too much to destroy the enemy, no land is too far, and no one too 
suspicious for America to take action. At the root of much of this discourse was 
emotional language, filled with rhetorical devices, vivid imagery (ex. ‘mushroom clouds’ 
in American cities), and metaphors to disastrous potential situations. Above all, the 
discourses were largely driven by fear: i.e. what might happen if America does not take 
action. These findings have all brought to light how important language is in 
constructing, and perpetuation ideologies, and further, how they aid in naturalizing 
these ideas into common sense beliefs.  
 
7.4 Concluding remarks and further research  
This thesis has sought to achieve a deeper understanding of power at the 
ideological level, asking how discourses were used to legitimize American imperialism. 
This thesis has argued that a combination of critical geopolitics and critical discourse 
analysis can shed light on the importance of ideas in international relations and further, 
offers a critical and interdisciplinary way to examine their power. This combination of 
framework and method provides a robust form of critical research that has been 
overlooked in the field of CGP, and hence has left CGP with less validity than it 
deserves within the larger field of international relations.  It is a combination that 
presents an alternative critical approach to the study of grand strategy and power. 
Critical discourse analysis is not limited to IR, and neither is CGP. It can act as a way to 
bring disciplines together in looking at issues that already cross academic fields. CGP is 
at the intersection of political science, human geography, and international relations. 
CDA is not a tool for linguists only, and has been broadly used in the past. However, 
combining them together is a complimentary, comprehensive, and critical way to 
conduct critical interdisciplinary research.  
 
 September 11, 2001 caused shockwaves across the world – politically, and 
academically. The importance of its repercussions continues to be in the spotlight as 
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other forms and variations of terrorism surface across the globe.  The discourses we 
hear in the media and from the American administration today provide ample material 
to analyze, compare and contrast on how the role of ideas matter in forming policy. This 
thesis has contributed to the existing literature in its combined approach of CGP and 
CDA within the field of IR. As much as been written about the Bush presidency, and 
the consequences of the 2001 attacks, especially within the field of IR, there has been a 
missing set of questions – which are the ‘how’ questions. This thesis has provided a 
critical analysis of the ways in which discourse and language are important: they form 
perceptions, and become embedded as common sense into our ideology. Not only that, 
but the importance of perception was highlighted by comparing many of the speeches 
and documents post 9/11 and subjecting them to a CDA which was then compared to 
the documents of the 1990s. Research, and books, such as Richard Jackson’s account 
have analyzed 9/11 discourse, but not traced its origins in depth to show the comparison 
of the language. This allows a clear understanding to emerge that focuses on the 
importance of perceptions. 9/11 discourse has been quoted many times, and its 
implications explored by various disciplines. The central importance, however, is its 
continuum by concretely pointing to documents and discourse that existed a decade 
prior that shows the window of opportunity 9/11 presented.  
 
Further research could take a few different paths. As mentioned in Chapter Two, 
CGP has branched out into several ‘sister’ disciplines that are important such as 
feminist geopolitics, popular geopolitics and emotional geopolitics. The incorporation 
of these frameworks or methods into international relations would enrich our 
understanding of how power works on several different levels. Critical discourse 
analysis is also not limited to the elite. This thesis was a project in understanding how 
elites legitimize power, however, CDA can equally be used to analyze other ‘branches’ 
of power. It is not just a methodology for linguists, and its incorporation into 
mainstream IR would benefit the existing debates, and perhaps pave the way for 
alternative ones. Importantly, the incorporation of CDA as a systematic and rigorous 
method for use, especially within the field of critical geopolitics moving forward, would 
give CGP much needed validity within the field of international relations as a robust 
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